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
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AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

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ἸΣΤΟΤΡΙΒΗΣ: AN ADDENDUM

In *AJP* 101 (1980) 42-46, the editors combined notes independently received within a short time of each other from two scholars, G. L. Koniaris and W. B. Tyrrell, under the heading 'An Obscene Word in Aeschylus', i.e. . . . ἰστοτριβής, the ms. reading of line 1443 in the brutally abusive series of descriptions of Cassandra by Clytaemnestra, where most editions of Aeschylus have continued to print Pauw's emendation ἰσοτριβής. Koniaris had based his interpretation on the witticism of a Corinthian hetaira (reported in Strabo 8.6.20), who, when criticised for her lack of application to traditional female domestic duties, answered ἐγὼ μέντοι ἢ τοιαύτη τρεῖς ἤδη καθεῖλον ἰστοῦς ἐν βραχεῖ χρόνῳ τούτῳ¹—punning on ἰστός = beam of a loom and an assumed slang usage = *membrum erectum*. Both conclude that familiarity with the same slang term used by sailors with reference to ἰστός = mast will satisfactorily explain Clytaemnestra's derisive ἰστοτριβής² here.

I am surprised that they appear not to have been aware that precisely this explanation, and with the backing of the same Strabo anecdote, was published by the late D. C. C. Young in

¹ With a number of small additions and transpositions, Crusius, following a suggestion of Meineke (see Bergk, *P.L.G.* ii. p 519), included the word as a couplet from Herodas (fr. 23), and Headlam-Knox attribute it, with brief comment, to the *Συνεργαζόμεναι*. (Not noticed by Douglas Young or the more recent writers).

² For the second element, cf. *πορνότριψ*, *χοιρότριψ*, *double entendres* on *παιδοτριβεῖν* in the *Anthology*, and—particularly apposite here—*μεσοτριβας*, play-title of Blaesus (μέσα, μέζα = μήδεα). Compare also Automedon's *τριβακὸν πάσσαλον* (A.P. 5.129 = 1513-14 G.-P.) with Sud. *ἰστίον σαπρόν*. . . . *τριβακόν* (Ar. *Eq.* 914).

his article 'Gentler Medicines in the *Agamemnon*' in *CQ* n.s. 14 (1964) 15, and was indeed subsequently repudiated contemptuously by J. Diggle in *CR* n.s. 18 (1968) 3, who proposed the new (palaeographically ingenious) emendation *κοιτοτριβής*, although Tyrrell at least acknowledges Young's interpretation³ with reference to his later published translation of the *Oresteia* (1974), in which however he did not refer to his own earlier note.

But the main purpose of this *addendum* is not so much to take sides on the question of whether Aeschylus could be thought to have used so striking an obscenity, unusual in tragedy, as to point out (i) that, even if *ιστός* = mast⁴ is not attested among the multitude of phallic words found in comedy, etc., it *is* so found in its sense of the pole of a plough (agricultural, like nautical, terminology is a fruitful source of sexual imagery⁵), in the oracle ap. Paus. 9.37.4 *ιστοβοῆτι γέροντι νεήν ποτίβαλλε κορώνην*, and (ii) that, although Strabo's witty hetaira is joking primarily from the terminology of the loom and weaving, the *nautical* appropriateness of her expression is not only suggested, as Koniaris says, 'because the anecdote is cited in close connection with *ναύκληροι*', but because *ιστόν καθαιρεῖν* is the standard nautical term for 'unstepping the mast' from Homer onwards (*Od.* 15.496-97 *κάδ δ' ἔλδον ἱστόν/καρπαλίμως*, Polyb. 14.10.11 *καθελόμενος τοὺς ἱστούς καὶ τὰς κεραίᾳς*). Doubtless many a sailor making the proverbial journey to Corinth, having performed the literal activity on reaching port, could look forward to engaging in the metaphorical one in due course.

E. K. BORTHWICK

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³ It may be that several scholars from Casaubon on have had some inkling of a coarse expression, but preferred to be reticent about it. Young, in his *CQ* article, compares *trabs* of Cat. 28.10, etc.

⁴ Note the use of *παραστάται* as supports for the foot of the mast. In the amusing fantasy of Luc. *V.H.* 2.45, to which Tyrrell refers for a phallic mast, one may suspect (cf. schol. ad. loc. *παίζων κάνταῦθα*) that the equivocation continues to *ταῖς χερσὶ τοὺς ποδεῶνας κατέχοντες*: cf. the well-known oracle given to Aegeus (schol. *Med.* 679, etc.) *ἀσκού τὸν προῦχοντα ποδάονα . . . μὴ λύσης*. On the mast-like character of the processional phallus-pole, see Star-
kie's note on Ar. *Ach.* 259.

⁵ Note *νύμφη* = point of the plough share (Procl. ad Hes. *Op.* 425): Hesychius glosses *ιστοβοεύς* ὀρθὸν ἐστὼς ὡσπερ ἱστός.

RHETORIC AND RELEVANCE IN EURIPIDEAN DRAMA*

The highly rhetorical nature of Greek Tragedy in general, and the agonistic character of much Sophoclean and Euripidean Tragedy in particular, have nowadays become so well recognized that most Classicists accept the fact and its implications: this was the convention within which, for whatever reason,¹ the Greek poets composed their tragedies (at least in the latter half of the fifth century) and modern critical judgments as to what is probable and relevant in any given dramatic speech or debate, and what is consistent with the overall characterization of the speaker, must undergo drastic revision when applied to Greek Tragedy. Indeed, now the pendulum has swung the other way. When one reads critics like Dawe on Aeschylus, Tycho Wilamowitz (admittedly a bit ahead of his time) on Sophocles, Zürcher and (more moderately) A. M. Dale on Euripides, one finds so much emphasis on the effects of the individual speech or scene, that it is now the critic who looks too closely for the larger dramatic relevance of various speeches or (God forbid!) some consistent thread of characterization in their speakers, who is under fire.² The present

* An earlier version of this paper was delivered at a "Workshop on Euripidean Tragedy" (supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and by the University of Victoria) held at Victoria, B.C., October 6-8, 1978.

¹ Jacqueline Duchemin (cited by Christopher Collard in his interesting paper, "Formal Debates in Euripidean Drama," *G&R* 22 [1975] 58), claims that this characteristic of Tragedy was inherited from a pastoral tradition of dramatic poetry composed in alternating form. See the supplement to her study, *L'Agon dans la Tragédie Grecque* (Paris 1945) in *Dioniso* 43 (1969) 11ff. I prefer the more general explanation given in Duchemin's original study, 236-38, that the antithetical form sprang from "des tendances les plus profondes de l'esprit grecque et en particulier l'esprit athénien," which Sophocles and especially Euripides developed in their individual ways.

² See R. D. Dawe, "Inconsistency of Plot and Character in Aeschylus," *Proc. of the Cambr. Phil. As.*, no. 189, n.s. 9 (1963) 30; Tycho von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Die dramatische Technik des Sophokles*, *Philologische Untersuchungen* 22 (1917) passim; (Basel 1947); A. M. Dale, *Euripides, Alcestis* (Oxford 1954) xxii-xxix (and articles noted below, nn. 6 and 7). The whole question of "characterization" in Greek Tragedy has been much

paper should not be regarded as an attempt to put the critical clock back, as it were, but rather to find some compromise between the extremely "atomistic" approach just described, which allows only a vague cohesive force to the overall tragic theme, and the more old-fashioned approach of the formal critic, who expects every speech to be uttered with a view to furthering the dramatic action, developing the theme or exhibiting the character of the speaker. Since Euripides is admittedly the most "rhetorical" of the Greek tragic poets and yet also the one providing the most clearly-marked tragic themes and the subtlest psychological effects (in individual scenes if not in overall characterization), his work seems the most suitable in which to pursue the question of "rhetoric and dramatic relevance." To what degree, and in what ways, did Euripides seek to make those set speeches and debates whose immediate effect (both rhetorical and dramatic) is most obvious, contrib-

debated in recent years; the reader is referred to two excellent studies, assessing recent critical trends, by Charles Garton, "Characterization in Greek Tragedy," *JHS* 77 (1957) 247-54 and "The 'Chameleon Trail' in the Criticism of Greek Tragedy," *Studies in Philology* 69 (1972) 389-413. In most of the studies referred to at the beginning of this note and in Garton's review articles, the reaction against the excesses of "psychological" or "individualizing" critics commenting on characterization in Greek Tragedy is very marked; this basically healthy and well-substantiated reaction has been further developed by John Jones, *On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy* (London 1962), e.g., in his attack on the "baneful" concept of "the tragic hero," pp. 16ff., and in various comments by Hugh Lloyd-Jones (see, for example, his comments on "character" in Aeschylus in "The *Supplices* of Aeschylus," *L'Antiquité Classique* 33 [1964] 370-71, and in the Introduction to his translation of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* [Englewood Cliffs, N.J.] 6-7). Two recent articles by P. E. Easterling, "The Presentation of Character in Greek Tragedy," *G&R* 20 (1973) 3-19, and "Character in Sophocles," *G&R* 24 (1977) 121-29, have attempted to select what is valuable in the attacks on the "psychologizing critics" while still insisting on the presence of individualized and credible dramatic personalities in the works of Aeschylus and Sophocles. Finally, John Gould in an excellent article, "Dramatic Character and Human Intelligibility in Greek Tragedy," *Proc. Cambr. Phil. Soc.* 204 (1978) 43-67, seeks to put "the new criticism" on character in Greek Tragedy in a fresh perspective by discussing the various ways in which "the framing process of dramatic language and dramatic form," as used by the three tragedians, affect our perception of dramatic personality in the particular medium in which various "dramatic persons" exist (see *ibid.*, 44). I shall have occasion below to indicate agreements and disagreements with Gould's study where it impinges on certain points to be made in the present paper.

ute to the larger dramatic meanings of the play? Or was the poet and his audience content to take their tragedies scene by scene, even speech by speech, for their own isolated effects, with no more than a general requirement that some large tragic idea ("The King has offended the gods in such and such a way; the King must die!") should suffice to provide a unifying coherence to the tragic action?

Two overlapping issues are raised in considering the question of "rhetoric and relevance" in Tragedy: one concerns the kind of relation which we may expect to find between the content of a given speech or debate and the theme of the play as a whole; the other concerns the degree, if any, to which we may expect a speech to be "in character," to tell us something significant about the speaker, especially if that speaker is a central figure in the play. I shall try to address these issues separately, though they are not, of course, wholly separable. As a sort of Prologue, I should like to consider certain comments of A. M. Dale in her Introduction to Euripides' *Alcestis*. Assailing with some justice the excessive interest of critics in the character and psychology of Admetus in this play, Miss Dale maintains that apart from the King's *οσιότης* (piety) mentioned at v. 10, Euripides had no particular interest in the sort of person Admetus was.

For in a well constructed Euripidean Tragedy, what controls a succession of situations is not a firmly conceived unity of character but the shape of the whole action, and what determines the development and finesse of each situation is . . . the rhetoric of the situation—what Aristotle calls *διάνοια*.³

Miss Dale would replace the question, "What would X, being such a man, be likely to say in such a situation?" with the question, "Suppose a man involved in such a situation, how should he best acquit himself? How gain his point? Move his hearers . . .?"

The aim of rhetoric [Miss Dale continues] is Persuasion, *Πειθώ*, and the poet is, as it were, a kind of *λογογράφος* who promises to do his best for each of his clients in turn as the situations change and succeed one another.

³ A. M. Dale, *Euripides, Alcestis* (Oxford 1954) xxvii. For the following three quotations, see *ibid.*, xxviii.

Now, in venturing to criticize some of the more extreme features of Miss Dale's view on the characterization of Admetus in *Alcestis*, I should make it clear that I think that her interpretation of the play as a whole is, for the most part, sound. The *Alcestis* is more concerned with the irony of the situation, "the irony of human intentions measured against their outcome,"⁴ than with an estimate of, or judgment on, Admetus' character. Its central theme is, as Miss Dale says, "summed up in his [Admetus'] words, *ἄρτι μανθάνω* . . . What Admetus realizes too late is that this life of which he has cheated Destiny is a useless possession."⁵

What does trouble me in Miss Dale's interpretation is the, to my mind, gratuitous removal of *all* interest in the sort of person Admetus is, her doctrinaire refusal to allow anything of what he says, or of what others say about him, to tell us anything about what sort of man he is. In another short essay, "The Creation of Dramatic Characters," Miss Dale warns against allowing attitudes of mind, religious and moral beliefs of other generations and cultures, to influence our impressions of a play's characters: only the dramatist's words and their implications provide real justification for such impressions.⁶ It seems to me that in the *Alcestis*, Euripides does supply us with "words and their implications" which do, in fact convey a somewhat unfavourable, even satirical "characterization" of Admetus, particularly in his own speeches in the *agon* with Pheres, where, according to Miss Dale's account of the poet's role as *λογογράφος* we would least expect to find it. All that I shall be arguing for here is not that such "characterization" is central to some sort of *πάθει/μάθος* theme (such as one might argue in the case of Creon in *Antigone*) but rather that Admetus himself, for a certain blindness or insensitivity which he shows throughout the course of the *present* action, is included in the "dry mock" which Dale has rightly concluded to be the dominant note in the play.

The allegedly naive reaction of modern readers to Admetus, as he mournfully watches Alcestis die in his place and as he berates his father Pheres for allowing Alcestis to sacrifice her-

⁴ Ibid., xxv.

⁵ Ibid., xxii.

⁶ A. M. Dale, "The Creation of Dramatic Characters," *Collected Papers* (Cambridge 1969) 278.

self for him, when Pheres might have done so himself, is to feel that the King is in a somewhat disadvantageous, not to say invidious, position. We are warned by the critics, however, that such a reaction may be *merely* modern and sentimental: it may never even have occurred to a fifth-century Greek in the audience. We find in the play, however, evidence that such a thought could, and in fact did, occur to a fifth-century Greek, namely Euripides, when he allows Pheres (admittedly in a moment of anger) to say, without contradiction, that Admetus will have ill-renewed (*ἀκούσῃ . . . κακά*, 705) for the shame of "having killed his wife" (*ταύτην κατακτάς*, 696), and allows Admetus later (954-60) to fear that this is precisely what his enemies *will* say of him. This is evidence also, by the way, that the poet means us to understand that even in the mythical times and circumstances of the play Admetus could (and so *would*) be viewed in the unfavourable light to which some critics ask us to close our eyes.

Having established that this unfavourable view of Admetus is at least a possible one for a fifth-century Greek and that the playwright does not expect us to regard it as impossible (or even improbable) in the dramatic time and circumstances of the play, one might still argue that the playwright did not wish *us* to think of Admetus in this light: there are all manner of extenuating circumstances and possibly it is only Admetus' enemies who might be expected to take the uncharitable view. If this were the case, then surely the poet must avoid giving the "sympathetic" characters, and *particularly Admetus himself*, any lines which would make us think of the more invidious aspects of his position, that he in fact has caused and accepted his wife's death by letting him die for her. In this case, surely the last words which he should put into the King's mouth during the death scene of Alcestis is the plea, twice repeated, that his wife should not *betray* him (*μὴ προδοῖς*, 250; *μὴ πρόσ (σε) θεῶν τλῆς με προδοῦναι*, 275) by dying.

The purist will reply, "But this is just the sort of thing which the rhetorical-dramatic convention requires of the husband at the moment of his wife's untimely death." Precisely, but it also happens to be the last thing which someone in Admetus' particular position *can* say, with any conviction: Euripides seems to me to be exploiting, for ironic effect at Admetus' expense, the conflict between the conventional and the particular as-

pects of the situation. However, this inference is, I am aware, debatable: it is at best an interpretation, not a dramatic certainty.

Be that as it may, ironic mockery of Admetus is surely developed, with devastating effect, in the speech given to him in the Pheres scene. Even before he knows he is unwelcome, Pheres sets the tone for this effect when he praises his son's union with Alcestis as a model of profitable marriage (627-28). Now let us look at Admetus' tirade against Pheres in some detail, for if, as Miss Dale insists, Euripides like a good logographer is concerned to let the speaker make the best case for himself on each occasion, then surely he has failed badly here: Admetus scores so many points *against* himself.

We may, perhaps, pass over the rather obvious irony of Admetus' initial amazement at Pheres' audacity in mourning one whom he has himself allowed to die, and accept as merely an ironic overtone Admetus' use (v. 646) of the word *ὀθνεΐαν* of Alcestis, the same unusual and ambiguous term as he has earlier used when he sought to "deny" to Heracles that the dead woman in his house was even a member of his own family. But surely the most telling shaft which Admetus lets fly against himself is the one which comes near the end of his speech, when he has formally repudiated his parents (itself a fearful thing for a Greek to do) and all duties toward them:

*My hands will never bury you, since, as far as it
lay in your power, I've perished. But since I live by
chancing on (τυχών) another saviour, I say that I am
that one's son and loving guardian of her old age*
(665-68)

γηροτρόφον ("old-age-tending"; 668) as a description of Admetus *vis-à-vis* Alcestis who, *χάριν αὐτοῦ*, will never reach old age! I find it impossible not to believe that here the poet (far from doing his best for his client Admetus, as Dale would have it) is here indulging in a bitter irony at the speaker's own expense. And if this is the case here, it may well be the case in the less obvious instance cited. Dare one suggest that the insensitive lack of perception which Admetus' unconscious irony reveals, reflects onstage the blindness which he has earlier

shown in choosing survival under conditions which he will find intolerable?⁷

There is, indeed, quite another way (rather less doctrinaire than Miss Dale's) of looking at the rhetorical aspect of Tragedy and of Greek literature generally. J. H. Finley, for example, reminds us that the art of rhetoric implied more than skill in language and argumentation: it implied an ability to understand broad laws of individual and social conduct. "The common ground [between Euripides and Thucydides]" he adds, "is that in both alike the concrete issues at hand are looked on as not, so to speak, interpretable in and through themselves but only through the more universal laws they exemplify."⁸ The same awareness of a certain universalizing quality in Euripidean rhetoric (a quality which suggests interest in larger themes, even while depicting the cut and thrust of furious debate) is present also in Friis Johnsen's comments on Euripides' use of "general reflections" in his speeches. Contrasting this with Sophocles' "reluctance against working in two separate levels of thought," he remarks: "Euripides never seems to have doubted the necessity and desirability of a superstructure of general thought and action."⁹ Now this "generalizing ele-

⁷ Something of the theoretical background of Miss Dale's view of "character" in Greek Tragedy appears in her article, "Character and Thought in Aristotle's *Poetics*," *Collected Papers* (Cambridge 1969) 139-55. Space forbids a detailed critique of this interesting article. The (in my view) excessive restrictions which Miss Dale imposes on the function of "character" in Greek Tragedy, according to Aristotle, spring from a possible misinterpretation of *Poetics* 1450b8 (compare, with her interpretation, Lucas' note ad loc.), from a refusal to allow to *dianoia* in Aristotle's discussion of Greek Tragedy any of the "intellectual" aspect which it has in the *Ethics*, and from a failure to give adequate attention to Aristotle's reminder (at *Poetics* 1449b36ff.) that *ethos* and *dianoia* (which together provide an approximation of the English concept of "character": cf. Dale, 143, 145-46) jointly determine the quality of actions in Tragedy. However, one can agree with her modest claim that the various Aristotelian distinctions which she discusses are "some sort of reflection of actual differences between Greek and more modern tragedy." (ibid., 146). It is mainly in considering the degree of those differences (as exemplified in our discussions of the *Alcestis*) that I venture to differ from Miss Dale.

⁸ J. H. Finley, "Euripides and Thucydides," in *Three Essays on Thucydides* (Cambridge, Mass. 1967) 52.

⁹ Friis Johnsen, *General Reflection in Tragic Rhetoric* (Copenhagen 1959) 174.

ment" in Euripidean rhetoric did not, of course, always find expression in relation to the larger theme of the play (as opposed to the individual scene) but I would suggest that sometimes this was the case. There is a tendency even among critics who, like Lucas and Zürcher, find something approving to say about Euripides' psychological subtlety, or about his concern for the motives of his characters, always to concentrate (with some justice) on individual scenes.¹⁰ So, too, even recent defenders, such as Hans Strohm, of Euripides' dramaturgy in connection with his "rhetoric," have dwelt mainly on his increasing skill in incorporating his "debates" into properly dramatic scenes; Collard develops Strohm's approach, which he cites with approval, though he also speaks in very general terms of the success of agonistic scenes in Euripides as depending in part on "the harmony of their themes with the main direction of the plot . . ."¹¹ However, it is with the subtler, more detailed connections between the "generalizing" rhetorical passages in Euripides and both the themes of their plays and our overall impression of the characters who speak them that we shall be concerned in the rest of this discussion.

John Gould has suggested that one result of this "pervasive intellectualism" (his term for the "generalizing element" noted above) surrounding many Euripidean characters is that these characters "seem not to be grounded in the common sensible feel of life but to move restlessly in the thinner air of uncertain abstraction."¹² This effect he contrasts (unfavorably, in this regard) with "the general shape and feel . . . of concrete reality and of present circumstances" which he finds in the Sophoclean *agon* (the scene at Sophocles' *Electra* 516-609 is his particular example). As far as this comparison with Sophocles is concerned, one must admit the justice of Gould's observation concerning the effect on characterization of the generalizing aspect of speeches in Euripides. I would argue, however, that even some of the most abstract and "philosophic" speeches which Euripides appears to "put in the mouths" of his characters are often more relevant to a

¹⁰ See below, p. 17 and n. 19.

¹¹ See Collard (above, note 1) 66ff. For Strohm's view on the matter (cited by Collard, *ibid.*, pp. 59, 62 and nn. ad loc.), see Hans Strohm, *Euripides, Interpretationen zur dramatischen Form*. Zetemata 15 (Munich 1957) 44-46.

¹² Gould (above, note 2) 53.

fuller understanding of those characters and to their part in the dramatic action than this critic would have us believe. A brief discussion of two scenes from Euripides' *Hippolytus* (which Gould also selects to illustrate *his* points) may serve to substantiate this view and to distinguish it from the Gould's rather different opinion on the matter.

The "philosophical discourse" of Phaedra at *Hippolytus* 373-430 is certainly one of the finest and most interesting speeches, considered in and for itself, in all Euripides. Here indeed the poet has done his duty well as Phaedra's logographer, providing her with a speech admirably suited to her situation. Yet the speech is clearly something more than this. On the one hand, it blends most expertly certain ethical generalizations with their precise application, made by the speaker herself, to Phaedra's own case. This feature saves the speech from appearing, in places, to be merely an exposition of Euripides' own views as some (Bruno Snell, for example) have argued, but this much Miss Dale's "speech-writer" for Phaedra in her immediate situation might well have achieved. On the other hand, however, the speech provides us with certain information about Phaedra which, while it is certainly not characterization for its own sake, will be most relevant to our reactions to two coming events in the play of which neither we nor the speaker are yet aware.

Phaedra begins with a little disquisition on the cause of human disaster (*ἡ διέφθαρται βίος*, 376): first, not ignorance (for many of us *do* have sound moral judgment, *εὖ φρονεῖν*, 378) but the distractions of pleasure prevent man from doing the good they know; then *αἰδώς*, in the *bad sense* of diffidence or indecisiveness¹³ is also the bane of houses (*ἄχθος οἴκων*, 386). From this philosophical basis, Phaedra turns to her own case (388ff.):

¹³ Here I follow Barrett's interpretation of "the bad *αἰδώς*" in his notes to vv. 381-85 and 385-86 in his edition of *Hippolytus* (Oxford 1964), though I must admit to continuing uncertainty about the matter. Barrett's explanation is, at any rate, the most convincing among the several divergent views offered by scholars (see especially his references to other ancient passages on the ambivalence of *αἰδώς*, including Plutarch's explanation [*de virtut. mor.* 448f.] of our *Hippolytus* passage. Barrett's interpretation also has the advantage, which he presses, of fitting in well with Phaedra's own situation: her difficulty in "fighting down her love as she knows she should," whether by suicide (on which she appears to decide later in the speech, but which—fatally, for Hippolytus—she postpones fulfilling), or by any other means.

having failed to overcome her love (for though she "knows what's right" she cannot do it), she will commit suicide and the rest of the speech (403-30) shows clearly that it is the fear of scandal, which is the cause of her decision.

The second half of this demonstration goes from the particular to the general (the reverse of the earlier sequence):

May all men know my deeds, if noble;
If shameful, may few witness them.

(403-4)

From this spring-board, Phaedra embarks on a general condemnation of adultery in noble houses as the source of similar corruption in society in general. The passage ends with a characteristic rhetorical flourish:

How can the false ones on their spouses look
Not fearing the very walls will shriek their guilt!

(405-18)

The peroration (419-30) arises from Phaedra's personal fear, with this significant statement:

This it is that kills me, friends, the fear lest I
be caught shaming my husband and the children whom
I bore!

(419-21)

Again the particular fear is generalized into a fine rhetorical statement about *εὐκλεια* (reputation) and about the horror of family disgrace when at last the dread secret is revealed. As before, a vivid image caps the sequence:

Time, in its passing, shows the evil ones
Like mirrors set before a maiden's face:
'Mid such as these may I be never seen!

(428-30)

As I have suggested, the speech is a model of Euripidean rhetoric in its blend of philosophic generalizations and of their particular applications to the speaker's fears and resolutions. But besides this immediate application, the speech is most relevant to two scenes which are yet to come. When Hippolytus gives his great indictment of Phaedra with all womankind, we judge the extent of his injustice from the evidence of nobility which Phaedra has provided in the present speech,

and since Hippolytus' tirade marks the turning-point in the play, and leads directly to his own undoing, we feel a certain justification (ironic and tragic, however "unfair") about his downfall. Secondly, Phaedra's great emphasis on *εὐκλεία* does more than explain, as Phaedra intends, the Queen's decision to slay herself. Not so much innocence as good *reputation* is all-important: the Queen's *total* commitment to this as a family obligation renders probable, in proper Aristotelian fashion, the extreme measures (suicide and the false incrimination of Hippolytus) which she eventually takes to protect it. Thus I would maintain that here the poet has not only provided Phaedra (as Miss Dale would expect) with a speech admirably suited to her conscious needs in her immediate situation; he has also provided the audience with a passage essential to the understanding of Phaedra (insofar as her character will be relevant to the coming action) and of the tragic meaning of the play.¹⁴

Such defences of the relevance behind the rhetoric of such speeches as Phaedra's are, as I have already indicated, by no means generally accepted to-day. Thus Gould comments as follows on the speech we have just discussed:

I do not think that we make any particular headway in understanding the movement of the scene by looking for Phaedra's 'purposes' in uttering this *epideixis*: when Mr. Barrett says that the disquisition here is by Phaedra and not by Euripides, I have the feeling that the critical cat is out of the bag. A speech such as this presents, in the Euripidean theatre, a facet of the action, arrested and illuminated by rational analysis: the movement of the verse in Phaedra's speech is antithetical and inferential, with scarcely a flicker of the emotional distraction and the rest-

¹⁴ An indication that the dramatist himself regarded at least certain aspects of both Phaedra's and Hippolytus' flights of rhetoric as dramatically relevant is provided by the rhetorical *clausulae* which he has each of the characters aim (indirectly) at the other. "Let someone teach them (women) to be chaste (*σωφρονεῖν*) or let me trample on them forever!" cries Hippolytus (667-68) at the end of his speech castigating Phaedra and all womankind. "In dying," cries Phaedra before her suicide, "I will become a bane to that other one as well . . . he will learn at last to moderate his utterance!" (*σωφρονεῖν μαθήσεται*, 731, an almost untranslatable expression in the context). The degree to which Phaedra and Hippolytus respectively can claim *σωφροσύνη*, and the degree to which each falls short of it, has been amply demonstrated in their two great speeches at 373ff. and 616ff., respectively.

less, defensive evasion which she displayed in the earlier part of the scene.¹⁵

Gould's rejection of any such formulation of "personal motivation" as I have attempted for this speech rests mainly on its rhetorical form and the contrast which its dispassionate rationality provides with the emotional utterances of Phaedra in the preceding scene. I have discussed elsewhere this highly artificial (but extremely effective) Euripidean device (most observable in the *Alcestis*, the *Medea* and the *Hippolytus*) for showing two conflicting aspects of a character's personality in juxtaposition;¹⁶ however, the lack of "realism" involved in this Euripidean exploitation of Greek dramatic convention need not imply that the "rational aspect" of a character thus displayed is any less valid or credible than the emotional aspect. The formal parallel between Phaedra's speech here and Medea's speech to the women of Corinth at *Medea* 214ff. (which also follows an emotional outburst from the same speaker, in that instance off-stage) further arouses Gould's suspicions concerning the "in character" nature of Phaedra's great speech: if we "psychologize" Medea's calm speech, he argues, we must take it as "Machiavellian dissembling," and since such an interpretation does not work in the case of the "parallel" speech of Phaedra, he rejects the "in character," or "psychological" (to use Gould's term) interpretation for both speeches. But surely this conclusion involves a non sequitur: the contexts of the two speeches are quite different. It is not *simply* the "tone of reasonableness" which leads us to the possible suspicions that Medea is "dissembling"; she has an axe to grind in her reasonable persuasion of the Chorus, whereas Phaedra has not; nor does Phaedra, in her reasonable speech, suppress anything which she has revealed in her hysterical outbursts, while Medea does (*viz.* the wish for the death of her children along with their father, at vv. 112-14). Neither Phaedra nor Medea can be expected to be hysterical all the time. All that we are entitled to expect of the formal similarity between the "Phaedra-sequence" in the *Hippolytus* and the "Medea-sequence" in the *Medea* is that the poet is using the same dramatic device for similar purposes: to provide us (in

¹⁵ Gould (above, note 2) 55-56.

¹⁶ D. J. Conacher, "Some Questions of Probability and Relevance in Euripidean Drama," *Maia* 24 (1972) 199-203.

addition to some intrinsically "interesting" philosophizing) with information relevant to the dramatic situation—information, which may (and usually does) include some revelations about the characters themselves, in passionate and in rational mood. There is no reason why *what* is revealed should be similar.

Another highly rhetorical passage in the *Hippolytus* is the *agon* between Hippolytus and Theseus (902-1101) and here, too, in my opinion, Euripides is remarkably successful in relating the immediate rhetorical effects to dramatic meanings of wider significance. I have discussed elsewhere, from this point of view, the preliminary exchanges (902-42) between Hippolytus and Theseus in this scene;¹⁷ here I shall restrict myself to discussion of Hippolytus' speech of self-defence against Theseus' accusations based on Phaedra's lying suicide note naming Hippolytus as her seducer.

The speech is a model of forensic rhetoric, complete with exordium, brief narration of the alleged offence, proofs of innocence, and refutations of anticipated rebuttals (both nicely based on τὰ εἰκότα, "the probabilities" of the situation), and a resounding peroration, ending with a clever and ironically significant play on words in the speaker's favour. But before we conclude that this speech too has been written by Miss Dale's ubiquitous λογογράφος, we should note again the recurrent terms and self-characterizing touches which, like thematic hooks, relate the speech to the tragic characterization of Hippolytus throughout the play. Thus Hippolytus spoils the conventional *captatio benevolentiae* of the exordium with characteristic haughtiness ("unaccustomed as I am to public speaking" acquires the unfortunate addendum, "for only the vulgar can speak before the mob," 988-89). Among the "improbabilities" of his alleged fall from grace is included a tactless reminder of Phaedra's limited charms ("Was she, after all, so beautiful?" 1009-19). Finally, the repeated occurrences of the term σώφρων, in one form or another (995, 1007, 1013, 1034), provide sinister reminders that this "virtue," linked with Hippolytus' σεμνότης, has been played up throughout as the catastrophic element in this tragedy.¹⁸

¹⁷ Ibid., 206-7.

¹⁸ For a contrasting view of the Hippolytus-Theseus *agon* in the *Hippolytus* see Gould (above, note 2) 57-58.

The *Hippolytus* is, to be sure, one of Euripides' best constructed (some would say, "most Sophoclean") plays. A brief glance at his *Electra*, an extremely "rhetorical" play, may indicate the wisdom of lowering one's sails somewhat in one's claims for Euripidean "relevance," or at least of sailing rather more closely to the wind of rhetoric. Here I am thinking particularly of *Electra's* own great "set speeches," her vaunt over the head of the slain Aegisthus (907-56) and her indictment of Clytemnestra at 1060-85, in the one formal *agon* in the play.

Aegisthus is assailed for his adultery, for his ignominy in marriage (as "Clytemnestra's husband" 931) and for his presumption in thinking to be *someone* (τις εἶναι, . . . 939) on the basis of wealth and pretty looks rather than on natural nobility. The speech lends itself well to effective gnomic passages, e.g.,

Money's worth nothing, save for brief companionship.
Not wealth but one's nature (φύσις) is enduring:
for that stands ever by one and defeats one's woes.
Wealth blossoms but a little while, then flies the coop,
Taking its base companions with it.

(940-44)

All this, one might argue, has little to do with either Aegisthus' major crimes or their avenging. Yet the whole drift of *Electra's* assault on Aegisthus is consistent with the sordid frustrations and deprivations (of "substance" and marital status) which are at the heart of *Electra's* woe. So, too, *Electra's* indictment of Clytemnestra (1060-85) dwells mainly on her mother's infidelities, thus allowing the poet to frame her arguments with moralizing maxims on the proper—and the improper—behaviour of wives in wartime:

Any woman who adorns her beauty (ἐς κάλλος ἀσκεῖ) when
her man's away, strike her off as a harlot!

(1072-73)

Evil behaviour provides a model—'gainst which the good
may shine!

(1084-85)

Yet once again, however much these topics are pursued "for their own sake," in flights of fancy rhetoric, the topics themselves are close to *Electra's* own bitter heart and to her own jealous motives in pursuing the mother-murder.

Critics unwilling to accept the possibility of "unitary characterization" in Greek Tragedy (that is, the intentional presentation of an individual consistently illustrating the same or similar characteristics in a variety of situations throughout the play) go to surprising lengths to deny this description to Euripides' presentation of Electra. Zürcher, for example, describes this Electra as "zwar psychologisch, nicht aber charakterologische motiviert."¹⁹ He believes that Electra is provided with certain character traits in accordance with the various situations in which she finds herself throughout the play which do, in effect, add up to a fairly constant *ethos*. This *ethos*, it is alleged, "appears as a natural result of the situation at various points . . ." and participates in shaping the action without governing it.²⁰ Now it is true that Euripides' "characterization" of Electra cannot be said to "govern the action" in any basic sense: the myth of the return of Orestes, his recognition by Electra and the subsequent vengeance on Aegisthus and Clytemnestra, which forms as it were the *ur*-plot of this and other "Electra and Orestes" plays, precedes any conception of Electra on which Euripides may have decided. But for the rest Zürcher's formulation seems perversely to put the matter the wrong way around. Euripides, with a clear conception from the start of the kind of Electra which he wished to present, surely devised scenes and their "occasion" (witness the novel introduction of Electra's vaunt over the slain Aegisthus) which would best illustrate the character (in an admittedly restricted sense) and motivation of Electra throughout. What is of particular interest for our study here is that he effected this largely through the most rhetorical parts of the play: Electra's "set-speeches," including that of the *agon*, which still produce, along with this "character-deployment," their usual Euripidean quota, and more, of "everyday topics" not normally associated with this heroic theme.

So much must suffice, within the limits of the present paper, concerning the "characterizing" aspects of rhetorical passages in Euripides, though similar demonstrations could, I think, be

¹⁹ W. Zürcher, *Die Darstellung des Menschen im Drama des Euripides* (Basle 1947) 131. (I am indebted to Charles Garton's article, "The 'Chameleon Trail' etc." [above, note 2] 403 and 408, for this and the following citation of Zürcher).

²⁰ Zürcher, (above, note 19) 134.

attempted with respect to certain other Euripidean plays, most notably, perhaps the *Medea*. Let us turn now to the examination of a few Euripidean "agon-scenes" whose relevance to the theme and action of the play has been particularly questioned by the critics.

Jacqueline Duchemin, in her useful book, *L'Agon dans la Tragédie Grecque*, remarks on the tendency of Euripidean *agones* to show increasingly less connection with the theme and action of their respective plays.²¹ This is, on the whole, true—and certainly true of Euripides in contrast with Sophocles; nevertheless, Duchemin does seem to me often to underestimate what connection there actually is. Thus in the case of the *Helen's agon* (one of the few which, *pace* Hans Strohm,²² actually do affect the action of their plays), Duchemin wrongly attributes the success of Helen's and Menelaus' plea to Theonoe not to their arguments but to the fact that Theonoe had from the beginning decided not to betray the pair to the Egyptian King:²³ a strange conclusion in view of Theonoe's line, in her opening speech, "Who, then will go and reveal this man's presence to my brother, so that *my* safety may be secured?" (892-93).²⁴ Duchemin also finds it "extraordinary" that in this *agon* the two antithetical speeches (by Helen and

²¹ Jacqueline Duchemin, *L'Agon dans la Tragédie Grecque* (above, note 1) 124ff.

²² Cf. Strohm (above, note 11) chap. 1, *passim*, esp. pp. 37-38, who argues for the unproductive nature of the Euripidean *agon*. Another possible exception is the first *agon* in Euripides' *Suppliques* (110-262), which has at least the "negative result" of deciding Theseus (at this point in the play) against accepting the Argive supplication.

²³ Duchemin, *L'Agon* (above, note 1) 128.

²⁴ The authenticity of these verses (*Hel.* 892-93) as they stand, has, it is true, been questioned by several scholars, e.g., Wilamowitz, (who regards the verses as an interpolation); Zuntz (who argues for a sizeable *lacuna* after v. 891); see Dale's note *ad loc.*, in her edition of the play (Oxford 1967). I accept Dale's defence of both these verses as they stand and her rejection of any *lacuna* here: the verses are faultless in themselves, intelligible as they stand (even if they do not fit some scholars' views of what Theonoe might be expected to say at this point) and could be addressed to one of the Chorus. Kannicht in his edition of the play (Heidelberg 1969) obelizes v. 892; in his note he develops Zuntz's argument for a *lacuna* but adds no compelling arguments of his own. However, even if Zuntz's strenuous argument (*Fondation Hardt, Entretiens* VI, 1958, 206ff.) for a *lacuna* after v. 891 be sound, my point, above, about the importance of Helen's and Menelaus' pleas to Theonoe is in

Menelaus) defend the same case in perfect agreement²⁵ but had she pursued the matter further she might have noticed that it is actually the contrasts between these speeches which provide one of the organic links with the rest of the play. While this is not a play involving "tragic characterization" in any depth, nevertheless we have already been given clear if superficial impressions of both pleaders in the *agon*: Helen as a melancholy and reflective beauty (contrasting ironically with other "Helens" of Euripides), pondering the causes, whether natural or supernatural, of her underserved reputation; Menelaus, a man of action, presented in possibly mock-heroic manner, whose brain-cudgelling over the problem of "the two Helens" suggests a certain lack of philosophic subtlety. Their two pleas reflect nicely these contrasting personalities, Helen's plea being a complex blend of the ethical and the theological ("How shameful if you, a priestess, should know all *divine* matters . . . and yet not know what is just!" 922-23); Menelaus', a blunt (if slightly confused) soldier's appeal for his rights . . . and a promise of bloodshed all around if he doesn't get them. There is, moreover, another (this time ironic) connection between the content of this *agon* and the subsequent action. Helen argues, successfully, that Theonoe should not perform base and unjust favours (*χάριτας πονηράς*, 902) for her brother Theoclymenos by delivering to him what is not rightly his (namely, herself, Helen); in the sequel, it is Helen who will exploit "base *χάρις*," when she secures Theoclymenos' aid in the feigned "sea-burial" of Menelaus, with the false promise, *χάρις* . . . *ἀντὶ χάριτος* (1234), of what is not, and never will be his (namely herself, Helen). These connections are, perhaps, superficial, and suited to the somewhat improbable action of the *Helen*; nevertheless, they indicate the playwright's awareness, as he composes his rhetorical *agon*, of what is going on in the rest of the play.

Let us consider next three agonistic passages in Euripides'

no way invalidated: Zuntz believes that, in the (incompletely transcribed) conclusion of Theonoe's speech here, she is simply expressing the danger to herself of failing to reveal Menelaus' presence to her brother. Zuntz concludes: "Helen's and Menelaus' appeal are felt by no means to be a mere rhetorical exercise when it is realized that success is anything but a foregone conclusion." (ibid., 210).

²⁵ Duchemin, *L'Agon*, 128, n. 4; cf. also pp. 75, 118.

Hecuba, each of which makes its separate rhetorical impact in its immediate context. In the first, Hecuba pleads with Odysseus for the life of her daughter, doomed to be sacrificed to the shade of Achilles; in the second, Hecuba pleads with her victorious enemy, Agamemnon, for aid in vengeance on Polymestor, the Thracian King who has treacherously slain her son, Polydorus; in the third, Hecuba defends herself before Agamemnon against Polydorus' indictment of her for the slaughter of his children. Can we find, in addition to the separate effects of these scenes, any connections between them which relate to the larger theme of the play?²⁶

In the first scene, Hecuba is seeking a favour from Odysseus, namely that he should save the life of her daughter in return for a favour she once did him in saving *his* life, when he might have been captured by the Trojans. (The Greek concept of *charis*, "favour," traditionally contained this reciprocal element). Hecuba concludes her plea with a significant *sententia* on "persuasion." Odysseus' *stature* among the Greeks (she tells him) will persuade them, *even if he speaks badly*:

For the same argument coming from men of repute and from men of *no* repute has very different weight.

(294-95)

Odysseus rejects Hecuba's plea based on *charis*, stating that the personal favour which he owes to her is outweighed by the *political* favour which is owed to Achilles, for the latter carries implications for other warriors who may be asked to die for their country. *Greeks*, Odysseus reminds her scornfully, understand this principle of honouring their heroic dead, and so prosper; barbarians do neither.

As the play progresses, the suffering Queen is crushed not only by the sacrifice of Polyxena but by the further blow of Polydorus' murder. Hecuba's earlier appeal to Odysseus was based on *just* claims of favour for favour; now, in her desperation, she resorts to an ignoble use of the *charis*-argument: she begs her victorious enemy Agamemnon for aid in avenging Polydorus in return for erotic favours from her daughter Cas-

²⁶ Only the first and third of these passages is, properly speaking, in the form of an *agon*. For the limited dramatic relevance which Duchemin finds in them, see *ibid.*, 128-30.

sandra (vv. 826-30). This time, Hecuba's gnomic utterance on Persuasion (*Peitho*) occurs in the middle of her speech and is now adapted to the base use to which she is about to put the art of rhetoric:

Why do we mortals labour at all other arts. . . .
and yet spend neither sweat nor gold to learn Persuasion,
man's only mistress, by which we might achieve whatever we
might wish . . . ?

(814-19)

(A *cri de coeur* reminding us of the base descriptions of rhetoric urged by certain sophistic opponents of "Socrates" in Plato's *Gorgias*.)²⁷

In the last of our three scenes from the *Hecuba*, the Queen's pronouncement on Rhetoric comes at the *beginning* of her defence before Agamemnon in the *agon* between her and her victim Polymestor. It is now her enemy Polymestor who has had recourse to the *charis*-argument: he now claims vengeance on Hecuba for murdering *his* children in return for his favour to Agamemnon for murdering the young Trojan prince. Once again, the changed circumstances produce a significant difference in Hecuba's view of the art of Persuasion:

Never (she cries) should words have greater power than deeds!
Only if men do good should they have power of speech!

(1187-89)

Polymestor's "favour-for-favour" claim on Agamemnon, Hecuba neatly rebuts by taking a leaf out of the *Odysseus*' book. *Odysseus* has scornfully shown her the gulf between Greeks and barbarians when she has pressed her claims of gratitude on him:

Base one! [she now cries to Polymestor] How could your
barbarian race be friend to Greeks? What favour urge on them?

(1199ff.)

Hecuba has learned her lesson well.

In these three passage, Euripides rings the changes on sev-

²⁷ E.g., by "Polus," at Plato, *Gorgias*, 466aff.

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eral well-worn rhetorical ploys concerning *charis* (favour) and the art of rhetoric itself. In so doing, he shows us also how men's values, like their use of rhetoric, change tragically with the vicissitudes of fortune and this, I would maintain, is an essential element in the tragedy of Queen Hecuba, as it is presented in this play.

In a section entitled "*L'agon hors d'oeuvre*,"²⁸ Duchemin describes the adaptation of the *agon* by Euripides to a new use: that of presenting his own ideas, on topics of contemporary interest, in debates of a sophistic type between two people defending opposed points of view. At the extreme end of this development, Duchemin places the debate on "Democracy versus Tyranny" in Euripides' *Suppliques*. In between, she places such scenes as that between Ion and his newly found "father" Xouthos (*Ion* 517-65), in which Ion unsuccessfully urges various reasons why he should remain as a temple-boy at Delphi instead of assuming his position as a young prince at Athens. Here she finds that, though the subject of the debate does arise from the action, the theoretical discussion has only a "quite intellectual" link with the situation of personages involved. Now it is quite true that in Ion's long speech (584-647) the speaker develops several set and "detachable" topics, some of them favoured elsewhere by Euripides and other tragic poets: such are "the unpopularity of foreigners at 'autochthonous' Athens" (589-94; cf. *Medea* 222ff., 252ff.); the hard lot of ambitious young men in a keenly competitive state (596-606); the fear-ridden life of the *τύραννος* versus the peaceful life of the private citizen (621ff.; cf. *Hipp.* 1016-20; Sophocles, *O.T.* 584-99; Shakespeare, *Henry V*, Act IV, Sc. I). But Duchemin fails to point out the very real links which this speech does contain with the thematic material of the play, including Ion's own ambiguous situation and his own characteristic reactions to it, both here and elsewhere in the action. The myth of Athens' autochthonous origins has already received considerable attention (265-93) and it is to form the basis of the Chorus' and the old Tutor's encouragement of Creousa to murder the young interloper. Secondly, in the midst of his "political" worries about moving to Athens, Ion expresses a touching concern for the childless Queen

²⁸ Ibid., 132-35.

Creousa's feelings which his presence at Athens as the King's son might evoke. This surely reaffirms the instinctive sympathy between Ion and his unknown mother, Creousa, which has been such a prominent feature of their first encounter (see 237-369, *passim*) and which is to add a piquant irony to the two murder plots (mother versus son and son versus mother) and their happy *denouement* later on. Once again, it would appear that Euripides has done much to atone for the rhetorical excursions which he does make in this agonistic speech.

Let us turn to a "political" play of Euripides, his *Supplikes*, where the agonistic passages have been singled out as lacking both dramatic relevance and any concern for "character" in the utterances of the principle *persona*, Theseus. The first *agon* of the play occurs (87-262) between Theseus and Adrastus as they debate the issue of Adrastus' supplication: namely, whether Athens should force Thebes to return the bodies of the Argive heroes slain in battle. Illustrating his view of the "inherent contradiction between the *agon*-form and natural drama," Collard comments (in his recent edition of the play): "When the debaters argue 'politics,' they rationalize Adrastus' defeat and Theseus' rejection of the suppliants according to attitudes and premises which rely less on the tragic world of myth than on contemporary Greece or Athens: their immediacy develops naturally from the *agon*-form's essential independence."²⁹ Of Theseus in this context, Collard remarks: "His words are informed by the needs of the *agon*, what A. M. Dale well described in the general context of Tragic character-drawing as 'the trend of the action and the rhetoric of the situation.' It matters less in *Supplikes* that we need to balance attitudinizing in an *agon* against a whole portrait, because Theseus is important not as an individual, a 'character' with feelings, faults or destiny, but as a symbol, a representative, a catalyst of the action."³⁰

Now we may readily grant that neither the character nor the destiny of Theseus is the central concern of this tragedy. Nevertheless, Theseus is more than a symbol through whom the appropriate rhetoric is piped. Both major decisions in this

²⁹ Christopher Collard, *Euripides Supplikes*, edited with introduction and commentary (Gröningen 1975) vol. 1, p. 28.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 30.

play are made by Theseus, decisions which involve "choice" and so (as Aristotle would tell us) "character."³¹ Paradoxically, *both* Theseus' decisions, first to reject, then to accept Adrastus' supplication turn on his attitude to the gods and on the "world view" which this entails, though it takes his mother's advice to open his eyes to the true issue. Ironically, the major expression of this "world view" (which is maintained consistently throughout the play) is to be found in a passage which is most in danger of being mistaken for a mere rhetorical *excursus* on a contemporary theme. Theseus begins his formal rejection of Adrastus' plea with a little disquisition (vv. 195-213) on man's social evolution. Theseus praises "whichever of the gods" it was who first separated man from his bestial existence by giving him intelligence whence he acquired successive arts and may successfully conduct his life. Significantly, Theseus' list of the arts ends with the divine art of augury which Adrastus neglected when he ignored the warnings of his prophet and joined bad allies in an unjust war. Thus it is Adrastus' infringement of the rules of "the well-ordered universe" in which Theseus believes which results in the initial rejection of the Argive supplicants, but when Aithra opens her son's eyes to the greater wrongs now being done the suppliants, he goes to war with the Thebans in defence of that same "well-ordered universe." This is the point of his repeated claims to the Theban Herald later that he is championing the ancient law of the gods (*νόμος παλαιὸς δαιμόνων*, 563) and the international law of all the Greeks (*Πάνελλήνων νόμος*, 671) in insisting, by force if necessary, that the Thebans allow burial of the enemy dead.

This is perhaps about as much as we can claim, in the way of "dramatic relevance" and "in-character opinions" for Theseus' speech to Adrastus and his debate with the Theban Herald. Those parts of the former speech which deal with ambitious war-mongering "hawks," who plague the state (232-37) and which describe and evaluate the three orders of society" (238-45) are, of course, nothing more than political *topoi* based on contemporary circumstances which have "nothing (or at any rate very little) to do with the case." The same is true of the celebrated debate, "Tyranny versus Democracy," which

³¹ Cf. Aristotle, *Poetics* 1450b8-9; cf. 1449b36-50a2.

forms the main substance of the second *agon*, that between the Herald and Theseus. This passage, which reads almost like a set piece from a rhetorician's school, has only the most general kind of connection with the dramatic situation (e.g. the contrast between "good" democratic Athens and "bad" despotic Thebes), and contains various rhetorical criticisms and defences of each constitution which are quite irrelevant to it.

I have purposely concluded this discussion of Euripidean rhetoric with mention of a passage which is least amenable to the kinds of defence, in terms of dramatic relevance and appropriateness, which I have urged in other, more debatable examples. I am not concerned in this paper with any special pleading for Euripides; indeed, I am sure that readers of the dramatist will think of various other passages, and not all of them from the so-called "political plays," which could be assailed almost as effectively, on this score, as the "Theban Herald debate" in *The Suppliants*. All I have sought to establish is that, generally speaking, Euripidean rhetoric is not as dramatically inorganic as many scholars have argued, and that many passages which have been assessed simply as set pieces of sophistic debate also contain much that is relevant to the major themes and even to significant revelations of character (in relation to the dramatic action) in the plays to which they belong.

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NEW FRAGMENTS FROM IAMBLICHUS' COLLECTION OF PYTHAGOREAN DOCTRINES*

In 1892 Paul Tannery published the text of a short work by the Byzantine polymath Michael Psellos entitled *Περὶ ἀριθμῶν* which he found in El Escorial MS Y-III-12, fol. 71^v-72^r.¹ The *Περὶ ἀριθμῶν* (henceforth *De num.*) deals with the importance of number in relation to the objects of physics, ethics (very briefly) and theology. The theological portion begins with a quotation which Psellos claims to draw from a work by Iamblichus:

Ἰάμβλιχος δὲ ὁ φιλόσοφος τῶν κρείττωνων φύσεων ἀριθμητικὴν ἔγραψεν, οὔτε μαθηματικῶς ἐν ταύταις ἀριθμοῦς μεταχειριζόμενος, οὔτε ἀναλογίαις ἀπεικάζων τὰ κρείττονα γένη, οὔτε ὑποστατικούς τιθέμενος ἀριθμοῦς ταῦτα, οὔτε αὐτοκινήτους οὔτε νοεραὺς οὔτε οὐσιώδεις, ἀλλὰ φησιν ὅτι, ὥσπερ τὸ τῶν κρείττωνων γένος ἐξήρηται πάσης οὐσίας, οὕτως καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς αὐτῶν ἀπόλυτός ἐστι καθ' ἑαυτόν² . . .

Tannery suggested that since this text is not to be found in Iamblichus' extant works, it probably comes from the lost seventh book of Iamblichus' *Collection of Pythagorean Doctrines* which we know to have dealt with number in relation to theology. Indeed Tannery proposed that the earlier parts of the *De num.*, those touching on number in relation to physics and ethics, were based to some degree on the lost fifth and sixth books of the *Coll. Pyth.* which covered the same subjects.³

Certainly, if Psellos is to be trusted, the quotation from Iamblichus can plausibly be assigned on the grounds of its subject matter to Book 7 of the *Coll. Pyth.* and, if so, a case could also be made for some use of Books 5 and 6 in the earlier

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¹ P. Tannery, "Psellus sur les nombres," *REG* V (1892) 343-47, reprinted in his *Mémoires scientifiques* IV (Toulouse-Paris 1920) 269-74; references will be to the pagination of this article in *REG*.

² Tannery, art. cit., 346, 11.21-26.

³ Tannery, art. cit., 343-44; cf. *infra* p. 30. On the title of the *Coll. Pyth.* cf. B. D. Larsen, *Jamblique de Chalcis* (Aarhus 1972) I, 44.

parts of the *De num.* However, despite the importance to the study of Greek philosophy of what still survives of Iamblichus' *Coll. Pyth.* (namely the first four books: *De vita Pythagorica*, *Protrepticus*, *De communi mathematica scientia*, *In Nicomachi Arithmeticam introductionem*)⁴ no attempt has been made to verify Tannery's suggestions,⁵ or to discuss their implications. In the almost ninety years since he published it, his work, if noticed at all, is mentioned only to be quickly passed over.⁶

The key both to confirming Tannery's suggestions and also to increasing greatly the amount of material from the *Coll. Pyth.* preserved by Psellos can be found in another Escorial MS, Φ -III-1, to which Tannery referred but which he did not have sufficient time adequately to compare to the text which he had transcribed from Y-III-12. He believed that Φ -III-1 contained merely the *De num.* divided into two pieces which were given separate titles, namely *Περὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ* (henceforth *De phys. num.*) and *Περὶ τῆς ἡθικῆς ἀριθμητικῆς καὶ τῆς θεολογικῆς* (*De eth. theol. arith.*).⁷ Had Tannery had

⁴ On the question of the authorship of the anonymous *Theologumena arithmeticae* (which has been taken by some to be the seventh book of the *Coll. Pyth.*) see now J. M. Dillon, *Iamblichi Chalcidensis in Platonis dialogos commentariorum fragmenta* (Leiden 1973) 20-21.

⁵ Quotations attributed to Iamblichus are sometimes suspect: see my articles "The Philosophical Writings, Sources and Thought of Athanasius Rhetor (ca. 1571-1663)," *Proc. Amer. Philos. Soc.* 121 (1977) 496; "*Sententiae* Attributed to Iamblichus in Byzantine Florilegia," *Byzant. Zeit.* 73 (1980) 323f. Even if the quotation in Psellos is not spurious, it is possible that it may derive, not from Iamblichus, but from a report for example in Proclus; cf. L. G. Westerink, "Exzerpte aus Proklos' Enneadenkommentar bei Psellos," *Byzant. Zeit.* 52 (1959) 7 on quotations from Plotinus taken by Psellos from Proclus' lost commentary on Plotinus. (Westerink also notes, 10, that Psellos can quote directly from the *Enneads*; cf. *infra* n. 18.)

⁶ Cf. Larsen, *op. cit.*, I, 63; Tannery's article is not mentioned, for example, by Mau, art. "Iamblichos," *RE* IX, 645f.; Dillon, *op. cit.*; *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* ed. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge 1967).

⁷ Tannery, *art. cit.*, 343. The two works in question are in fact part of an important collection of Psellos' writings which is found not only in Escor. Φ -III-1 but also in Escor. Y-I-9, Marc. Gr. 524, Ambros. M 84, Monac. gr. 98 and 435, Vat. Barber. gr. 170. The relations between these MSS will be set forth in the edition of Psellos' *Tractatus philosophici* which I am at present preparing in collaboration with J. M. Duffy. It will suffice here to note that Marc. gr. 524 is a 14th century MS and that the other MSS are all Renaissance

more time, he would have noticed that these two works, far from being no more than the *De num.* divided in two, are in fact, if taken together, about twice as long as the *De num.* Much (but not all) of the *De phys. num.* is represented by the first half of the *De num.* However the second half of the *De num.* contains only a small part of what is to be found in the *De eth. theol. arith.* It is the material contained in the *De phys. num.* and in the *De eth. theol. arith.* but not in the *De num.* which enables us to confirm beyond any doubt Tannery's suggestions about Psellos' sources in the *De num.*

Before discussing this new evidence, it is necessary to examine in more detail the relation between the *De num.*, on the one hand, and the *De phys. num.* and *De eth. theol. arith.* on the other: are the latter two works merely an expanded version of the *De num.* or are they, on the contrary, the basis on which the *De num.* was composed? Comparison between corresponding passages of the *De num.* and of the *De phys. num.* and *De eth. theol. arith.* shows that the *De num.* is in fact a condensed version of the other two works. The following examples might be given.

De eth. theol. arith. (11.17-19)⁸

ἔστι γὰρ νοῦς μὲν τὸ ἐν ὧς ἐνοειδής· ἐπιστήμη δὲ τὰ δύο, διότι μετ' αἰτίας γινώσκει· ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου ἀριθμός, δόξα· ὁ δὲ τοῦ στερεοῦ, αἴσθησις, διότι τῶν στερεῶν σωμάτων αὕτη ἀντιλαμβάνεται.

De num. (p. 346, 18-20)

ἔστι γὰρ νοῦς μὲν τὸ ἐν· ἐπιστήμη καὶ διάνοια, δυνάς, ὅτι μετ' αἰτίας· ὁ γὰρ νοῦς ὑπὲρ αἰτίας οἶδεν· ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου ἀριθμός, δόξα· ὁ δὲ τοῦ στερεοῦ, αἴσθησις· διὰ στερεῶν σωμάτων αὕτη ἀντίληψις.

The passage from the *De eth. theol. arith.* is in fact an excerpt (with some glossing) from Aristotle's *De anima* (A 2, 404b22-24). The corresponding passage in the *De num.* gives a some-

copies directly or indirectly dependent on it. Psellos composed a Christian sequel to the *De phys. num.* and *De eth. theol. arith.*, entitled *Περὶ τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς θείων ἀριθμῶν*, which follows them in the above MSS (with the exception of Marc. gr. 524, cf. infra n. 8) and which is also found in Paris. gr. 1182, ff.29^r-30^r.

⁸ Judging from the Renaissance copies, it seems that about eight folia of Marc. gr. 524, which came between ff.168 and 169 and which contained the *De phys. num.* and *De eth. theol. arith.* and five other works (in whole or in part), were lost after Renaissance copies had been made of the MS. I will therefore quote the *De phys. num.* and *De eth. theol. arith.* following the best text to be found among the Renaissance copies, namely that of Escor. Y-I-9, as edited below.

what garbled version in which the (Aristotelian) original is altered (*ἐπιστήμη δὲ τὰ δύο becoming ἐπιστήμη καὶ διάνοια, δυνάς*⁹) and in which some attempt is made to explain the original (*De num.*: *ὁ γὰρ νοῦς ὑπὲρ αἰτίας οἶδεν*). A similar attempt at explanatory paraphrase can be found elsewhere in the *De num.*:

De eth. theol. arith. (11.70-72)

ἔστιν οὖν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ κυρίως ἓν, ὃ δὴ φαίμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς ὁ θεός, ἑνὰς καὶ τριάς (ἢ γὰρ τοὶ τριάς ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσα καὶ τέλη περι τὸ ἐν ἀνελίσσει).

De num. (p. 346, 28-30)

ἔστι οὖν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ κύριον ὃ δὴ φαίμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς [ὁ θεός] ἓν ὃν καὶ τρία: ἀρχή καὶ μέσα καὶ τέλη. ἴσως περὶ τὸ ἐν ἀνελίσσει.

By simplifying the *ἑνὰς καὶ τριάς* of the original, the *De num.* misses the connection between *τριάς, ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσα καὶ τέλη* and *ἀνελίσσει* and the consequent confusion is expressed by a puzzled *ἴσως*.¹⁰

For the most part however the compiler of the *De num.* sought to condense the contents of his sources, the *De phys. num.* and the *De eth. theol. arith.* One example of this practice of condensation will suffice:

De eth. theol. arith. (11.2-9)

Ὡςπερ εἰσὶν ἀριθμοὶ τῇ φύσει προσήκοντες, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἡθεσι: καὶ ὥςπερ ἔστι φυσικὴ ἀριθμητικὴ, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἠθικὴ. ἀρχὴ δὲ ἔστι τῆς ὅλης περὶ τῶν ἡθῶν φιλοσοφίας τὸ μέτρον αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ μέτριον ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀριθμῶν οὐσίᾳ, ὅπερ ἔστι καὶ ἀρχηγόν ἐξάιρετον τῆς ὅλης περὶ τὰ ἡθῆ κατασκευῆς. μετὰ δὲ τὴν μίαν ἀρχὴν εἰσὶ καὶ τινες ἀρχαὶ ἕτεραι τῆς ὅλης τῶν ἡθῶν φιλοσοφίας, οἷον τὸ πέρας, τὸ τέλειον (ἢ γὰρ τελείωτης ἐνοειδῶς συμπληροῦ τὸ ἀριστον μέτρον τῆς ζωῆς) ἐπὶ τούτοις ἡ τάξις . . .

De num. (p. 346, 14-17)

Ἔτι ὥςπερ εἰσὶν ἀριθμοὶ τῇ φύσει προσήκοντες, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἡθεσιν: ἀρχὴ γὰρ τῆς ὅλης τῶν ἡθῶν φιλοσοφίας τὸ μέτρον αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ μέτριον ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀριθμῶν οὐσίᾳ πρῶτως ἐνθεωρούμενον ἔτι τὸ πέρας: τὸ τέλειον ἢ τάξις . . .

As noted above, less of the *De phys. num.* is missing from the *De num.* However the compiler of the *De num.* was obliged to

⁹ The addition of *διάνοια* may have been prompted by knowledge of Philoponus *In de an.* 78,11 Hayduck, which is excerpted in a work probably by Psellos in Oxford Barocc. gr. 131, f.427^v.

¹⁰ For the activity of the triad, cf. Lydus *De mens.* 27, 8-9 Wuensch: *ἡ τριάς πρώτη συνέστησεν ἀρχήν, μεσότητά καὶ τελευτήν* (Ocellus), and Iamblichus *De myst.* 1. 19, Parthey p. 60, 1: *ἀρχή τε καὶ μέσα καὶ τέλη κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν συνπάσχει*. Westerink has suggested to me that *ἴσως* may be the remainder of a marginal conjecture.

omit the final paragraphs of the *De phys. num.* (which contain concluding remarks directed to the addressee of the work) in order to join his two source texts into one work. Although one cannot be sure at the moment about this, it is likely that the compiler of the *De num.* is Psellos himself, no mean paraphraser he and no man to refrain from using to the full what literary materials were available to him.^{10a} If the compiler is indeed Psellos, the *De num.* provides useful clues about the extent to which Psellos understood the excerpts from Iamblichus which, as will be shown below, he assembled in composing the *De phys. num.* and the *De eth. theol. arith.*

Since then the *De num.* is in fact a condensed version of Psellos' *De phys. num.* and *De eth. theol. arith.*, it is clear that Tannery's suggestions about the source of the Iamblichean quotation in the *De num.* and about the sources in general of the *De num.* must be verified in relation to the original appearance of the contents of the *De num.* in the *De phys. num.* and in the *De eth. theol. arith.* Indeed the very titles of the latter two works tend to bear Tannery out and must have at least partially inspired his suggestions. (Not being aware however of the relation between the *De num.* and the *De phys. num.* and *De eth. theol. arith.*, he was not in a position to use these titles as support for his proposals.) Of the two titles the first echoes fairly closely the title of the fifth book of Iamblichus' *Coll. Pyth.* as given in a pinax of the *Coll. Pyth.* preserved in Florence MS Laur. 86, 3 (f. 1^r): *Περὶ τῆς ἐν φυσικοῖς ἀριθμητικῆς ἐπιστήμης*.¹¹ The title of the second work by Psellos appears to be a conflation of the titles of the sixth and seventh books of the *Coll. Pyth.* which are listed in the same pinax as: *Περὶ τῆς ἐν ἠθικοῖς ἀριθμητικῆς ἐπιστήμης* and

^{10a} Cf. J. Bidez, *Michel Psellus Epître sur la Chrysopée (Catalogue des MSS Alchimiques grecs VI)* (Bruxelles 1928) 113-18, 155-56; Westerink, *Mnemosyne* 10 (1942) 279.

¹¹ Cf. A. Nauck, *Iamblichi De vita Pythagorica* (repr. Amsterdam 1965) xxxiv, where the pinax is printed. Pistelli has shown that Laur. 86,3 is the archetype of all other MSS of the remaining books of the *Coll. Pyth.*; cf. *Iamblichus Protrepticus* ed. H. Pistelli (Leipzig 1888) v. Containing a pinax of the *Coll. Pyth.* which is followed by the first four books, it seems to represent the first volume of a two volume MS of the *Coll. Pyth.* the second volume of which at some point disappeared. For an analogous loss, cf. J. Whittaker, "Parisinus graecus 1962 and the Writings of Albinus," *Phoenix* 28 (1974) 354.

Περὶ τῆς ἐν θεοῖς ἀριθμητικῆς ἐπιστήμης.¹² The title of the *De num.* is therefore a paraphrase of the more detailed and far more revealing titles of the two works on which it is based, the *De phys. num* and the *De eth. theol. arith.* The correspondence between the latter two titles and the titles of Books 5, 6 and 7 of Iamblichus' *Coll. Pyth.*, if combined with the quotation from Iamblichus in the *De num.* (which appears originally in the *De eth. theol. arith.*), seems to constitute a strong argument for the case that in composing the *De phys. num* and *De eth. theol. arith.* Psellos made use of the lost fifth, sixth and seventh books of Iamblichus' *Coll. Pyth.*

There is fortunately some independent evidence which confirms that this is in fact so. Syrianus, the teacher of Proclus and self-proclaimed follower of Iamblichus,¹³ indicates in his *Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics* that he made use in it of the later (as well as of the earlier) books of Iamblichus' *Coll. Pyth.*¹⁴ At one point he claims that Iamblichus, in the fifth book of the *Coll. Pyth.*, did not admit the void:

τοῦ δὲ κενοῦ παράδειγμα μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων οὐκ ἀπολιμπάνουσιν, ἐπεὶ μὴδ' ἐν τοῖς οὐσιν ἔστι κενόν, ὥς ἐν ἑ βιβλῳ τῆς τῶν Πυθαγορείων δογμάτων συναγωγῆς δείκνυσιν Ἰάμβλιχος
(*In met.* 149, 28-31)

As it happens, the final part of Psellos' *De phys. num.* (which is omitted in the *De num.*) contains this passage:

τὸ δὲ κενὸν ἀνυπαρκτόν ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει καὶ ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ ἀριθμῷ. παράδειγμα δὲ τούτου οὐκ ἂν ἄλλο τι εἴη ἢ ἀναρμοστία καὶ ἀσυμμετρία· πεφυγάδευται δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἡ ἀσυμμετρία
(11.90-92)

Syrianus' testimony thus shows that in the *De phys. num.* (where no mention is made of Iamblichus) Psellos is indeed using the fifth book of Iamblichus' *Coll. Pyth.* and allows us safely to assume that in the ethical as well as in the theological part (where Iamblichus is named) of the *De eth. theol. arith.* Psellos is using the sixth and seventh books of the *Coll. Pyth.*¹⁵

¹² See also Iamblichus *In Nicom.* ed. Pistelli p. 125, 19-22.

¹³ Cf. W. Kroll, art. "Syrianos," *RE* Zweite Reihe IV.1, 1733, 42-46.

¹⁴ Syrianus *In met.* ed. Kroll, Comm. in Aristot. gr. VI.1 (Berlin 1902), 140,15; 149,30; cf. Kroll's *Index nominum* s.v. Ἰάμβλιχος for Syrianus' use of the earlier books of the *Coll. Pyth.*

¹⁵ If Psellos merely had indirect knowledge of these lost books of the *Coll. Pyth.*, it is clear that in order to reproduce as fully as he does the order and

Supporting evidence could be supplied in the form of multiple parallels between the *De phys. num.* and *De eth. theol. arith.*, on the one hand, and passages in Iamblichus' extant works, in the Neopythagorean literature he used and in Syrianus' *Commentary* on the other. One example from the ethical section of the *De eth. theol. arith.* (11.70-72) has already been given above (p. 29). Another example from the same section might be considered here, that passage quoted above (p. 28) which makes use of Aristotle's *De anima*. Iamblichus in his *De anima* uses the same Aristotelian text. In his *De anima* he assumes, like most of the commentators, that Aristotle is reporting Plato's views,¹⁶ whereas in the *De eth. theol. arith.* the Aristotelian text, if anything, is supposed to describe Pythagorean doctrine. In the *Coll. Pyth.*, however, Iamblichus would have little hesitation in presenting as Pythagorean doctrine what would seem properly to belong to Plato.¹⁷

If then Psellos made use of the fifth, sixth and seventh books of Iamblichus' *Coll. Pyth.* in composing his *De phys. num.* and *De eth. theol. arith.*, it still remains to be seen to what extent and in what ways Psellos incorporated the Iamblican source material in these two works. To what extent do these two works provide us with actual "fragments" from three lost books of Iamblichus' *Coll. Pyth.*? This question could be discussed on the basis of a line-by-line comparative analysis of Psellos' two works and the extant writings of Iamblichus. However a more reliable approach is furnished by the analysis of the ways in which Psellos composed his works. I believe in particular that enough is known about Psellos' composi-

contents of these books, his intermediary source would have had to have been nothing less than a commentary on the *Coll. Pyth.* The only mention of the existence of such a commentary is that in Gesner's *Bibliotheca* which refers to a commentary by Simplicius on three books of Iamblichus' *Coll. Pyth.* which was supposed to be found in the Vatican Library; cf. Fabricius-Harles, *Bibliotheca graeca* (Hamburg 1796) V, 770. However it is likely that, as is suggested in Fabricius-Harles (IX, 567), Gesner's report is based (as in other cases) on a *vana rumor*, since such a commentary, if it ever existed, would surely have been found by now.

¹⁶ Iamblichus *De an.* apud Stob. *Anthol.* I, 49, ed. Wachsmuth-Hense I, 364, 15-18; cf. Aristotle *De an.* ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford 1961) 177.

¹⁷ Cf. Larsen, op. cit., I, 73-79. References to further parallels between the *De phys. num.* and *De eth. theol. arith.* and passages in Iamblichus, in Neopythagorean literature and in Syrianus follow the texts edited below.

tional practices to warrant the conclusion that, with the exception of the introductory and concluding words and allowing for the occasional gloss, all of the *De phys. num.* and of the *De eth. theol. arith.* is taken, in the form of short excerpts, from Iamblichus' *Coll. Pyth.* The following brief argument might be given in support of this conclusion.

In composing his philosophical (and other) works Psellos frequently did little more than produce a more or less coherent concatenation of short excerpts taken from a (usually unacknowledged) Greek source. This can easily be seen in those cases where his sources are extant. Psellos' *De ideis*, for example, is for the most part an assemblage of snippets from Plotinus *Enn.* 5, 9;¹⁸ his various short exegeses of Plato's *Timaeus* are composed of passages taken from Proclus' *Commentary*;¹⁹ his exegesis of Plato's *Phaedrus* excerpts from Hermias' *Commentary*.²⁰ To these patchwork productions Psellos would often give an epistolographic form, adding an introductory paragraph addressed to a questioner (often hypothetical) in response to whose inquiry the work purports to have been written.²¹ A concluding paragraph might also be added and some short glosses might be inserted in the excerpts which would vary in length and which could be chosen from a wide span of text in the source being used.

The compositional structure of the *De phys. num.* and of the *De eth. theol. arith.* (which is reflected in the structure of the

¹⁸ Cf. Westerink, art. cit., (supra n. 5) 10; *Plotini opera* ed. Henry-Schwyzler III (Paris-Bruxelles 1973) 340. The most recent edition of the *De ideis* is that by L. Benakis in *Φιλοσοφία* V-VI (1975-76) 415-23.

¹⁹ Cf. J. Bidez, "Psellus et le commentaire du *Timée* de Proclus," *Rev. de Philol.* 29 (1905) 321-27. Psellos' exegeses were first published by C. Linder (Uppsala 1854) whose text is reprinted in Migne *PG* CXXII, 1077-1114.

²⁰ Cf. C. Zintzen's note in *Hermias In Phaedr.* ed. P. Couvreur (repr. Hildesheim 1971) 298. Psellos' text was edited by A. Jahn in *Hermes* 34 (1899) 316-19, reprinted in *Michaelis Pselli Scripta minora* ed. Kurtz-Drexel (Milan 1936) I, 437-40. For other examples of excerpting cf. Westerink, art. cit., 2-3 and (an example of patchwork composition in a non-philosophical work) G. Aujac, "Michel Psellos et Denys d'Halicarnasse: le traité 'Sur la composition des éléments du langage,'" *Rev. ét. byz.* 33 (1975) 257-75 (Aujac gives an excellent analysis of the not always very coherent way in which Psellos excerpts from his source).

²¹ On the fictional nature of the epistolographic form of these works (the questions which are alleged to occasion them being themselves taken from the source being excerpted), cf. Westerink, art. cit., 3.

De num.) belongs to the patchwork type described above. The introduction of the *De phys. num.* (paraphrased at the beginning of the *De num.*) indicates the supposed occasion of the work: a Platonic discussion²² in which the addressee is said to have expressed wonder at there being another sort of number besides mathematical number. This is followed by what reads as a series of excerpts on "physical" number which is brought to an end in a brief concluding paragraph and which starts up again in the *De eth. theol. arith.*, dealing this time with "ethical" and "theological" number and ending with another concluding paragraph. On the grounds alone of this compositional structure and of its similarity to the structure of other works by Psellos which we know to be agglomerations of excerpts, I believe we can take it that Psellos' two works preserve a substantial number and a wide range of fragments from the lost fifth, sixth and seventh books of Iamblichus' *Coll. Pyth.* What these fragments tell us about these lost books and about the *Coll. Pyth.* as a whole is matter however for another, longer, investigation.²³

The following edition of Psellos' *De phys. num.* and *De eth. theol. arith.* is based on Escor. Y-I-9 (248), ff. 107^r-110^r (= e; s. XVI). I have made use on occasion of superior readings preserved in the *De num.*, which is found in an older MS, Escor. Y-III-12 (282), ff. 71^v-72^r (= e¹; s. XIV).²⁴

²² Ἐθαύμασας εἰρηκότος μου κατὰ τὴν χθὲς συνουσίαν (1.2); cf. Plato *Tim.* 25e2-3.

²³ Which I hope to undertake shortly. In his article "Psellus" in the *Dict. Scient. Biogr.* XI, 182, D. Pingree suggests that Psellos' *Περὶ τῶν ἰδιωμάτων τῶν ἀριθμῶν* ed. S. Weinstock, *Cat. cod. astrol. graec.* XI.1 (Bruxelles 1951) 104-6 may make use of Iamblichus' *Coll. Pyth.* However there is nothing in the *De phys. num.* and *De eth. theol. arith.* which would confirm this. The similarities between the latter two works and the *Περὶ τῶν ἰδιωμάτων τῶν ἀριθμῶν* can be accounted for in terms of the fund of Pythagorean numerical lore which they share in common. I cannot find any grounds for Pingree's suggestion that the excerpts by Psellos from Diophantes published by Tannery (*Mémoires scientifiques* IV, 277-78) also use the *Coll. Pyth.*

²⁴ The sigla are those which will be used in the edition referred to supra n. 7. In the *apparatus* of the following texts I have noted all differences between the *De phys. num.* and the *De eth. theol. arith.*, on the one hand, and the *De num.* on the other.

107²

Περὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ

- Ἐθαύμασας εἰρηκότος μου κατὰ τὴν χθὲς συνουσίαν ὅτι
 ἔστι φυσικὸς ἀριθμὸς ἄλλος ὢν παρὰ τὸν μαθηματικόν. εἰ δέ γε
 τὴν ποικιλίαν ἤδεις τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, ἀπήτησας ἄν με καὶ τὸν νοητὸν
 5 καὶ οὐσιώδη καὶ εἰδητικόν. ἔστι γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος
 ἀριθμὸς ἀνωτάτω τε ὢν καὶ πρῶτιστος, ὁ δὲ μαθηματικὸς ἐν κοινοῖς
 ἐπινοήμασι θεωρούμενος, ὁ δὲ φυσικὸς περὶ τῶν τελευταίων καὶ
 τῶν γινόμενων καὶ περὶ τοῖς σώμασι διαιρουμένων. οἱ γὰρ ἐγ-
 κεκραμένοι λόγοι τοῖς σώμασι φυσικοὶ εἰσιν ἀριθμοὶ ἐν τε τοῖς
 10 ζώοις ἅμα καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς· ἕκαστον γὰρ τούτων χρόνους ὥρισμένους
 καὶ γεννᾶται καὶ ἀφθίνει καὶ φθίνει. καὶ χρὴ τὸν γε φιλόσοφον
 τοῖς φυσικοῖς αἰτίοις προσαρμόττειν τοὺς οἰκείους ἀριθμούς.
 Καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ φύσει πρῶτον ἐστὶν αἴτιον καὶ
 ἀρχηγικώτατον (κατ' αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει), καὶ ἀριθμοὶ
 15 οὖν ὅσοι τὸ εἶναι παρέχουσι τῇ φύσει καὶ εἰσιν οὐσιώδεις, τοῖς
 εἰδεσὶν εἰσιν ὁμοφυεῖς. φυσικοὶ οὖν ἀριθμοὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος οἱ
 περιττοὶ πάντες, οἱ ἰδίως καλούμενοι τέλειοι, οἱ σύμμετροι οἶον
 οἱ πολλαπλάσιοι καὶ ἐπιμόριοι, οἱ τεταγμένοι ὥσπερ οἱ τετραγῶνοι
 καὶ κύβιοι. τὸ κάλλος τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς, ὃ ἐν τῇ συμμετρίᾳ
 20 αὐτῶν διαφαίνεται· τὸ αὐταρκες, ὃ ἀπὸ τῶν τελείων ἀριθμῶν ἐστὶ
 κατὰδὲλον· τὸ γόνιμον, ὃ ἐν τῷ ἑπτὰ καὶ ἑννέα θεωρεῖται· ἡ
 δυνάμις, ἥτις κατὰ τὴν τετρακτὺν μάλιστα ὁρᾶται· τὸ ἀρχηγικόν,
 ὃ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς θεωρεῖται· καὶ τὸ ταῦτόν καὶ τὸ ἀμιγές καὶ τὸ
 παραδειγματικόν, ὃ ἐπὶ τῶν πρῶτων ἀριθμῶν ἐμφαίνεται· καὶ τὸ
 25 ἴσον, ὃ ἐπὶ τοῦ τετραγώνου θεωρήσειεν ἄν τις· ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα
 τῷ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος φυσικῷ προσήκει αἰτίῳ.
 Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὅλη ἐν τῇ φύσει αἰτία οὐ συμκρὰν παρέχεται, καὶ
 ταύτην ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἀριθμοῖς ἀνευρήσομεν, τάναντία λαμβάνοντες
 πάντα τῶν προειρημένων ἀριθμῶν οὗς περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν εἰρήκαμεν. εἰσὶν
 30 οὖν τῇ ὅλῃ προσήκοντες ἀριθμοὶ οἱ ἀρτιοί, οἱ ἀτελεῖς, οἱ ἑτεροποιοί,
 107² οἱ ἀνόμοιοι, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὅσοι τὴν | ἐναντιώσιν ἔχουσι πρὸς
 τοὺς εἰδικούς ἀριθμούς.
 Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς τοῖς φυσικοῖς,
 καὶ γνοίῃ τις ἄν τοῦτο ἀπὸ τῶν γονίμων ἀριθμῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ ζωογονίᾳ
 35 δεικνυμένων. καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἑτερότητα δὲ καὶ ἀνισότητά κινητικὴ
 ἀρχὴ ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς ποιητικὴν τινα αἰτίαν ἐνδείκνυται. μάλιστα
 δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐρανίων περιφορῶν καὶ ἀποκαταστάσεων τὸ τοιοῦτον δείκ-
 νυται. καὶ οἱ τῶν ἀστέρων δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους σχηματισμοὶ περιοδικῶς
 ἀποκαθίσταντες καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς σχήματα καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῶν
 40 ἐν λόγοις ἀριθμῶν περιέχονται. καὶ οἱ φωτισμοὶ δὲ τῆς σελήνης καὶ
 ἡ τάξις τῶν σφαιρῶν καὶ τὰ διαστήματα αὐτῶν τὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ τὰ
 κέντρα τῶν κύκλων ἐφ' ὧν φέρονται, πάντα ἀριθμοῖς περιεῖληπται. ἔτι
 τοῖνον ἡ ὕψις κατὰ μέτρα ἀριθμῶν συνίσταται, καὶ αἱ τῶν νόσων κρίσεις
 κατὰ ἀριθμούς ὥρισμένους ἐπιτελοῦνται, οἱ τε θάνατοι συμπληρούσης
 45 τῆς φύσεως τὰ οἰκεῖα μέτρα τῶν κινήσεων οὕτω συμπίπτουσιν. ἐνθεν
 τοὶ καὶ ζωογονικὸς ἐστὶν ἀριθμὸς. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ ζῶον ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ
 σώματος συνέστηκεν. οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν συνεστάναι
 λέγουσιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ἐκ κυβικοῦ
 ἀριθμοῦ, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἐκ βωμίσκου. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἡ οὐσία ἐκ τοῦ ἰσάκης
 50 ἴσου ἰσάκης καὶ συνεστάναι φασὶν ἐν ἰσότητι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα βωμίσκον
 εἶναι, ὅς ἐμπαλιν συνίσταται ἐξ ἀνισάκης ἀνίσων ἀνισάκης. τὸ γὰρ
 σῶμα ἡμῶν ἀνίσους ἔχει τὰς διαστάσεις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ μήκος αὐτοῦ

μέγιστον, τὸ δὲ βάθος ἐλάχιστον, τὸ δὲ πλάτος μέσον· ἀμφοῖν. ἡ μὲν
 οὖν ψυχὴ, ὡς ἐκεῖνοί φασι, κύβος οὐσα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ, ὅς ἐστι
 55 τέλειος, συνίσταται ἴσος ἰσάκις ἴσος κατὰ τὸν σὺν κύβον· ἐξάκις
 γὰρ ἐξ ἐξάκις ταῦτα. τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἐξ ἀνίσων πλευρῶν ἀνισάκις ὅν
 ἀνισον ἀνισάκις, οὔτε δοκίς ἂν εἴη, οὔτε πλινθίς, ἀλλὰ βωμίσκος,
 ἔχον πλευράς ͵ε ζ ζ' πεντάκι μὲν γὰρ ἐξ λ, ἐπτάκι δὲ τὰ λ σι. διὰ
 ταῦτα γούν τὰ ἐπτάμηνα γόνιμα ἐν σι ἡμέραις συμπεπληρωμένον τὸ
 60 σῶμα ἔχοντα. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ μόνῃ ἐγεννᾶτο, ἐν ταῖς σις ἂν
 ἡμέραις ἐτίκτετο, κύβου τελείου ἀποτελεσθέντος τῇ ἐκφάνσει αὐτῆς.
 108^ε ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐκ ψυχῆς | καὶ σώματος τὸ ζῶον ἀποτελεῖται, αἱ σι ἡμέραι
 εἰς συμπλήρωσιν τοῦ σώματος ἐπιτήδειοι γεγόνασιν· κρατεῖ δὲ ἐπὶ
 τοῦ ζῶου ἡ τοῦ σώματος γένεσις. διὸ ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ ἰσότητος ἐφίεται,
 65 τὸ δὲ σῶμα οἰκεῖον ἀνωμαλίᾳ καὶ ἀνισότητι. τὸν δὲ βωμόν ἐδοξε
 τοῖς πάλαι κατὰ πάσας τὰς διαστάσεις ἀνισον εἶναι.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ δοκεῖ ἡ φύσις τῇ κινήσει μάλιστα εἰδοποιεῖσθαι, δεῖ
 καὶ τὸν φυσικὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐπιδείξαι πῶς ἔχει κίνησιν. εἰσιν οὖν
 αἰτίοι τῆς κινήσεως οἱ κατὰ τὴν δυνάδα θεωρούμενοι, οἱ ἄρτιοι, οἱ
 70 ἑτερομήκεις καὶ ὅσοι τοιοῦτοι (καθόλου γὰρ ὅταν ἀοριστία περὶ
 τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς θεωρεῖται, τότε ἡ κίνησις ἐμφύεται), ἑτερότης δὲ
 καὶ ἀνισότης (ἡ μὲν ἐστὶν ὥσανει σχέσις καὶ ἰδιότης ἥτις ἐστὶν
 ἡρεμία, ἡ δὲ ἑτεροίωσις καὶ ἀνίσωσις καθ' ἣν οὐ τὰ ἕτερα οὐδὲ τὰ
 ἀνισα ἐν κινήσει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἑτεροιοῦμενα καὶ ἀνισοῦμενα).
 75 Καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀπειρου δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ περαίνοντος δύναμις καὶ ἐν
 τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ ἀριθμῷ. καὶ περαῖνον μὲν ἐν τῇ
 φύσει τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ καλόν, ἡ ἰσότης, καὶ τὰ ὁμοία· τὸ δὲ ἀπειρον
 τὸ ἀόριστον, τὸ ἀτακτον, τὸ ἄλογον, τὸ κακόν, τὸ αἰσχρον, καὶ
 ὅσα τοιαῦτα. ἐν δὲ τῷ φυσικῷ ἀριθμῷ ἀπειρον μὲν ἡ κατὰ τὸ πλήθος
 80 ἀρχή, πεπερασμένον δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὸ ἐν πρώτῃ αἰτία.

Ἐχει δὲ καὶ τόπον ὁ φυσικὸς ἀριθμός. εἰ γὰρ τὰ σώματα καὶ
 πᾶσαν διάστασιν περιεῖληφεν ὁ ἀριθμός, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ
 τὸν συνακολουθοῦντα τοῖς σώμασι τόπον συνεῖληφεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οὐ
 κατὰ ἐπαφὴν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν ἀσώματων. καὶ χῶραι δὲ ἐκάστου
 85 ἀριθμοῦ κατὰ τὸ ἐξῆς τεταγμέναι εἰσὶ. τῶν γὰρ ἀριθμῶν οἱ μὲν καὶ
 φύσει καὶ τάξει περιττοὶ καὶ ἄρτιοι εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ τῇ μὲν φύσει
 περιττοί, τῇ δὲ τάξει ἄρτιοι. καὶ ἐμπαλιν αἱ δὲ χῶραι πλείστον
 ἰσχύουσιν ἐν τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων γενέσει πρὸς τὸ συνεζωμοιάσθαι
 αὐταῖς τὸ γεννώμενον:

90 Τὸ δὲ κενὸν ἀνύπαρκτόν ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει καὶ ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ
 ἀριθμῷ. παράδειγμα δὲ τούτου οὐκ ἂν ἄλλο τι εἴη ἢ ἀναρμωστία καὶ
 ἀσυμμετρία· πεφυγάδενται δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἡ ἀσυμμετρία, εἰ μὴ
 108^ε βούλοιτό | τις τὸν ἄρτιον ὡς διεχρὴ λέγειν διάκενον.

Οἶδα μὲν οὖν ὅτι βίαια ταῦτα πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ φυσικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ.
 95 ἀλλ' οὖν (τὰ) εἰρημένα τοῖς παλαιοῖς καὶ ἡμεῖς προσέμεθα καὶ σοι
 τὰ πλείω ὡς ἀρέσκοντα παραδιδόαμεν. τὰ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ζωογονίας οὐ
 πάντι προσέμεθα· ἄλλοι γὰρ λόγοι ὑπάρξεως ψυχῆς καὶ συστάσεως
 σώματος, δημιουργικοὶ ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀριθμητικοί.

2 μὲν e¹: om. e¹ || 3 γε] συ e¹ || 4 ἥδεις] εἰδείης e¹ | καὶ] εἰς e¹ || 5
 τὸν post καὶ¹ habet e¹ | εἰδητικόν e¹: εἰδοτικόν e¹ | γὰρ] δ' e¹ | τοιοῦτος]
 νοητός e¹ || 6 τε om. e¹ | πρώτιστος] πρώτος e¹ || 8 περὶ] πρὸς e¹ || 9
 λόγοι τοῖς σώμασι] τοῖς σώμασι λόγοι e¹ || 10-11 ὠρισμένοις-καὶ² om. e¹ ||
 11 γε] τε e¹ || 12 τοῦς-ἀριθμούς] om. e¹ || 13 φύσει scr. Tannery, cf. 1.27:
 φυσικῇ e¹ | αἴτιον post ἀρχηγικώτατον (1.14) trp. e¹ || 14 ὑπάρχει] ὑπάρχον
 e¹ || 15 ὅσοι] ὅσον e¹ || 21 δὲ post τὸ add. e¹ || 23 ταυτὸν e¹: ταυτὸν

e || 27 σμικρὰν] σμικρῶς e¹ || 30 οὖν] οἱ e¹ | ἑτεροποιοῖ] ἑτεροποιεῖς e¹ || 35 δὲ om. e¹ || 35-36 κινητικὴ ἀρχὴ] κινητικὴν ἀρχὴν e¹ || 36 τινα αἰτίαν trp. e¹ || 38 δὲ om. e¹ || 39 ἀποκαθίσταντες e¹: ἀποκαθίστανται e || 43 μέτρα] μέτρον e¹ || 44 ὠρισμένους] ὠρισμένως e¹ | ἐπιτελοῦνται] ἀποτελοῦνται e¹ || 46 ζωογονικός] ζωόγονος e¹ | τὸ ante ἐκ trp. e¹ | ἐστὶν post ζῶον add. e¹ || 47 συνέστηκεν om. e¹ || 50 φασὶν] φησιν e¹ || 51 ὅς] καὶ e¹ | συνίσταται] συνιστάναι e¹ | ἀνίσων iter. e¹ || 52-53 τὸ-ἀμφοῖν om. e¹ || 54 ἐστὶ ante ἀριθμοῦ add. e¹ || 55 ἴσος²] ἴσως e¹ || 56-57 ἀνισάκεις-ἀνισάκεις] ἀνισάκεις ὃν ἀνισα κἀνισάκεις ὃν e¹ || 58 πεντάκι] πεντάκεις e¹ | γὰρ om. e¹ | ἐπτάκι] ἐπτάκεις e¹ || 59 ἐπτάμηνα] ἐπτάκεις e¹ || 60 σῖς ἄν e¹: σ ἄν τς e || 61 κύβου τελείου] κύβον τέλειον e¹ | ἀποτελεσθέντος-αὐτῆς] lac., δεῖ αὐτῆς tantum e¹ || 63 τοῦ σώματος] lac. e¹ || 65-80 τὸν-αἰτία] εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κινήσεως ἀριθμοὶ ὅσοι ἀνισότητι καὶ ἑτερότητι μέτοχοι (sic) tantum e¹ || 82-83 ὁ-συνεῖληφεν om. e¹ || 87 τὸ post καὶ add. e¹ || 87-93 αἰ-διάκενον om. e¹ || 94 καὶ ante οἶδα add. e¹ | οὖν om. e¹ || 95 τὰ supplevi || 95-98 καὶ²-ἀριθμητικοί om. e¹

2 cf. Plato *Tim.* 25e2-3 || 3-8 cf. Iambl. *In Nicom.* 3, 10-16 Pistelli; *De comm. math.* 92, 27-93, 2 Festa; Syrian. *In met.* 122, 13-15 Kroll || 6-7 cf. Iambl. *In Nicom.* 4, 4-8 || 8-11 cf. Syrian. 190, 30-33 || 12 cf. Iambl. *Vit. Pyth.* 118, 16 Nauck; Syrian. 188, 2-5 || 19-20 cf. Iambl. *In Nicom.* 34, 23-24 || 21 cf. *Theolog. arith.* 61, 5sq.; 63, 1sq.; de Falco || 21-22 cf. Iambl. *Vit. Pyth.* 119, 6-7 || 22-23 cf. *Theolog. arith.* 1, 4sq. || 23 cf. Iambl. *In Tim.* fr. 53 Dillon || 36-42 cf. Iambl. *De comm. math.* 64, 8-13; 73, 17-26; Syrian. 190, 26-30 || 43-44 cf. Theo. Smyr. *Expos. rer. math.* 104, 9-10 Hiller || 48-49 cf. Syrian. 130, 34; 143, 7; 188, 1-4 || 53-56 cf. *Theolog. arith.* 45, 10sq.; Lydus *De mens.* 32, 15sq. Wuensch || 54-55 cf. Nicom. Geras. apud Phot. *Bibl.* 187, 144b1-2; Theo. Smyr. *Expos. rer. math.* 101, 7-8; *Theolog. arith.* 42, 19; Iambl. *In Nicom.* 34, 17-18 || 58-60 cf. *Theolog. arith.* 63, 1sq.; Lydus *De mens.* 35, 11sq. || 65-66 cf. Nicom. Geras. *Intro. arith.* 107, 22-108, 1 Hoche || 68-72 cf. *Theolog. arith.* 8, 2sq.; 9, 23sq.; 32, 13-14; Nicom. Geras. *Intro. arith.* 112, 19sq.; Lydus *De mens.* 24, 4-12; Syrian. 5, 20-23; 131, 28-29; 145, 16-17 || 76-77 cf. Aristot. *Met.* 986a15 = Diels-Kranz *Fragm. Vorsokr.* I, 452, 37-46 || 79-80 cf. Syrian. 10, 1-4; 166, 1-2 || 84-85 cf. Syrian. 149, 31 || 90-93 cf. Syrian. 149, 28-30; 132, 23-29 || 92 cf. Iambl. *In Nicom.* 91, 20

108^v

Περὶ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀριθμητικῆς καὶ τῆς θεολογικῆς

Ὡς περ εἰσὶν ἀριθμοὶ τῇ φύσει προσήκοντες, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἡθεσιν καὶ ὥς περ ἐστὶ φυσικὴ ἀριθμητικὴ, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἠθικὴ. ἀρχὴ δὲ ἐστὶ τῆς ὅλης περὶ τῶν ἡθῶν φιλοσοφίας τὸ μέτρον αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ 5 μέτριον ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀριθμῶν οὐσίᾳ, ὅπερ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀρχηγὸν ἐξαίρετον τῆς ὅλης περὶ τὰ ἡθῶν κατασκευῆς. μετὰ δὲ τὴν μίαν ἀρχὴν εἰσὶ καὶ τινες ἀρχαὶ ἑτεραι τῆς ὅλης τῶν ἡθῶν φιλοσοφίας, οἷον τὸ πέρας, τὸ τέλειον (ἢ γὰρ τελείωτης ἐνοειδῶς συμπληροῖ τὸ ἄριστον μέτρον τῆς 10 ζωῆς) ἐπὶ τοῦτοις ἢ τάξεις ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς προσήκει καὶ τῇ 10 ἐπὶ τοῖς ἡθεσιν εὐταξίᾳ, καὶ τὸ μονοειδὲς καὶ προσεικὸς τῷ ἐνί, εἴτε περὶ τὴν τετράδα εἴτε περὶ τὴν ἑβδομάδα εἴτε περὶ τὴν δεκάδα τοῦτο θεωρηθεῖ. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλο οἷον εἰ παρὰδείγμα τοῦ σπουδαίου τρόπου τὸ μέσον καὶ συγκρατικὸν τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν διαφορᾶς, ὅπερ

προσήγορα πάντα ἀλλήλοις ποιεῖ, πασῶν τε ἀναλογιῶν παράγει γένεσιν,
15 καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εὐάρμοστον ἀπεργάζεται.

Καὶ αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς δὲ δυνάμεις ἐπὶ τὰ εἶδη τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἀναφέρονται.
ἔστι γὰρ νοῦς μὲν τὸ ἐν ὧς ἐνοειδής· ἐπιστήμη δὲ τὰ δύο, διότι μετ'
αἰτίας γινώσκει· ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου ἀριθμὸς, δόξα· ὁ δὲ τοῦ στερεοῦ,
αἴσθησις, διότι τῶν στερεῶν σωμάτων αὐτὴ ἀντιλαμβάνεται. ἡ δὲ
20 δεκάς τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν τῶν ἡθῶν ἀρχὰς περιέχει. ἡ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ζωὴ
πέρας ἔχει καὶ αὐθις συμφυῆς, τὴν ἑβδομάδα· μονοειδής γάρ ἐστι.
καὶ ἡ ἑβδομάς ὥσπερ ἡ νοερά ἐνέργεια, οὔτε γεννώσα κατὰ πολλα-
πλασιασμόν ἑτερόν τινα τὸν ἴσον τῆς δεκάδος οὔτε τικτομένη ἀπὸ τινος.
Εἰ δὲ ἐν μετριότητι ζωῆς καὶ τελειότητι τὸ εἶδος τῆς ἀρετῆς
109^ο 25 ἀφώρισταί, οἱ μεσοὶ ἄρα καὶ τέλειοι ἀριθμοὶ προσήκουσι τῇ
φυσικῇ ἀρετῇ, οἱ δὲ ὑπερτέλειοι καὶ οἱ ἐλλειπεῖς ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς
ταύτης καὶ ταῖς ἐλλείψεσι. καὶ τάναντία πάντα ὧν διδόμεν τῇ
ἀρετῇ χρὴ ἀποκληροῦν τῇ κακίᾳ, τὸ ἄμετρον, τὸ ἀνάρμοστον, τὸ
ἑτεροποιοῦν, τὸ ἀνισόν, τὸ ἀπειρον, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ταῦτα γὰρ
30 πάντα τῆς κακίας ὅλης συμπληροῖ τὴν συστοιχίαν.

Καὶ ἐκάστη δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐκάστῳ προσήκει ἀριθμῷ. ἡ μὲν γὰρ
περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων φρόνησις, ἥτοι ἡ πρακτικὴ εὐβουλία, τῇ
τριάδι προσήκει τῇ ὡς ἐν πλάτει χρωμένη τοῖς λογισμοῖς· ἡ δὲ
τὰ ὄντα γινώσκουσα σοφία εἰς τὴν μονάδα ἀνάγεται τὴν ἐνοειδῶς
35 ἐπιβάλλουσιν τοῖς γινωσκομένοις. καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐναντίον ἡ ἀφροσύνη
τῇ δυάδι προσήκει, ἡ ἀπειρος καὶ ἄλογος τῇ ἀπειρῷ καὶ ἀλόγῳ. κατ'
ἡ ἀνδρεία δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἀρρενωπὸν εἰς τὸν περιττὸν ἀριθμὸν
ἀνήκει, κατὰ δὲ τὸ μόνιμον εἰς τὸν τετράγωνον· τὸ δὲ θηλυγενὲς
οἷον ἐστὶν ἡ δειλία τῷ ἀρτίῳ ἀναθετόν, καὶ τὸ ἀστατον τῷ προμήκει.
40 τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνη συμμετρίας οὕση αἰτία ὁ ἐννέα προσήκει, ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς
τριάδος πολλαπλασιαζόμενος· πάντων γὰρ τῶν τετραγώνων ἰσότητος
ὄντων ποιητικῶν, οἱ ἀπὸ περιττῶν τετράγωνοι κυριώτατοι πάντων
εἰσὶν [εἰσὶν] εἰς τὴν ἀπεργασίαν τῆς ἰσότητος, ὧν ἡγεῖται ὁ ἀπὸ
τῆς τριάδος τετράγωνος ὁ ἐννέα, ἀπὸ δύο τελείων τοῦ τε τρία καὶ
45 τοῦ ἕξ κατὰ τὸν πρῶτον τέλεον ἀριθμὸν τὸν τρία ὅλας δι' ὅλου
τελεωθεῖς. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη δύναμις οὕσα ἀνταποδόσεως τοῦ ἴσου καὶ
προσήκοντος ἐμπεριέχεται ἀριθμοῦ τετραγώνου περιττοῦ μεσότητι· ὁ
γὰρ τέτταρα προσήκει τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ * * * μέσος κείμενος τῆς
μονάδος καὶ τοῦ ἐννέα, καὶ ὃ ὑστερεῖ ἀριθμῷ τοῦ ἐννέα, τούτῳ
50 ὑπερέχων τῆς μονάδος. καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ μονάδος ἄχρις ἐννεάδος
συγκεφαλαιουμένων ἀριθμῶν ἕνατον αὐθις ὁ πέντε μέρος ἐστὶ.
τοιαυτὴ μὲν δὴ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἡθεσιν ἀριθμητικὴ.

Ἰάμβλιχος δὲ ὁ φιλόσοφος καὶ κρειττόνων φύσεων ἀριθμητικὴν
ἔγραψεν, οὔτε μαθηματικῶς τοὺς ἐν ταύταις ἀριθμοὺς μεταχειριζόμενος,
109^ο 55 οὔτε ἀναλογίας ἀπεικάζων τὰ κρείττονα γένη, οὔτε ὑποστατικούς
ἀριθμοὺς ταῦτα τιθέμενος οὔτε αὐτοκινήτους οὔτε νοερούς οὔτε
οὐσιώδεις, ἀλλὰ φησιν (ὅτι) ὥσπερ τὸ τῶν κρειττόνων γένος ἐξήρηται
πάσης οὐσίας, οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς αὐτῶν ἀπόλυτός ἐστι καὶ καθ' ἑαυτόν.

Περὶ δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λέγων καὶ τοῦ ἐνός, φησὶν ὅτι
60 ὥσπερ ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις γόνιμος οὕσα κατ' αἰτίαν προηγουμένη τῶν
ἀγαθῶν ὅλων ἐν ἑαυτῇ πρόεισι καὶ πληθύνεται, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῦ ἐνός
ἡ παντελὴς αἰτία πληροῖ πάντα ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῇ συνέχει τὰ
ὄντα καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῇ πληθύνεται.

Καὶ ἐστὶ οἰκεῖον καὶ πρόσφορον τοῖς κρείττοσι γένεσι τὸ κρεῖττον
65 γένος τοῦ μαθηματικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, οἷον τὸ ἐν, τὸ πέρας, τὸ ὠρισμένον,
τὸ ἴσον, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὥσπερ τῶν φυσικῶν ἀριθμῶν
φυσικὴ ἀρχή, καὶ τῶν ἡθικῶν ἡθικὴ, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῦ θείου ἀριθμοῦ

- μονοειδής ἔστιν ἀρχὴ καὶ θεῖα ἡ κατ' αἰτίαν προηγουμένη τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς πᾶσιν ἀρχῶν καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἡνωμένου παντός
- 70 ἀριθμοῦ προπάρχονσα μονοειδής ἔνωσις. ἔστιν οὖν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ κυρίως ἐν, ὃ δὴ φαίμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς ὁ θεός, ἐνὰς καὶ τριάς (ἡ γὰρ τοι τριάς ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσα καὶ τέλη περὶ τὸ ἐν ἀνελίσσει) καὶ τὸ νοητὸν καὶ φανότατον τῆς μονάδος εἰς ἄκραν αἰτίαν υπερβαίνει, καὶ τὸ ὑπερουράνιον αὐτῆς ἀρχηγὸν διακοσμησέως, καὶ τὸ περιγέειν
- 75 ἀδιαίρετον ἐν τοῖς διηρημένοις, πλήρες ἐν τοῖς (ἐν)δεέσιν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ θεῖα δυνάς δύναμις ἄπειρος, ζωῆς προόδος ἀνέκλειπτος, ὑποδοχὴ τοῦ πρώτου ἐνὸς μέτρου. ἡ γὰρ δυνάς ἔστι καὶ νοητὴ καὶ νοερά καὶ μαθηματικὴ καὶ ἔνολος. οὕτω δὴ καὶ τριάς· ἡ μὲν τίς ἔστι νοητὴ, ἡ δὲ νοερά, ἡ δὲ ὑπὲρ τὸν οὐρανόν, ἡ δὲ ἐν οὐρανῷ, ἡ
- 80 δὲ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ πάντῃ διαπεφοίτηκε.
- Κατὰ τοῦτον οὖν τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἐξηγήσεως τῆς θαυμασίας ταύτης ἀριθμητικῆς ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ χύματι ἀριθμῶν εἰς τὰς ὑπερφυνεῖς ἀνάγους ἐνώσεις· μᾶλλον δὲ τοῦτο ὑστερόν ἐστι καὶ ἀναλογία προσήκον. εἰ δὲ βούλοιτο τις ἀκριβέστερον τὸν θεῖον ἰδεῖν ἀριθμόν,
- 85 ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν κρείττωνων γενῶν τοῦτον ἀφορίσσαι· ἂν ἔστι γὰρ καὶ
- 110^ρ θεῖον ἐν καὶ θεῖα μονὰς καὶ θεῖα δυνάς καὶ περιττόν | καὶ ἄρτιον ἐξηρημένα καὶ κατὰ κρείττους ἐννοίας νοούμενα. καὶ οἶδα μὲν ὅτι δυσχερῶς ἂν τις ταῦτα παραδέξαιτο. τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται περὶ τὴν περὶ τὰ κρείττω ἀμελετησίαν ἡμῶν· οἷς γὰρ οὐκ ἠθίσμεθα οὐδὲ συντεθράμ-
- 90 μεθα, τούτων οὐκ ἂν ῥᾶστα τὰς θεωρίας παραδεξαίμεθα.

2 ἔτι ante ὥσπερ add. e¹ || 3 καὶ¹-ἡθική om. e¹ || 4 δέ¹ γὰρ e¹ | ἔστι om. e¹ | περὶ om. e¹ || 5-7 ὅπερ-φιλοσοφίας] πρώτως ἐνθεωρούμενον tantum habet e¹ || 5 ἐξαίρετον scripsi: ἐξαίροντον e || 7 οἶον] ἔτι e¹ || 8-9 ἡ-τούτοις om. e¹ || 9-13 ἡ²-τρόπου om. e¹ || 13-15 καὶ-ἀπεργάζεται] ἡ ἀναλογία tantum e¹ || 16 ἔτι δὲ ante καὶ add. e¹ | δὲ om. e¹ | ἐπὶ] πρὸς e¹ | τὰ-ἀριθμῶν] τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς tantum e¹ || 17 ἐν e¹: ἐνὸς e || ὡς ἐνοειδής om. e¹ | δὲ-δύο] καὶ διάνοια δυνάς e¹ || 18 γινώσκει om. e¹ et add. ὁ γὰρ νοὺς ὑπὲρ αἰτίας οἶδεν || 19 διότι] διὰ e¹ | τῶν om. e¹ | ἀντιλαμβανεται] ἀντίληψις e¹ || 19-52 ἡ-ἀριθμητικὴ om. e¹ || 48 aliqua desunt in quibus de quinque numero tractatum est || 51 ἑνατον Westerink: πέμπτον e || 53 καὶ] lac. in e¹, τῶν Tannery || 54 τοὺς om. e¹ || 55 γένη] γένους e¹ || 56 ταῦτα τιθέμενος Westerink: μετατιθέμενος e: τιθέμενος ἀριθμοὺς ταῦτα e¹ || 57 ὅτι supplevi ex e¹ || 58 οὕτω] οὕτως e¹ | καὶ² om. e¹ || 59-63 περι-πληθύεται om. e¹ || 66-70 ἔστι-ἔνωσις om. e¹ || 71 κυρίως] κυρίον e¹ | ἐν om. e¹ | ὁ θεός secl. Tannery | ἐνὰς καὶ τριάς] ἐν ὃν καὶ τρία e¹ || 71-72 ἡ-ἀνελίσσει] ἀρχὴ καὶ μέσα καὶ τέλη· ἴσως περὶ τὸ ἐν ἀνελίσσει e¹ || 72-75 καὶ³-ἐν)δεέσιν om. e¹ || 75 (ἐν)δεέσιν Westerink: δεέσιν e || 77 ὑποδοχὴ-μέτρον om. e¹ | ἡ γὰρ] ὥσπερ δὲ e¹ | ἔστι om. e¹ || 78 post ἐννολος add. καὶ μονὰς ὡσαύτως e¹ || 78-80 ἡ-διαπεφοίτηκε om. e¹ || 81 θαυμασίας ταύτης] θαυμασιώτατης e¹ || 83 ἀνάγους] ἀναγάγεις, ἀναγαγεῖν scr. Tannery et add. ἔστιν || 84 ἰδεῖν ἀριθμόν trp. e¹ || 86 post ἐν add. ὡς εἴρηται e¹ | καὶ¹-μονὰς om. e¹ || 88 ταῦτα παραδέξαιτο trp. e¹ | περὶ-περὶ] παρὰ πρὸς e¹, τὴν post παρὰ add. Tannery.

2-3 cf. Iambl. *In Nicom.* 125, 14-22 || 17-19 cf. Aristot. *De an.* 404b22-24; Iambl. apud Stob. *Anthol.* I, 364, 15-18 Wachsmuth-Hense || 22-23 cf. Philolaus apud Lydum *De mens.* 33, 15-16; Theo. Smyr. *Expos. rer. math.* 103, 1-3 || 24-25 cf. Iambl. *In Nicom.* 17, 1-2; 32, 25-33, 2 || 25-30 cf. *Nicom.* Geras. *Intro. arith.* 36, 6-37, 3; *Theolog. arith.* 19, 12-17; Iambl. *In Nicom.* 53, 7-9 || 31 cf. Iambl. *In Nicom.* 35, 2-3 || 32-33 cf. *Theolog.*

arith. 16, 18-21; Nicom. Geras. apud Phot. *Bibl.* 187, 143b28 || 33-34 cf. *Theolog. arith.* 4, 4-5; Iambl. *In Nicom.* 6, 6-7 || 37-38 cf. Iambl. apud Stob. *Anthol.* III, 320, 2; Syrian. 131, 35-37 || 40 cf. *Theolog. arith.* 17, 10-12; Iambl. apud Stob. *Anthol.* III, 257, 14-258, 2; 271, 25-26 || 44-46 cf. Iambl. *In Tim. fr.* 53, 12-13 Dillon || 46-47 = *Theolog. arith.* 37, 2-4 = Iambl. *In Nicom.* 16, 16-18 || 47-48 cf. *Theolog. arith.* 29, 6-10 || 48-51 cf. *Theolog. arith.* 37, 4sqq.; Theo. Smyr. *Expos. rer. math.* 101, 14-23; Iambl. *In Nicom.* 16, 18-17, 3 || 53-57 cf. Iambl. *De comm. math.* 63, 23-31 || 57-58 cf. Iambl. *De myst.* 23, 15-16; 160, 1-3 Parthey || 59-63 cf. Syrian. 182, 3-7 || 67-75 cf. Iambl. *De myst.* 261, 9-263, 7; 264, 13-265, 5 || 71-72 cf. Ocellus apud Lydum *De mens* 27, 8-9 (= Diels-Kranz I, 441, 7-8); Theo. Smyr. *Expos. rer. math.* 100, 13-14; *Theolog. arith.* 17, 4-5; Iambl. *De myst.* 60, 1-2 || 72-74 cf. Syrian. 140, 10-17 || 76-77 cf. *Theolog. arith.* 12, 10-11; Syrian. 5, 22-23; 112, 16 et 35-113, 3.

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CATULLUS 64.1-2

Peliaco *quondam* prognatae vertice pinus
dicuntur liquidas Neptuni nasse per undas . . .

“Eine solche indefinite Zeitpartikel ist typisch für Epyllienanfänge”—so W. Bühler on the opening verse of Moschus’ *Europa*, *Εὐρώπη ποτὲ Κύπρις ἐπὶ γλυκὺν ἦκεν ὄνειρον*, to which he compares Callimachus *Hec.* fr. 230 Pf. *Ἀκταίη τις ἔναιεν Ἐρεχθέος ἐν ποτε γουνῶ*, and Theocritus 24.1 *Ἡρακλέα δεκάμηνον ἐόντα ποχ’ ἁ Μιδεαίτις*.¹ Equally typical of Hellenistic narrative style is the verb of reporting, used often to emphasize the legendary nature of the story told, as in Callim. *Aet.* fr. 75.4 Pf. *Ἡρην γάρ κοτέ φασι . . .*

Latin imitation of these conventions is commonly assumed to begin with the neoteric epyllion—Cat. 64.1-2; 76 *nam perhibent olim crudeli peste coactam*; and 212 *namque ferunt olim, classi cum moenia divae*—from which source it then passes to the Augustan poets, most suggestively in Propertius 1.20.17-18 *namque ferunt olim Pagasae navalibus Argon / egressam longe Phasidos isse viam . . .*²

Catullan commentators have, however, neglected Cicero *Aratea* 33.420-21 Soubiran, the beginning of an extended passage on the sacrilege and death of Orion. I quote Aratus first (*Phaen.* 637-39), followed by Cicero’s version:

προτέρων λόγος, οἳ μιν ἔφαντο
ἐλκῆσαι πέπλοιο, Χίω δτε θηρία πάντα
καρτερὸς Ὠρίων στιβαρῇ ἐπέκοπτε κορύνῃ . . .

Vir *quondam* Orion manibus violasse Dianam
dicitur, excelsis errans in collibus amens . . .

This parallel gains in importance after G. Luck’s suggestion that Catullus knew and used the *Aratea* in the composition of

¹ *Die Europa des Moschos*, *Hermes Einzelschriften* 13 (1960) 47-48.

² See D. O. Ross, Jr., *Backgrounds to Augustan Poetry: Gallus, Elegy, and Rome* (Cambridge 1972) 77-78; and E. Norden, *P. Vergilius Maro: Aeneis Buch VI*³ (Leipzig 1934, rpt. Stuttgart 1970) 123-24, who cites occurrences of the verbs *dico*, *fero*, *perhibeo*, and *aio* as part of the “alexandrinische Manier.”

c. 64;³ the neoteric poet will have found a helpful lesson in transferring from Greek to Latin two characteristic points of Alexandrian style.

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³ "Aratea," *AJP* 97 (1976) 213-34, 233-34.

ODYSSEAN ECHOES IN AEN. 10.880-82

Before Aeneas begins his deadly combat with Mezentius, he joyfully and confidently invokes the gods to begin the battle (10.875-76):

sic pater ille deum facit, sic altus Apollo!
incipias conferre manum.

In his retort Mezentius displays the fierce, if blasphemous, independence and courage which win our respect for this otherwise contemptible and atrocious tyrant (10.878-82):

quid me erepto, saevissime, nato
terres? haec via sola fuit, qua perdere posses.
nec mortem horremus *nec divum parcimus ulli*.
desine: nam venio moriturus et haec tibi porto
dona prius.

With the help of some parallel passages from Homer's *Odyssey* which have been largely overlooked, I hope to shed some light on the striking and much disputed expression *nec divum parcimus ulli*, as well as the deadly "gifts" which Mezentius brings for Aeneas.

The commentators on the *Aeneid* have offered a wide variety of interpretations to explain the phrase *nec divum parcimus ulli*.¹ La Cerda views it as an indication that Mezentius does not fear any of the gods and is quite prepared to accept even them as his enemies: "Quasi dicat: omnes accuso et incuso; omnes dii mihi ex aequo hostes, nullum veneror, ut tu qui nuper Iovem invocasti et Apollinem." Heyne, who was followed by Sidgwick,² sees the verb *parcimus* as combining the ideas of fear, care, and concern: "parcere, pro vereri, metuere, adeoque omnino curare." Wagner takes the phrase to mean that the gods whom Aeneas is invoking will not be able to

¹ The most complete discussion of this disputed phrase is found in J. Henry, *Aeneidea* 4 (Dublin 1889) 136-44. Cf. also A. Forbiger, *P. Vergili Maronis Opera*⁴, 3 (Leipzig 1875) ad loc., J. Conington and H. Nettleship, *P. Vergili Maronis Opera*³, 3 (London 1883) ad loc., T. E. Page, *The Aeneid of Virgil*, 2 (London 1900) ad loc., and R. D. Williams, *The Aeneid of Virgil*, 2 (London 1973) ad loc.

² A. Sidgwick, *P. Vergili Maronis Opera*, 2 (Cambridge 1890) ad loc.

save him in the ensuing battle: "nec tibi dei quos invocas quidquam profuerint mecum pugnanti." Süpfle interprets the phrase as meaning, "Kein Gott soll mich abhalten mit dir zu kämpfen." Bryce finds here an arrogant taunt against Aeneas' supposed divine origins: the Trojan's claim that he is the son of Aphrodite will not avail him now. Conington, who was followed by Papillon and Haigh,³ goes so far as to paraphrase these words as "your gods shall feel my spear as well as you," and compares Diomedes' aggression against Aphrodite at *Iliad* 5.330ff. In a very lengthy and helpful note on this passage, Henry suggests that Mezentius is implicitly contrasting himself to those other heroes (Aeneas himself and such Homeric warriors as Achilles, Sarpedon, and Odysseus) whose hardships or death provoke anxiety and even tears from their divine parents or patrons: "I neither fear death, nor have patron god (patron saint it would be in the time of the Crusades) to grieve or offend by dying."⁴ Page suggests the translation, "nor have I regard for any of the gods," and cites several parallel passages where *parcere* means "hold back out of regard for." In his recent edition R. D. Williams offers the vague translation, "nor do I concede anything to any of the gods," which he paraphrases: "Mezentius does not care if Jupiter and Apollo answer Aeneas' prayer."

The precise interpretation of Mezentius' words here is an extremely subjective problem which probably admits of no precise solution. While commentators attempt the difficult challenge of confining the poet's exact meaning as precisely as possible, Vergil is hardly likely to be very cooperative. On the contrary, it is the essence of his poetic technique to allow his phrases and imagery to operate on more than one level of meaning, to liberate rather than constrict our feelings and sensibilities. I do not mean by this to propose a relativism of despair: any view is as plausible as the next. Rather, I am suggesting that by careful attention to language and context (especially parallel uses of *parcere* in Vergil and other Latin authors) we can generally arrange the possible interpretations of a difficult phrase of this sort in a spectrum: the more likely

³ T. L. Papillon and A. E. Haigh, *P. Vergili Maronis Opera*, 2 (Oxford 1892) ad loc.

⁴ Cf. Henry, op. cit. (above, note 1) 142.

and helpful interpretations in the middle, the others on the extremes. In this particular instance, the views of Bryce, Süpfle, and Conington clearly seem to me to be on the periphery of the spectrum. Bryce's and Süpfle's paraphrases are probably the most remote of all from the denotation of the Latin, and their violence to the literal sense is not compensated by any significant insight into the situation or characters. In the case of Süpfle, it is also difficult to see how Aeneas' eager prayer that the battle begin should elicit a reply from Mezentius that no god can prevent the battle. There is no trace of logic here, and such an interpretation must imply that Mezentius is raving on the brink of madness. This same idea, however, is also implicit in the view of Conington, who would have us believe that Mezentius is ranting rabidly, shouting that he eagerly anticipates joining physical combat with the gods themselves. This strikes me as utterly discordant with the *gravitas* and grim determination which Vergil seems to be imparting to this loathsome figure who impresses us nonetheless with his courage and pathos. By contrast, the most central and helpful views are probably those of Page and Henry. Their paraphrases do no violence to the denotation of the Latin, are well suited to the character and situation, and are well argued by parallel uses of *parcere* in similar contexts by Vergil and near-contemporary authors.

In addition to this spectrum-type of approach, we may also take a lesson from the title of John Ciardi's well known book, *How Does a Poem Mean?* The problem of assessing *what* the poem means—in this limited case, the range of possible meanings and paraphrases of *nec divum parcimus ulli*—should not distract us from the still more central search for the subtle forces at work in Vergil's casting this phrase in the peculiar and striking way that he did. Here, too, we should not expect necessarily to find a single "correct" answer. I should like, however, to suggest some fresh evidence to support and elaborate on an old theory about the possible inspiration for Vergil's rather puzzling wording of Mezentius' retort at *Aen.* 10.880. In a famous commentary on the *Aeneid* (Bks. 6-12) published in 1617, the noted Vergilian scholar Juan Luis de la Cerda, following Germanus (1575)^{4a} suggested that the word *parcimus* at

^{4a} Cf. G. N. Knauer's lists (p. 510a) below n. 10.

Aen. 10.880 may have been inspired by the language of Polyphemus at *Od.* 9.277-78:

οὐδ' ἄν ἐγὼ Διὸς ἔχθρος ἀλευόμενος πεφιδοίμην
οὔτε σεῦ οὔθ' ἐτάρων' . . .

The ostensible sense of this is: "Nor, in an attempt to avoid the wrath of Zeus, would I spare either you or your companions." The genitive Διὸς in this context, however, could lend itself to an ἀπὸ κοινοῦ construction: "Nor, in an attempt to avoid the wrath of Zeus, would I spare (or 'show concern for') him or you or your companions." While I am not arguing that Homer necessarily wishes to exploit such an ambiguity, it is possible that Vergil sensed it and may have been influenced by it. This is especially true if (as can be demonstrated, I believe) Vergil had Polyphemus very much in mind as he was fashioning his own portrait of Mezentius.

To date, the theory that Vergil's *nec divum parcimus ulli* may be at least partially explained as inspired by *Od.* 9.277-78 is nothing more than a dusty, random speculation of a 16th century commentator—mentioned only rarely and in passing by his successors,⁵ and generally ignored. This picture changes significantly, I believe, if it is viewed in the light of both recent scholarship on Mezentius and an additional possible Homeric echo in this same Vergilian passage. In the spring of 1971, two articles appeared which independently suggested that Vergil's portrait of Mezentius was considerably influenced by the Homeric Polyphemus. In my article "Mezentius and Polyphemus," I suggested that the Cyclops was the single literary model (excluding the earlier Roman accounts of Mezentius himself) which had made the greatest impact on Vergil's characterization of Mezentius.⁶ My arguments rested on a series of parallels which had been largely ignored: contempt for the gods, verbal echoes between the Polyphemus of *Aen.* 3 and the Mezentius of later books, pathetic addresses to a beloved animal (Polyphemus' ram at *Od.* 9.447-60, Mezentius' horse at *Aen.* 10.861-66), and others. In her article "The Blindness of Mezentius (*Aeneid* 10.762-68)," E. W. Leach illuminates from various angles the complexity and subtlety of

⁵ La Cerda's interpretation is cited by Conington (with cautious approval) and Forbiger (with apparent neutrality) *ad loc.*

⁶ J. Glenn, "Mezentius and Polyphemus," *AJP* 92 (1971) 129-55.

the Orion-simile which Vergil uses to describe Mezentius at *Aen.* 10.762-68.⁷ In the course of her analysis, she devotes considerable attention to the Polyphemus parallels implicit in this simile, and in a footnote she briefly suggests two additional Polyphemus-Mezentius parallels.⁸

If these analyses are correct, and if these parallels are too close and too numerous to be coincidental, then Polyphemus played a continuing and decisive role in the development of Vergil's characterization of Mezentius. This would have the effect of removing la Cerda's theory about *Aen.* 10.880 and *Od.* 9.277-78 from the realm of random speculation, and would place it within the framework of a series of parallels and literary adaptations. While this admittedly does not constitute "proof," it amplifies and adds considerable weight to la Cerda's suggestion. In the imagery that I used earlier, it moves la Cerda's view from a peripheral position in the spectrum of plausibility toward a place much closer to the center.

The probable influence of Homer's Polyphemus on Vergil's Mezentius also offers us an insight into the ironic "gifts" which the Etruscan offers to Aeneas (10.880-82):

nec mortem horremus nec divum parcimus ulli.
desine: nam venio moriturus et haec tibi porto
dona prius.

Though the commentators are silent on *dona*, the concept of ironic "gifts" from enemies has a long history in Greek literature. One might be tempted to interpret this Vergilian phrase as an ironic variation on the genuine exchange of gifts by respectful enemies in the *Iliad*: Glaucus and Diomedes (*Il.* 6.230-36), and Hector and Ajax (*Il.* 7.299-312). As Sophocles tells us in a famous reference to Hector's ironically fatal gift to Ajax, the idea that there was some inherently dangerous, ironic quality about gifts from enemies had become something of a proverb among the Greeks (*Ajax* 664-65):

ἀλλ' ἔστ' ἀληθὴς ἡ βροτῶν παροιμία,
ἐχθρῶν ἄδωρα δῶρα κοῦκ ὀνήσµια

This theme recurs frequently with some variations in later

⁷ E. W. Leach, "The Blindness of Mezentius (*Aeneid* 10.762-68)," *Arethusa* 4 (1971) 83-89.

⁸ Cf. Leach, *ibid.*, 84-86 and 89, n. 15.

Greek literature,⁹ and it is immortalized by Vergil himself in the famous warning of Laocoon (*Aen.* 2.49): *timeo Danaos et dona ferentes*.

It is possible, then, to compile a rather lengthy catalog on the theme of ironic gifts in classical literature. The grim humor of Mezentius' *dona*, however, is not exactly parallel to any of the examples cited above. I should suggest that the closest parallels to the Etruscan's sarcastic *dona* (and possibly the inspiration for it) are two passages found in Homer's Polyphemus story.¹⁰ The first of these is *Od.* 9.369-70, where the ogre offers as a "guest gift" to eat Odysseus last:

'Οὐτὶν ἐγὼ πύματον ἔδομαι μετὰ οἷς ἐτάροισι,
τοὺς δ' ἄλλους πρόσθεν· τὸ δέ τοι ξεινίον ἔσται.'

The second (and much closer) parallel is *Od.* 9.517, where the blinded Cyclops shouts to the departing Odysseus:

ἀλλ' ἄγε δεῦρ', Ὀδυσσεῦ, ἵνα τοι πᾶρ ξείνια θείω . . .

The precise point of this latter "gift" is unclear. D. L. Page plausibly has suggested that it is a relic of the old folktale-plot which underlies Homer's Cyclops adventure: the ogre of the story often succeeds in tricking (and nearly killing) the escaped hero by enticing him with a magical gift, usually a ring.¹¹ Another possibility—and this would almost certainly be the view of Vergil or any other reader of the *Odyssey* who was not a student of folktales—would be to read the "gift" in this passage as foreshadowing the huge rock with which the giant will soon assail Odysseus (*Od.* 9.526-42). If this is true, then this passage would constitute a rather close parallel to the situation at *Aen.* 10.882, where Mezentius' *dona* also refer to the missiles which he is preparing to hurl at his enemy. This possibility is reinforced, of course, by the remarkable series of parallels between Polyphemus and Mezentius cited above.

In conclusion, there appear to be two Odyssean echoes in *Aen.* 10.880-82, and together they make at least three contri-

⁹ Cf. Soph. *Trach.* 555ff., Eur. *Med.* 618, 1165ff., Menander *Sent.* 166.

¹⁰ To judge from G. N. Knauer's exhaustive *Die Aeneis und Homer* (Göttingen 1964), these possible Homeric parallels have been overlooked completely.

¹¹ Cf. D. L. Page, *The Homeric Odyssey* (Oxford 1955) 8-9, and J. Glenn, "The Polyphemus Folktale and Homer's *Kyklopeia*," *TAPA* 102 (1971) 177-79.

butions to a clearer understanding of Vergil's poetic technique. First, they reinforce a pattern that has been uncovered recently in the *Aeneid*: a series of subtle parallels between Mezentius and Polyphemus. Second, they provide support for the generally ignored theory of la Cerda that a passage in Homer's Cyclops adventure (*Od.* 9.277-78) may have inspired at least partially Mezentius' striking phrase *nec divum par-cimus ulli* (*Aen.* 10.880). Third, a rather close parallel and possible inspiration for Mezentius' ironic *dona* (10.882) may well lie in two additional details from Homer's Polyphemus story, where the giant ironically offers deadly gifts to Odysseus.

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TRIMALCHIO AT SOUSA-ON-SEA

Petronius' Trimalchio tells us at great length about his Eastern origins, and the *Cena* leaves little doubt as to the extent of his pretensions. Little attention has been paid, however, to the implications of his Eastern name (Trimalchus = thrice king):¹ he should be as much an oriental potentate as a Roman emperor.² I wish to show that Petronius developed this role by imitating at several points the material of the *Alexander Romance*, which includes Alexander's reports of his experiences in and around the palaces of Darius.³

At *Satyricon* 27-30 Encolpius and his companions are suitably impressed by the sequence of exhibits which adorn the entrance to Trimalchio's house. Each of these should of course be related to contemporary taste: the arbiter of elegance has given his butt a treasure-house of authentic first-century Campanian kitsch.⁴ But Pompeian and other parallels do not preclude a series of ulterior references in the same objects. Above Trimalchio's doorway is a golden cage containing a *pica varia* which greets the entrants: in the palaces of Cyrus and Xerxes the visitors find ἐν μέσῳ τῆς ὀροφῆς ὀρνυγοτροφεῖον χρυσοῦν

¹ For detailed discussion of the meaning, see S. Priuli, *Ascyllus: Note di onomastica petroniana* (Brussels 1975) 35-41; he rightly argues that Petronius would also have intended the suffix -ion to have some force ('thrice-mighty kingling'). This accords exactly with the parody discussed below.

² For the Roman Imperial role of Trimalchio, see P. G. Walsh, *The Roman Novel: The Satyricon of Petronius and the Golden Ass of Apuleius* (Cambridge 1970) 137ff.

³ I quote from M. Feldbusch, *Der Brief Alexanders an Aristoteles über die Wunder Indiens, Synoptische Edition, Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie* 78 (Meisenheim am Glan 1976), with cross-references to W. Kroll, *Historia Alexandri Magni (ps.-Callisthenes), recensio vetusta* (Berlin 1926) for the A version, which I cite when available; and to L. Bergson, *Der griechische Alexanderroman, Rezension β, Studia graeca Stockholmiensia* (Stockholm/Uppsala 1965) for the B version. On the complex history and relationship of the materials, see R. Merkelbach, *Die Quellen des griechischen Alexanderromans*² (Munich 1977). For the present purpose it is sufficient to establish that some branch of the tradition was available in some form to Petronius in the first century A.D.

⁴ For detailed commentary on the *Realien* see now M. S. Smith, *Petronii Arbitri Cena Trimalchionis* (Oxford 1975).

κρεμώμενον, ἐν ᾧ ἦν ὄρνεον ἡλίκον (περιστερά). τοῦτο ἔφασαν ἐρμηνεύειν τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν.⁵ Trimalchio's version debases the sacred bird's function to the level of cheap gimmickry. Encolpius goes on to see a series of pictures, including a sequence depicting the rise of Trimalchio, and his triumphal entry into Rome. This is not just the host's personal megalomania: in a room in the Persian palace γέγραπται ἡ ναυμαχία ἡ γεναμένη Ξέρξου.⁶ Trimalchio too must have his naval exhibits, apparently: Encolpius describes the ends of fasces *quasi embolum navis aeneum* on display outside the triclinium.⁷ The throne at Sousa, merely alluded to in Ps.-Callisthenes, was surmounted by a baldacchino or a roof representing the heavens; Trimalchio offers another comedown: an astrological chart confronts the guests entering the dining-room.⁸

Two scenes juxtaposed in the *Alexander-romance* throw fresh light on the incredible first impressions made by Trimalchio himself. Visiting the shrine at Lysou Limen Alexander sees ἔσωθεν δὲ καὶ ἔξωθεν ἀνάγλυφοι ἀνδριάντες ἡμιθέων γεγλυμμένοι, Βάκχαι, Σάρτυροι, Μύστιδες αὐλοῦσαι καὶ βακχεύουσαι ἰδιοφνεῖς. ὁ δὲ πρεσβύτης Μάρων ἐπὶ ὑποζυγίῳ ἦν. Encolpius witnesses this undignified Bacchic scene translated into fact in Trimalchio's courtyard, where the old master himself is playing ball among the slaves.⁹ Inside the shrine Alexander goes on to see ἀνὴρ περιβεβλημένος σινδόνα βαμβυκίνην. καὶ τὴν μὲν μορφήν αὐτοῦ οὐκ εἶδον. ἦν γὰρ περικεκαλυμμένος. Trimalchio organises his appearance inside the house in like manner: *pallio . . . coccineo adrasum excluserat caput . . . oneratas veste cervices*.¹⁰

If there is any doubt that the start of the *Cena* is modelled on Alexander in Babylon, they should be dispelled by similar re-

⁵ *Sat.* 28.9 Müller; Ps.-Callisthenes 3.28.8 (p. 130 Kroll, p. 142a Feldbusch).

⁶ *Sat.* 29.3; Ps.-Callisthenes 3.28.9B (p. 179 Bergson, p. 144b Feldbusch).

⁷ *Sat.* 30.1.

⁸ Ps.-Callisthenes 3.28.10; *Sat.* 30.4. It is the Syriac version which is most helpful here: V. Ryssel, *Die syrische Uebersetzung des Pseudo-Callisthenes*, *Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen und Litteraturen* 90 (1883), translates 'Und in dem Saale stand ein goldener Sessel; und ein Baldachin (eigentl. 'eine Art Himmel') war oberhalb desselben'. For a more elaborate version, see Philostratus' description of a royal room in Babylon, *VA* I.25.

⁹ *Sat.* 27.1; Ps.-Callisthenes 3.28.5B (p. 175 Bergson, p. 138b Feldbusch).

¹⁰ *Sat.* 32.2; Ps.-Callisthenes 3.28.5B (p. 175 Bergson, p. 138b Feldbusch).

semblance right at the end of the episode.¹¹ Trimalchio's funeral march is too loud, and calls out the fire brigade, so that the hero escapes: all has an air of spontaneous invention, especially in the light of contemporary fire-risks. But a further interpolation in the B version of Ps.-Callisthenes speaks for itself: ἐν δὲ τῷ κατακλιθῆναι ἡμᾶς τε καὶ τὰ στρατεύματα πρὸς εὐωχίαν ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἐξαίφνης ὥσπερ βροντὴ βιαία αὐλῶν καὶ κυμβάλων πλήθους καὶ σύριγγος καὶ σάλπιγγος καὶ τυμπάνων καὶ κιθάρας ἐγένετο. καὶ τὸ ὄρος ὅλον ἐκαπνίζετο, ὥσπερ κεραυνοῦ πολλοῦ πεσόντος ἐφ' ἡμᾶς. (6) Ἡμεῖς οὖν φοβηθέντες ἀνεχωρήσαμεν ἐκ τοῦ τόπου ἐκείνου . . . Alexander was dislodged by a volcanic eruption in the middle of the symphonic performance; Encolpius by a fire alarm!¹²

What do these bathotic resemblances amount to? There are enough of them, framing the *Cena* on either side, to suggest that the *Alexander-Romance* or one of its sources was intended to be recognized as part of the complex literary texture of the *Cena*. We need have no doubts about how well known such a source might have been, or how readily the details would have been associated with a Roman context: the exploits of Alexander commanded frequent interest and emulation among Roman emperors.¹³ The two strands are associated in the same way a century later when Lucian describes the experience of a second-century philosophic sponger who has just penetrated the household of a rich Roman: his own comment is *Βαβυλῶνα εἴληφας*. Once the guest is established, a glance at his host's wife will bring the vengeance of the King's eye.¹⁴ The implications for Trimalchio's house-

¹¹ There are naturally fewer opportunities for contact in the *Cena* proper, but we might suspect at least two details: The centrepiece of one of Trimalchio's offerings is a hare winged like Pegasus; Ps.-Callisthenes describes κυλικεῖον χρυσοῦν . . . ἐπάνω δὲ ἐφειστήκει ἀετός χρυσοῦς ὑπερέχων ταῖς περὺνζιν ὅλον τὸ κυλικεῖον (*Sat.* 36.2; Ps.-Callisthenes 3.28.11A (p. 130 Kroll, p. 144a Feldbusch). One of the most vulgar and supposedly 'Roman' touches is the weighing of Fortunata's trinkets in the dining room; in Ps.-Callisthenes Alexander mentions at the palace at Sousa κρατὴρ ἀργυροῦς χωρῶν μετρητὰς τριακοσίους ἐξήκοντα, ὃν καὶ ἐξεμετρήσαμεν (ἐν) τῷ μεγάλῳ δείπνῳ (*Sat.* 67.6f; Ps.-Callisthenes 3.28.9A (p. 130 Kroll, p. 142a Feldbusch).

¹² *Sat.* 78.5ff.; Ps.-Callisthenes 3.28.5fB (p. 177 Bergson; p. 140b Feldbusch).

¹³ E.g. Suet. *Aug.* 18.1, 50, 94.5; *Cal.* 52; *Nero* 19.2.

¹⁴ *Merc. Cond.* 13; 29.

hold are obvious. It is not just a Neronian villa or palace at some indefinite Campanian town: it is also a Babylon pavillion at Sousa-on-Sea, with its pearly king perched uneasily on the Peacock throne! The parallels should serve to confirm that Petronius did use some kind of Romance material; this would at least accord agreeably with Heinze's old case in favour of imitation of the love-romance.¹⁵ At the same time it should suggest that Petronius could make effective use of popular material other than Mime. And Encolpius, amid all his other roles, begins to look like a down-at-heel Alexander.

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¹⁵ 'Petronius und der griechische Roman' *Hermes* 34 (1889) 494-519 (= *Vom Geist des Römertums* 417-439). This thesis still has a hard fight for acceptance, for example in J. P. Sullivan, *Petronius' Satyricon, a literary study* (London 1968) 92-98.

HERCULES BOUND: A NOTE ON SUETONIUS,
NERO 21.3

In his description of Nero's passion for singing to the *cithara* and acting in stage plays Suetonius (Nero 21.3) mentions that one of the rôles which he performed was that of *Hercules insanus* and relates an incident which occurred during one of his performances of this rôle:

*inter cetera cantauit . . . Herculem insanum. in qua fabula fama est tirunculum militem positum ad custodiam aditus, cum eum ornari ac uinciri catenis, sicut argumentum postulabat, uideret, accurrisse ferendae opis gratia.*¹

The episode is also reported by Cassius Dio (63.10.2), who places it in the account of Nero's Hellenic tour of 66/67:² εἰς μέν τις στρατιώτης ἰδὼν αὐτὸν δεδεμένον ἡγανάκτησε καὶ προσδραμὼν ἔλυσεν. He also mentions that the chains used to bind Nero when he played parts like that of *Hercules furens* (cf. 63.9.4) were golden, since it was not thought proper for a Roman emperor to be bound in iron shackles: 63.9.6 χρυσαῖς ἀλύσεσιν ἐδεσμεύετο· καὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἔπρεπεν, ὥς ἔοικεν, αὐτοκράτορι Ῥωμαίων σιδηραῖς δεῖσθαι.

The performance alluded to by both authors is in all probability one based on the *Herakles* of Euripides.³ If so, Suetonius' explanatory remark, *sicut argumentum postulabat*, refers to two clearly identifiable passages of the Greek play. (1) Herakles, having slain his wife and his children, falls exhausted into a deep sleep. Amphitryon assisted by his attendants puts him in chains and binds him to a pillar to prevent him from raging further once he wakes up, 1009-12:

¹ C. Suetonius Tranquillus, *De vita Caesarum libri viii*, ed. M. Ihm (Leipzig 1908) 234.

² On the problem of the chronological order of events in Suetonius see K. R. Bradley, *Suetonius' Life of Nero. An Historical Commentary*, Collection Latomus, 157 (Bruxelles 1978) 119-20 and 135.

³ See A. Lesky, "Neroniana," *AIPhO* (Mélanges H. Grégoire) 9 (1949) 401-3 (= *Ges. Schr.* [Bern 1966] 347-48), and for a most recent discussion of this question, H. A. Kelly, "Tragedy and the Performance of Tragedy in Late Roman Antiquity," *Traditio* 35 (1979) 28-29.

1010 ἡμεῖς δ' ἐλευθεροῦντες ἐκ δρασμῶν πόδα
 1009 σὺν τῷ γέροντι δεσμὰ σειραίων βρόχων
 ἀνήπτομεν πρὸς κίον, ὡς λήξας ὕπνου
 μηδὲν προσεργάσαιο τοῖς δεδραμένοις.

(2) Herakles wakes up and realizes that he is tied up to a pillar like a boat which is moored in a harbour, 1094-97:

ἰδοῦ, τί δεσμοῖς ναῦς ὅπως ὥρμισμένος
 νεανίαν θώρακα καὶ βραχίονα,
 πρὸς ἡμιθραύστῳ λαῖνῳ τυκίσματι
 ἤμαι, . . .

In the text of Suetonius as we have it both passages are summed up in the phrase *ornari ac uinciri catenis*. This short expression is, however, not free from ambiguity. What does *ornari* really mean? From a linguistic point of view there are two possibilities of construing the infinitive: (a) *ornari* is to be taken with *uinciri*, which together forms a kind of hendiadys with *catenis*, or (b) *ornari* is used absolutely as a counterpart to *uinciri catenis*.

The first possibility is virtually ruled out because it is inconsistent with the context. *ornari* implies the idea of providing necessary equipment, of fitting out with things which one can use such as arms, money, etc., and normally carries the connotation of adornment and embellishment. To be bound with chains, however, is an impediment which cannot be called *ornari*, unless it is used in an ironical sense.⁴

Generally, *ornari* has been taken as an absolute infinitive, though its meaning has been understood in different ways. P. Burmann, for example, commented in his note on the passage: "*ornari pro instrui, de multis et hominibus et rebus occurrit*,"⁵ and D. Ruhnken explained it as "*indui vestibibus, quibus scenici utuntur, et quas persona illa postulabat*."⁶ The same line of interpretation was followed by J. H. Bremi, who was well aware of the problem of determining the exact meaning of *ornari*: "*ornari*: Häufig in der allgemeinen Bedeutung von *in-*

⁴ For ironical meaning of *ornari* (being decorated with blows, i.e. flogged) cf. Pl. *Capt.* 997, *Rud.* 730, *Ter. Ad.* 176.

⁵ C. Suetonius Tranquillus, *cum notis variorum*, cur. P. Burmanno (Amsterdam 1736) II, 45.

⁶ D. Ruhnken, *Scholia in Suetonii vitas Caesarum*, ed. J. Geel (Leiden 1828) 321.

strui, ohne dass der spezielle Begriff des Schmuckes darin liegt."⁷ J. C. Rolfe, the Loeb editor, translated it with "in mean attire,"⁸ A. Lambert with "verkleidet,"⁹ and H. Ailloud, the Budé editor, explained his translation, "voyant qu'on paraît Néron (pour le sacrifice)," with the note: "Dans la pièce d'Euripide, Hercule arrive à Thèbes au moment où sa femme et ses trois fils, déjà parés pour le sacrifice, vont être mis à mort, et son retour imprévu les sauve."¹⁰

This interpretation was rightly rejected by A. Lesky¹¹ who points out that it is most unlikely that Suetonius refers to any part played by Nero other than the one of Hercules placed in bonds after having killed his family in an attack of frenzy. Less convincing, however, is the conclusion which Lesky draws from this passage. He interprets *ornari ac uinciri catenis* as referring to an action which is supposed to have taken place behind the scenes. The soldier posted at the entrance of the stage sees how the emperor is dressed and in chains, prepared for his entry, and mistakenly rushes forward to lend him aid. This interpretation, however, will not bear closer scrutiny. In both authors, Suetonius and, particularly, Cassius Dio (63.10.2, cf. also 9.6) the context, in which the anecdote is mentioned, clearly refers to Nero actually performing on stage.

In short, none of the various attempts which have been made to understand what *ornari* could mean in this context is satisfactory. We must therefore look for another solution to the problem. In the two passages of the Euripidean play which Suetonius in all probability had in mind Hercules is described as being both put in chains and bound to a pillar to prevent him from moving. It is his being chained to the pillar which induces the hero to compare himself with a boat anchored in a harbour

⁷ C. Suetonius Tranquillus, *Vitae XII imperatorum*, erläutert von J. H. Bremi, 2nd ed. (Zürich 1820) 524.

⁸ Suetonius, ed. with an English translation by J. C. Rolfe (London/Cambridge, Mass. 1914) II, 119.

⁹ Sueton, *Leben der Caesaren*, übers. und hrsg. von A. Lambert ([Zürich 1955] München 1972) 243.

¹⁰ Suétone. *Vies des Douze Césars*, par H. Ailloud (Paris 1931–32, 4th ed. 1967) II, 167.

¹¹ Op. cit. 401–2 (347). The interpretation which Lesky develops was already suggested in L. Friedlaender's note on the passage in his *Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms*, 9th ed. (Leipzig 1919–21) II, 123.

(v. 1094). In Suetonius the act of putting Nero (= Hercules) in chains is described by *uinciri catenis*. The other aspect of the binding, the fastening to the pillar, has, however, been obscured by textual corruption, but can be restored by the slight change of *ornari* to *onerari*.¹² The expression *onerari catenis* is regularly used of prisoners and captives weighed down by heavy chains or fetters to prevent them from escaping, cf. Ov. *Ars* 1.215f. *ibunt ante duces onerati colla catenis, / ne possint tuti, qua prius, esse fuga*, and also Hor. *Carm.* 3.11.45, V. Max. 3.8.1, Tac. *Ann.* 2.3.1, 65.3, *Hist.* 1.48.3, 3.74.2. Whereas *ornari* is scarcely intelligible in the context, *onerari ac uinciri catenis* not only produces excellent sense but describes exactly the scene from Euripides which Suetonius almost certainly had in mind. Moreover, the corruption of *onerari* to *ornari* is common; for the same confusion of the two verbs see, for example, Prop. 2.30.15, [Ov.] *Ep. Sapph.* 127, *Ilias* 183, 186, 214. The emendation, which Burmann and later editors should have accepted, is the only way of restoring proper sense to the obviously corrupt text.

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¹² It is worth noting that the same emendation occurred to an unknown reader long ago, but was then apparently forgotten. Burmann in his commentary on the passage (see note 5 above) mentions that he found the form *onerari* added in the margin of his Gryphius edition (Lyon 1534), but could not identify its author.

THE DIALECT GLOSS, HELLENISTIC POETICS AND LIVIVS ANDRONICUS

In his *Poetics* Aristotle states that γλῶτται, or unusual words, are particularly appropriate to heroic poetry (1459a 9). They help to elevate poetic diction by imparting a certain solemnity to it (1458a 21). The way in which Aristotle distinguishes between "glosses" and other kinds of poetic and unusual words (e.g., neologisms) makes it clear that he thought of the former as dialect words—i.e., words which were, or once had been, current in dialects other than that of the poet and his audience.¹

The richly exotic vocabulary of the oral epic tradition provided the original basis for an awareness of glosses as independent elements of style. Over generations the epic *Dichtersprache* had acquired an extensive heterogeneity of dialect features stemming from differing periods and regions. When the Homeric poems were reduced to written form this language was codified and it became possible to study and describe its components, one of the most salient of which were the glosses. Already by the later fifth century Homeric glosses were listed and defined in isolation from their contexts.² Homer's language exerted some measure of influence on virtually every literary genre, but it was the tragedians in particular who employed glosses along with other features borrowed from Homer in order to achieve exactly that σεμνότης to which Aristotle refers in the passage cited above. In this way glosses, through being independently cataloged and creatively reused, increasingly acquired a stylistic identity which transcended time, place and genre.

At the beginning of the fourth century Antimachus of Colophon, a stylistic innovator in so much else besides, gave a novel turn to the use of glosses. Looking beyond the traditional

¹ 1457b 3ff. (ed. Kassel): λέγω δὲ κύριον μὲν ὃ χρώνται ἕκαστοι, γλῶτταν δὲ ὃ ἔτεροι ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι κύριον εἶναι δυνατόν τὸ αὐτό, μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς δέ.

² In a well-known fragment (222 Kock) of Aristophanes' *Banqueters* (427 B.C.) a father interrogates his refractory son on the subject of Homeric glosses: πρὸς ταῦτα σὺ λέξον 'Ομήρου ἐμοὶ γλῶττας. τί καλοῦσι κορύμβα; τί καλοῦσ' ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα; κ.τ.λ.

sources for such words, namely the epic and lyric poetry of the archaic period, Antimachus seems to have been the first poet who deliberately imported contemporary dialect words into "higher" poetry.³ At least three factors may have contributed to the growing interest in dialect words which made this innovation feasible. One would be the influence of Ionian ethnography reflected, for example, in the occasional glottological digression in Herodotus.⁴ A second factor was the evolving debate on the origin of language, namely whether *ὀνόματα* were *φύσει* or *θέσει*. This issue naturally inspired a rudimentary dialectology—e.g., in several passages of Plato's *Cratylus*—as evidence for the debate was marshalled.⁵ Lastly one might mention the florescence of Attic comedy as a factor. The pro-Attic language of Aristophanes, in which exquisitely refined lyric existed side by side with vernacular and foreign expressions, perhaps as influenced by the contemporary and starkly dialectal literary mime, may have helped to point the way to the importation of dialect words into the new kind of elegy and epic being written by Antimachus.

It was not until the Hellenistic period, however, that the use of glosses attained its greatest popularity as a poetic device. The gloss particularly suited the literary tastes of Hellenistic poets. It complemented their interest in novel variations on traditional themes and situations. It provided an opportunity for the subtle and not-so-subtle display of their learned researches into the byways of Greek culture. It was a perfect ornament not only for dialect compositions, like the *Hymns* of

³ E.g., fr. 67 Wyss (= M. L. West, *Iambi et Elegi Graeci*, II, p. 40) from the *Lyde*: *ἐνθα Καβάρνους θῆκεν ἀβακλέας ὀργειῶνας*. *Καβάρνους* (a proper name referring to priests of Demeter in Parium), *ἀβακλέας* (evidently an otherwise unattested agent noun derived from the "hapax" *ἀβακλή*, which is glossed by Cyril as *ἄμαξα*), and *ὀργειῶνας* (originally an Attic legal term describing congregants at a cultic ceremony, later a metaphor for "priests") are all glosses. The "wagoner-priests" known as "Kabarnoi" exemplify exactly the kind of recondite folklore which would fascinate the Alexandrians a century later. For other Antimachean glosses, including contemporary dialect words, see the index in Wyss, p. 101.

⁴ E.g., 1.120; 2.161; 5.9; 7.197.

⁵ Cf. the *βεκός* story in Herod. 2.2. These remarks on the origin of glossography owe much to K. Latte's very informative article: "Glossographika," *Philologus* 80 (1925) 136-75.

Callimachus or Theocritus' *Idylls*, but also for the aetiological and didactic poetry which dominates the taste of the age.

In the tradition begun by Antimachus, the Hellenistic poets did not restrict their search for glosses to archaic and classical literature. They also borrowed freely from contemporary dialects and technical jargons. That the Alexandrians delighted in traditional glosses and pseudo-traditional glosses (by which I mean the learned coinages based on etymological interpretation of literary words—e.g., Callimachus' ἐδνηστίς "paid for bride" based on epic ἀνάεδνον "without bride price")⁶ is too well known to require illustration. But the use of contemporary dialect words—both regional and technical—may be illustrated by the following examples: εἰσπνηλος (Theoc. 12.13, also used by Call. fr. 68.1 P.), a Laconian word for "lover"; δίφραξ (Theoc. 14.41, also used and later rejected by Ap. Rhod. 1.789—see scholion ad loc.), a technical term for a certain kind of couch; γέντα (Call. fr. 322 P. also used by Nicander *Al.* 62.557), a Thracian word for "viscera"; κεβλή (Call. fr. 657 P.), the Macedonian reflex of κεφαλή; and the list could be extended.⁷ One might wonder how such words ever became known to these poets were it not for the fact that the third century was an age of almost feverish glossographic research.⁸ This research is undoubtedly reflected in the exotic expressions collected from past and present which adorn the poetry of the period.

Toward the end of the third century Rome was for the first time directly confronted by the full force of Greek art and literature. It is well known that the experience was a revelation

⁶ Fr. 67.10 P.—see Pfeiffer's note ad loc.

⁷ See, e.g., Pfeiffer's "Index Rerum Notabilium" to *Callimachus*, vol. II (Oxford 1951) s.v. "Dialectica" and A. S. F. Gow's "English Index" to *Theocritus*, vol. II (Cambridge 1952) s.v. "Dialect."

⁸ See R. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship*, vol. I. (Oxford 1968) 87-210. Many of the principal poets of the age themselves engaged in glossographic research—e.g., the programmatic *Ἀτακτα* of Philitas, Callimachus' *Ἑθνικαὶ Ὀνομαστίαι*, and the *Φρύγλαι Φωναὶ* of Neoptolemos of Parium. The impulse for much of this work was the developing science of philological criticism, as in the *Γλῶσσαι* of epic and lyric poets compiled by Zenodotus. Other studies seem to reflect Peripatetic interest in systematic description—e.g., Eratosthenes' *Ἀρχιτεκτονικός*, a treatise devoted to the explanation of architectural terminology. Both traditions merge in the monumental *Λέξεις* of Aristophanes of Byzantium.

for the Romans. One of its immediate effects was to inspire the instantaneous creation of a native Latin literature. Recent classical scholarship has become increasingly aware of the extent to which this "archaic" literature reflects the careful application of Hellenistic literary theory. Most of the attention has been given to the poetry of Ennius,⁹ whose proud boast to be the first *dicti studiosus* among the Romans helped to engender a lasting prejudice against the Saturnian epic of his predecessors, Livius Andronicus and Naevius.¹⁰ Nevertheless both Naevius and Livius were themselves very much attuned to the Greek literary theory and practice of the Hellenistic age. The case for Naevius is made very convincingly by S. Mariotti in his edition of the *Bellum Punicum*.¹¹ At this point we may turn to a brief review of the evidence for Livius.

In his much-cited article on Livius Andronicus,¹² E. Fraenkel demonstrated that the language of the *Odyssey* fragments is qualitatively different from that of the tragedies. Perhaps the strongest argument concerns the a-stem genitive singular ending *-as*, a feature which Fraenkel calls "hochaltertümlich." Priscian (see n. 50 below), who elsewhere reveals familiarity with Livius' tragedies, cites six examples of this ending: one from Ennius' *Annales*, two from the *Bellum Punicum* of Naevius, and the remaining three from Livius' *Odussia*. The pattern of citations seems to indicate that the ending was felt to be appropriate for epic poetry but inappropriate for the relatively less grand and solemn language of tragedy. In other words Livius (and his successors) demonstrates a sensitivity to the Greek literary convention whereby the idioms of different genres must be formally differentiated from each other.

E. Fraenkel's study demonstrated that Livius was attentive to a fundamental precept of Greek literature, but not necessarily to a precept which was specifically Hellenistic. In an article

⁹ See, e.g., O. Skutsch, *Studia Enniana* (London 1968) 5ff.; G. Williams *Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry* (Oxford 1968) 696ff.; J. E. G. Zetzel, "Ennian Experiments," *AJP* 95 (1974) 137-40.

¹⁰ The passage in question is the famous proem to Book 7 of the *Annales* (213-19 V.3). On the reconstruction and interpretation of the proem see Skutsch, *Studia Enniana*, 119ff. and W. Suerbaum, *Untersuchungen zur Selbstdarstellung älterer römischer Dichter* (Hildesheim 1968) 249ff.

¹¹ *Il Bellum Punicum e l'arte di Nevio* (Rome 1955) chaps. I and III.

¹² *RE* suppl. V (1931) cl. 598ff.

appearing one year later, however, H. Fränkel pointed out that the nature of Livius' translation of the *Odyseey* sometimes reveals the unmistakable influence of Hellenistic commentary to Homer.¹³ For example *O.* 28-29 (Warmington)—*nexabant multa inter se flexu nodorum / dubio*—answers to *ταρφε' ἀμειβομένω* (8.379) which is explained in the "V" scholia ("pseudo-Didymus") as *πυκνῶς πλέκοντες εἰς ἀλλήλους*. Clearly Livius has incorporated some version of this scholion into his own interpretation and rendition of the passage. One is reminded of the notice in Suetonius (*de Gram.* 1.2) that Livius and Ennius represented the beginning of *ars grammatica* among the Romans, and that they did so in part because they "interpreted" Greek authors (*Graecos interpretabantur*). What Suetonius means by *interpretabantur* is clarified by a later passage (4.1) where he accepts Nepos' definition of *litterati* (for which label Livius and Ennius seem to qualify) as *poetarum interpretes qui a Graecis 'grammatici' nominentur*. In short, Livius (and Ennius) might be described by the same phrase which Strabo (14.657) used of Philitas of Cos: *ποιητῆς ἄμα καὶ κριτικός*—i.e., the typically Hellenistic combination of poet and scholar.

We have other indications of Livius' Alexandrianism. A. Ronconi¹⁴ has argued plausibly that expansions in Livius—i.e., passages in which the Latin version expands the content of the Greek locus to which it seems to correspond—are often the result of "contaminazione a distanza." For example he would see *O.* 18 W.—*Igitur demum Ulixi cor frixit prae pavore*—as a "contamination" of the primary Homeric locus (5.297): *καὶ τότε Ὀδυσσεύς λῦτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ*, with another passage (23.215-16): *αἰεὶ γάρ μοι θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλοισιν ἐρρίγει*.¹⁵ This "contamination of Homer with Homer" is a compositional device typical of Alexandrian poetry, where it is employed as a means of alluding to or incorporating a literary precedent (of theme, situation or style) in a creative and learned way.

The preceding discussion focused on Livius' method of

¹³ "Griechische Bildung in altrömischen Epen I," *Hermes* 67 (1932) 303-11.

¹⁴ "Sulla tecnica delle antiche traduzioni latine da Omero," *SIFC* n.s. 34 (1962) 5-20.

¹⁵ Compare Macrobius (5.3,9) on *Aen.* 1.92: *Hic de duobus unum fabricatus est (Od. 5.297 and Il. 15.436).*

composition. The evidence which was reviewed suggests that Livius, far from being the literary amateur he was once considered,¹⁶ was in fact a careful stylist who was informed about Hellenistic poetics and sought to apply their precepts to his Latin creations. Scevola Mariotti would go one step further. In his brief but penetrating book on Livius¹⁷ he argues that the poet was sufficiently sensitive to the literary issues which were occupying the Alexandrians during the third century that he actually took sides in the famous debate concerning the feasibility of writing traditional epic poetry. Mariotti points out that Livius' translation of Homer often alters the emphasis of the Homeric model by accenting the "pathetic"—one might think sometimes to the point of sentimentalism.¹⁸ For example *O.* 23-26 W. read as follows:

. . . namque nullum
peius macerat humanum quamde mare saevum;
vires cui sunt magnae toppe confringent
importunae undae.

The corresponding passage in Homer (8.138-39) is noticeably less elaborate:

Οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ γέ τί φημι κακώτερον ἄλλο θαλάσσης
ἄνδρα γε συγχεῖναι, εἰ καὶ μάλα καρτερὸς εἴη.

Mariotti calls attention to three Livian additions to this γνώμη as expressed by Homer: 1) the emphasis on the idea of destruction through two metaphors in the Latin as opposed to one in the Greek; 2) the gratuitous qualification that such destruction is swift (*toppe*) in the case of the strong; 3) the double emphasis on the cruelty of the sea—*mare saevum* and *importunae undae* as opposed to the simple θαλάσσης. Mariotti sees this emphasis on the pathetic as a reflection of the new kind of epic poetry which had been written by Antimachus

¹⁶ E.g., J. W. Duff, *A Literary History of Rome. From the Origins to the Close of the Golden Age*³ (London 1960) 91-92: "Livius . . . makes blunders of omission and commission. The extant specimens prove that he can positively mistranslate." Compare the patronizing "Aber es war doch ein grosser Schritt" in Schanz-Hosius, *Gesch. der röm. Literatur*, vol. I (Munich 1927) 46.

¹⁷ *Livio Andronico e la Traduzione Artistica* (Milan 1952).

¹⁸ *Livio*, p. 47ff.

and, later, Apollonius. As further Antimachean features in Livius he cites the poet's striving for solemnity and his delight in elaborate rhetorical figures.¹⁹ Mariotti concludes that Livius sought to imbue his poetry with much the same ethos as critics would observe in the poetry of Antimachus: e.g., Quintilian (10.1,53): *vis et gravitas et minime vulgare eloquendi genus*. It was left to Ennius to adopt the Callimachean position in this stylistic debate which had been transferred from Alexandria to Rome.²⁰

Livius' Antimacheanism further confirms his sophistication as stylist and critic. It seems most probable that such a stylist, who reflects the Greek literary tastes of his age in so many other respects, would also adopt the gloss as a device for amplifying the connotative dimension of his poetry and, particularly in his epic and tragicomic compositions, for enhancing the solemnity of the idiom. Indeed if one defines glosses simply as rare and archaic words, most critics would acknowledge that Livius did incorporate them into his poetry.²¹ It will be remembered, however, that at least for Hellenistic poets the gloss was preeminently a dialect word.²² In fact it is precisely at this period of Greek that the traditional literary dialects begin to be described in terms of ethnic and regional labels: e.g., the text of Alkman is established in the "Lakonian" dialect, Theocritus is said to employ the "Mild Doric" of Epicharmus and Sophron, the epic genitive in *-οιο* is called "Thessalian,"

¹⁹Livio, p. 38ff., 57ff.

²⁰ Despite their overall length, the *Annales* reveal a Callimachean manner in: 1) the proem to Book 1, which combines the dream motif of the opening of the *Aitia* with explicit allusions to the opening of the *Theogony*; 2) the Hesiodic approach which the annalistic method entails; 3) the fact that it is the first Roman epic to be composed in book-length units—i.e., with a view to smaller-scale effects; 4) the literary polemic of the proem to Book 7.

²¹ E.g., Mariotti, *Livio*, p. 25: "Così ritroviamo in lui il tipico gusto antimacheo ed ellenistico per la glossa, per il vocabolo o la forma rara e disusata." Compare E. Fraenkel (n. 12 above) col. 606: "Immer wieder zeigt es sich wie L. bemüht ist gerade mit Hilfe hochaltertümlichen Sprachgutes seinem Epos Würde und Distanz zu geben"; and J. H. Waszink, "Tradition and Personal Achievement in Early Latin Literature," *Mnemosyne* 4.13 (1960) 16ff.

²² This is not to say that the term was used exclusively with that signification—cf. the contrast between *πλῶτται παλαιά* and *ξένα ὀνόματα* in Dion. Hal. *Comp. Verb* 1.3, 15 (my thanks to Prof. A. R. Dyck for this reference).

and so forth.²³ It would follow, then, that Livius also accepted regional dialects as a valid source for glosses. He would have attempted to adorn his poetry with dialect words that were conceived of as being analogous to the ornamental glosses favored by Antimachus and his successors. And indeed analogous words were right at hand in the form of Etruscan, Sabine and other Italic idioms which are known to have much influenced the pre-literary evolution of the Latin language.²⁴

That Livius may have employed dialect glosses is not an entirely novel idea. "Mots étrangers glottals" form one of the types of epic vocabulary which A. Cordier has reviewed in his lexical study of the *Aeneid*.²⁵ Cordier is interested in discovering the extent to which Vergil's predecessors, beginning with Livius Andronicus, used the dialect gloss as well as other types of epic vocabulary. His investigations have yielded comparative data with which to gauge this aspect of Vergil's traditionalism and originality. Cordier makes a distinction between Greek words and words from other sources, mostly Italic. A further distinction is made between words which have acquired the "droit de cité"²⁶—i.e., words which have been thoroughly assimilated in Latin—and words which still retain a dialect color. Only the latter qualify as dialect glosses. Cordier finds that non-Greek dialect glosses are quite rare in Vergil and almost non-existent in his predecessors, with one notable exception: Ennius, for whom such words account for 2.25 percent of his total vocabulary.²⁷ The other percentages reported by Cordier are: Vergil—1.6 percent (comprising 20 words of which at least seven are attested in Ennius and are therefore traditional), Catullus—0 percent, Lucretius—0.1 percent, Cicero—0.32 percent in the translations and 2 percent (com-

²³ See E. Risch, "Die Sprache Alkmans," *MH* 11 (1954) 20-37; *Scholia in Theocritum Vetera* (ed. Wendel) 6; R. Meister, *Die griech. Dialekte*, vol. I (Göttingen 1882) 305.

²⁴ A. Ernout, *Les éléments dialectaux du vocabulaire latin* (Paris 1909) 21ff. This otherwise useful study is unfortunately marred by incompleteness and numerous false references.

²⁵ *Études sur le vocabulaire épique dans l'Énéide* (Paris 1939).

²⁶ So called by Ernout and Meillet, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine*⁴ (Paris 1967) xii.

²⁷ *Études*, pp. 118ff, 127, 180ff.

prised mostly of Ennianisms) in his other poetry, Naevius—0 percent, Livius Andronicus—0 percent.²⁸

It will be seen that Cordier's figures make Ennius exceptional in his use of non-Greek dialect glosses. If the data are correct, then the conventional view that the dialect gloss is not a stylistic device normally employed in Latin can remain unchallenged.²⁹ Certainly it is not impossible that the subject matter of the *Annales* and Ennius' own Messapic origin³⁰ and fluency in "Oscan"³¹ may be reflected in a comparatively high incidence of Italic words in his poetry.³² Yet a re-examination of the Livian evidence reveals that in him, at least, the dialect gloss³³ is not as rare as Cordier's tabulations suggest.

The method I have employed for identifying such glosses is to analyze Livian vocabulary from the comparative perspective afforded by the attested Italic dialects. My purpose has been to discover words which exhibit one or more formal characteristics which are both non-native to Latin and are independently attested in Italic. Unfortunately this procedure cannot be entirely diagnostic. It can be said of almost any alleged

²⁸ Cordier is inconsistent on Livius. He identifies four words as dialectal in origin—*Camena*, *balteus*, *carpentum*, *ocris*—but argues (118) that they "ne devaient pas avoir le caractère glottal." Nevertheless at pp. 180-81 he classifies these same words as dialect glosses. With respect to his first three examples, which are not purely "poetic" words (see *TLL* s.v.v.), Cordier is certainly right in denying them the effect of dialect glosses. The final example, *ocris*, will be discussed further on in this article.

²⁹ E.g., M. Leumann, "Die Entwicklung der lateinischen Dichtersprache," *MH* 4 (1947) 125: "Im Wortschatz dienen diesem Streben [for an elevated diction] die seltenen Wörter, zwar nie dialektische wie im Griechischen, aber doch altertümliche und feierliche, etwa aus der religiösen Sprache, dann Metaphern, schliesslich für die Dichtung neugeschaffene Wörter" (emphasis added); cf. L. R. Palmer, *The Latin Language* (London 1954) 100, who asserts that dialect glosses are normal in early Latin poetry—but Palmer appears to base his remark solely on Cordier's very equivocal evidence.

³⁰ Servius, in *Aen.* 7.691.

³¹ Gellius, *N.A.*, 17.17, 1.

³² Yet only two of the glosses inventoried by Cordier are specifically "Oscan" (or Samnite): *meddix* and *famul*.

³³ Greek words are excluded from consideration in the discussion to follow. It is debatable whether Greek loans have the force of poetic glosses at all, since they often seem to be employed in situations where a Greek concept or literary model has itself created the need for a word which the native resources of Latin cannot meet. Such situations are common, of course, in Lucretius—e.g., 1.830ff.

dialect gloss in Livius that, unless we possess express ancient testimony to its external provenance, the Livian usage itself certifies its Latinity. Such an objection is all the more likely in view of the prevailing opinion that dialect glosses are not common in Latin poetry, a preconception which ultimately derives from the puristic prescriptions of *urbanitas*, the stylistic canon of oratorical prose in the Ciceronian age.³⁴ This preconception has both caused and been reinforced by a general failure on the part of students of early Latin poetry to recognize dialect glosses for what they are, the tendency being to label them "archaisms" instead. The issue is not simply terminological. Facile applications of the term "archaism" significantly distort our understanding of the method and aesthetics of this poetry.³⁵ Indeed if any preconception regarding the issue is defensible, then it must be that Livius did use the dialect gloss since, as I attempted to show earlier, he was an Alexandrian in spirit and the Alexandrians much favored the dialect gloss in their own poetry. Nevertheless in the discussion to follow I shall avoid *a priori* arguments. In order to control for the possibility that an allegedly dialectal feature may also be native to Latin, I shall review the usage of each example so as to establish its purely "poetic" identity. Thus from the concurrence of these three types of evidence—1) the phenomenon is apparently foreign to Latin, 2) the phenomenon is attested in one or more Italic dialects, 3) the example(s) in Latin are restricted to very specific poetic environments—it will be concluded that the feature in question constitutes a dialect gloss. I now turn to a discussion of five examples.³⁶

³⁴ On this question see especially J. Marouzeau, *Traité de stylistique latine*² (Paris 1946) 169-86.

³⁵ I am not suggesting that Livius employs no "archaisms" (meaning native words or features which were no longer in general use even in his own day). Genuine examples of Livian archaisms are: *donicum* (O. 20 W.), *quamde* (O. 24), *+duona+* (O. 46), *juas* (T. 23), *dusmo* (T. 37). Such archaisms would have been culled from the traditional language of religious *carmina* and legal statutes. For the influence of such language on the stylistic development of early Roman literature see chap. "X" of E. Fraenkel's *Elementi Plautini in Plauto*, rev. ed. of *Plautinisches im Plautus* (Berlin 1922), trans. F. Munari (Florence 1960).

³⁶ Fully assimilated loanwords—e.g., *Camena* (Etruscan), *baltea* (-us) (Etruscan), *carpento* (Gaulish), cf. n. 28 above and Ernout-Meillet s.v.v.—will not be discussed.

insece (O. 1 W.)³⁷

The root-final velar in place of labiovelar in *insece* < **en-sek*^w- is phonologically anomalous in Latin.³⁸ We might have expected to find *inseque* in its place, the form which the pedantic *litterator* (*docens* as opposed to *doctus*) alleges was written by Ennius (A. 326 V.³) in Gellius 18.9 (the source of our Livian fragment)—cf. *insequis: narras, refers* at *Corp. Gloss. Lat.* 5.78,10. It is surely not coincidental that root-final velar has been generalized throughout the inflectional system of the Umbrian cognate of this same verb: *sukatu* (IV 16) “let him proclaim,” *prusikurent* (Va 26, 28) “they will have proclaimed.”³⁹ Thus it would appear that Livius has here translated the Aeolic gloss, ἔννεπε, of the first line of the *Odyssey* with an Umbrian gloss, *insece*. Ennius later reused the gloss in the proem to book 10 of the *Annales*—the only other attestation of the word in Latin.

homones (O. 33 W.)⁴⁰

The peculiarity of the word consists in the predesinential vowel of the stem: *-ō-* instead of *-i-*, a feature which Fraenkel (above, n. 12: cl. 604) called an archaism. But the linguistic history of Latin rules out the possibility that this word is an archaism. A phonological change of *homōnes* to *homines* can-

³⁷ *Virum mihi, Camena, insece versutum*; cf. Ἀνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα, πολύτροπον.

³⁸ Cf. *inquit* < **en-sk*^w-e-t, Grk. ἐνισπεῖν and the homophonous root of Lat. *sequor*.

³⁹ R. von Planta, *Grammatik der oskisch-umbrischen Dialekte*, vol. I (Strassburg 1892) 338ff.

⁴⁰ *Topper facit homones ut prius fuerunt* (*homones* L. Müller: *homines* cd.). I accept Müller's emendation for the following reasons. 1) The *homōn*- stem is indisputably attested in archaic poetry—Priscian 2.206, 22 K.: *vetustissimi . . . homo homonis declinaverunt*. Ennius: ‘*Vultur in silvis miserum mandebat homonem*’ (A. 138 V.³): cf. Probus *Cath.* 10.28 K. and P. ex F. 89.8 L.; 2) Precesural *homines* would be rhythmically unique in Livius, being the only example of a trisyllabic anapest in this position. It is true that Naevius (21 Mor.) attests *homines* in the same position, but Naevius' saturnian technique is at least 40 years later than that of Livius and noticeably more tolerant of resolution—cf. Naevius' precesural *Cereris* (29 Mor.), *populo* (43), and *pariet* (63).

not be paralleled elsewhere in the language. Nor is there any clear morphological proportion which could account for the change analogically. Indeed the reverse is true. If *homo/homōnis* were the Old Latin inflection, we should expect it to have been supported by, and preserved along with, the inflection of formally similar nouns like *tiro*, *leno*, *baro* and *caupo*.⁴¹

The subdivision of Latin n-stems into two declensional types, the one with stem apophony (e.g., *homo*, *virgo*, *nomen*, etc.) and the other without (e.g., *caupo*, *praeco*, *Iuno*, *regio*, etc.), reflects a dichotomy inherited from late Indo-European. The older of the two types is the one with stem apophony, preserved perhaps most clearly in Sanskrit n-stems which show suffixal full grade (or *Dehnstufe*) in the strong cases and zero grade elsewhere: e.g., nom. sg. *rāj-ā(n)*, voc. *rāj-an*, gen. *rāj-ñ-as*, dat. *rāj-ñ-e*, nom. pl. *rāj-an-as*, acc. *rāj-ñ-as*, etc. Vestiges of this ancient pattern are preserved in Lat. *car-o(n)*, gen. *car-n-is* (cf. Grk. *κύ-ων*, gen. *κυ-ν-ός*). But when following an *-m-* in Latin the zero grade suffix generated an anaptyctic vowel which shows up as *-i-* in the historical period: e.g., IE loc sg. **nom-n-i* > Lat. abl. sg. *nom-in-e* (cf. the Skt. loc. byform *nām-n-i*). The second type of n-stem—i.e., the one with normalized suffix with constant vowel timbre—is reflected, for example, in a variety of Greek formations: *ποιμήν-μένος*, *ἄκμων-μονος*, *ἀγκών-ωνος*, etc. That *homo* has an IE etymon of the first, or apophonic, type is guaranteed by its cognate in Gothic: nom. sg. *guma*, gen. *gumins*, dat. *gumin*, acc. *guman*.⁴² Thus the Latin stem *homin-* is not a late innovation but rather the normal reflex of an Indo-European inheritance.⁴³

⁴¹ If the etymological connection with *humus* (< IE **ghem-*, cf. *χαμαί*) was still perceptible, then the stem in *-ōn-* would have received still further support from productive denominatives like *nebulo* 'foggy witted dolt' and *verbero* 'scapegrace.'

⁴² I.e., *guma* is a normal masculine noun of the so-called "weak declension." This inflection, which reflects a proto-Germanic stem apophony of *-o/-e-*, is complemented by the normalized suffix of the feminine n-stems in Gothic: nom. sg. *tuggō*, gen. *tuggōns*, dat. *tuggōn*, acc. *tuggōn*, etc.

⁴³ We do not need a supposed stem in *-ōn-* to account for the *Umlaut* of the root vowel **hemo* > *homo* (cf. *nēmo* < **ne-hemo*) as argued by M. Leumann, *Lat. Laut- und Formenlehre* (Munich 1977) 101. The apophonic suffix would originally have shown o-grade in the maximally unmarked strong cases, on the basis of which the *Umlaut* would have been triggered.

Turning to the Italic dialects one discovers that both types of n-stems are preserved, although, significantly, the apophonic type is considerably more restricted than in Latin. Only two inherited classes of apophonic n-stems are preserved (or at least attested) in Italic: 1) neuter nouns in *-men-*: e.g., Umbr. *nome* (= Lat. *nomen*), gen. *nom-n-er*, dat. *nom-n-e*, etc. and Oscan *teremenniu*⁴⁴ 'boundaries' (a nom. pl. form, cf. Lat. *flumina*), dat. pl. *terem-n-iss*; 2) archaic "irregular" nouns: Umbr. *karu* (= Lat. *caro*), dat. sg. *kar-n-e*, and Oscan gen. sg. *car-n-eis*.⁴⁵ On the other hand a fairly large number of nouns with generalized *-ōn-* stems are attested in Italic: e.g., Osc. dat. sg. *sverr-un-ei*, an agent noun derived from IE **swer-* 'speak'; Paelig. gen. pl. *sem-un-u* (cf. Latin *Semo*); Umbr. acc. sg. *abr-un-u*, acc. pl. *abr-on-s* 'boars' (< **apr-ōn-*, cf. Lat. *aper*).⁴⁶ Furthermore it happens that both Oscan and Umbrian preserve the cognate of Latin *homo*. And in both dialects the stem appears with *-ō-* (or its reflex) as the predesinential vowel: Umbr. *hom-on-us* (= Lat. *hominibus*) Vb 10, 15; Osc. *hum-un-s* (= Lat. *homines*) Vetter 6.9 (the "Vibia curse"). Surely this fact cannot be a mere coincidence. Instead it seems clear that Livius' *homones* was an Italic gloss which was reused a generation later by Ennius. Outside of the three grammarians' notices cited in n. 40, the stem does not appear again in Latin.

Monetas (O. 30W.)⁴⁷

This a-stem genitive ending has traditionally been considered an archaism.⁴⁸ There is no doubt, of course, that the ending is archaic in the sense that it preserves an Indo-

⁴⁴ I take the spelling of the ending to reflect a palatalization of the stem-final /n/ before the high vowel -ū < /*ā/.

⁴⁵ Oscan and Umbrian share a third and innovative type of n-stem which corresponds to the Latin formant in *-io/-iōnis*: i.e., the type in **-ions/īn-* (see R. von Planta, *Grammatik der oskisch-umbrischen Dialekte*, vol. II [Strassburg 1897] 64 ff.).

⁴⁶ Varro, *LL* 5.97: *Porcus, quod Sabini +apruno porco por+, inde porcus*. More examples of normalized n-stems at von Planta, *Grammatik*, II, p. 61ff.

⁴⁷ *Nam divina Monetas filia docuit*; cf. *escas* (O 14 W.) and *Latonas* (O. 27 W.).

⁴⁸ Cf. n. 12 above.

European inheritance. Latin, however, abandoned this ending in favor of $\bar{a}\bar{i}$ (later $> -ae$) which was formed on the model of the corresponding o-stem ending in \bar{i} . The new ending was better integrated into the Latin declensional system than the inherited one, and it quickly and completely supplanted the latter. The surrounding Italic dialects did not possess the o-stem ending in \bar{i} nor, consequently, did they participate in the a-stem innovation. Instead they preserve and uniformly attest the inherited ending $\bar{a}s$: e.g., Umbr. *fiklas* (IIa 41), Paelig. *Perseponas* (Vetter 213.5), Marruc. *Jovias* (Vetter 218.7), Osc. *vereias* (Vetter 173.1). The point at issue here is whether these Livian examples of $\bar{a}s$ are truly native archaisms and were so perceived. A quick review of the evidence for this ending in Latin will suggest instead that they are dialect glosses which merely happen to be archaic from the point of view of comparative linguistics.

The evidence for a Latin genitive in $\bar{a}s$ is confined almost exclusively to old epic poetry.⁴⁹ In addition to the three Livian

⁴⁹ Most of the evidence is collected by F. Neue, *Formenlehre der lateinischen Sprache*³, rev. C. Wagener, vol. I (Leipzig 1902) 9-24. Note, however, that Charisius (1.18, 8 K.) cites *aulas* not as an attested example (so taken by Neue-Wagener, p. 10) but as a hypothetical one: *Dicunt quidam veteres in prima declinatione solitos nomina genetivo casu per as proferre, item dativo per i, veluti haec aula huius aulais huic aulai; item inde perserverasse 'pater familias,' item adhuc morem esse poetis in dativo casu, ut 'aulai medio' Vergilius, 'terrai frugiferai' Ennius in Annalibus*. This same passage is quoted in the *Excerpta ex Charisii Arte Grammatica* (538, 24 K.) with an interpolated addition of two more hypothetical examples (*terras* and *aquas*) which Neue-Wagener again mistake for genuine attestations. Charisius' reference to *Maias* (107.11 K.) also appears to involve a hypothetical example (*antiqui . . . nominativo singulari s litteram adiciebant ut facerent genetivum: haec familia huius familias, haec Maia huius Maias . . .*), although, if it actually was attested in old literature, this theonym was most likely culled from epic poetry (Livius?). Neue-Wagener do not cite *Coira* (v.1.1. *Coerae, Cofra, Cofrai, Cotra, Coera*) from a now lost clay dish (*CIL* I² 442 = XI.6708, 4) which has sometimes been seen as a reflex of **Coira(s)*—so taken by F. Stolz and J. Schmalz, *Lateinische Grammatik*⁴ (Munich 1910) 202 and A. Ernout, *Recueil de textes latins archaïques* (Paris 1947) 51. This is one of a collection of similar votive inscriptions which all take the form of THEONYM (gen. case) followed by POCOLO (M). Except in this one example, wherever the name is an a-stem noun, the ending is invariably in -AI: e.g., ACETIAI, BELOLAI, FORTUNAI, LAVERNAI, MENERVAI, VESTAI (*CIL* I² 439, 441, 443, 446, 447, 452). If the reading COIRA is correct—and that seems doubtful in light of the variant apographs—then the ending more likely reflects an engraver's omission of -I rather than -S.

examples we have *fortunas* and *Terras* from Naevius (19, 20 Mor.) and *vias* from Ennius (A. 153 V.).⁵⁰ Poetic, but not epic, is *Alcumenas* (unless this is intended to be a Greek genitive) in the highly artificial second (acrostic) argument to the *Amphitruo*. The *-ās* ending here saves the author of the argument from the necessity of eliding the word or rewriting his line. Elsewhere in the same argument (1.4) the normal Latin ending *-ae* is employed.

Apart from these seven examples we have only one certain attestation of the ending in Latin.⁵¹ That of course is the word *familias* in the phrases *pater familias* and *mater familias*. The plural of these phrases (e.g., *patres familias*, *patrum familias*—Cic. Verr. 3.51, 20; *matres familias*, *matribus familias*—Plaut. Stich. 1, 41) reveals that *familias* has been lexicalized as an indeclinable complement in Latin. The lexicalization of *familias* is at least as old as Plautus and most probably a much older and preliterate phenomenon. In other words, *familias* is not synchronically “genitive” at all;⁵² and

⁵⁰ All six examples are known to us only from a single passage (198, 11ff. K.) of Priscian. The distribution of the examples (one from Ennius, two from the much shorter poem of Naevius) and their relative abundance suggests that the list is exhaustive—at least as far as Priscian could tell.

⁵¹ *Quartas* (CIL IX.2398) from Samnite Allifae is very likely influenced by the local Oscan dialect. *Cornelias* (CIL X.8071, 38) from Pompeii is also in all probability a patois form—perhaps the influence is Oscan, but more likely Greek. *Devas Corniscas* (CIL I.2814 = VI.96) are dat. plur.—see A. Ernout, “Le parler de prenestes d’après les inscriptions,” *MSL* 13 (1905/6) 324.

⁵² That *familias* did not necessarily strike the Roman ear as genitive is suggested by the argument of Sisenna as reported by Charisius (107.14 K.): *sed emendatius . . . familiae* [i.e., rather than *familias*] *dicimus. Quod ne celebraretur Sisenna effecit. At enim eum qui diceret pater familiae etiam pluraliter dicere debere patres familiarum et matres familiarum. Quod quoniam erat durum et longe iucundius patrum familias sonabat, etiam pater familias ut diceretur consuetudo conprobavit* (cf. Varro, *LL* 8.73; Probus 211.27 K.). The point seems to be that the rationalized genitive of *pater familiae* would be subject to pluralization as *familiarum*, which was evidently a solecism (*erat durum*). Consequently the indeclinable form in *-as* which, in not being transparently “genitive,” did not embody a potential for pluralization, continued to be sanctioned by custom. Charisius goes on to argue that Sisenna’s point is not valid: *nec enim necesse est pluralem numerum rei adiunctae adhibere. Nam familia est ut plebs, et posset pater familiae dici ut tribunus plebis . . .* The problem with this and the other alleged parallels which follow is that the dependent genitive in such phrases is not logically subject to pluralization—i.e., there may be many tribunes, but there is only one *plebs*, a fact which makes the *tribunus plebis* different from the *pater familias*.

its indeclinable ending would not necessarily have been perceived as "archaic" by a Plautine or Livian audience any more than, say, the old objective genitive ending, which appears in English "toward-s" (as opposed to "toward"), is perceived by us as an archaism. But even if *familias*, despite its lexicalization as an indeclinable complement, was perceived as a quasi genitive, its aberrant form is more likely to have raised dialectal associations than archaic ones. I infer this from the fact that the word itself is probably not native to Latin and certainly was viewed as foreign by no less a scholar than Verrius Flaccus (P. ex F. 77, 11 L): *Famuli origo ab Oscis dependet, apud quos servus 'famel' nominabatur, unde et 'familia' vocata*. This testimony is corroborated by numerous Italic attestations of the word-family—e.g., Paelig. *famel* (= Lat. *famulus*; Vetter 209), Osc. *famelo* (= Lat. *familia*; Vetter 2.22).

It would seem, then, that there is no reliable evidence in Latin for the gen. ending in *-ās* outside of old poetry. Of the seven examples which we possess six are certifiably epic glosses—a seventh (*Maias*), if genuine, probably is also an epic gloss—and the remaining one (*Alcumenas*) is a nonce word. If the ending were truly an archaism, and was felt to be such by Livius and his audience of the period, then we should expect to find examples of *-ās* at least sporadically preserved in archaic or archaizing inscriptions.⁵³ But such is not the case: e.g., *Duelonai* (from the strongly archaizing *Epistula Consulum de Bacchanalibus*—CIL I² 581), *Voltai* (from a third c. bronze plate found at Falerii—CIL I² 364), and the third c. votive inscriptions quoted in n. 49 above. This fact should lead us to conclude, I believe, that the epic examples of *-ās* are literary dialect glosses (cf. Greek epic *-οιο* or *-αο* or *-έων* or Hesiodic *-ᾶν*) created in a tradition which Livius is responsible for establishing.

ocrim (T. 32 W.)⁵⁴

The only attestations of this word in Latin are these four

⁵³ As we do, for example, with the genuinely archaic case-form *-abus* found in Livian *dextrabus* (O. 46 W.): this ending is widely attested in Old Latin inscriptions.

⁵⁴ *Sed qui sunt hi qui ascendunt altum ocrim?* cf. *ocri* (T. 30 W.), *ocres* (T. 33, 35 W.).

fragments of Livius, perhaps all of them from the same play. The four examples are collected in a single passage of Festus (192.1ff. L.) who glosses the word as *mons confragosus* and attributes this information to the *Liber Glossematorum* of Ateius. Outside of Latin, however, the word or a derivative of it are several times attested in central Italic: 1) it frequently appears in the Iguvine Tables where it refers to the "Fisian Mount" (e.g., in the formula: *ocri-per fisiu*);⁵⁵ 2) it is found as an element of Latinized place-names in Umbria (e.g., *Ocriculum* "Mountain City," *Interocrea* "In-the-Heights"); and 3) it is employed in a "Marrucinian" public decree from Chieti (Vetter 218.6)—*ocres* "citadel." Thus it appears that Livius has here experimented with an Umbrian or, perhaps, Sabine gloss which was eschewed by later tragedians as a barbarism.

perbitat (T. 28 W.)⁵⁶

The Livian fragment comes from Nonius (225 L.) who quotes it to illustrate his gloss: *perbitere, perire*. In the same passage Nonius quotes three other examples of the word from fragments of: 1) Pacuvius' *Periboea*, 2) Ennius' *Hecuba*, and 3) Titinius' *Fullonia*. Two further examples of the verb are known from Plautus: *Pseud.* 778 and *Rud.* 495—cf. P. ex. F. 235 L. At first sight the presence of this word in Plautus and Titinius might be taken to invalidate the thesis that the word is a gloss associated with "serious" poetry, specifically tragedy. But a closer examination of the texts in question reveals that the word has a strongly tragic coloring.

The Ennius fragment (*Scaenica* 211-12 V.³) reads as follows:

set numquam scripstis, qui parentem aut hospitem
necasset, quo quis cruciatu (*Iunius*: quos . . . cruciatus
cdd) perbiteret.

It will be seen that *perbiteret* fills the final dipody of the *senarius*, the metrical slot which H. Hafter has called: "der

⁵⁵ J. W. Poultney, *The Bronze Tables of Iguvium* (Baltimore 1959), Index, s.v. *ocar/ukar*.

⁵⁶ *Ego puerum interead ancillae subdam lactantem meae / ne fame perbitat.*

beliebte Platz der altertuemlichen Formen."⁵⁷ The same holds true for the two Plautine *senarii* in which this word appears:

interminatust . . .

eum cras cruciatu maxumo perbitere.

(Pseud. 776-78)

utinam . . .

malo cruciatu in Sicilia perbiteres.

(Rud. 494-95)

Plautus here seems to be invoking that *iocosa sollemnitas* which forms such a distinctive element of his comic style. Indeed the verbal similarity of the Plautine passages to the Ennian fragment suggests that he may even be parodying Ennius. In either case, however, Plautus uses this word for an effect conditioned by its poetic (tragedic) aura, and not because it is a word "normal" to comic idiom. The Titinius fragment (17 Ribb.) which Nonius quotes also positions this gloss at the end of a *senarius*: . . . *iam pridem egressa aut perbiteres*. Titinius may be here, as often elsewhere, imitating Plautine vocabulary (see below), or he may simply be resorting to a "traditional" word to fill this metrically exigent position. Thus it appears that Livius' *perbitat* was a poetic word which attained some popularity as a gloss in tragedy, was parodied by Plautus, and was later reused in a stylized context by Titinius.

In addition to *perbito* six other compound verbs in *-bito* are attested for a total of eleven examples: *abito* (3 times), *adbito* (1), *imbito* (1), *interbito* (1), *praeterbito* (2), *rebito* (3). All eleven of these examples come from Plautus. Over half of them (six) are found in recitative *septenarii* or *cantica*—i.e., the highly rhetorical passages which are characterized by Plautus' most extravagant language.⁵⁸ Of the remaining examples, the

⁵⁷ *Untersuchungen zur altlateinischen Dichtersprache* (Berlin 1934) 115. Haffter's study demonstrated that the verse-endings of comic *senarii* tend to be characterized by quasi-formulaic elements of tragic diction—e.g., the archaisms *fuas* and *duim/duis*.

⁵⁸ E.g., the mock solemn: *ad fores auscultate atque adservate aedis, iniquis adventor gravior abeat quam adveniat* (Truc. 95-96); or the lead-up to a delayed punch-line: TY. *solus te solum volo*, / Hegio. HE. *istinc loquere, si quid vis, procul. tamen audiam*. / TY. *namque edepol si adbitres proprius, os denasabit tibi/mordicus* (Capt. 602-5). The other loci are: *Epid.* 145, 304; *Most.* 1096; *Rud.* 777.

three attestations of *rebito* come from a single play, the *Captivi*. All three appear in conditional protases which are verbally reminiscent of each other and are tied together by a shared function in the plot of the play.⁵⁹ Clearly Plautus is playing with the word, making a joke that turns on its strangeness and periodic reappearance in structurally identical contexts. Two examples of *praeterbito* complete this family of compound verbs. Although both of the lines in which *praeterbito* appears (*Epid.* 437, *Poen.* 1163) are *senarii*, the surrounding language and the dramatic contexts of each are markedly rhetorical.⁶⁰ In other words, even these two examples reveal the word as a "marked" form, a gloss, and not a free variant of *praeterire*.

The simplex of all these verbs is *baeto* (*būto*) which Nonius (108 L.) glosses as *ire* (cf. *Corp. Gloss. Lat.*, Index, s.v. *baeto*). Nonius quotes three examples of the word: two from tragedies by Pacuvius, and the third from a Menippean satire of Varro. In addition, the word is used four times by Plautus—always in *cantica* or *recitative* (*Curc.* 141; *Merc.* 465; *Mil.* 997; *Pseud.* 254). Here again the distribution of attestations reveals the verb to be a gloss associated with old tragedy and the more extravagant language of Plautus. Precisely because it was a gloss did Varro resurrect it into the fantastic idiom of Menippean composition.

So far as we can judge, Livius inaugurated the use of this group of tragic glosses which contain the root-verb, *baeto*. Neither the simplex nor any compound form of the verb appears in epigraphic Latin, nor indeed in any literary context other than those discussed above.⁶¹ Yet the root **baet-* is independently attested in two Italic dialects: Osc. *baiteis* (Vetter 161) "you are going"; Umbr. (*h*) *ebetrafe* (VIa 12, VIb 13) "to

⁵⁹ *Capt.* 378-81 (Tyndarus to Philocrates): *convenit . . . si non rebites huc, ut viginti minas/dem pro te*; 409 (Tyndarus to himself): *et mea opera, si hinc rebito, faciam ut faciat facilius*; 747 (Tyndarus to Hegio): *at unum hoc quaeso, si huc rebitet Philocrates*.

⁶⁰ In the *Epidicus*, the *miles* is making a pompous threat. Hanno, in the *Poenulus*, is word-playing on Agorastocles' question while concluding the climactic *sponsio* scene.

⁶¹ Ernout (*Éléments*—n. 24 above—p. 117) cites *adbito* from Lucilius (393 Warmington). But *adbitere* is actually Schneider's emendation of an obviously corrupt *abbire* in Velius Longus (7.62, 18 K.). Marx's emendation, *abbibere*, which is accepted by Warmington, fits the context of the Velius passage much better (cf. *ebibit* at 7.63, 5).

the exits"—a postpositional phrase incorporating the agent noun **e-bait-ra*. Taken with the distribution of the Latin attestations, this Italic evidence suggests that the root-verb is a dialect gloss which was imported by Livius into Latin. The extraordinarily high incidence of this gloss in Plautus is perhaps an Umbrianism—i.e., a reflection of his native dialect.

* * *

These five examples and perhaps others⁶² provide evidence that Livius did indeed import dialect glosses into the poetic idiom he was crafting virtually *ex nihilo*. It is interesting that the range of features comprises phonological differences (as in *insece*), inflectional differences (as in the stem of *homōnes* or the ending of *Monetas*), and lexical differences (as in *ocrim* and *-bitat*). All three kinds of dialectalisms are also found in Greek poetry (e.g., Homeric *πόλις*, *ἐκόμισσα* or *ἄμμες*, *ἄναξ*). Thus in imbuing his poetic idiom with a tincture of such features Livius was responding to both the precepts of Hellenistic literary theory and the example of his native Greek literature.

Four of the glosses which were discussed above continued to be used in poetry for a generation or more, but all of them were eventually abandoned as being what Quintilian called: *ab ultimis et iam obliteratis repetita temporibus*.⁶³ Yet there is evidence that later Romans were not unaware of the existence of dialect glosses in the poetry of the archaic period. For example in the book which Varro devotes to discussion of the language of old poetry (*L.L.* 7) dialectal origin is often attrib-

⁶² E.g., *amplotens* (*O.* 19 W.), an apophonic variant of *amplectens*, contains a root vowel which Ernout-Meillet call "obscur" (*Dictionnaire*⁴, p. 514, s.v. *plecto*). Manu Leumann (*Lat. Laut- und Formenlehre* [Munich 1977] 47) is more specific: "Eine Vokalstufe *plok* wie in gr. *πλόκαμος* neben *πλέκω* ist im Verbum unverständlich; aber ein Lautwandel *e > o* ist hier auch unwahrscheinlich." A primary present stem with o-grade is indeed an anomaly in Latin, but not in Umbrian where the phenomenon is not infrequent—e.g., *SUKATU* 'let him proclaim,' the obscure verb *holtu*, and perhaps *purdovitu* 'let him present.' This comparative evidence suggests that Livius' *amplotens* may be an Umbrianism.

⁶³ . . . *qualia sunt 'topper' et 'antegerio' et 'exanclare' et 'prosapia' et Saliorum carmina vix sacerdotibus suis satis intellecta* (1.6, 40). *Topper* and *exanclare* are attested in Livius. Quintilian admonishes that such words are so outmoded that to reuse them is an offensive affectation.

uted to individual words: e.g., Ennius' *cascus* is called "Sabine" (section 28); his *subulo* is "Etruscan" (35); his *catus* is "Sabine" (46); Naevius' *asta* is said to be "Oscan" (54); *crepusculum* in Plautus is "Sabine" (77), and so forth. We can discern a similar judgement in Verrius Flaccus (through Festus) who identifies, for example, Ennius' *tongent* as "Umbrian" (cf. Varro, *L.L.* 7.67, where the same gloss is called "Greek"), and so forth. Sometimes dialect glosses may have been overused to the point of barbarism. At any rate that seems to be the substance behind Titinius' criticism of playwrights who wrote "in Oscan and Volscian."⁶⁴ And it may be at the root of Cicero's judgement (*Brut.* 258) that the poets Caecilius and Pacuvius wrote bad Latin in contrast with the pure and pristine language of the orators Laelius and Scipio. If such excesses occurred, however, I would suggest that they were not the result of unintended *rusticitas*, but that rather they were conscious stylistic experiments which failed to please the changed tastes of a later audience.⁶⁵

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⁶⁴ Fr. 104 Ribb.: *qui Obsce et Volsce fabulantur: nam Latine nesciunt.*

⁶⁵ "The essential problem was that the analogy to Greek conditions introduced by Livius was a false one: Oscan, Umbrian, etc. do not stand in the same relation to Latin as Aeolic and Ionic to Attic: they are different languages, not related dialects of a single language, and therefore words borrowed from them could not take root once the criterion of *Latinitas* was adopted"—A. R. Dyck in a letter to me dated 19 Feb. 1980. My thanks to him and to Profs. J. P. Hershbelle, J. F. Miller, and W. N. Nichipor for criticising an earlier draft of this paper. My thanks also to the University of Minnesota for a single quarter leave to research and write the study.

THE USE OF *BINEÏN KINEÏN*

There has been much debate recently¹ over Henderson's² contention that *βινεῖν κινεῖν* are used only of violent and/or illicit intercourse, never a husband's normal relations with his wife.

No one has yet quoted, by way of refutation of this dogma, the following epigram from the Anthology by Nicarchus:

*Οὐδεὶς τὴν ἰδίην συνεχῶς, Χαρίδημε, γυναῖκα
κινεῖν ἐκ ψυχῆς τερπόμενος δύναται
οὕτως ἢ φύσις ἐστὶ φιλόκνισος, ἀλλοτριόχρωσ,
καὶ ξητεῖ διόλου τὴν ξενοκυσθαπάτην.*

(AP 11.7)

Or this one from the pen of Moschus:

*Τὴν γραῦν ἐκκομίσας, φρονίμως πάνυ Μόσχος ἔγνημε
παρθένον ἢ φερνὴ δ' ἔνδον ἔμεινεν ὅλη.
Ἄξιον αἰνῆσαι Μόσχου φρένας, ὅς μόνος οἶδε
καὶ τίνα δεῖ κινεῖν καὶ τίνα κληρονομεῖν.*

(AP 11.202)

In the first of these two epigrams, the manuscript reading *κινεῖν* is retained by Dübner, Waltz, and Beckby; Paton printed *βινεῖν* (albeit not tampering with the second poem). The Planudean variant *αἰνεῖν* has little sense or point, and is no doubt one of that scholar's typical exercises in expurgation.³

The sexual meaning of *κινεῖν* (along with its compounds) might have originated as an euphemism, but it certainly became established as an obscenity in its own right. The presence of *βινεῖν* and *προσκινεῖσθαι*, in the same sentence in a fragment of Xenarchus (ap. Athenaeus 569D) is one proof of that. So are

¹ C. Collard, *LCM* 4 (1979) 213-14; A. H. Sommerstein, *LCM* 5 (1980) 47; H. D. Jocelyn, *LCM* 5 (1980) 65-67. The editor of that journal has since vetoed further contributions to the debate.

² J. J. Henderson, *The Maculate Muse* (New Haven 1975) 151-52.

³ For the bowdlerising activities of Planudes, see E. J. Kenney, 'A Byzantine Version of Ovid,' *Hermes* 91 (1965) 224-27. *αἰνω*, a rarish synonym of *πρίσσω*, would have been a more interesting possibility; cp. the Latin *molo*. For a possibly obscene use of the cognate noun *πρισμός*, see Henderson, op. cit., 184.

jingles such as *βινεῖν καὶ κινεῖν* (Lucian, *Paras.* 10), phrases like *σκέλεα κινεῖν*,⁴ and the creation of a desiderative verb *κινητιᾶν* which occurs in texts both with and without *βινητιᾶν* as a variant.⁵ Where *βινεῖν* and *κινεῖν* co-exist as textual variants in the manuscripts of Aristophanes, palaeography rather than bowdlerisation appears to be responsible. Certainly, there is no pattern to suggest euphemism on the part of a particular scribe or tradition: the Ravenna manuscript has *κινεῖν* at *Ach.* 1052, *βινεῖν* at *Eq.* 364.

Words can gain or lose in strength of meaning in the development of any language. The most pertinent case is that of *ὄπνιω*. In Homer and other early poets, it means "marry." Solon, according to Hesychius, employed it of married love as the opposite to *βινεῖν*. Yet in later Greek, the verb came to mean simply having intercourse; Palladas (*AP* 10.56.7) provides a good example. The Latin *futuo* is also instructive. Although it may have had a respectable etymology in the Greek *φύω*, the word became an obscenity.⁶ Martial, however, twice uses it for comic effect of marital sex: 9.41.5: *nempe semel futuit, generaret Horatius ut tres* (note the variant *saliit*); 11.71.1-2: *hystericam vetulo se dixerat esse maritolet queritur futui Leda necesse sibi*.

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⁴ Herodas 5.2; cf. the Latin *tollere pedes*, in indecent contexts such as Martial 11.71.7-8.

⁵ Menander, *Dysc.* 462; cf. G. Pascucci, 'Κινητιᾶν,' *Atene e Roma* n.s. 4 (1959) 102-5. The verb is found without variant in *Vita Aesopi* 32 (= Perry, *Aesopica*, p. 47); with variant *βινητιᾶν* in Plato Comicus (*ap.* Athenaeus 442A), on which see Cobet, *Variae Lectiones* (Leiden 1854) 218.

⁶ This etymology, however, is not universally accepted; the *Oxford Latin Dictionary* (for easy instance) regards the origins of *futuo* as "dubious."

REVIEWS

GREGORY NAGY. *The Best of the Achaeans. Concepts of the Hero in Archaic Greek Poetry*. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979. Pp. xvi + 392. \$15.00.

Throughout the large number of subjects examined by N. the hero remains in the center. The hero in poetry, the hero in cult, his death in the epic tale and his immortality in *κλέος* are studied while individual heroes like Achilles, Odysseus, Hector, Pyrrhus-Neoptolemus and not a little surprisingly even Homer as a hero are used to give substance to arguments and conclusions. Many other topics receive attention and are invariably shown in a new light. In fact the light in which familiar phrases, sentences, passages as well as larger units are presented is so surprising and so many startling relationships are discovered that one wonders about N.'s guiding ideas. He himself when setting forth his "assumptions" in the 'Introduction' stresses his debt to Milman Parry's work. Few will find fault with this commitment nor need we here argue about rigid or flexible formulas or about the meritorious efforts made in some quarters to relate Parry's approach to design and large scale composition. For where N. resorts to epic passages he seems to use formulaic and non-formulaic material indiscriminately. On the other hand he expands the concept of traditional poetry far beyond formulas and typical scenes, comprehending under it large themes and their interconnections, situations, emotions, especially as attached to specific characters and much else. However if "the genius behind our *Iliad*'s artistic unity is in large part the Greek epic tradition itself" (79) and if not only Homer's and Hesiod's but even Pindar's individuality practically disappears in the "immensely creative process" of countless generations which reduces them to a "mere function or instrument of the poetry itself" (5f., 19f.), interpreters are destined to struggle and stumble in quicksand. Even if we discount such obvious exaggerations as e.g. the reference to "myriad previous compositions" (41), N.'s construction remains hopelessly vague. His own analysis of *Iliad* Book 9 encounters fatal obstacles; for as we shall presently see, his thesis requires a particularly ingenious individual poet while the blunders that we shall find would somehow—but it is hard to see how—have to be distributed between this individual and the tradition.

It is high time to become specific. Demodocus' first song in the *Odyssey* relates a quarrel between Achilles and Odysseus during a sacrificial meal. Agamemnon, we read (8.78) rejoices at seeing the *ἄριστοι Ἀχαιῶν* quarrel, for he recalls an oracle of Apollo that an event of this kind was to be *πῆματος ἀρχή* for Trojans and Danaans (8.79-82). Inevitably this falling out of two *ἄριστοι* reminds us of *Iliad* 1 and makes us wonder whether Agamemnon misunderstood the oracle.

On the topic of this song quite diverse views have been taken. N. may well disagree with von der Mühl and others who trace the story to the *Cypria*. Improvisation or recapitulation is the alternative we have to face; yet when N. develops his theory of a rival "Iliadic tradition" built around the conflict between Achilles and Odysseus (25, 65 and pass.) he builds a huge edifice on very treacherous foundations. For quite probably the contest between Achilles' advocacy of *βία* and Odysseus' of *μητις* rests on nothing better than the speculations of Alexandrian or other exegetes that are recorded in the scholia to the *Odyssey* passage.¹ As it is impossible here to report the arguments for and against the various theories about Demodocus' story, I am content to draw attention to a single word in v. 74 which seems to have been overlooked: οἴμης τῆς τότ' ἄρα κλέος οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἴκανε. If the song was so famous τότε, i.e. in the days of Demodocus, Alcinous and Odysseus, it is evidently no longer so at the time of the *Odyssey*. To the audience it comes as a novelty, a most highly valued νεωτάτη, (cf. *Od.* 1.351f.) and N. fortunately does not maintain that the poet tries to revive something that had fallen into oblivion.

If so little is left of the case for the age-old tradition the prospects for discovering allusions to it in the *Iliad* are not bright. The most intriguing ones that N. brings to light (on which I must concentrate) are in the 'Embassy' of Book 9. When Ajax, Odysseus and Phoenix visit Achilles to effect his return to battle Achilles finds ways—at once subtle and brutal—to show Odysseus his opinion of him. The much discussed duals (instead of plurals) of this Book do not indicate an original absence of Phoenix from the embassy. Rather, we now learn, Odysseus is pointedly ignored, most notably in Achilles' words of welcome: χαίρετον ἢ φίλω ἄνδρε ἰκάνετον (v. 197; cf. ἔστον v. 198). Only Ajax and Phoenix qualify as φίλτατοι (ibid.; 52 ff.). Other duals in this section conform to normal usage (50) yet N. has overlooked those in v. 182 and v. 183 which must refer to all three men and cannot be a snub since Achilles is not present.

After this initial nastiness Achilles' behavior is perfect. He honors Odysseus at the meal and listens patiently to his long speech. Still at the beginning of his reply when he emphatically declares: ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κείνος ὁμῶς Ἀίδαο πύλῃσιν / ὅς χ' ἕτερον μὲν κεύθῃ ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ εἶπῃ he tells Odysseus, the "consummate dissembler" very plainly what he thinks of him (52, 58). Must it really be pointed out that words that suit Achilles' forthright character so perfectly and are an excellent prelude to his uncompromisingly negative answer cannot without

¹ The entire pertinent information has recently been collected by Stefan Radt (ed.), *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta (TrGF)* vol. 4 (Göttingen, 1977) 425ff. under the heading of Sophocles' satyr play *Ξύνδαιπνοι* vel *Ξύνδαιπνον*. A factual error of N. needs correction; for slight as it is it may encourage wrong conclusions. Aristarchus does not know a 'tradition' (24, 46) about a quarrel or rivalry between Achilles and Odysseus. The subject is for him a 'problem' (ζήτημα; see N. himself p. 22).

very strong support in the text be claimed for a purpose which is unrelated to the conception of the Book and which besides other disastrous results would turn Achilles into a greater dissembler than Odysseus; for he would say one thing and mean another, whereas Odysseus keeps the other in his mind. N. recognizes "artistic masterstrokes" in the "retention of the dual greeting" and other clever turns (54). What about the far more basic and significant masterstroke (which in another perspective looked rather like a bad blunder) of including Odysseus, Achilles' deadly enemy in the delegation sent to allay Achilles' wrath and of allowing wise Nestor to give him a special sense of urgency (v. 180)?

I have made it a point to examine N.'s arguments one by one and to indicate oversights and other mistakes, although I felt sure (and I believe many would agree with me) that so sophisticated a technique of allusions is quite alien to the early epic and would hardly be found even in Hellenistic poetry. Reasons of space exclude a continuation of this critical report which covers only three of N.'s twenty chapters. Again and again I have noticed a use of passages without sufficient attention to their immediate as well as to their larger context and with disregard of alternative explanations that come readily to mind and remain persuasive. About the etymologies introduced in the later chapters I feel uneasy but must leave the judgment to others; what is certain is that N. often extracts from words or phrases more meaning than they readily yield. Still I would not doubt that of the very numerous ideas advanced in this book some will prove valuable. What N. says on pp. 114-17 about the relations of the heroes of the epic and those of cult may well be appreciated by other students of this subject. That the *θεράπων* motif as exemplified by Patroclus' relation to Achilles signifies more than what appears on the surface (33, 292ff. and pass.) is perfectly possible. And when we are introduced to Achilles in the role of a ritual 'antagonist' or 'rival' of Apollo (143ff.) we may not feel very sure about the thematic similarities, even though *μῆνις* might seem to pass back and forth between them—W. Burkert whose authority N. here invokes stays more cautiously within the limits of safety (see *Rh. Mus.* 118 [1975] 19), and Schadewaldt's brilliant appraisal of Apollo's role (*Der Aufbau der Ilias* [Frankfurt a.M. 1975] 93ff.) suggests a different perspective—and yet there is some substance to this 'rivalry' and one regrets that N. damages his case by seeking to construct an analogous rivalry between Hector and Athena (144ff.). He considers them comparable as 'city-protectors' and as possessing *μῆτις*; yet Athena refuses to act as *ῥυσίπολις* (*Il.* 6.311) and Hector's *μῆτις* ranks from the beginning below Polydamas' and when it comes to the test proves deplorably inferior to it (13.724-33; 18.247-52, 312f.). Still I cling to the hope that there are redeeming features, even if my own search for them has been frustrating.

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ARISTOTLE. *De Motu Animalium*. Text with Translation, Commentary and Interpretative Essays by Martha Craven Nussbaum. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1978. Pp. xxiv + 431. \$30.00.

Aristotle's zoological works are the most neglected part of the corpus. No full commentary on any of them has been published in this century and the *GA* is the only one of which a modern critical edition exists. Yet Aristotle devoted a great deal of time and energy to the study of biology, and his writings on this subject can throw light on many aspects of his thought. The short *De motu animalium*, in particular, deals with questions which have a bearing on cosmology and ethics as well as zoology. It is gratifying, therefore, to find that someone who is qualified both as a philosopher and a classical scholar has prepared an elaborate edition of this treatise. Her book, originally a Harvard Ph.D. thesis, contains a brief introductory section on the authenticity of the work (which was generally considered spurious until rehabilitated by W. W. Jaeger in 1913¹) and the transmission, a new critical text and translation, five long "interpretative essays" dealing with the major philosophical issues raised in the *MA*, a detailed commentary, bibliography and three indices.

The text is a great improvement on its predecessors. It is based on ten manuscripts of which five have not been used before, while the remainder have been newly collated; in addition N. has used the mediaeval Latin tradition, represented by the translation of William of Moerbeke and the paraphrase of Albertus Magnus, and the Greek commentary of Michael of Ephesus.² She has corrected a substantial number of misreadings by previous editors and her use of Michael's evidence is more circumspect than theirs, as a comparison of her *apparatus* with Jaeger's at 700 a15, b33, 702 b 19 will show.³ Her collations have established that the manuscripts fall into two main groups, *a* containing EYV, and *b*; within *b*, sub-groups are formed by O^d S (= *b*₁) and X H^a L (= *b*₂), while P shows signs both of

¹ "Das Pneuma im Lykeion," *Hermes* 48 (1913) 29ff. = *Scripta Minora* (Rome 1960) 1.57ff.

² In her commentary she also refers to the paraphrases of Buridan and William Burley. It appears that her thesis included a full discussion of these, and one rather hopes that she will see her way to publishing this material in some form.

³ The *apparatus* which accompanies her text is selective, but a fuller version giving all the readings of seven of the ten manuscripts, together with a detailed description and evaluation of the manuscripts and earlier editions and a discussion of selected textual problems, has been published in *HSCP* 80 (1976) 111-59. Some additional readings of P, one of the manuscripts not fully reported by N., can be found in the *apparatus* of Bekker, Jaeger (Teubner 1913) and Louis (Budé 1973). In her choice of readings N. has been considerably influenced by the suggestions of A. S. L. Farquharson (in the notes on his translation, Oxford 1912).

contamination with *a* and of access to a source independent of either group. The indirect tradition, Greek and Latin, generally agrees with *b*, but William seems to have had access to the same independent source as *P*. None of these authorities can be neglected; each group and almost every manuscript has its moment of glory, when it alone preserves the correct reading. *N*.’s reasoned eclecticism continues the policy adopted by Jaeger and by Ross in his edition of the *Parva Naturalia* (Oxford 1955; see especially p. 62ff.) as against Torraca⁴ and Louis, whose editions lean more heavily towards one group of authorities or the other.

Interesting as these results are, their value for the constitution of the text might seem, at first sight, to be limited. On my count, *N*. has introduced 21 readings never before printed in an edition of the Greek text, only four of which come from ancient sources previously unknown: 700 a 8, *b*, *N*; 700 b 24, where the earlier editors misread *P*; 701 b 30, *b*₂ *NA*; 702 b 19, *X*. But such an impression would be misleading. *N*.’s researches have given a new depth and solidity to our knowledge of the history of the text. Readings formerly attributed to a single manuscript or to Leonicus’ sixteenth-century Latin translation (1) have been assigned to their place in the tradition, and this has sometimes shifted the balance of authority sufficiently to warrant a change in the text (e.g. at 702 a 22). In five places conjectures by Jaeger (700 a 15, 26) Bonitz (702 a 20) and Farquharson (702 b 19, 703 a 22) have been confirmed. On the other hand misreadings, including some which were received into the text by some editors, have been removed (e.g. at 698 a 8), and even where no new information has come to light, *N*.’s familiarity with the tradition has sharpened her discrimination in choosing between variants or, where all the authorities go wrong, emending the text. She has also paid great attention to punctuation and often succeeded in clarifying the argument by this means.⁵

The translation and commentary do not, unfortunately, match the excellence of the text. The commentary assembles practically all the material needed for understanding the *MA* and succeeds in clarifying many of its obscurities, but tends to be diffuse and lacking in incisiveness, and her conclusions are not always convincing. The translation is clear and accurate on the whole, but not entirely free from misunderstandings. Its most striking stylistic feature is a tendency to break Aristotle’s long sentences up into shorter ones. This makes the argument easier to follow, but with some loss of authenticity; we seem

⁴ Naples, 1958; I only know this edition from reviews and the reports of Louis and *N*. herself.

⁵ A few grumbles. At 700 a 29 *ἦτερ* seems to be a misprint for *ἦντερ*; at 702 b 10 a semicolon has been omitted after *ἐνταῦθα*. The *apparatus* on 699 b 26 is printed on p. 29 and not with its text on p. 31; at 703 b 32 there is no note to say that the deletion of *ἀρχή* is due to Farquharson. The *apparatus* on 698 b 16 and 700 a 30 is obscure, and the abbreviation “A.M.” for Albert’s paraphrase can be confused with some of the other sigla.

to hear N. speaking rather than Aristotle. To illustrate, I have picked out some passages for detailed comment.

698 a 15 *πρῶτον μὲν οὖν*: not "above all," but "first of all" ("before all else," Farquharson). Aristotle is starting from the bottom, as it were, with the most obvious sense in which animal movements require an unmoved *ἀρχή*, which is also the one most remote from the Unmoved Mover of the heavens. For *πρῶτον μὲν*, see *Index Arist.* 654 a 11; here it is picked up by *ὅτι μὲν οὖν* at 698 b 4 and responded to by *ἀλλά* at b 8. This helps to explain why Aristotle does not mention muscles, tendons etc. at this point, an omission which seems to worry N. (p. 281, 284): he is not concerned with mechanisms, but with the simple observation that the movement of limbs starts from a joint which is (relatively) unmoved.

698 a 27 *τὰ δ' ἐν ταῖς καμπαῖς*, etc: N. translates, "In the case of joints, the centres become now one, now divided," supplying *κέντρα* to go with the article from *κέντρον* at a 25. But a joint only has one centre, located in the middle of the convex member. What "becomes one and many" is (a) the joint as a whole, i.e. the two bones with their interlocking convex and concave ends, and (b) more strictly, the surfaces of the ends of the bones where one moves inside the other, which would coincide in the same way as the inner surface of a container coincides with the outer surface of its content (*Phys.* 212 a 6ff.). In *τὰ* we have the idiomatically vague use of the neuter plural: Louis' "ce qui constitue les articulations" renders it correctly and Leonicus seems to be on the right lines.

698 b 6f.: of the two possible interpretations suggested on p. 285, the first is preferable (it is strange, in a commentary of this length, that N. should say that "both have been argued for," without giving references or saying what arguments were used). Any animal movement, even of one finger, requires an internal unmoved *ἀρχή*, but if the animal is to move as a whole, it also needs an external one to provide a "fulcrum"; this will be the subject of c. 2.

699 a 15: *θγγάνειν*, like *ἄπτεσθαι*, can be used of "making contact" with abstract objects: *Metaph.* 1051 b 24, 1072 b 21. The ambiguity may be deliberate, but Aristotle does not, at this point, commit himself to any view of the unmoved mover. He is only asking if there is such a mover in the case of the heavens, i.e. whether there is an analogy with animal movement.

699 a 16 *εἴτ' εὐθὺς ἀκίνητόν τὸ κινούμεν*; "If the mover was unmoved from the first" implies the alternative that the mover was moved at some earlier time. But the alternatives Aristotle intends to pose are that either the heavens are moved by a moved mover which in turn is moved by an unmoved mover (a 14), or it is directly moved by an unmoved mover, without the intervention of a moved mover (i.e. the heavenly sphere itself is the *primum mobile*). Louis' "directement" translates *εὐθὺς* correctly.

699 a 26 *ἀν τις διαπορήσειεν*: N. translates "one might conclude" and complains (p. 299) that this is "blatantly question-begging," but her translation fails to bring out the provisional nature of the "con-

clusion": a clarification of the problem, not its solution. Louis has the right nuance with "on pourrait se demander s'il n'existe pas . . ."

699 a 27ff.: the commentary on the Atlas myth is long-winded and heavy-footed and does little to advance our understanding of Aristotle or confirm the authenticity of the *MA* (in *Cael.* 284 a 22 *οἱ ὕστερον* must be the philosophers whose views are discussed at a 25ff., and the subject of *ὑπέστησαν* are *οἱ συστήσαντες τὸν λόγον* of a 21): The earliest extant writer to suggest that Atlas *turned* the heavens, rather than just supporting them on his shoulders, is Ennius *Ann.* 59 Warmington; none of the passages quoted by N. shows conclusively that the idea was current in literature before the time of Aristotle. But it is quite possible that Aristotle extended the traditional image himself, as with Oceanus and Tethys (*Metaph.* 983 b 30). The authenticity of the *MA* cannot be decided by such arguments.

N.'s views on the philosophical import of this passage have to be sought in the second of her interpretative essays (p. 127ff.), where she battles valiantly to establish that it has some direct relevance to Aristotle's own theory. Unfortunately she seems to have misunderstood his meaning. In the "Atlas theory" the earth behaves neither as a mathematical point nor as the hub of a wheel of which the outer heavens would be the circumference, but as its axle, performing a function analogous to the stationary part of a joint. This "mythical" theory, according to Aristotle, is reasonable provided that (a) the earth is not regarded as part of the moving system—*τοῦ παντός* must be a synonym for *τοῦ οὐρανοῦ* (cf. *Index Arist.* 571 b 54ff.), but it is an odd expression to use in the context—and (b) the forces required to move the heavens and their moved mover are no greater than those making for the stability of the earth at the centre of the universe. (b) is then refuted; (a), which those who held the mythological world-picture would probably have accepted, is passed over without further comment. In spite of N.'s objections, Aristotle's argument seems to be purely dialectical and to assume that all bodies have weight; her suggestion that Aristotle means to criticise and revise something he said in the *De caelo* (286 a 12ff.), is far-fetched. But dialectical is not the same as *eristic*; what Aristotle is doing is to show that his conclusion about the need for a stationary "fulcrum" for every movement is in accord with the intuitions about the movement of the heavens which found expression in the Atlas myth.

699 b 12: N. (p. 139ff., 311ff.) tries to interpret the first two sections of c. 4 (to 700 a 6) as a continuous argument, in which Aristotle tries to show that there cannot be a force within the universe capable of moving the whole system and then hints, without trying to develop the suggestion further, that this is no objection to an unmoved mover outside the universe. But b 31 seems to mark the preceding paragraph off as a digression, and her interpretation of the Greek is rather strained.⁶ The first difficulty is the subject of *ὑπερβάλλη* in b 14; N.

⁶ In general, chapters 4 and 5 read like a series of notes on subsidiary points arising out of the first three chapters, which Aristotle wanted to dispose of

translates τις as "someone" (and in her note on b 25 suggests that the source of the hypothetical "overwhelming force" is a doubly hypothetical "sixth body"), but surely it must refer back to κινήσεις τῶν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μορίων of b 12; otherwise there would be no point in mentioning the μόρια at all. So the problem is, "Suppose that one of the elements were to have a movement powerful enough to displace the earth" (τῆς κινήσεως in b 14 might seem redundant, but was probably put in to balance ἡρεμίαν in b 15). In b 16 δύναμις must be the earth's power of staying at the centre of the universe, as Michael says (p. 109. 27ff.), not, as N. and Farquharson seem to think, the force which might displace the earth; for it is said to be finite because the bulk and weight of the earth are finite. Otherwise we would have to translate, "The power from which this force *would* originate *would not need to be* infinite" (so Louis), but there is no warrant for this in the Greek. This interpretation will make sense of ἀλλήλων in b 26, where the meaning must be that if any element exerted overwhelming force, the rest would be destroyed by it. N. takes it to mean that the elements would destroy each other after being moved from their natural places by the "overwhelming force" of her "sixth body," but there is no reason why they should, since none would be powerful enough to overcome the rest.

The problem, then, is this: suppose there is a force in the universe corresponding to the mythical Atlas: it would destroy the world. But there is no *logical* reason why there should not be such a force, and therefore no logical necessity for the world to be indestructible, as Aristotle believed (*Cael.* 1.12). At this point he breaks off, wisely, one may think.

699 b 32: Aristotle now returns to the questions raised at the beginning of c. 3 (699 a 12), whether the universe, like individuals, needs an unmoved source of movement outside itself, but his only answer is a quotation from the *Iliad* (8.20ff.). Evidently he does not want to discuss the movement of the universe in detail here, only to suggest, as briefly as possible, that it involves the same factors as animal movement. But the implication that the mover of the world is divine and (eternally) unmoved reminds him that this may be a way to re-establish the eternity of the world, which the previous argument appeared to threaten (cf. *Phys.* 259 b 32ff.). There is a movement of surpassing power in the world, that of the heavenly spheres; but it is caused by an eternally unmoved mover acting on matter capable only of circular movement in its own natural place, and therefore by its very nature it cannot ever cause any mischief elsewhere. — In 700 a 5 εἰ must mean "seeing that"; N. seems to accept this in her notes, but her translation does not make it clear.

before going on to the second part of his main argument in c. 6. It seems possible that some of them were first raised in discussion by members of Aristotle's audience; while such a suggestion must be treated with great caution, it would obviate the need to suppose that he is arguing every time against a fully fledged theory advanced by some earlier thinker.

700 b 12: *ἐμψυχα* does not include the heavenly spheres, because they have been mentioned separately (b 11) and the movement of the *ἐμψυχα* is said to be limited. N. tries to avoid this difficulty by claiming that *πέρας* in b 13 means "the end to which the motion is directed," but this is to attribute teleological causation to the movement of inanimate things, something she strongly denies elsewhere. In b 32 *πέρας* undoubtedly means "limit" and is confined to animal movements.

700 b 35: N.'s objections to *πρότερον* or *πρότερόν τι* are well founded, but *πρὸς ἕτερον* does not give a satisfactory meaning either. What is the point of "contrasting, parenthetically, both sorts of moving beings with the unchanging first mover"? And if such a contrast is intended, what is meant by describing the Unmoved/Mover as "not relative"? The only thing with which a non-relative good can be meaningfully contrasted is a relative good. Moreover, the difference needing to be explained is that animal movements are limited whereas that of the *primum mobile* is not. It looks as if a clause to the effect that animal movements are caused by a (real or apparent) good relative to the individual and his situation has been lost before *τὸ δὲ ἀίδιον καλόν*. This would account for the corruption of *πρὸς ἕτερον* in most manuscripts.

701 a 3: N.'s conjecture *κινήσεων* is interesting and may be right. But Jaeger's reading *γινόμενων ἐν τοῖς κινουμένοις* has the advantage of emphasising that *φορά* is the last movement "in order of generation," and that this does not infringe the doctrine that in itself local movement is prior to the other kinds (700 a 29, etc).

701 a 28ff.: surely the point of the "drinks" example (a 32) is that the major premiss is not verbalised; we simply feel thirsty and reach for the glass. *ἡ ἐπιθυμία λέγει* is metaphorical; in fact desire takes the place of explicit thinking, as in animals. *τὴν ἑτέραν πρότασιν* (a 26) should be translated "one of the two premisses," as it is by Forster.

702 a 5ff.: "Memory and anticipation, using things of this kind (i.e. feelings of confidence, fears, sexual excitement etc.) as likenesses, are . . . responsible for the same things (i.e. heating and chilling in the body)." According to N., Aristotle's use of the expression *οἶον εἰδώλοις χρώμεναι τοῖς τοιοῦτοις*, instead of *τῶν τοιοῦτων*, marks a new development in his theory of memory: memory and imagination have as their objects, not representative images of things (as in *Mem.* 450 b 20ff.), but the things themselves as something past or future. If this were correct, there would be no reason why *εἰδῶλα* should be mentioned at all. It would certainly be wrong to say that the actual state of affairs, perceived as past or future, was being used as images; when we feel pleasure or pain by imagining a pleasant or painful state of affairs, we are not experiencing a real state of affairs as if it were an image, but something which exists only in our minds as if it were objectively present here and now. So we must return to the translation of Farquharson and Forster, "Using, as it were, images of such things . . ."

702 a 14: *μηδὲν ἀπολίπη* . . . *τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ*: not, "falls short . . . of

the account we give of them," but "... of the elements of its essence (or definition)." So Michael (p. 120.15ff.), Farquharson, Forster and Louis.

703 a 22ff.: N. accepts Farquharson's conjectures, except that she keeps *ἀβίαστος*; but the adverbial form is better grammar and the parallel in Pl. *Tim.* 61 a (quoted in *HSCP* 80.157) supports it: there adverbial *βία* is used with *συστάντα* in the first clause and the adjective *ἀβίαστον* without a participle in the second. Even so, I am not certain that the cure is complete; a main verb, e.g. *κινεῖται* or *ἐνεργεῖ* is required both to complete this clause and to balance *ἔχει* in the next. If this is supplied, we could even keep *ἀβίαστος*.

703 b 5ff.: here N., following Farquharson, has altered the punctuation in an attempt to bring out the structure of the thought. Her analysis of lines 5-11 is certainly right: *οὐθενὸς-ὀρεξίς* refers to non-voluntary movements, *πολλάκις-κινουῦνται* to the involuntary ones. But as a result of putting a full stop after *ὀρεξίς* and making a single sentence of b 11-18 *γίνονται*, she produces a sentence without a main verb and is forced to understand *αἱ παρὰ τὸν λόγον κινήσεις* (b 16-17) as referring to both non-voluntary and involuntary movements, although she admits that the expression is unsatisfactory in this sense. It is better to translate *παρὰ τὸν λόγον* as "contrary to reason" and make it refer to involuntary movements only, to punctuate before *οὐθενὸς* b 9 and after *φυσικαί* b 16, and to make a single sentence of these lines, treating the last clause (from *αἰτίαι* b 14) as a parenthesis. Then the movement of thought is as follows: explanation of what is meant by involuntary (b 6-8) and non-voluntary (b 8-11) movements, leading directly to an account of how non-voluntary movements come about (b 11-16); these are taken as the paradigm of the class of other-than-voluntary animal movements because they are its purest representative, since *phantasia* plays no part at all in their causation. At b 16 this account is then extended to include involuntary movements; for this use of *καί- δὲ* see *Index Arist.* 173 a 12ff.

703 b 22-23: the note printed under this lemma refers to b 32 and has been displaced; the note on b 22 appears to have been omitted, but can be supplied from *HSCP* 80.157f.

I can only deal briefly with the "interpretative essays." In the first, N. explains and justifies Aristotle's teleology as the most general and economical account of the behaviour of living organisms, but denies that it is more than this: Aristotle says nothing about the world as a whole or the species of living things it contains, including man, having any overriding purpose or good at which they aim. Much of what she says can be accepted without reserve. When Aristotle speaks of teleology, it is usually in the course of explaining the existence of particular structures or processes by the contribution they make to the well-being of the organism to which they belong. But is there really nothing more to it than this? Aristotle repeatedly compares the world to a family or a city; these are political organisations, distinguished from mere herds or aggregates of animals by having some common *ergon* (*HA* 488 a 7, cf. *Pol.* 1252 b 30ff.). N. herself writes of the

universe as an "interlocking, orderly whole in which each species contributes to the good of other species and all depend on the consistent movement of the heavenly bodies" (p. 96f.). How does this order come about? Is it something contingent and mechanical? Is the universe like a herd of cattle gathered round a water-hole? I doubt if the Platonist in Aristotle ever died so completely that he would have been satisfied with such a belief.⁷

In the second essay N. considers some problems arising out of the way in which cosmological and biological questions are combined in the *MA*. She begins by suggesting that to link the subject-matter of different disciplines as is done here contravenes the methodological principles laid down in the *Analytics* and represents a later development in Aristotle's thought; but the rules advanced in the *Analytics* are not as narrow as she makes out, the notion that biology and cosmology belong to different disciplines is a modern one, and to explain apparent discrepancies in Aristotle by positing a process of development without any consideration of the motives which may have led to it or its connection with other changes in his doctrine, is merely facile. Nevertheless N. is certainly right to assign a late date to this treatise. The greater part of the essay is an attempt to show in detail how the two themes are interwoven in the early chapters of the *MA*. It contains some good observations but also some misunderstandings, and I am not convinced that the cosmological sections are as firmly integrated into the argument as N. believes (see above, p. 87f.).

Essay 3 examines Aristotle's theory of the Connate Pneuma. N. begins by showing, against Nuyens, that this doctrine, far from being incompatible with the view that the soul is the form of the organic body, is its necessary complement. Then she goes on to explore some of its obscurities and concludes that Aristotle developed it fairly late in his life and never worked out its implications fully. This is a useful study, on which I only have two comments. (1) N.'s contention that the pneuma is not subject to qualitative change cannot be right. Its expansion and contraction are not instances of *αύξησις* and *φθίσις*, for these are due to the addition or subtraction of matter (*Phys.* 245 a 12f.); they seem to be caused by heating and cooling (702 b 23), and at *GA* 742 a 15 the existence of pneuma is associated with the presence of heat and moisture. This appears to conflict with 703 a 25, where it is said to cause motion *μη ἀλλοιώσει*, but these words can be interpreted in a weak sense to mean "without losing its proper character," as explained at *An.* 417 b 2ff. and 429 a 15ff. The process it undergoes will be analogous to the "change" suffered by the sense-organs during sensation. This means that the difference between the pneuma and the

⁷ Aristotle's inability or unwillingness to define the purpose of the universe can be illustrated by a modern parallel. We often speak of (our) society having a purpose, and many of us believe that this is, or could be, something more than politicians' claptrap. But we should be hard put to it to describe this purpose with any degree of precision.

"fifth substance" of which the heavens are composed is greater than N. would admit. (2) Pneuma played a considerable part in the thinking of the early Peripatetics and of medical writers connected with them, such as Diocles and Erasistratus. Their fragments can give us some idea of the intellectual climate in which the theory developed and perhaps even of the direction which Aristotle's thought might have taken if he had lived longer.

In the fourth essay N. argues that Aristotle's practical syllogism is a model to explain the way in which human and animal action is motivated, and does not imply the existence of a rigid set of ethical rules derived from an a-priori view of man's nature and purpose; her view is closely connected with her interpretation of Aristotle's teleology in essay 1. It is hardly controversial and one wonders why it should have taken 55 pages to establish; while she raises a number of interesting points on the way, much of what she says contributes little to our knowledge of Aristotle. She does not appear to have thought the problems out fully, and the boggy she sets out to refute is largely of her own creation. Who besides Maritain ever attributed to Aristotle the extreme deductivist view she describes in the first part of her essay? Certainly not Ross or St. Thomas Aquinas, to whom she refers on p. 169. Her confusion about the issues involved is revealed by a passage on p. 217, where she finds a "jarring note" in Aristotle's description (*EN* 1166 a 13ff.) of how the virtuous man will be at peace with himself because he has nothing to regret; this, it seems, is a state of mind she would only expect to find in a man with a strict system of rules to live by. But such a system could not eliminate clashes of duties, with the consequent feelings of regret or even remorse; e.g. if someone had to choose between going to work or accompanying a sick relative to hospital.⁸ On the other hand, one function of any system of morality is to help people come to terms with such situations. Aristotle's good man, who has always done what was best in the circumstances, deserves his peace of mind, and a philosophy which denied it to him would be of little practical use.

In essay 5 N. argues against the common interpretation of *phantasiai* as images. In her view they are the awareness of an object as something, in the case of things which cause movement, as desirable; when an animal has a *phantasia* it becomes aware, not simply of an object or situation as it happens to be, but of those aspects of it which are relevant to its own needs and interests at the time. This activity of

⁸ I assume that the work is important and cannot be put off without some harm to others, and the relative's illness is serious and there is nobody else to look after him. This is a more appropriate illustration than Agamemnon at Aulis, for however we judge his position, there is no doubt that his troubles were largely of his own making. A good man would not have offended a goddess in the first place. In general N.'s argument is not strengthened by her tendency sometimes to treat Nietzsche's exaltation of tragic moral conflict as if it could be applied to ordinary life.

selecting and interpreting data is what constitutes *phantasia*; N. has to admit, rather grudgingly, that some *phantasiai* take the form of mental images, but denies that this is central to Aristotle's doctrine. — One may grant that there are some passages where Aristotle characterises *phantasia* in ways that are not easy to reconcile with an image-theory, although they are fewer than N. would claim. But her own account is unconvincing and not even entirely clear. She makes great play with the etymological connection between *φαντασία* and *φαίνεσθαι*, which she translates "to appear," but does not say exactly what this means. In ordinary language, "X appears to me" can mean either "I have an image of X (I see, visualise, dream, have a vision of X)," or "I have an opinion about X." But Aristotle denies that *phantasia* is opinion (*An.* 428 a 18ff.), N. that it is imaging. What is left? When Aristotle sets out to give a full account of *phantasia* he says that it denotes a process of having images (*φαντάσματα*), unless we are using the term metaphorically (*An.* 428 a 1ff.; N. makes a weird attempt to explain it away on p. 252ff.), and even suggests that its name is derived from *φῶς* because there can be no vision without light (429 a 4)! This is borne out in a passage where its working is described, and which suggests that *phantasia* as such is unselective: when we think about triangles, we "place a triangle before our eyes," and the triangle we visualise has a certain size, even if this is not relevant to our thinking at the time (e.g. if we are thinking a theorem about the angles of a triangle). Here *phantasia* presents the object "as it comes," and it is thinking which selects the aspect it needs (*Mem.* 450 a 4; N. refers to this passage on p. 266, but fails to see its import). A similar point could be made about our *phantasia* of the sun as a foot in diameter (*An.* 428 b 2 ~ *Insomn.* 460 b 19, strangely misinterpreted by N. p. 248ff.). What this means is that when we look at or visualise the sun, we get about the same impression of size as when we look at or visualise a dinner plate hanging on a wall. This is determined by the structure of our vision; we can correct the *phantasia* in thought, using information derived from astronomy and optics, but we cannot change it; in spite of our knowledge that it is illusory, we shall continue to have the same *phantasia* whenever we look at or visualise the sun. (In this respect our *phantasia* of the sun differs from our *phantasia* of a jar of liquid as drink (MA 701a 32); as long as we have only seen it, it may appear to be water and drinkable, but once we have learned, through our sense of smell or by being told, that it is ammonia solution, the original *phantasia* will be replaced by a different one. A way of reconciling this with the instances adduced above may be to suppose that the *phantasia* is only of a jar of colourless liquid, and that it is thinking which decides whether it is drink or not). These passages, in which Aristotle professes to say what *phantasia* is, must be the starting-point for any discussion of his views; they cannot be dismissed as a "sub-theory of imaging" (p. 268). It is legitimate to ask whether such a theory will be adequate to account for all the activities Aristotle attributes to *phantasia*, and N. has shown that it may not be.

But Aristotle gives no hint that this term may cover more than one kind of mental activity and may not have been aware of these inadequacies, or if he was, may have been unable to find a solution.

Implicit in all these essays is a tendency to assimilate Aristotle's ideas to those current among English-speaking philosophers to-day, and to avoid at all costs imputing to him doctrines which they might find unacceptable. Characteristically, several of them begin, not with a survey of what Aristotle wrote, but with a critique of doctrines supposedly imputed to him by recent interpreters. It is of course right and proper that his views should be discussed in terms which bring out their relevance to current debates, but there is a danger, which N. has not avoided, both of distorting them and of overlaying them with accretions and refinements belonging to a more sophisticated age.

The book is handsomely produced and accurately printed on the whole. Apart from the errors in the text already noted (above, p. 85 n. 5), and the displacements of the notes on 703 b 22-32, I only noticed a handful of misprints, of which the following are recorded as potentially misleading: p. 71 line 13, for 412 b 10 read a 10; p. 262 n. 62 end, for II read 11; p. 301 last line, for ἀνάγκη read ἀνάγκην; p. 322 line 21, for 225 read 255. But it is inconvenient to use: the Greek type is unnecessarily small (it is a relief to turn from it to one of Ross' editions), the cross-references are imprecise, and the Bekker page-numbers are not included in the running headlines of the text and commentary; their absence makes it very difficult to find the note on any particular passage and in some cases even to find a place in the text.

To conclude, the value of this edition lies principally in the newly constituted text, an outstanding achievement. On the interpretative side N.'s judgement is less sure. The commentary and essays bring together a large amount of useful material and make many interesting and some valid points but contain much that is historically unsound and philosophically unsatisfying.

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DIONYSIACA: Nine studies in Greek poetry by former pupils presented to Sir Denys Page on his seventieth birthday. Edited by R. D. Dawe, J. Diggle, P. E. Easterling. Cambridge [Eng.], The Editors, 1978. Pp. xiv + 203. £5.00.

The nine studies under review are: I. *The Oligaihidai and their victories* (Pindar, *Olympian* 13: SLG 339, 340) by W. S. Barrett (Oxford) 1-20. II. *Pindarica* by Christopher Carey (St Andrews) 21-44. III. *Ten notes on Aeschylus, Agamemnon* by H. Lloyd-Jones (Oxford) 45-61. IV. *Aeschylus' simple plots* by A. F. Garvie (Glasgow) 63-86. V. *The end of Seven Against Thebes yet again* by R. D. Dawe

(Cambridge) 87-103. VI. *Aeschylus, Sicily and Prometheus* by M. Griffith (Berkeley) 105-39. VII. *The second stasimon of Antigone* by P. E. Easterling (Cambridge) 141-58. VIII. *On the Helen of Euripides* by J. Diggle (Cambridge) 159-77. IX. *Euripides, Iphigenia at Aulis* 919-74 by W. Ritchie (Sydney) 179-203.

The first study discusses the stemma of the Oligaitheidai (a Corinthian family of renowned athletes) on the basis of data found in Pindar (*Olympian* 13), the *scholia Pindarica* (58b-c), and two papyrus scraps, amounting to nine lines (half of them severely battered), of the P. Oxy. 2623 (first published by Lobel in 1967 [the *Oxyrhynchus papyri* XXXII])—the bulk of the paper concerns these two scraps which Barrett prints with supplements and a discussion of the text. Barrett is a leading Hellenist and the paper bespeaks his mastery of philological technique. This reviewer, however, doubts that his conclusions will register as probable. If we read the text of Pindar without preconceptions, Ptoiodoros is the father of Terpsias and Eritimos (cp. Barrett 2). On the other hand the scholia make Ptoiodoros the brother of Terpsias and the father of Thessalos. Barrett prefers to follow the scholia and to bring the Pindaric text in agreement with the scholia by understanding *Θεσσαλῶ* with *ἔψονται*—a very difficult suggestion if one takes into consideration, as one should, the *ordo verborum*, where *Τερψία θ'* and *Ἐριτίμω τ'* precede and follow *ἔψονται* respectively. Barrett's further attempts in support of his understanding *Θεσσαλῶ* with *ἔψονται* are gratuitous. 1) The Corinthians knowing that Ptoiodoros was the father of Thessalos would understand *Θεσσαλῶ* with *ἔψονται*, argues Barrett (2). But assuming the Corinthians were likely to do so (could they not rather suppose that Pindar made an ugly blunder?), what of the other Greeks? How many Greeks had straight in their minds the family tree of the Oligaitheidai so as to avoid misunderstanding the text of Pindar? Even assuming that all Greeks knew that Ptoiodoros was the father of Thessalos, what was the reason (factual and/or artistic) for Pindar to produce such cryptic verses? 2) "I cannot conceive that he [=Thessalos] had no Isthmian victories . . . nor . . . can I conceive that Pindar here passed over them in favor of the Isthmian victories of his kinsmen . . . Thessalos therefore must be included among the Isthmian victors . . ." contends Barrett (4). But could it be that Thessalos, an *Ὀλυμπιονίκης*, neglected the Isthmia (he had all the more reason to consider it simply a local event—Corinth being eleven kilometers from the Isthmus)? *Ἀθλητῇ μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν Ὀλυμπίᾳσιν ἀγωνισαμένῳ ἀμελῆσαι τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ* writes Maximus Tyrius (ed. Hob. speech I.IVa). And what of the *περιστάσεις* of Thessalos' life? It may be that Thessalos sometimes abstained from the Isthmia in favor of another athlete (relative or friend), or because he did not feel at his best and did not wish to fail in the eyes of all Corinthians, or even that sometimes he participated but with poor results (even Muhammad Ali has experienced defeats!) and Pindar omits the case altogether as not complimentary to his client. Even supposing that Thessalos had won at Isthmia, should we assume that Pindar must offer a complete catalogue of Thessalos' victories? Hardly so, not only because the ode aims at celebrating Xenophon and dwelling on Thessalos would inevitably detract from his son, but also because Pindar is not a chronicler but a poet. 3) The further observation of Barrett, that without Thessalos included in the group Pindar's words *μακρότεροι . . . ἔψονται . . . αἰοῦνται*

make the poet absurdly speak "of those victories as surpassing in number any feat of Thessalos's" (4), is not compelling either. The adj. *μακρότεροι* in its context need only mean "too long would be the songs that shall keep up with the victories of the three of you." No direct comparison between the length of the song(s) in honor of (Xenophon/) Thessalos with those of the three is necessarily involved, but rather the statement should be understood in connection with the fact that in the present ode Pindar dismisses the three *collectively*. In a polite way, avoiding offence, Pindar says: I cannot dwell on the victories of each of you three in an ode written for Xenophon (/Thessalos), but there can be no offence since all know that you are first-rate athletes and I personally, needless to say, would love to celebrate your "endless" victories if you only wish me to be one of those hired for this purpose. That Pindar stresses *quantitatively* the victories of the three can hardly affect the greatness of Thessalos and Xenophon, who are *Ὀλυμπιονῆται* (the three are not, or at least are not mentioned as such) and therefore *qualitatively* (which really counts) superior to the three. Furthermore, the victories of Ptoiodoros – Terpsias – Eritimos are seen collectively and thus we cannot say whether any of the three was superior to Thessalos even quantitatively. Now, Pindar has obviously exaggerated regarding the *ἀριθμός* (cp. v. 46 *ψάφων ἀριθμόν*) of the victories of the three. In the expression *ψάφων ἀριθμόν* it is hard to say where reality stops and rhetoric takes over. If all the victories of Thessalos were to be counted would Pindar have had difficulty in describing the number as *ψάφων ἀριθμόν*? Probably not. Therefore we cannot even be certain that the victories of the three put together exceeded numerically those of Thessalos. The scholia (going beyond the names found in Pindar's *Ol.* 13) introduce a Namertidas: . . . καὶ Τερψίου μὲν παῖδες Ἐρίτιμος καὶ Ναμερτίδας . . . Then the scholia return to *Ναμερτίδας* and *Ἐρίτιμος*, and, in a text which is taken to be corrupt, we are first told that some sources offered a different account of the relation between the two, and then that an *Αὐτόλυκος* was son of Eritimos. Boeckh emended: *τινὲς δὲ τοῦ Ναμερτίδα{ν} Ἐρίτιμόν φασιν, Ἐριτίμου δὲ Αὐτόλυκον* "some sources say that Eritimos was the son of Namertidas, and Autolykos the son of Eritimos." Barrett agrees with the thrust of Boeckh's text regarding the relation between Namertidas and Eritimos—he accepts *Ναμερτίδα{ν}* but prefers *νίδον* to Boeckh's *τοῦ*, which preference, nevertheless, does not change the meaning. What caused the confusion between the relation of Namertidas and Eritimos? Barrett finds the answer in the battered text of the aforementioned scrap of Pap. Oxy. 2623 (5ff.). But even if we restore *Ναμερτίδας* out of what Barrett reads as *ιδας* (and Lobel as only *.δα.*), even if we assume all that Barrett assumes in order that the sequence *πατέρος . . . Ἐριτίμου κασιγ[ν]ήτου* (Lobel reading *κα . . . []* . [instead of Barrett's *κασιν[ν]ήτου*) . . . *Ναμερτίδας* may be claimed to pose the dilemma of whether Eritimos is Namertidas' brother or Namertidas' son and to allow for the possibility that this text caused the two versions of the scholia (where Eritimos appears first as brother of Namertidas and then as Namertidas' son), even then the dilemma is not established without our *further* assumption that the obscurity in *πατέρος . . . Ἐριτίμου κασιγνήτου . . . Ναμερτίδας* was *not* dispelled in some other part of the text of the pap. (which made clear the relation between *Ἐρίτιμος* and *Ναμερτίδας*). But difficulties for Barrett's thesis do not end here. A number of "loose ends" appear (bottom of 6-8) which he tackles with further as-

sumptions (including an ode written supposedly by Simonides for Thessalos, as well as the assumption that Autolykos is the *laudandus* victor of the pap. scrap) leading to the emendation of the scholion with two addenda so that the scholion now reads *Τερψίου ἀδελφὸς Πτοιοδώρος, καὶ Τερψίον μὲν παῖδες Ἐρίτιμος καὶ Ναμερτίδας, (οὗ Ἀυτόλυκος), Πτοιοδώρον δὲ Θεσσαλός, οὗ Ξενοφῶν. τινὲς δὲ νῖδον Ναμερτίδα{ν} Ἐρίτιμόν φασιν, Ἐρίτιμον δὲ (ἀδελφόν) Αυτόλυκον*. Many would remark that Barrett begs the question: the scholion emends the papyrus, and then the need to prove the papyrus a principal source of the scholion leads to emendation of the scholion. Far from finding Barrett's restoration of the scholion convincing, I even entertain doubt as to whether any emendation is needed, provided we assume the scholion to be written in a shorthand fashion. The name of *Ναμερτίδας* does not occur in Pindar. We may then suspect that the scholion 58c (τινὲς κτλ.) aims at explaining the omission of *Ναμερτίδας* in Pindar and tells us that *Ἐρίτιμος* (cp. the adj. *ἐρίτιμος* = *ὁ μεγάλως τιμώμενος*) is a nickname (an *ἐπίκλην*) of *Ναμερτίδας*, that is to say *Ναμερτίδας* and *Ἐρίτιμος* are one and the same person, and that *Αυτόλυκος* was the son of this *Ναμερτίδας/Ἐρίτιμος*—the introduction of *Αυτόλυκος* being due to an attempt to make the stemma of the Oligaithidai as full as it could be, or possibly because this *Αυτόλυκος* appeared in the sources sometimes as son of *Ναμερτίδας* and sometimes as son of *Ἐρίτιμος* and therefore the scholiast felt that in offering the opinion of the *τινὲς* regarding the *Ναμερτίδας/Ἐρίτιμος* problem he might also offer their explanation of the *Αυτόλυκος* problem, thus rendering full service to the reader. This shorthand scholion if more fully written would have been: *τινὲς δὲ τὸν Ναμερτίδαν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι Ἐρίτιμόν φασιν, Ἐρίτιμον δὲ (sc. παῖδα) εἶναι Αυτόλυκον* = "but some say that Namertidas was nicknamed Eritimos, and that Autolykos was the son of Eritimos (i.e. of Namertidas *alias* Eritimos)—the acc. *παῖδα* understood *ex analogou*, cp. *παῖδες . . . Πτοιοδώρον* (sc. *παῖς*) . . . οὗ (sc. *παῖς*).

We pass to the second study, which consists of four pieces: (1) *Hieron and Philoctetes*: P. 1.50ff. (21-27); (2) *The Threat to the Gods in I. 8* (27-33); (3) *I. 8.11, 46a-47* (34-35; the piece is an appendage of textual matters pertaining to the second piece); (4) *N. 7.48-53* (35-38). Carey shows familiarity with Pindaric scholarship and contributes toward our comprehension of P. 1, I. 8, and N. 7 in terms of their *realia* and aesthetic appreciation. The first piece focuses on the question of which of Hieron's campaigns are alluded to in P. 1, v. 50ff. Carey opts for the victorious one against the Carthaginians at Cyme (474 B.C.). Difficulties, however, are not dispelled. Above all, one still wonders whether *νῦν γε μάν* (v. 50) is applicable to a battle fought four years before (the *νῦν* is likely to point to 470 B.C., the year the ode was written, or shortly before). We may turn to the second piece. Carey argues that in I. 8 the myth, the threat to the gods, contains features which match elements found at the opening of the ode. An appreciation of Carey's suggestions here depends on how far one is willing to go in the game of "echoes"—Carey is here offering us quite a trip. For example, after remarking that *καὶ* (v. 102) "telescopes the interval between the decision of the gods and the military achievements of Achilles," he draws a parallel arguing that as *καὶ* "links the glorious deeds of Achilles with the end of the menace of the gods; so, at the beginning, Cleander's victory was closely

linked with the passing of the danger to Greece. In each case gloom and danger are succeeded by achievement and celebration in song" (33). We may take up the third essay. I find Carey's argument in favor of Benedictus' παροιχόμενον (v. 13) most attractive. I entertain substantial doubts for the legitimacy of συναλέγειν ([v. 46a] in Pindar there are no instances of σύν [+ vowel]), and for the plausibility of Triclinius' ἀνακτε ([v. 47] in the context the combination Zeus + Poseidon appears in the plural, not the dual [ἔρισαν v. 27, σφιν v. 30, παύσατε (?) v. 35a], and the dual, usually referring to natural pairs, is after all not particularly meaningful when applied to two brothers who are neither twins nor the only brothers in the family). If a change in ἀνακτα is needed, Bergk's ἀνακτας (all the gods) seems preferable to ἀνακτε.¹ We pass to the fourth piece. The discussion concentrates on the problem of the identification of the μάρτυς of N. 7 v. 49. Carey rightly argues that vv. 48-49 contain no reference to Pindar, poets, or poetry. Many, however, will question his judgment that the μάρτυς is Apollo. The context points to Neoptolemos more naturally than to Apollo, and Neoptolemos makes good sense here as an ἐπιστάτης (cp. ἐπιστατεῖ) at large, i.e. Neoptolemos would be the overseer of the activities at large in Pytho which involved not only the regulations for expected fair play during the competitions but also the observance of the various νομιζόμενα such as sacrifices (cp. πολυθύτοις v. 47) etc. After all, the larger the area of activities falling under the supervision of Neoptolemos, the greater the honor Pindar bestowed on him and, through him, on his, Pindar's, Aeginetan client.²

We come to the third paper, the learned and imaginative notes on the Agamemnon: (1) vv. 1-4, (2) 16-18, (3) 72-82, (4) 104-6, (5) 681-87, (6) 799-802, (7) 1025-29, (8) 1140-49, (9) 1440-43, (10) 1541-42 + 1551-54. The paper closes with an Appendix on the riddle of the Sphinx. I record my few reservations. In the first note, taking ἄγκαθεν to mean ἐν ἀγκάλαις, the author translates κοιμώμενος στέγαις Ἀτρειδῶν ἄγκαθεν "lying in the arms of the house of the Atreidai." One senses two difficulties here: 1) If x is *inside* (or at least partially inside) the house, it can be said of him that he is "in the arms of the house." But if x is on the top of the house it is difficult to see how he can be in the arms of the house. Surely, στέγαις by synecdoche can mean οἶκον, but here synecdoche will not bring the watchman inside the house as long as he is stationed on the roof. The translation "in the arms of the house" contradicts our seeing the watchman on the roof. 2) The author explains the construction of στέγαις . . . ἄγκαθεν as analo-

¹ With ἀνακτα or ἀνακτας the preceding καί, translated as "even," would indicate the force with which the advice of Themis registered with Zeus and/or the other gods. If we read ἀνακτα Zeus goes *even* to the actual marriage of Thetis to Peleus, thus ratifying this marriage *all the way* (his presence in the marriage is tantamount to his giving up his claim on her officially). If we read ἀνακτας all the gods (including Zeus and Poseidon) go to the marriage to make certain that it will take place.

² This extension of Neoptolemos' significance at Delphi becomes all the more understandable if the Aeginetans had indeed complained that elsewhere Pindar had maligned the character of Neoptolemos (see conveniently Sandys' *Introduction* to the Nemean VII in his Loeb ed. of Pindar) and Pindar here tries to show (exaggeratedly?) his respect for Neoptolemos.

gous to a sentence such as ἄγκαθ' ἐν μοι κοιμᾶται ὁ παῖς. But μοι here seems not to be connected with ἄγκαθεν but rather to be a modifier of the sentence as a whole, a dative of interest (ethical?)—notice that cutting ἄγκαθεν, one can still say κοιμᾶται μοι ὁ παῖς. We need a dat. which undisputably equals an adnominal genitive, i.e. we need a parallel in which an adverb (equaling ἐν or ἐπὶ [and the like] + dat. of a substantive) is connected with a dat. which in meaning equals an adnominal gen., something like οἰκίᾳ . . . θύραθι, equaling ἐπὶ (τῇ) θύρᾳ . . . (τῆς) οἰκίας ('at the door of the house'). We pass to the sixth note. The author's suggestion that between v. 801 and 802 a verse has dropped is, in this reviewer's assessment, a mere possibility at best. We may take οὐδ' εὖ πραπίδων οἶακα νέμων as an adverbial sequence (νέμων as a modal participle) parallel to ἀπομούσως, that is to say ἀπομούσως qualifies γεγραμμένος (or the periphrasis ἦσθα γεγραμμένος) and so does οὐδ' εὖ πραπίδων οἶακα νέμων. In syntax γεγραμμένος (or ἦσθα γεγραμμένος) is qualified by κάρτ' ἀπομούσως οὐδ' (where οὐδ' = καὶ οὐκ) εὖ πραπίδων οἶακα νέμων, but as the *ordo verborum* breaks the sequence into two segments, left and right of ἦσθα γεγραμμένος, these two segments qualify γεγραμμένος (or ἦσθα γεγραμμένος) separately. In fact, syntax fully developed will also keep the two segments separate, i.e. κάρτ' ἀπομούσως ἦσθα γεγραμμένος, οὐδ' (sc. ἦσθα γεγραμμένος) εὖ πραπίδων οἶακα νέμων—i.e., οὐδὲ connecting main clauses, the verb of the second clause understood *apo koinou*. There is therefore no reason to worry that οὐδ' is likely to detach ἀπομούσως from γεγραμμένος (or ἦσθα γεγραμμένος). The argument that οὐδ' εὖ is "colorless" seems unjustifiable since εὖ construes with νέμων and thus οὐδ' εὖ πραπίδων οἶακα νέμων forms a compact whole, not to mention that the negation (the οὐ in οὐδὲ [for οὐδὲ = καὶ οὐ]) which logically goes closely with either εὖ or νέμων does now (when οὐδὲ is used instead of καὶ οὐ) emotively color the whole sequence from εὖ to νέμων. The use of οὐδ(ὲ) does not violate ἑλληνισμός if we take into account the negative content of the *hegoumena* (i.e. ἀπομούσως = ἀμούσως = οὐκ εὐμούσως) leading to οὐδ(ὲ) (in fact sometimes οὐδὲ is used without any negative preceding, see conveniently LSJ s.v. οὐδέ AII). Parataxis (i.e. οὐδὲ [= καὶ οὐ]), in place of hypotaxis (i.e. ἄτε or ὥς [or the like] + οὐ), gives the sequence a poetic liveliness in place of flat logicity. I pass to the ninth note. The discussion centers on ἰσοτριβής. Citing Hesychius 2576 (ed. Latte, i p. 91 ἀκρίστιος· ἡ ἐπάνω τοῦ ἰστοῦ καθεζομένη. ἔστι δὲ ἄτιμος) the author takes ἰσοτριβής as referring to an offender (in cases of adultery or fornication) who is rendered ἄτιμος by being exposed to public view sitting upon the horizontal crossbar of a loom. The suggestion is ingenious, but not free from difficulties. Thus: 1) ἰστός in ἀκρίστιος may well refer to any pole, especially to a ship's mast. 2) If ἀκρίστιος (through its ἀκρ-) refers to the top-beam of the loom, why should ἰσοτριβής refer to it as well (even assuming that its part ἰστο- refers to the loom)? 3) One feels uneasy with the suggestion that σελμάτων is "the comparatively comfortable accommodation provided by the platform at the bow of the ship . . . Even on the poop, one would have only a wooden bench to sit on," and that "the picture of Cassandra seated on such a bench might well recall to Clytemnestra the undignified posture of the dishonoured woman seated upon the horizontal top-beam of the loom." The author's interpretation of (ναντίλων) σελμάτων is only a possibility and, even if correct, it credits Aeschylus with but a farfetched

association (I can see little connection between a platform or a bench of the ship and the horizontal top-beam of the loom). 4) To the author's suggestion (59) that in *ἄτιμα δ' οὐκ ἐπραξάτην* (v. 1443) the word *ἄτιμα* is likely to echo the *ἄτιμος* Cassandra, one may retort the dual *ἐπραξάτην* makes it clear that *ἄτιμα* refers to Agamemnon *no less* than to Cassandra (are we to imagine Agamemnon as well on the horizontal crossbar of a loom?). My opinion on the meaning of *ἰστοτριβής* I have offered in *AJP* v. 101 (1980). We pass to the Appendix. The author suggests that Aeschylus must have had something like this riddle in mind when he wrote *Agam.* 80-82, an insightful suggestion to be sure. Nevertheless, if the author is right and in the version used by Aeschylus "the old man, and not the child, was the most feeble of the three" (the author reading *τρισοῖσιν*, instead of *πλείστοισιν*, in v. 4 of the riddle), it is difficult to see how Aeschylus conforms to this version. Speaking of their own feebleness, the old men in the *Agamemnon* can hardly intend to present themselves as less feeble than they are. In a pessimistic spirit, they compare and equate (cp. *ἰσόπαιδα* v. 75, *ἰσόπρεσβυς* v. 78, *οὐδὲν ἀρείων* v. 81) their weakness with that of a child, and this pessimism logically requires that they consider the creeping child feebler than the old man, or, at the very least, as feeble as the old man, but hardly less feeble.³ Therefore, if the riddle in Aeschylus' day read *τρισοῖσιν*, Aeschylus did not conform to its spirit in the *Agam.* 72-82. Indeed, one wonders how justifiable is the contention that "in the version [of the riddle] used by Aeschylus the old man, and not the child, was the most feeble of the three" (61).

We shall now consider the fourth paper which deals with literary criticism and can be summarized in the words of Garvie himself (80): "... the normal development of an Aeschylean plot is in a straight line from initial foreboding . . . to the climax which represents the fulfilment of . . . foreboding. But at various points . . . Aeschylus breaks that straight line, and makes us temporarily expect that something different is going to happen or at least turns our attention away from the climax . . ." The piece as a whole is a useful contribution toward understanding Aeschylean dramatic technique. Garvie knows his Aeschylus and is himself a talented literary critic. These appreciable qualities, however, are occasionally vitiated by what strikes one as unrestrained subjectivity. Frequently the reader will find it difficult to witness the existence of the very breakages Garvie cites. Take, for example, the three instances he discusses in the *Seven* (71-74). The story of Oedipus is at the center of Greek mythology, and all knew that Eteocles and Polynices killed each other. Dramatic economy excludes the possibility that Aeschylus can match Eteocles against anyone but Polynices. We may therefore wonder how justifiable it is for Garvie (72) to conclude that in *Seven* 397ff. "with the first person *ἐγώ* we are jolted momentarily into wondering whether he [i.e. Eteocles] will in fact appoint . . . himself to meet Tydeus. The hope remains for

³ If the chorus generally believed that old men are feebler than crawling children, but nonetheless present themselves as equal in strength to such children, they would have been optimistic—they would have seen themselves in a better light than other old men. Such optimism (such upgrading of their strength) can hardly be meaningful in the *Agamemnon*.

several lines, and is reinforced at 407, with the emphatic juxtaposition of *ἐγὼ δὲ Τυδεΐ* . . .” But let us suppose that we are indeed “jolted” in the case of Tydaeus but then see that our wondering is foolish. Should we continue foolishly wondering? Garvie thinks (72) we should, for the similarity of Eteoclus’ name with the name Eteocles “is so obvious an omen that the audience are bound to wonder whether the fates of the two men are not also to be combined. . . .” in other words we once more wonder whether Eteocles will choose to fight Eteoclus.⁴ Nor do I see much cogency in the third breakage which Garvie creates by assuming (73-74) that our interest in Amphiarus for his own sake is so great that we forget the duel between Eteocles and Polyneices . . . It is only with the end of the sixth pair that we remember that Polyneices is still to come, and that Eteocles must fight him.” And of course the summit of subjectivity in these three assumptions comes when Garvie feels their intensity in comparative terms, for he experiences them (72) as “three surprises, of *growing intensity*” (my italics)—I find it extremely difficult to see why the “surprise” of Eteoclus is more intense than the “surprise” of Tydeus, and why the “surprise” (or whatever else we choose to call it) of Amphiarus surpasses in intensity the other two.

We come to the fifth paper. In his *CQ* n.s. 17 (1967) article Dawe argued against the genuineness of the end of the *Seven* on considerations of content only. There he described the style of the supposedly interpolated portions as competent fifth-century tragic idiom. With the present paper Dawe returns to the *Seven* to examine its end

⁴ The suggestion (bottom of 72-73) that the appearance of Eteocles’ statue among the statues of the Seven dedicated at Delphi by the Argives is due to Aeschylean influence is improbable. There are considerable differences between Aeschylus and the Argive ensemble of these statues (see Paus. 10.10.3-4). Parthenopaeus is absent from the ensemble but one of the Seven in Aeschylus; Polyneices is the last in Aeschylus’ catalogue but in the ensemble he appears between Eteoclus and Hippomedon; Adrastus figures as one of the Seven in the ensemble, but is not included among the Seven in Aeschylus; there were also other figures in the ensemble, such as Baton, Amphiarus’ charioteer, and a certain Alithersis (spelling doubtful), neither mentioned in Aeschylus. Probability suggests that the Argive statues and Aeschylus’ catalogue derive, independently from each other, from tradition which included the name of Eteoclus among the Seven. That in accounts of the Seven the name Eteoclus tended to be eliminated seems due to the fact that it created confusion with reference to the name Eteocles. One of the two names was likely to be eliminated under the circumstances, and since Eteocles is a major character, the obvious choice was to eliminate Eteoclus. Above all one wishes that Garvie had told us what is the evidence that in Classical Greece, if a person’s name was mentioned in the presence of another person who had a similar or the same name, that mention would suggest a portent, and thus that Garvie had explained why the mention of Eteoclus in the presence of Eteocles would suggest to Aeschylus’ audience that the two would fight, any more than the mention of some *Γιάωνης* in the presence of another *Γιάωνης* (or *Γιάωνος*) would suggest to a modern Greek audience that a quarrel between these two *Γιάωνηδες* is likely to take place.

in terms of language/meter and to conclude by saying (101): "If the end of *Septem* contained no problems on other grounds, it would stand condemned for its metrical and linguistic flaws. If it contained no metrical and linguistic flaws, it would stand condemned on its content. If we put the two types of argument together, the possibility of authenticity does not exist." Dawe argues that vv. 822-31, 848-74, 996-97, and 1005-78 are demonstrably spurious, and (if I understand him correctly) that on this ground the part from v. 822 to the end of the play should be pronounced spurious. Dawe's paper is learned (he is a pre-eminent expert Aeschylus) and adds to the evidence in favor of spuriousness, but I cannot in good conscience concur with his belief that he has proved it. The problem of the genuineness of the end of the *Septem* has been debated by able scholars for more than a century. There is probably no scholar today who does not have his doubts. Nevertheless, no argument for athetesis as yet exists which satisfies critical standards to the extent that it may be pronounced conclusive. The matter is extremely difficult to prove. If we can prove that element *x* cannot be by Aeschylus (frequently a notoriously difficult matter to demonstrate), the question arises whether *x* is the product of corruption (i.e. whether what has now ended as *x* was once the element *X* belonging to the hand of Aeschylus) or belongs to an interpolator. If element *x* can be shown to belong to an interpolator, the question arises whether the spuriousness of *x* entitles us to infer that elements *y* and *z* belong to the interpolator as well. But difficulties go even deeper. Suppose we could prove that someone c. 435 B.C. rewrote the end of the *Septem* to modernize it for restaging along the lines of Sophocles' *Antigone*. The question arises whether this interpolator used material of the original end of the *Septem* in his reworking. Dawe is, of course, aware of what scholarly methods demand from him, but on the whole he has preferred to keep such demands in the background and instead to argue the spuriousness with a massive accumulation of "difficulties" of widely varying significance and a barrage of rhetoric. Let me offer one example demonstrating a "difficulty" of doubtful import in combination with forceful rhetoric. I need go no further than Dawe's first "difficulty," the vocative *μεγάλε*, v. 822. Here we have a unique formation, says Dawe with justification. The formation, however, is unique not only for Aeschylus, but also for the presumed interpolator (for it is unique at large). If so, the question to be answered by Dawe is why this uniqueness points more toward an interpolator than toward Aeschylus. We expect the presentation of the evidence for *μεγάλε* versus *μέγα* or whatever else and, through its analysis, the reasons for which *μεγάλε* is improbable or impossible for Aeschylus. Instead of satisfying his reader in this regard, Dawe prefers to tell him (89) that "the balance of probabilities is strongly against authenticity [of vv. 822-31], for however many *lacunae* are posited, however many textual adjustments are made to assist the metre, that vocative *μεγάλε* remains an unsuitable case of treatment"; and, what amounts to a superimposition of rhetoric upon rhetoric, he has prefaced this statement with the assertion that he has "a vested interest in retaining 822-31 . . . None the less the balance of probabilities is strongly against authenticity . . ." (89).

Let us review the sixth paper, a product of hard work and good judgment. To defend the genuineness of *Prometheus Bound*, scholars

have tried to explain the play's peculiarities through Aeschylus' connections with Sicily. And so Sicilian influence on the *Prometheus* has been advanced by claims that the text contains Sicilian words/forms, Pythagorean elements, similarities to the style/views of Empedocles, similarities to the works of Epicharmus, etc. Griffith shows that all these claims remain unsubstantiated—the burden of proof resting on those who advocate Sicilian influence. What are the paper's weaknesses? His lengthy discussion in section (e) (= 117-20) produces little that is cogent. All Griffith can really say that carries weight is that the Typhos episode in the *Prometheus Bound* is traditionally one of the famous incidents in the early part of Zeus' career and therefore relevant inherently in the story of *Prometheus Bound*—the proponents of the Sicilian influence are welcomed to show, if they can, that had Aeschylus intended this play for Athens he would have eliminated the Typhos episode as irrelevant. Also, the paper does not succeed in reducing the Sicilian hypothesis into an impossibility (it still hovers as a possibility). For example, at the end of his paper Griffith argues (and I refer to this argument of his because the place he marshals it shows that he considers it of special strength) that the *Προμηθεὺς Λυόμενος* is linked to Athens, and on the basis of this link he demands "compelling proof before we accept any other place of performance than Athens." But could Aeschylus, the Athenian patriot, have linked the *Πρ. Α.* to Athens in order to offer a *σφραγίς* of his patriotism, to indicate that he did not forget Athens when away from Athens? The strength of Griffith's argument here too, if stripped of rhetoric, can amount to no more than this: *there is evidence that the Πρ. Α. was linked to Athens; the advocates of the Sicilian hypothesis are welcome to explain to us why this link points more to a trilogy connected with Sicily than with Athens*—much therefore must depend on arguments outside Griffith's paper. And, of course, so long as we cannot supply the argument which conclusively renders the Sicilian hypothesis impossible, this hypothesis must per force remain a "working" hypothesis.

The seventh paper offers a textual and literary commentary on the second stasimon (vv. 583-625) of the *Antigone*, illuminating the sequence of thought and the function of this ode in its dramatic context. The paper is learned, sensitive, and generally clear-headed (albeit not always equally convincing). Of the few instances where Easterling is betrayed by her good judgment the following is probably the most striking. In v. 606 she reads with L *παντογήρως* and attempts to defend it by observing (150) that "if we ask how sleep exercises its power over all the answer must be that it does so through time" and by pointing out that *πανδαμάτωρ* and *παγκρατής* are adjectives which are used for both time and sleep. Nevertheless the qualification of *ὕπνος* as *παντογήρως* involves not time but *γῆρας*, and *γῆρας* here is as absurd as saying *γηράσκομεν πάντες ὑπνώσσαντες*, "we all get old(er) by sleeping" (that "sleeping" is irrelevant to our getting old becomes obvious from the fact that less sleeping is not going to retard our growing old(er); in fact sleeping to the extent that it reinvigorates us may be said to work against our growing old!). That *sleep* and *time* can be qualified by the adjectives *πανδαμάτωρ* and *παγκρατής* does not bring *sleep* and *time* any closer than, for example, the adjectives *early* and *late* bring close *dinner* and *time*. The question is whether *ὕπνος* is *παντογήρως* and the answer is that it cannot be

because γῆρας/γηράσκειν does not belong to the definition/essence of ὕπνος. Time may be said to belong to the definition of ὕπνος but only to the extent that it belongs to the definition of τρώγειν, πίνειν, ἔδειν etc.—practically *everything* we do involves time. As for Easterling's verbal "echo" in παντογῆρας/ἀγῆρας, it strikes one as a most instructive example of how suspicious we should be of "echoes," for they appear even as a result of corruption (I find it reasonably certain that the part -γῆρας of παντογῆρας developed under the influence of the following ἀγῆρας).

We pass to the eighth paper. It comprises eight notes which involve textual criticism of groups of verses in Eur.'s *Helen* amounting to about fifty verses. The reader will be impressed by Diggle's systematic discussion which bespeaks not only learning but also an alert mind at work—the paper merits the attention of the future editor of the *Helen*. What are the paper's shortcomings? Diggle tends to show a peremptory attitude, saying "we must . . ." instead of "we should probably" or even "we should perhaps." I shall exemplify the point through material I take from notes five and seven (I have chosen these notes at random). In note five Diggle asserts (168-69) that "we must . . . alter μύθων to μύθοις" (*Hel.* v. 770). He continues by claiming that "Menelaus must not say that he cannot fill Helen full of stories . . . but rather that he cannot satisfy her appetite with stories" and includes among the evidence *Hipp.* 664 μισῶν . . . οὐποτ' ἐμπλησθήσομαι (which, Diggle maintains, equals μίσει [dat.] . . . οὐποτ' ἐμπλησθήσομαι, not μίσους . . . οὐποτ' ἐμπλησθήσομαι). If I understand his argument correctly, he says that when ἐμπίπλημι denotes "I satisfy" this meaning must develop from the original meaning of πίμπλημι through a gen. inherently understood (say, πιμπλάναι τινὰ πληρώσεως, "to fill one with satisfaction," analogous to πιμπλάναι τινὰ ἡδονῆς") in which case an instrumental dat. or a circumstantial part., not a gen., is to be expected (say, ἐμπιμπλάναι τινὰ [πληρώσεως] λόγοις or λέγων = to satisfy one [= to fill one with satisfaction] by means of speech or speaking)—the dat. or the part. conveying not the *material* by which the "filling" is accomplished (this material consists of the gen. πληρώσεως inherently understood) but the "means" or the "circumstances" by or in which the "satisfaction" is achieved. Nevertheless, it is quite possible that πιμπλάναι as "to satisfy" develops simply out of the meaning of πιμπλάναι as "to fill up" per se, i.e. "to fill up and thereby to satisfy," cp. κορέννυμι. And just as κορέννυμι takes gen. or dat., so πίμπλημι, in the sense of "to satisfy," may also continue taking gen. or dat. indiscriminately (as the verb does when it means only to "fill up"). If so, the emendation of μύθων to μύθοις is at best disputable. I pass on to note VII where Diggle changes a nom. (ψόγος) to an acc. (ψόγον) in apposition to a sentence. This change of ψόγος to ψόγον in *Hel.* 987 he offers as "certain" (171). Now, a case such as Eur. *El.* 231 εὐδαιμονοίης μισθὸν ἡδίστων λόγων may be explained in terms of a consecutive/result clause involving ὥστε + infin.: εὐδαιμονοίης (sc. ὥστε εἶναι σοι ταύτην τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν) μισθὸν ἡδίστων λόγων. But consequence/result may also be expressed with ὥστε (= καὶ οὕτω = paratactic consequence/result) and finite mood. I shall draw attention to a fr. from *Phil.* 2.531 ἐμέθυον· ἱκανὴ πρόφασις . . . the construction in terms of consecutive/result clauses here will be ἐμέθυον· (ὥστε [= καὶ οὕτω] αὕτη ἡ μέθη ἐστίν [or ἦν etc.]) ἱκανὴ πρόφασις . . . We may therefore argue that the acc. in apposi-

tion to the verbal action makes the apposition "subjective (/a tendency)," while the nom. makes it "objective (/a fact)," in a manner analogous to the differentiation between *ῥωστε* + inf. versus *ῥωστε* + finite verb in consecutive/result clauses. If so, in *Heracl.* 71-72 *βιαζόμεσθα καὶ στέφη μαιίνεται, πόλει τ' ὄνειδος καὶ θεῶν ἀτιμία* we should hesitate to follow E. B. England (*CR* 15 [1901] 56) changing *ἀτιμία* to *ἀτιμίαν*, a conjecture which Diggle embraces (cp. also [Eur.?] *Rhes.* 414-15 . . . *οἱ μὲν ἐν χωστοῖς τάφοις/κείνται πεσόντες, πίστις οὐ σμικρὰ πόλει*). As for *Hel.* 985-87, the construction (in terms of a consecutive/result clause) will be: *κείσόμεσθα δὲ νεκρῷ δῦο ἔξης τῷδ' ἐπὶ ξεστῷ τάφῳ*, (sc. *ῥωστε* [= *καὶ οὕτω*] *ἐσόμε(σ)θα* [parallel to the fut. *κείσόμεσθα*]) *ἄλγος* (= *αἰτία ἄλγους*) *σοι*, *ψόγος* (= *αἰτία ψόγου*) *δὲ σὺ πατρί*. We may suppose that apposition in the nom. was preferred to apposition in the acc. by the influence of the nom. predicate *νεκρῷ-τάφῳ* (a lengthy and picturesque predicate). I have used consecutive/result clauses throughout my discussion in order to treat the topic of "apposition to a clause" *ἐπὶ τῇ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ*, so to speak. I am in basic agreement with Kühner-Gerth, I. 284-85. What they present in terms of "ein Bewirktes, ein Erlebnis, eine Folge, Bestimmung oder Absicht" I present as a "subjective (/a tendency)" apposition. What they present as apposition expressing "ein Urteil" I present as an "objective (/a fact)" apposition. My difference with them is that in their "Urteil" apposition they allow not only apposition in the nom. but also in the acc., perhaps because they are influenced by such consecutive/result clauses where *ῥωστε* + infinitive may represent *ῥωστε* + finite verb (cp., for example, Aesch. *Pers.* 457 *ἀμφὶ δὲ κυκλοῦντο πᾶσαν νῆσον, ῥωστ' ἀμνηχανεῖν* [= *ἡμνηχάνουν*] *κτλ.*). I personally classify such *ῥωστε* + inf. usage with the "subjective (/a tendency)" class—I believe that to speak of meaning outside of form (i.e. to say that meaning = *ῥωστε* + finite verb, but form = *ῥωστε* + [complementary] inf.) invites hazards (one need not mean something other than what one says). There is one point I wish to draw attention to. Diggle argues that *El.* 987 "is a *patent* [my italics] instance of apposition which gives, in the words of Kühner-Gerth, 'ein Bewirktes, ein Ergebnis, eine Folge, Bestimmung oder Absicht'." In making this statement is he proposing that the "Urteil" category does not exist (under which category Kühner-Gerth classify the above mentioned Eur. *Heracl.* 71 [reading of course the nom. *ἀτιμία*] and would have undoubtedly classified *Hel.* 985-87)? If he is, we would like to hear the reasons. On the other hand, if he allows the "Urteil" class to exist (as he probably does) is not his classification of *Hel.* 985-87 in the "Bewirktes . . ." category a *petitio principii*? His statement that "'grief that is to last forever' (*ἀθάνατον*) expresses no *Urteil*" is strange at best. If we think in terms of such restrictions we should, for example, abolish the future indicative (the indicative being the factual mood) arguing that by definition futurity cannot be a fact but a possibility. But if the future indicative is a linguistic reality, why should we reject the notion of a logical *quasi-Urteil* treated poetically as *Urteil* (after all, we are dealing with *emotive* poetry). The speaker says: ". . . so the two of us shall lie dead side by side upon this curved tomb, (and thus [to the best of my judgment as to the probable, indeed certain, consequence] we will be) your deathless grief and your sire's reproach." I see no reason why the nominatives *ἄλγος-ψόγος* and the voice of the actor cannot here unmistakably convey the "Urteil" apposition. My conclusion is that Diggle's change of *ψόγος* to *ψόγον*

Homer! The penultimate chapter sets out twenty-six fallacies of modern criticism. A brief summary of the argument concludes the whole.

The present reviewer largely agrees with Professor Stanford's theses, but is surprised by the way in which they are developed. Like Juvenal before him, Stanford spares the blushes of his contemporaries by mentioning no living names (is this fair?), and by assailing figures of the past such as Bentley and Leaf. He defends this in his first chapter by asserting that their faults are typical (7). Happy our age, one can only rejoin, if Bentley is typical of it! But, even supposing that this tactic is justified, should we not then hear about Bentley in some detail? What we find are three examples drawn from the edition of *Paradise Lost* of which one at least (on IV. 555) is a critical commonplace, along with the notorious *nitedula*, conjectured at Horace, *Epp.* 1.7.29. Ought not the erudition to mine more deeply? What about the conjecture on *P.L.* I.63 "a transpicuous Gloom" for "darkness visible," or "a Language rude" at *P.L.* IX.44 for "an age too late" (on this see Choerilus of Samos, fr. 1, Kinkel with Arist. *Rhet.* 3.1415 a 1ff.). And, after beginning in fine style with an attack on Bentley's note to Horace, *Odes* 3.18.12 (p. 46), the author is forced to admit that Bentley was in fact right.

J. W. Mackail's Warton Lecture (*Bentley's Milton*, 1924) sets out judiciously not only the weaknesses but also the strengths of the great scholar. We can learn a great deal from both. But this is not a matter which admits of the brevity allotted to it here. Bentley's ocean will not be evaporated into an Irish pint pot. In our time, even the suggestion of such alchemy is dangerous.

The Anglo-Saxon preoccupation with Coleridge as a theorist of literature is a typical piece of insularity, as R. Wellek (*A History of Modern Criticism* III, 151ff.) has pointed out. Quite amazingly, Coleridge is praised in this book as the originator of an "epoch-making theory of imagination" (23). Stanford's corresponding under-emphasis on the ancient theory of *phantasia* leads in his chapter on the creative process (57ff.) to misunderstanding of his favorite Aristotle. Aristotle did not believe in "abstraction" (60) as the key to artistic composition. Why then would he assert that the most persuasive compositions are made by those "in the passions" (*Poetics* 1455 a 31)? Stanford establishes a wrong distinction (63-64) between the art of the actor and that of the writer with the help of Shakespeare of all people, the supreme example of the fruitful combination of actor and author. It is because the author can seize on the universal in the particular, and choose the particulars which convey the universal, that we admire him. No room for a bloodless term like "abstraction" here.

Since Dante is mentioned here and there, it is a pity that the end of the *Commedia* was not quoted in all this: *all'alta fantasia qui mancò possa*. . . . The ancient theory was evidently good enough for that sublime imagination.

The history of literature is not in fact one of the book's strong points. Can Professor Stanford really be serious in declaring (80) that

in the Middle Ages the Pythagorean notion of life as a deserved punishment for sin prevailed in literary theory? Why then do medieval poetics give such space to Gorgianic tricks which rather suggest that their authors took a Joycean delight in language for its own sake? Matthew of Vendome, for example, uses terms like *elegantia* and *venustas* (E. Faral, *Les arts poétiques du XIIe et du XIIIe siècle*, 167). Here is another topic which should either have been discussed at suitable length, or dropped.

Classicizing literary criticism has of course done an immense disservice to the authors it professes to admire, but since modern lovers of literature have largely ceased to take notice of classicists, it seems naive to quote Leaf, and overlook the Italian and French scourges who drove Tasso to madness and caused Racine to abandon the stage for the post of Royal Historiographer at the height of his career. A wedge has been driven in our day between the classics and the study of medieval / modern literature which will not easily be pushed out. I am not sure that words of reproof for 18th and 19th century epigones will really do the trick. A *catalogue raisonné* of the horrors listed by B. Weinberg in his *History of Literary Criticism in the Italian Renaissance* may well be an essential preliminary to any re-assessment of our situation. Classical philology also needs its Vatican II!

Among the "fallacies" noted, the refutations of the documentary and intentional fallacies seem the weakest. If historicism is wrong, how can the notion of the documentary fallacy, invented to protest historicism, also be wrong? Does not Aristotle himself call attention to the primacy of plot over character? We are not justified in asking how many children Lady Macbeth had, unless it can first be shown that this question is relevant to the total understanding of Shakespeare's play.

Stanford is already quarrelling with Goethe in believing that works of literature are in some sense documents. In attacking the intentional fallacy, he is quarrelling with Kant, Schleiermacher, Hegel and August Boeckh (for the last, see his *Encyclopädie und Methodologie der philologischen Wissenschaften*, 2nd. ed. [Leipzig 1886] 87). Of course it seems arrogant to say that the sensitive critic may come to understand a piece of literature better than its author, but has not Stanford already conceded this point when elsewhere (22) he quotes E. M. Forster on the poetic process and the unconscious? The engaged author, writing "in the passions," does not fully grasp what he is doing, any more than a soldier in the thick of the fray understands the tactics of the battle. Later, in the calm of the study, the critic attempts to set what has been done in perspective, and to bring to consciousness what was earlier achieved by less deliberate agonies. The artist usually cares very little about all this (see Stanford, 114-15). He is no more a privileged interpreter of his own work than our soldier is a military historian.

The artist still has primacy. It could be that Professor Stanford would like to urge a return to the Alexandrian ideal of the poet /

scholar (in that order). Indeed I sympathize with this, but the case would need to be argued at greater length.

These theses touch on large issues, and demanded a large preparation. In particular, the relationship of the most fruitful modern criticism to the brilliant insights of the period of the German *Aufklärung* might have been explored, and Professor Stanford might have discovered that he is not so alone as he fancies. But what there is is stimulating and attractively written, and the book, sure to challenge debate, is recommended to students with all eagerness.

J. K. NEWMAN

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R. F. WILLETTTS. *The Civilization of Ancient Crete*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1977. Pp. 279, 25 figures, 23 plates. \$22.75.

Professor Willetts has devoted his professional life to the interpretation of ancient Crete, especially classical Crete, and is an authority on history, epigraphy, and religious life. Many will have consulted with profit his *Cretan Cults and Festivals* (1962), *Ancient Crete: A Social History* (1965) and *Everyday Life in Ancient Crete* (1969). This new detailed survey of aspects of Cretan civilization necessarily recovers ground already covered by the author, or by others in the long first section devoted to the Neolithic and Bronze Ages, but it has the advantage of presenting a cultural continuum from the beginnings to the creation of the Roman province of Crete and Cyrene. While Professor Willetts' experience, authority and conviction are seen best, perhaps, in the third section, *The Dorian Aristocracy*, his unusual control of both the "prehistoric" and historic phases of Cretan society allows him to make a number of suggestive points about traditions native to the island, which might not occur to more specialized scholars.

Professor Willetts read widely to support his Bronze Age survey, and quotes steadily from reliable secondary sources and scholars like Matz and Hood. He is keenest on architecture and artefacts that may illuminate social organization and the economy; he urges a theocratic impulse for the development of the palace systems, and likes Helen Waterhouse's arguments for a society controlled by women, priestesses representing the goddess on earth and invoking her blessings for a peaceful fruitful culture. Male energy was channeled into the conquest of the environment and the organization of agriculture, crafts and trade. There are shrewd comments on farming, stock breeding, the size and distribution of the population. The discussion of art and technology seems rushed, perfunctory, perhaps "obligatory," and since the illustrations are few and of miscellaneous character, students will probably find these sections less useful. Still, since Profes-

Professor Willets is not writing an archaeological but a cultural history, the strong sections covering myth, cult, matriarchy, and the roles of tribe, clan and household repay close attention. It is a pity that the maps of Minoan Crete and Mycenaean Greece are marred by legends containing misinformation and unhelpful news: "Kamares, Pottery style before and after 2000, named after cave"; "Sesklo, Flourished from c. 3000"; "Dimini, Climax 2300–2100"; "Lerna, Settlement 23 century, destroyed c. 2100"; "Phaistos, First palaces 2200–1700"; or the misplacement of Vasilike. These might be redone.

The sections on classical Crete, enfolding it in a larger Mediterranean history, tackle the difficult problems with energy: the Dorian presence in Crete, the early relations with Syria and Cyprus, the forms of language, the adaptations of cult, the internal organization of society. Professor Willets is strong on law and slavery, as one would expect, and has added his translation of the Gortyn law code as a valuable appendix. The discussions of the marriage restrictions for heiresses and the conflicts of patriarchal and matriarchal values are extremely interesting. The British Museum *poinikastas* text is stressed, the red-letter and judge positions fully explored. Religion and cults with their epigraphic testimony form the climax of the book, with a few final words bringing Cretan history up to date, from the role of Hellenistic mercenaries to the German invasion of 1941: There is a substantial bibliography, and interesting notes, although the abbreviations are sometimes confusing and some page references not filled in. The misprints are not important, generally involving *n* for *u* (skenomorphic) and the appearance of the book is clean and handsome. Professor Willets has presented with considerable subtlety and special knowledge the continuity and complex changes in six-thousand years of Cretan culture.

EMILY VERMEULE

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

EMILY VERMEULE. *Aspects of Death in Early Greek Poetry and Art*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979. Pp. xvi + 270. \$22.50 (*Sather Classical Lectures*, 46)

Despite the importance of this book's topic for students of Greek artists, poets, and burial customs, there exists little up-to-date, extensive, and synthetic work on it. Throughout *Aspects*, V. keeps Rohde's *Psyche* in sight, but she avoids its dated methods of religious history. Likewise, V. draws upon such recent works as Kurtz and Boardman's *Greek Burial Customs* and Burkert's *Homo Necans*, but she has attempted a wider, less specialized study. This is not to say that V. has written a comprehensive or monumental treatment; as she says, the book "is a derivative and arbitrary selection of aspects of Greek death in terms of artistic documents and familiar passages." (x) Two qualities of *Aspects*, however, make it a valuable contribution: V. surveys

a wealth of detail taken from epic and lyric poetry, early philosophy, art, and funerary practices, and she employs a basically sound comparative method to interpret individual pieces and to derive general conclusions unhindered by preconceptions. Both in its character as a survey and in the use of visual evidence (figures in the text, not plates), *Aspects* represents something of a departure from the norm for the Sather series.

Throughout the book, V. has restated, often with fresh insight and good interdisciplinary support, many of the basic generalizations about early Greek (defined as ca. 750–450 B.C.) art and poetry dealing with death. They include: the perceived activity and power of the dead in “controlling Greek life, not only as important objects of ancestor or hero cult, but also through their role in myth and poetry and art” (7); the inconsistency, ambiguity, and pessimism of the Greeks in trying to alleviate the pain of death by means of poetry, art, and funerary practices and in conceiving of the body and soul after death; the great quantity, high artistic quality, and thematic continuity, throughout the periods considered, of works dealing with death; the importance of wit and intelligence for Greek thinking about death—“for some poets, wit was the only reliable *pharmakon* for death” (26); in short, the basic humanism of the Greeks in this matter. In chapter 1, V. introduces these ideas and other points, some of which she pursues later in more detail; her analysis of the Homeric and later usage of *thanatos* (death) is particularly instructive and complete. In the second chapter, V. surveys some of the evidence for Bronze Age practices, artistic motifs, and beliefs. Special attention is given to two aspects: first, the universality of Bronze Age customs, most notably exemplified by Greek imitations of Egyptian motifs like the *ba*-bird, and, second, the continuation of Bronze Age funerary art and practices, in spite of the change to cremation, into later times. There is much of value in this chapter; but the non-expert reader should be aware that the archaeological evidence is by no means complete and has been variously interpreted. For example, no book has yet done for Mycenaean Greek funerary practices what Pini’s *Minoische Gräberkunde* has for Minoan Crete.

Chapter 3 contains a discussion of the “elaborate ballet” of dying in combat in the battle books of the *Iliad*, which helped to “shape the tradition of subsequent literatures, that death is not the enemy of achievement or creativity but its cause.” (94) The treatment is good, particularly in comparing human and animal combat motifs; yet this reviewer at least would like to have seen integrated into it the evidence for athletics as an activity parallel to war in its ability to confer immortal glory. Not only would this have been relevant to a book that deals with immortality as well as mortality, but some tantalizing connections exist between death and athletics.¹ Chapter 4 examines the

¹ Besides, of course, the practice of funeral games, one can point to examples like the deaths of losers (e.g., Oenomaus); parallels between hunting and athletics (e.g., Pindar, *Pyth.* 9; *Nem.* 6.14); the funerary epigram to an

"vulnerable" immortality of the gods, who cannot obtain the heroic glory of death and therefore behave worse than men, and the mythical adventures of certain humans and other creatures (e.g., Medusa, Geryon) who go up and down the ladder connecting mortal life with immortality and death. In the fifth chapter, perhaps the best, V. begins with the "other" *partheneion* of Alcman and looks at the thematic connections that artists and poets articulated amongst Love, Sleep, and Death; mythical figures that illustrate these connections include Eos, the Harpies, and the Sphinx. In chapter 6, the paradoxical magic of sea and song is discussed; like Sirens, both have to do with immortality but both are dangerous.

Some scholars might fault *Aspects* for handling topics of special interest to themselves with brevity or superficiality. This reviewer, for example, would like to have seen a fuller treatment of the origin and form of private and public funeral monuments and funerary epigrams. One must not, however, expect too much of *Aspects*. It is a good survey, and in its text, figures, full notes, and critically selected bibliography the specialist will find much relevant information from other fields, and the generalist and student will receive valuable insights and find out where to pursue topics further. Some might be offended by the tone of *Aspects*, its witty remarks and irreverent quotations and photographs; others, more generous, might say that this material must have contributed to the rhetorical success of the lectures but should have been edited out for publication. This reviewer, however, respects V. for fitting her rhetoric to that of the Greeks, whose wit and irreverence often marked their attitudes towards death. One general criticism should be made: V. occasionally draws conclusions from "connections" perceived to exist amongst disparate sources.² In chapter 2, for example, one finds both the kind of hard-headed argumentation one expects of V. (in regard to grave gifts, 56ff.) and the suggestion of a parallel between the vulture shrines of Çatal Hüyük and Greek *keres*; the parallel may well be legitimate, but we want more proof. Finally, one can only lament the length of the delay between the lectures (1975) and the date of publication; only a few references from 1976 appear and virtually no subsequent ones.

A typographical point: one wishes that the references in the notes had been checked more carefully. References to Homer in chapter 1 seem especially careless, and there follows a list of corrections: p. 211, n. 6, for II.775 read 755; p. 212f., n. 12, for XXIV.348 read xxiv; for XII.361 read XXII.362; for XIII.100 read XXIII; p. 213, n. 13, except possibly for xi.476, I fail to see the relevance of the passages cited to support the statement about intelligence and color; p. 214, n. 23, for i.306 read 136; p. 217, n. 45, for XI.109,323, xi. 109 simply

athlete-warrior erected near a race course (Friedländer and Hoffleit, *Epigrammata*, no. 136).

² On the dangers of such practice, cf. A. M. Snodgrass, "Poet and Painter in Eighth Century Greece," *PCPhS* N.S. 25 (1979) 118ff.

read, I assume, xi.109, xii.323; for XVII.373 read 371f.; p. 220, n. 66, for XVIII.478 read XVII; for II.354 read 359; for XIV.207 read xiv; delete xiii.157 and add xii.157 to the next item; for VIII.170 read 70; n. 67, for III.699 read II; for XXIV.587 read, I assume, XVIII.583; n. 68, delete XXII.202; for XVII.714 read, perhaps, xxii.14.

JOSEPH W. DAY

THE COLLEGE OF WOOSTER

ELMAR SCHWERTHEIM (ed.). *Die Inschriften von Kyzikos und Umgebung. Teil I: Grabtexte.* Bonn, Rudolf Habelt Verlag, 1980. Pp. xv + 283. Plates 44. Folding Map. DM94.00. (*Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien*, Band 18)

The Kommission für die archäologische Forschung Kleinasiens at the Austrian Academy of Sciences and the Institut für Altertumskunde at the University of Cologne have been bringing out volumes with striking rapidity and skill. This handsome fascicle, richly illustrated, presents 588 (minus one) texts of metrical inscriptions and other epitaphs. The commentary is economical but useful and the accuracy high. The reviewer found two false breathings in no. 497, line 8, but only five false accents (one each in nos. 38, 301, 509, 532 and 544). In no. 38 Ἀου?μανίας does not look right; the photograph seems to show the name after ὑπόμνημα as Πόλλας [Φ]ουλγίας, i.e. "of Polla Fulvia."

The index is one of names only and not divided into *nomina* and personal names. The missing index of professions and formulas may perhaps appear in a later fascicle. The formulas ὑποχός ἐσται τῷ [τῆς τυμβορρ]χίας ἐ(γ)κλήματι in no. 557, ἀποτείσει λογάρην ὃ τι κληρον[όμοις δοκεῖ] in no. 554, and καὶ σύ γε, ὦ παροδεῖτα, χάρις ὅτι τοῦτο τὸ κοινὸν (σεμνόν) εἶπας (ἀν)τεῖπας ἐμοὶ "χαίρειν" εἵνεκεν εὐσεβείας with variations in nos. 73, 90, 278, 348, 541, 548 are worth mentioning here.

Nos. 126 and 380 are registered in both Latin and Greek, Nos. 144, 357, 424 and 482 in Latin only. No. 395, which is in Latin or Latin alphabet, ends *idio patri mnemes charin*. Most of the inscriptions are from the Roman period, but no. 286 has been dated in the sixth century B.C.

The book should be in every library for classics.

JAMES H. OLIVER

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

ERRATA

In vol. 101, 1980, p. 318, line 6 read "dans l'intervalle" for "tous les deux ans"; line 8 read "pentétériques" for "triétériques".



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THE WISH WITHOUT DESIRE

Among the multifarious materials that Gregory Nagy has included in his recent book *The Best of the Achaeans* (Baltimore & London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), there is on pages 148-50 a discussion of some remarks made by Hector. These remarks lead Nagy to make statements about Hector's "aspirations" and the "ritual aspect of a hero." Since Nagy has misunderstood what Hector says, since he appears to base somewhat important conclusions on this misunderstanding, and since similar misunderstandings have appeared in other recent writing on Homer, it is desirable to review the nature of Homer's idiom, even though I had thought that Leaf had given the definitive explanation of it decades ago (*The Iliad*, Vol. I, 2nd ed., London, Macmillan, 1900, p. 368). Apparently Leaf's note (with citation of the relevant passages) was too brief to make a lasting impression. Setting out the passages one by one and showing how Leaf's explanation of the idiom fits all of them perfectly may serve to eliminate, or at least diminish, the misunderstanding. It seems well to begin with Nagy, because his important book is likely to attract special attention, and his misunderstanding of the idiom may influence other writers.

The passages on which Nagy based his discussion are *Iliad* 8.538-41 and 13.825-28. The lines in Book 8 run thus:

εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼν ὥς
εἶην ἀθάνατος καὶ ἀγήρωσ ἤματα πάντα,
τιοίμην δ' ὥς τίετ' Ἀθηναίη καὶ Ἀπόλλων, 540
ὥς νῦν ἡμέρη ἣδε κακὸν φέρει Ἀργείοισιν."

It is on the basis of these words that Nagy tells us, "The hero himself says that he wishes he were immortal and 'honored'—specifically like Athena and Apollo."

Lines 827-28 in Book 13 are identical with 8.540-41, but the introductory lines are different:

εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼν οὕτω γε Διὸς παῖς αἰγιόχοιο 825
εἶην ἡμᾶτα πάντα, τέκοι δέ με πότνια Ἥρη.

These lines move Nagy to say, "... Hektor himself wishes that he were the child of Zeus." On the next page (149) Nagy tells us, "On the level of epic, of course, the hero gets *tīmē* by virtue of his reputation as a warrior; on the level of ritual, on the other hand, the hero gets *tīmē* in the form of cult . . . In the specific case of Hektor, the *tīmē* to which he aspires is that of Apollo and Athena themselves, and it is hard to imagine a more direct way for epic to convey the ritual aspect of a hero."

Though what Hector says in these passages is grammatically a wish, he does not express here any desire to be immortal or to be the child of Zeus; he does not "aspire" to the *tīmē* of Apollo and Athena. Leaf beautifully defined this idiom as "a form of wish, where a thing is vividly depicted as certain by opposing it to an imaginary event which is obviously impossible." What Hector is really saying in these two passages is, "I wish I were as sure of immortality (or of being the son of Zeus) as I am that this day brings evil to the Greeks." The sentences are formally, grammatically, wishes, but the speaker is not wishing to be immortal or the son of Zeus. If I say, "I wish I were as certain of being elected President as I am that my taxes will go up this year," my sentence is grammatically a wish, but no one would imagine for a moment that I am expressing a desire to become President. I am using an idiom to emphasize my certainty that my taxes will go up. And Hector is merely emphasizing his certainty that evil is in store for the Greeks. Some may share the view of Willcock (*A Companion to the Iliad*, Chicago & London, University of Chicago Press, 1976, p. 92) that there is "dangerous presumption" in Hector's remarks in Book 8, but if so it lies in the certainty of victory, not in any wish to be immortal. It is of the essence of this idiom that what is in the "wish" is meant to be the utmost of the impossible. (Willcock also has a misleading note on 8.540 in his recent edition of the first twelve books of the *Iliad* [Basingstoke & London, Macmillan; New York, St. Martin's Press, 1978]). We happen to have an odd English idiom which, though different from Homer's, has this same purpose: "He's nothing if not

ambitious," meaning "He certainly is ambitious." I should expect foreigners to find this cryptic.

Leaf cites a few other passages in Homer that he believes contain the same idiom. The one that is formally like the passage involving Hector is *Iliad* 18.464-66:

αἶ γάρ μιν θανάτοιο δυσηχέος ὧδε δυναίμην
νόσφιν ἀποκρύψαι, ὅτε μιν μόρος αἰνὸς ἰκάνοι, 465
ὥς οἱ τεύχεα καλὰ παρέσσειται.

The meaning here was well paraphrased by D. B. Monro in his *Homeric Grammar* (2nd ed. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1891, p. 285): "fair arms shall be his as surely as I wish I could save him from death." Monro had devoted a few lines to the idiom, describing it as "a form of asseveration," and citing three other passages, one of them the words of Hector in Book 8 quoted above. Hephaestus wants to assure Thetis that he will *certainly* provide the armor for Achilles. In this passage and in the Hector passages, there is a significant adverb in the wish clause, ὥς in 8, οὔτω (strengthened by γε) in 13, and ὧδε in 18, and this adverb is often omitted from the wish clause by translators who do not understand the idiom (and it is omitted by Nagy).

Among the other examples of the idiom cited by Leaf, the most interesting is *Iliad* 22.346-48, a passage that has sometimes led to more or less fantastic remarks about Achilles the cannibal:

αἶ γάρ πως αὐτόν με μένος καὶ θυμὸς ἀνείη
ὥμ' ἀποταμνόμενον κρέα ἔδμεναι, οἷά μ' ἔοργας,
ὥς οὐκ ἔσθ' ὃς σῆς γε κύνας κεφαλῆς ἀπαλλάκοι.

The passage is not so clear as the others, since there is no adverb in the wish clause (τῶς has been conjectured for πως) but I agree with Leaf in thinking that here again certainty is being contrasted with the impossible by means of this most emphatic "wish" idiom. What Achilles means is, "It is just as likely that I would cut you up and eat you raw as that anyone will keep the dogs away from your head." Achilles is not in these lines being brought "to the verge of a bestial deed," as Nagy thinks (p. 136). He mentions the cannibalism as the most impossible thing he can think of in order to emphasize the certainty of the dogs tearing Hector's body.

The view that in this idiom the adverb may not be necessary in the wish clause is strengthened by some Odyssean instances (also cited by Leaf) of what looks like the same emphatic asseveration of certainty, though in these passages the wish is not so obviously impossible:

“ αἶ γὰρ δὴ ψυχῆς τε καὶ αἰῶνός σε δυναίμην
εὖνιν ποιήσας πέμψαι δόμον Ἴδως εἴσω,
ὥς οὐκ ὀφθαλμόν γ’ ἰήσεται οὐδ’ ἐνοσίχθων.”

9.523-25

Odysseus means here, “I wish I were as sure of being able to kill you as I am that not even Poseidon will cure your eye.”

αἶ γὰρ Τηλέμαχον βάλοι ἀργυρότοξος Ἀπόλλων
σήμερον ἐν μεγάροις, ἢ ὑπὸ μνηστῆρσι δαμείη,
ὥς Ὀδυσῆϊ γε τηλοῦ ἀπώλετο νόστιμον ἦμαρ.”

17.251-53

Melanthius clearly means, “I wish I were as certain that Apollo or the suitors would kill Telemachus today as I am that Odysseus’ day of return has been lost afar.”

Odyssey 21.401-3 is a short and ironical example of the same idiom:

“ Ἄλλος δ’ αὖτ’ εἶπεσκε νέων ὑπερηνορέοντων
“ αἶ γὰρ δὴ τοσσοῦτον ὀνήσιος ἀντιάσειεν
ὥς οὐτός ποτε τοῦτο δυνήσεται ἐντανύσασθαι.”

The meaning is well given in Murray’s Loeb translation: “And again another of the proud youths would say: ‘Would that the fellow might find profit in just such measure as he shall prove able ever to string this bow.’ ”

Misunderstanding of Hector’s remarks seems to be a modern phenomenon. Some of the early Latin translators recognized the importance of the adverb in the wish. Crispinus, for instance, as given in Giphanius’ edition published in Strasbourg in 1572 translated thus Hector’s words in *Iliad* 8.538-41: “utinam enim ego sic essem immortalis et non senescens per dies omnes et colerer sicut colitur Minerva et Apollo, ut nunc dies haec malum fert Argivis.” And in 1802 Heyne in his edition translated Hector’s words thus: “utinam ego tam certe consequi possem immortalitatem, quam certe crastino die Achivi male sibi res suas evenire videbunt.” The early English

translators, Chapman and Pope, had this passage right, as did Lord Derby in 1868 and Samuel Butler in 1898. I suspect that it may have been Leaf himself who was responsible for the frequent current misunderstanding. After explaining the matter with exemplary clarity and soundness in his edition of the text, he adopted a phraseology in his translation (of Books 1-9 in the Lang, Leaf, and Myers long-popular version) that obscured what Hector was saying: "Would that I were immortal and ageless all my days and honoured like as Athene is honoured and Apollo, so surely as this day bringeth the Argives ill." This phrasing, with something like "so surely as" in the conclusion and with nothing in the wish to represent the adverb, has become almost normal nowadays and appears in Nagy's translation. Such a translation seems to invite misunderstanding.¹

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¹ The referee has kindly called my attention to a paper by E. M. Bradley, "The Hybris of Odysseus," (*Soundings* 51 [1968] 33-44) which has a few pages dealing with the idiom. This is not the place to argue the matter; so I shall merely say that Bradley has not convinced me that some of the instances of the idiom involve hybris.

ON THE COMPOSITIONAL USE OF SIMILES IN THE *ODYSSEY**

For Karl Deichgräber

LION SIMILES

The lion similes of the *Iliad* occur almost exclusively in battle scenes and are used to describe warriors fighting or ready to fight.¹ For all their vividness, the lion similes are typical and traditional as to the context in which they are deployed, and the purpose they serve. As a simile *motif* the lion "is cited for a generic behaviour. The Homeric lion is always a belligerent beast; above all he is known for his fierce attacks, but even on the retreat he remains warlike."² Embodying noble daring and energetic strength as well as ferocity of attack and the recklessness of determined prowess, the lion stands out among the other animals used in similes of the *Iliad*; occasionally, the wild boar or a bird of prey may replace him. In fact, the lion stands out in the same way in which the great heroes are dis-

* This article is based on a paper read at the Annual Meeting of the Classical Association of Canada in Fredericton, N.B., 1977. The topic is briefly discussed, but not elaborated, in my Homer book: *Stilwandel im Homerischen Epos. Studien zur Poetik und Theorie der epischen Gattung*. Bibliothek der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaften, N.F., 2. Reihe, Bd. 55 (Heidelberg 1975) 72-73. When writing this article I was supported by a Leave Fellowship of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Last, but not least I wish to thank both Nancy O'Brien and the unknown reader appointed by the editors of *AJP* for their constructive criticism which greatly helped to improve this paper.

¹ See H. Fränkel, *Die homerischen Gleichnisse* (Göttingen 1921); and *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy. A History of Greek Epic, Lyric, and Prose to the Middle of the Fifth Century*, transl. M. Hadas and J. Willis (New York and London 1975) 41-42. H. Seyffert, *Die Gleichnisse der Odyssee* (Diss. Kiel 1949) 6. T. B. L. Webster, *From Mycenae to Homer* (London 1958, repr. 1960) 235. W. C. Scott, *The Oral Nature of the Homeric Simile*. Suppl. *Mnemosyne* 28 (Leiden 1974) 58-62. On the use of similes in the *ἀπιστεῖται* of the *Iliad*, see the comprehensive and systematic study of T. Krischer, *Formale Konventionen der homerischen Epik*, *Zetemata* 56 (Munich 1971) 36-75.

² B. Snell, "From Myth to Logic: The Role of the Comparison," in: *The Discovery of the Mind. The Greek Origins of European Thought*, trans. T. G. Rosenmeyer (Harper Torchbooks: New York 1960) 201.

tinguished from the rank and file which all too often are reduced to providing the corpses in a hero's ἀριστεία. The heroic animal *par excellence*: the scholiast pertinently characterizes the lion as the ἀλκιμώτατον ζῷον (Schol. A ad *Il.* 17.109). Thus the lion simile not only illustrates, it also glorifies. Only once in the *Iliad* does a lion simile seem to be used to criticize a hero's behaviour; it is when Apollo, in a speech to the gods in Bk. 24, condemns Achilles' lack of αἰδώς and ἔλεος: pursuing his revenge beyond the death of his enemy, a dehumanized Achilles is said to have 'in his heart no feelings of what is proper (φρένες ἐναίσιμοι) nor can his heart be bent (οὔτε νόημα γναμπτόν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι)':

λέων δ' ὥς ἄγρια οἶδεν,
 ὃς τ' ἔπει ἄρ' μεγάλη τε βίη καὶ ἀγήνορι θυμῷ
 εἷζας εἰς ἔπ' ἰμῖλα βροτῶν, ἵνα δαῖτα λάβῃσιν
 ὥς Ἀχιλεὺς ἔλεον μὲν ἀπώλεσεν, οὐδέ οἱ αἰδώς
 γίγνεται. . . .

(*Il.* 24.42ff.)³

It is noteworthy that the critical purpose of this comparison does not affect the traditional form of the lion simile: the lion remains the ζῷον ἀλκιμώτατον with the noble attributes bestowed on it in other lion similes. Take, for instance, the λέων ὀρεσίτροφος in *Il.* 12.299; he, too, is driven by his ἀγήνωρ θυμός:

(Sarpedon is urged on by Zeus to attack the Achaean wall)

βῆ ῥ' ἴμεν ὥς τε λέων ὀρεσίτροφος, ὃς τ' ἐπιδευῆς
 δηρὸν ἔη κρειῶν, κέλεται δέ ἐ θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ
 μῆλων πειρήσοντα καὶ ἐς πύκινον δόμον ἐλθεῖν
 εἰ περ γάρ χ' εὖρησι παρ' αὐτόφι βώτορας ἄνδρας
 σὺν κυσσὶ καὶ δούρεσσι φυλάσσοντας περὶ μῆλα,
 οὐ ῥά τ' ἀπείρητος μέμονε σταθμοῖο δῖεσθαι,
 ἀλλ' ὃ γ' ἄρ' ἡ ἥρπαξε μετάλμενος, ἡὲ καὶ αὐτὸς
 ἔβλητ' ἐν πρώτοισι θοῆς ἀπὸ χειρὸς ἄκοντι
 ὥς ῥα τότε ἄντίθεον Σαρπηδόνα θυμὸς ἀνῆκε
 τεῖχος ἐπαῖζαι. . . .

(*Il.* 12.299ff).

A fine illustration of the heroic spirit which the lion simile of the *Iliad* breathes! The heroic stylization of the lion *motif* goes

³ The *Iliad* is quoted from the Oxford edition by D. B. Munro and T. W. Allen, *Homeri Opera I & II* (Oxford 1920, repr. 1958).

so far as to allow an element of a battle scene enter the simile in line 306: *ἔβλητο ἐν πρώτοισι*, which is more appropriately said of a warrior, as in *Il.* 11.675 (*ἔβλητ' ἐν πρώτοισι ἐμῆς ἀπὸ χειρὸς ἄκοντι*).

This *λέων ὀρεσίτροφος* has his counterpart in a simile of the *Odyssey* (Bk. 6). The contest is Odysseus' arrival in Scheria. After being driven ashore, Odysseus has spent the night in the wilderness. Starved, naked, his body swollen in all limbs by the sea water and covered with a salty crust, Odysseus has been reduced to the most wretched natural condition. He wakes from his sleep of exhaustion to the cries of young girls at play: these are for him, who has spent a long time among super- and subhuman beings and has been exposed to the hostile elements of nature, the first sign of a civilized and human world. Despite his miserable condition, Odysseus still remembers how not to approach young ladies: covering therefore his genitals with a leafy branch, he steps forth

ὥς τε λέων ὀρεσίτροφος, ἀλκὶ πεποιθώς,
ὃς τ' εἰς ὕμενος καὶ ἀήμενος, ἐν δέ οἱ ὄσσε
δαίεται· αὐτὰρ ὁ βουσί μετέρχεται ἢ δῖεσσιν
ἢ μετ' ἀγροτέρας ἐλάφους· κέλεται δέ εἰ γαστήρ
μῆλων πειρήσοντα καὶ ἐς πυκινὸν δόμον ἐλθεῖν.
ὥς Ὀδυσσεὺς κούρησιν εὐπλοκάμοισιν ἔμελλε
μεῖζεσθαι, γυμνὸς περ ἐὼν· χρεῖώ γάρ ἴκανε.
σμερδαλέος δ' αὐτῇσι φάνη κεκακωμένος ἄλμη. . . .

(*Od.* 6.130ff.)⁴

This simile clearly echos the simile of *Il.* 12.299 and invites comparison. In both similes a *λέων ὀρεσίτροφος*—an *epitheton significans*, not *ornans*!—is driven by hunger from his accustomed hunting grounds in the mountains where his usual prey is—wild animals, the larger cattle which graze in the wilderness, and the occasional strayed sheep; he approaches human settlements to go after the smaller livestock which remain close to the farm. But this is as far as the similarity goes. In the *Iliad* simile, this is only the opening; the lion then attacks, meets with resistance by armed men with dogs; but he sustains his attack regardless of the danger. The lion of this simile, although driven by hunger, remains every inch the *ἀλκιμώτατον*

⁴ The *Odyssey* is quoted from P. Von der Mühll's edition: *Homeri Odyssea*, rec. Peter Von der Mühll. Editiones Helveticae, Ser. Graeca 4 (Basle 1962).

ζῶον of the traditional lion simile. It is the lion's spirited attack and his courageous determination on which the simile turns—in accordance with the heroic action of the narrative it describes. The *Odyssey* simile, however, has as its main theme what in the *Iliad* simile is only the introductory situation: it elaborates the condition of a living being which, exposed to the natural elements, is driven by sheer need (γαστήρ, χρειώ) from the wilderness to civilized regions. At this point of the epic action, the poet aims at a precise description of Odysseus' physical appearance which is both wretched and terrifying: having been exposed helplessly to sea and storm and stripped of all exterior attributes of civilized man, Odysseus has been reduced to the condition of Natural Man and has taken on the appearance of a troll-like figure. To give vivid expression to the terror such a figure evokes in civilized beings, the *Odyssey* poet has adapted the *Iliad* simile of the λέων ὀρεσίτροφος in such a way as to form an exactly analogous image to the sight Odysseus in his wretched condition offers to these young girls. In the process the lion *motif* has changed its character: this lion is obviously not depicted as the ἀλκιμώτατον ζῶον of the *Iliad*; rather as a creature whose strength of attack is born, not of its valour, but of desperation. Viewed in a passive role, the lion is depicted as a plaything of nature's elements and his stomach—just like Odysseus.⁵ Nothing signals more clearly the lion's descent from the ἥρωικόν to the βιωτικόν than the change in the phrase κέλεται δέ εἰ θυμός (*Il.* 12.300): in the *Odyssey* simile it is significantly altered to κέλεται δέ εἰ γαστήρ (*Od.* 6.133).⁶

⁵ My interpretation differs somewhat from A. J. Podlecki's; see his "Some Odyssean Similes," *Greece and Rome* 18, 1 (1971) 83: 'He cuts a splendid figure, this lion with his flashing eyes . . .' I think Podlecki was slightly carried away by R. V. Rieu's rather dramatizing translation: ' . . . like a mountain-bred lion who sallies out, defying wind and rain in the pride of his power, with fire in his eyes . . .' (quoted by Podlecki). W. C. Scott (*The Oral Nature of the Homeric Simile* 62) notes the simile's untraditional character and seems to emphasize the non-heroic features of the lion *motif*: 'a hungry, weather-worn lion who yearns for food' (*ibid.*). H. Fränkel (*Die homerischen Gleichnisse* 70) refers to the lion as a *Poesielöwe*. C. Moulton, *Similes in the Homeric Poems*. Hypomnemata 49 (Göttingen 1976) 140 has surprisingly little to say about this remarkable simile.

⁶ Note that the ancient critics used to describe the difference between the two Homeric epics in terms of ἥρωικός/βιωτικός and πάθος/ἥθος. See my *Stilwandel im Homerischen Epos* 130-32 and n. 16 (198).

Needless to say, this Odyssean lion simile has shed its generic and traditional character: it is used outside its typical martial context and serves a purpose quite different from its traditional one (to describe warriors fighting or ready to fight). Most importantly, its heroic character has yielded to a realism which aims at precisely grasping an exterior appearance.⁷ The result is a highly unique simile. Its uniqueness is all the more poignant, as the poet has not concealed its descent from the simile in *Il.* 12.299, which is, for all its vividness, traditional and generic in placement, purpose, and character.

Quite similar observations can be made in another *Odyssey* simile comparing Odysseus with a lion (*Od.* 22.401): After the slaughter of the suitors, Eurycleia is summoned by Odysseus to the great hall; there she finds

Ὀδυσῆα μετὰ κταμένοισι νέκυσσιν
αἵματι καὶ λύθρῳ πεπαλαγμένον ὥς τε λέοντα,
ὃς ῥά τε βεβρωκὼς βοὸς ἔρχεται ἀγραῦλοιο·
πάν δ' ἄρα οἱ στήθος τε παρήϊά τ' ἀμφοτέρωθεν
αἵματοέντα πέλει, δεινὸς δ' εἰς ὧπα ἰδέσθαι
ὥς Ὀδυσσεὺς πεπάλακτο πόδας καὶ χεῖρας ὑπερθεν.
(*Od.* 22.401ff.)

This lion simile, too, refers us back to the *Iliad*; apparently, it originated as the elaboration of a brief half-line comparison in *Il.* 17.541f. describing Automedon:

πόδας καὶ χεῖρας ὑπερθεν
αἱματοίεις ὥς τίς τε λέων κατὰ ταῦρον ἐδηδώς.

In *Od.* 22.401 the lion simile, unlike the one in Bk. 6, seems to be found in its traditional context, the battle scene: it marks the end of Odysseus' fight with the suitors, his ἀριστεία. However, there is a significant displacement. Instead of describing and glorifying Odysseus' heroic deeds *during* this ἀριστεία, or his warlike spirit *prior to* it—the traditional placement of the beast-of-prey simile in the *Iliad*—this lion simile is placed *right after* the fight with the suitors. Moreover, like the lion simile in Bk. 6, it concentrates on physical appearance—this time the

⁷ This is one of the basic features of the Odyssean simile according to H. Seyffert (*Die Gleichnisse der Odyssee* 95 and passim): 'der Zug zur äusseren und inneren Prägnanz,' zum 'exakten empirischen-technischen' und 'psychologischen Erfassen.'

physical appearance of hero and lion after committing a slaughterous act.

Now, gory details such as the devouring of the victim's blood and entrails are also found in lion similes of the *Iliad*;⁸ but only as part of a broader picture which emphasizes the heroic splendour of lion and warrior. This *Odyssey* simile, however, concentrates *exclusively* on the abhorrent view of a blood-spattered lion after his terrible meal. By making this the sole object of the simile, the *Odyssey* poet—instead of glorifying the lion as the ἀλκιμώτατον ζῷον—seems to disparage the animal for its savagery. What such an ambiguous image may imply for the understanding of the μνηστηροφονία will have to be discussed later. At any rate, in this lion simile of the *Odyssey* the prototype of noble daring has become a slaughterous beast. Differing in purpose, function, and tone from the traditional lion similes of the *Iliad*, the simile in *Od.* 22.401, like the one in *Od.* 6.130, is unique. The very fact that it is placed so close to the traditional context of lion similes only emphasizes its uniqueness.⁹

THE LION SIMILES AS ELEMENTS OF LARGER NARRATIVE UNITS

About a hundred lines after the lion simile in *Od.* 6.130, an artist simile occurs (*Od.* 6.232) which is repeated verbatim in *Od.* 23.159, about 250 lines after the lion simile of *Od.* 22.401. Each artist simile is preceded by a bath scene (*Od.* 6.224 and 23.153). Several critics have already argued that the repetition of the artist simile is compositionally significant.¹⁰ One can go a step further. I propose that the repeated unit 'artist simile' be

⁸ Cp. *Il.* 11.176 and 17.61: ἐπετα δέ θ' αἶμα καὶ ἔγκατα πάντα λαφύσσει.

⁹ The remainder of the Odyssean lion similes are also untypical: *Od.* 4.791; 4.335 = 17.124, plus the brief comparison in 9.292 of the Cyclops with a lion (cp. also, below, n. 14). For these similes, cp. the interesting comments by Podlecki ("Some Odyssean Similes" 83-84); see also W. C. Scott (*The Oral Nature of the Homeric Simile* 121-24) and C. Moulton (*Similes in the Homeric Poems* 139-41).

¹⁰ Cp. J. A. Notopoulos, "Continuity and Interconnexion in Homeric Oral Composition," *TAPA* 82 (1951) 97: 'The simile associated with a character can also serve to bind parts of an oral composition, as may be seen in *Od.* 23.47-48 and 22.402; 23.157-62 and 6.230-35. 'Notopoulos obviously sees connections

enlarged by the bath scene, and that then each combination *bath/artist simile* be related to the respective lion simile in Bks. 6 and 22. From this arises my first thesis: in both cases the artist simile forms the third element of a larger unit, a *sequence* consisting of *lion simile/bath/artist simile*. It is thus not merely the repetition of the artist simile, but that of the sequence, which calls for examination. Of course, we are dealing here with two different forms of repetition: the artist simile is repeated verbatim,¹¹ while in the case of lion simile and bath we have repetitions by *motif*.

My second, and main, thesis is that the repetition of the sequence *lion simile/bath/artist simile* of Bk. 6 in Bks. 22/23 establishes a cross-reference between two important stages of the epic action; and that this cross-reference forms a connective link which is meaningful in terms of composition and theme.

In order to bring out the inner connection between the three elements *lion simile*, *bath*, and *artist simile*, I first give a free paraphrase of both sequences:

Od. 6.130/224/232:

As a lion, rained on and blown by the storm, driven by hunger, approaches a farm, so Odysseus, naked and

different from those I am about to show. Also see T. B. L. Webster, *From Mycenae to Homer* 236; W. C. Scott, *The Oral Nature of the Homeric Simile* 131, and C. Moulton, *Similes in the Homeric Poems* 139 n. 10, and 153.

¹¹ A question of textual criticism has to be answered first. *Od.* 23.157-62—i.e. part of Odysseus' rejuvenation by Athena and the accompanying artist simile—have been suspected as an interpolation of rhapsodists, cp. the apparatus of Von der Mühl's edition on lines 157-62: 'rhapsodorum ut vid. additamentum.' The reason—apart from the analyst's ingrained suspicion of any repetition—is the syntactical awkwardness of the transition from line 156 to 157:

αὐτὰρ κὰκ κεφαλῆς χεῦεν πολλὸν κάλλος Ἀθήνη
μειζόνά τ' εἰσιδέειν καὶ πάσσονα· κὰδ δὲ κάρητος
οὔλας ἤκε κόμας κτλ.

A word seems to be missing with which the infinitive *εἰσιδέειν* could be connected. I personally find Eustathius' explanation (ὥστε εἶναι τὸν Ὀδυσσεῖα μείζονα τ' εἰσιδέειν καὶ πάσσονα) satisfactory. However, Monro's suggestion that lines 157-58 be rejected is very attractive: for if these lines are athetized, one would not only get a syntactically smooth transition from 156 to 159 but would also remove the pleonastic *κὰδ δὲ κάρητος* (157) which is rather clumsy after *κὰκ κεφαλῆς*; see W. B. Stanford on 23.157-62. in *ΟΜΗΡΟΥ ΟΔΥΣΣΕΙΑ—The Odyssey of Homer*, ed. W. B. Stanford, II (London 1948) 396.

crusted over with sea-spray, driven by need, approaches Nausikaa and her comrades. . . . A little later, Odysseus takes a bath in the river which changes his physical appearance depicted by the lion simile; and as an artist overlays gold on silver, so Athena pours grace and strength over Odysseus' bathed body, anointed and clad in fine garments.

Od. 22.401/23.153/159:

As a lion who has devoured an ox in the field, is all spattered with blood on his chest and face, a horrible sight—so Odysseus' legs and hands, after the slaughter of the suitors, are soiled with blood and filth. . . . A little later, Odysseus takes a bath which changes his physical appearance depicted by the lion simile; and as an artist overlays gold on silver, so Athena pours grace and strength over Odysseus' bathed body, anointed and clad in fine garments.

On the level of the mere story line, the three elements may be said to form a coherent sequence. However, this does not imply that the sequence is meaningful in itself, or that it has any significance beyond itself. By the same token, the repetition of the sequence, by itself, means nothing. 'Repetition, by itself,' writes B. C. Fenik, and establishes thereby an important methodological principle, 'is not sufficient proof of consciously planned effect, or for maintaining that one part is older than the other, or that two different poets were at work. Other, and stronger evidence is needed for any of these conclusions.'¹² Such evidence, exegetical in nature, can be provided. The following analysis is to demonstrate that each sequence forms a meaningful constellation within its own context; and that their relation to one another, constituted by repetition, becomes meaningful by virtue of their placement within the context of the epic action as a whole.

THE SEQUENCE IN BK. 6

In the lion simile and the artist simile, an image of wild nature is antithetically related to an image of cultural activity. Thus both similes implicitly describe contrasting states—of

¹² B. C. Fenik, *Typical Battle Scenes in the Iliad*. Hermes-Einzelschriften 21 (Wiesbaden 1968) 45.

raw nature and civilized life—, and Odysseus' bath describes, in its turn, the transition from one to the other. In ancient literature, a bath, as H. Fränkel has shown,¹³ is often a significant *motif*. It may mark the fulfilment of a task, the completion of an activity, the entrance into a new world or the return to a once familiar one. Odysseus' bath in Bk. 6 may be understood to connote this: a helpless plaything of nature's elemental forces, Odysseus has been reduced to the most wretched state of Natural Man; through the bath Odysseus, physically and symbolically, sheds this state and returns to civilization; he is thus restored as a member of the civilized community of men. It is by virtue of the strong contrast of such fundamental states, which the similes illustrate, that the bath can be said to have this implied force.

Viewed in relation to the *Odyssey's* basic narrative themes—wanderings (πλάνη) and return (νόστος) of the hero—the sequence appears highly significant by virtue of its position at the opening of the Phaeacia episode. The bath completes Odysseus' arrival in Scheria, the land of the Phaeacians. Once Odysseus has reached Scheria, it is decreed by fate that his wanderings will be over, Poseidon's wrath will lose its force, and his homecoming will be vouchsafed and secured. This is stated in Zeus' speech in the assembly of gods in *Od.* 5.29ff., and by Poseidon himself when he catches sight of Odysseus' raft approaching the coast of Scheria:

καὶ δὴ Φαίηκων γαίης σχεδόν, ἔνθα οἱ αἴσα
ἐκφυγέειν μέγα πείραρ δῖζ' ὕος, ἣ μιν ἰκάνει.

(*Od.* 5.288f.)

Odysseus' return from wild nature and the world of *τέρατα* and superhuman beings to a civilized human world coincides with the transition from one phase of the epic action to the other: from the πλάνη to the νόστος. Thus the sequence *lion simile/bath/artist simile* marks the beginning of the νόστος proper.

THE SEQUENCE IN BKS. 22/23

The contrast *wild nature—civilized world*, as expressed by the similes in *Od.* 22.401 and 23.159, is more poignant than in

¹³ H. Fränkel, "Das Bad des Einwanderers," in *Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens* (Munich 1960) 97-99.

Bk. 6, since the lion simile in 22.401 emphatically dwells on the savagery of the animal. But this poses a problem. If indeed the poet disparages the lion for his savagery—which seems to be the tenor of the image¹⁴—what would correspond to this in the narrative? It is, after all, Odysseus after his great *ἀριστεία* who is the object of the simile. Should one conclude that the simile implies a critical judgment on Odysseus' deed, the slaying of the suitors? Certainly, such a conclusion would overstate the case: the necessity of this deed is never in doubt. Nevertheless, there is a profound ambiguity about Odysseus' *ἀριστεία*—an ambiguity which lies in its nature and of which the hero himself seems to be aware.

The *μνηστηροφονία* is undoubtedly designed as Odysseus' *ἀριστεία*.¹⁵ In an heroic epic, the hero's *ἀριστεία* is *de rigueur*. The *μνηστηροφονία* was for the *Odyssey* poet the only opportunity to present Odysseus, one of the great heroic figures of the Trojan War, in heroic action, and he certainly made full use of it. In the fight with the young nobility of his country, Odysseus brilliantly exhibits his heroic qualities proving himself to be a warrior of a different order from them. What would have been more natural and appropriate in this context than to add the finishing touch to this portrait of heroism in the form of a traditional lion simile?—a lion simile which would, by likening the hero to the *ἀλκιμώτατον ζῷον*, extol his heroic nature? But, instead, the poet designed a highly individual simile placed close to, yet, by a slight but significant displacement, outside the traditional context of the lion simile; and, most importantly, he presented a ravenous beast rather than the *ἀλκιμώτατον ζῷον*. The physical appearance of the lion after his gory meal corresponds perfectly with the narrative which at this point dwells, not on the splendour of the victorious hero, but on the horrible sight of the blood-stained man after the carnage.

This is in some way at odds with the poet's endeavour to

¹⁴ Let the skeptical reader be reminded that the lion *motif* is used in *Od.* 9.292 as a brief comparison for the barbarous Cyclops when his most savage act is being described. Also, the critical undertone of the lion simile of *Il.* 24.41 should be remembered (see above in first section of this article).

¹⁵ See R. Schröter, *Die Aristie als Grundform homerischer Dichtung und der Freiermord in der Odyssee* (Diss. Marburg 1950): he shows how the typical *motifs* of the Iliadic *ἀριστείαι* are transferred to the *μνηστηροφονία* which thereby is given the character of an *ἀριστεία*.

present Odysseus as a traditional heroic figure. The subsequent scene may throw some light on this peculiarity. At seeing Odysseus among the corpses of the suitors, Eurycleia is about to raise the customary cry of triumph over the slain enemy, but is prevented by Odysseus at once:

ἐν θυμῷ, γρηῷ, χαῖρε καὶ ἴσχεο μηδ' ὀλόλυζε·
οὐχ ὅσῃ κταμένοιισιν ἐπ' ἀνδράσιν εὐχετάασθαι.
τούσδε δὲ μοῖρ' ἐδάμασσε θεῶν καὶ σθένε' ἔργα·
οὐ τίνα γὰρ τίεσκον ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων,
οὐ κακὸν οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλόν, ὅτις σφεας εἰσαφίκοιτο·
τῷ καὶ ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ἀεικέα πότμον ἐπέσπον.

(*Od.* 22.411ff.)

Remarkable verses in an epic of the heroic tradition! Although it cannot be disputed that the *Odyssey* is firmly rooted in this tradition, it can nevertheless be stated that its outlook is already beyond the heroic world-view (as is, in its own way, the *Iliad*). Here we touch the ethical core of the *Odyssey*. To the most immediate understanding the *μνηστηροφονία* is essentially an heroic *τίσις*: by fighting and killing those who were ruining his house, harassing his wife, humiliating himself, and threatening his son's life and his own, the returning hero restores his *τιμή* and wins immortal *κλέος*. According to the heroic code, this is quite unproblematical. However, the *μνηστηροφονία* cannot be understood in terms of the heroic code only. It is an epic-heroic *τίσις*, true; but, as Odysseus' words to Eurycleia indicate, the significance of the *μνηστηροφονία* is not exhausted when grasped by the terms *τίσις*, *τιμή*, and *κλέος*. Ultimately, its *τέλος* is *δίκη*. This makes the *μνηστηροφονία* transcend the limits of an heroic *τίσις* and pass into a divinely sanctioned punishment of those who, in every possible way, have violated the order of justice. The killing of the suitors is a necessity for restoring a just order and for ending the state of anarchy which is always a relapse to the natural state. But a sad and ugly necessity; moreover, Odysseus' heroic fight with the suitors is itself the savage culmination of the savage state it is to end.

Odysseus' prohibiting Eurycleia from raising the cry of triumph over the slain suitors points to the problematical nature of his *ἀριστεία*. It is, after all, not taking place in a war between enemies, but is rather the expression of the inner strife of a community in which the king is pitted against the

hybristic nobility of his own country in mortal combat. It ends in the wholesale slaughter of the *ἄριστοι κούρων*—a result not to be glorified as a *μέγα ἔργον*, however glorious the returning hero's fight and victory may have been. Gone is the innocent and spontaneous delight in fighting and killing which can be felt in the unproblematical *ἀριστεῖαι* of the *Iliad*.¹⁶ The placement as well as the tenor of the lion simile in 22.401—in which the lion *motif* is used against the grain, as it were—bring out the ambiguity of Odysseus' *ἀριστεία*. The subsequent bath symbolizes both the completion of the hero's task—the punishment of the hybristic suitors—and his reinstatement as the lord of house and land. This means nothing less than the transition from the chaos of anarchy—a relapse to the natural state—to the restoration of the order of a just *κοινωνία πολιτική*. It parallels the transition from brute nature to civilized life of Bk. 6—but on a higher plane and at a point where the epic action is reaching its inner *τέλος*.

THE PLACEMENT OF BOTH SEQUENCES IN THE EPIC ACTION

Dealing with plot construction in the epic, Aristotle observes about the composition of the Homeric poems that it is simple in the *Iliad* and complex (*πεπλεγμένον*) in the *Odyssey*: *ἀναγνώρισις* (*ἀναγνωρίσεις*; Christ) γὰρ διόλου (*Poet.* ch. 24.59b15). Indeed, the *νόστος* 'Οδυσσέως, on which the epic action of the *Odyssey* is based, is structured by a series of *ἀναγνωρισμοί*.¹⁷ The first *ἀναγνωρισμός* reveals the shipwrecked stranger as 'Οδυσσεὺς πτολιπόρθιος to the Phaeacians: the famous sacker of Troy restores his identity as *ἥρως*. After the arrival in Ithaca, Odysseus is forced to slip back into anonymity, as the conditions at his court require the beggar's

¹⁶ Or is it romantic, as H. Fränkel suggests? Cf. his *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy* 36: 'Admiration for animal savagery, obsessive pride, wholesale slaughter, is no longer naive in the *Iliad* but is now romantic, for the singers and in general "the men who live today" are of a different cut.' Also cp. his interesting comments on the new piety of the *Odyssey* on p. 53 in reference to Odysseus' words to Eurykleia (*Od.* 22.411ff.). As to the differences in outlook between *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, see A. Heubeck, *Der Odyssee-Dichter und die Ilias* (Erlangen 1954) esp. 72-99.

¹⁷ See my *Stilwandel in Homerischen Epos* 43-44.

disguise. This prepares the series of ἀναγνωρισμοί in Ithaca, starting with the ἀναγνωρισμός by Telemachus, culminating in that of Penelope, and ending with Laertes' recognition of his son. Telemachus recognizes in the wretched beggar his father, Eurycleia the master of the house, the suitors their king and the only legitimate 'suitor' of the woman they woo; although it is the ἀναγνωρισμός by Laertes who, in recognizing Odysseus as his lost son, completes the homecoming, it is the queen's ἀναγνωρισμός which restores Odysseus as husband and king and in which the epic action attains to its inner τέλος. Thus, with each ἀναγνωρισμός, Odysseus emerges one more step out of the state of the nameless stranger and lost hero, gradually restoring his identity as *hērōs*, father, master of the house, husband, and king, and regaining in the process his former position.

Both sequences *lion simile/bath/artist simile* must be viewed in relation to this series of ἀναγνωρισμοί. The sequence in Bk. 6, marking Odysseus' return to the civilized human world, prepares the ἀναγνωρισμός through the Phaeacians. This, in turn, marks the end of the hero's wanderings—the final escape from a non-human world. Thus the first sequence is intrinsically bound up with what I have elsewhere called the νόστος δυνάμει: Odysseus' homecoming *in potentia* as the fulfilled precondition for his actual homecoming, the νόστος *in actu*.¹⁸ When repeated in Bks. 22/23, the sequence *lion simile/bath/artist simile* concludes the μνηστηροκτονία, which encloses the ἀναγνωρισμός by the suitors, and leads up to the recognition scene with Penelope. Thus the sequence mediates between events bound up with those ἀναγνωρισμοί which result in Odysseus' reinstatement as husband, *paterfamilias*, and king—the completion of Odysseus' homecoming, νόστος *in actu*.

Both sequences, then, relate the two decisive ἀναγνωρισμοί to one another and link the two constitutive stages of the epic action. These stages form the crucial transitions in the course of Odysseus' return: from the hostile world of natural forces to the human world of civilization, and from the chaos of anarchy to the well-ordered κοινωνία πολιτική. Thus both sequences contribute to the articulation of the larger themes of the poem. They help render the particular and private themes of an indi-

¹⁸ *ibid.* 74.

vidual hero's wanderings, homecoming, and reunion with his family transparent as to their more universal, and that is truly epic, significance.

OTHER SIMILES

The *Odyssey*, as is well known, contains far fewer similes than the *Iliad*; most of them, and most of the long ones at that, cluster in Bks. 5 (second half) and 6 as well as in Bks. 22 and 23—the sections of the epic action characterized as *νόστος in potentia* (arrival in Scheria) and *νόστος in actu* (*μνηστηροφονία* and the reunion with Penelope). Some Books, on the other hand, contain no similes at all. Thus the distribution of the similes also accentuates these sections as the *foci* of the epic action.

Two of these similes merit a closer examination. The simile in *Od.* 5.394 marks the moment when Odysseus catches sight of the coast of Scheria after the seastorm; and the simile in *Od.* 23.237 concludes the *ἀναγνωρισμός* of Penelope.

First *Od.* 5.394. After the shipwreck of his raft, Odysseus has been tossed and carried by waves and winds for two days; on the third a huge wave lifts him up and he is able to see land, the Phaeacian coast:

ὥς δ' ὅτ' ἂν ἀσπάσιος βίोटος παιδέσσι φανήη
πατρός, ὃς ἐν νούσῳ κεῖται κρατέρ' ἄλγεα πάσχων,
δηρὸν τηκόμενος, στυγερός δέ οἱ ἔχραε δαίμων,
ἀσπασίον δ' ἄρα τόν γε θεοὶ κακότητος ἔλυσαν,
ὥς Ὀδυσῆ' ἀσπαστὸν εἰείατο γαῖα καὶ ὕλη,
νῆγε δ' ἐπειγόμενος ποσὶν ἠπείρου ἐπιβῆναι.

(*Od.* 5.394ff.)

A fine example of a *Stimmungsgleichnis*; the mood of joy which dominates narrative and simile is vigorously emphasized by the adjectives *ἀσπάσιος/ἀσπαστός* in lines 394, 397 and 398. The same mood runs through simile and narrative in *Od.* 23.233 (again strongly emphasized by the same adjectives in 233, 238, 239). Penelope at last recognizes Odysseus and yields to her pent-up emotions:

ὥς δ' ὅτ' ἂν ἀσπάσιος γῆ νηχομένοισι φανήη,
ὦν τε Ποσειδάων εὐεργέα νῆ' ἐνὶ πόντῳ

ῥαΐση, ἐπειγομένην ἀνέμῳ καὶ κύματι πηγῶ·
 παῦροι δ' ἐξέφυγον πολίης ἁλὸς ἡπειρόνδε
 νηχόμενοι, πολλή δὲ περὶ χροῖ τέτροφεν ἄλμη,
 ἀσπάσιοι δ' ἐπέβαν γαίης, κακότητα φυγόντες·
 ὥς ἄρα τῇ ἀσπαστὸς ἦν πόσις εἰσοροῶση,
 δειρῆς δ' οὐ πῶ πάμπαν ἀφίετο πῆχεε λευκῶ.

(*Od.* 23.233ff.)

T. B. L. Webster says of *Od.* 23.233 that it is 'a clear reference back to' 5.394.¹⁹ H. J. Mette adduces a third simile which also expresses joy²⁰—the joy Odysseus feels, when at last the evening arrives on which the Phaeacians will escort him home to Ithaca:

ὥς δ' ὅτ' ἀνὴρ δόρποιο λιλαίεται, ᾧ τε πανῆμαρ
 νειὸν ἀν' ἔλκητον βόε οἶνοπε πηκτὸν ἄροτρον·
 ἀσπασίως δ' ἄρα τῷ κατέδν φάος ἡελίοιο
 δόρπον ἐποίχεσθαι, βλάβεται δέ τε γούνατ' ἰόντι·
 ὥς Ὀδυσῆ' ἀσπαστὸν ἔδυ φάος ἡελίοιο.

(*Od.* 13.31ff.)

Mette convincingly argues that these three similes (5.394; 13.31; 23.233) are designed in such a manner as to form a triple cross-reference, related to one another by the key-words ἀσπάσιος/ἀσπαστός.²¹ What is the possible significance of this triple cross-reference in terms of composition and theme?

It is noteworthy that in 5.394 and 23.233 the themes in simile and narrative are the same: shipwreck and family relations; more specifically: escape from shipwreck in seastorm and re-union of families (children-father, husband-wife). Here, as so often in the *Odyssey*,²² the similes reflect aspects of the poem's

¹⁹ *From Mycenae to Homer* 238.

²⁰ H. J. Mette, "Homer 1930–1956," *Lustrum* 1 (1956) 42 and 77.

²¹ It should be pointed out that in 23.238 ἀσπάσιοι is used actively ('glad'), while in the other passages it is used passively ('welcome'). But this does not affect the argument.

²² See T. B. L. Webster, *From Mycenae to Homer* 238f.; W. C. Scott, *The Oral Nature of the Homeric Simile* 123–24; C. Moulton, *Similes in the Homeric Poems* 117: 'The most striking feature of the developed similes of the *Odyssey* is their capacity to evoke response to the major themes of the epic'; cp. esp. chap. "Thematic Allusions" 126–34. Also cp. Podlecki, "Some Odyssean Similes" 82 and passim; see 88–89 where he speaks of the effect of 'indirection,' i.e. 'a sudden and even surprising suggestion of a major motif in an indirect way.' Similarly p. 82 (see the quotation from Podlecki's essay, below, n. 23).

basic themes: the seastorm and shipwreck in 23.233 evoke the *πλάνη*, the reunion of a family in 5.394 the *νόστος*. Furthermore, the themes of narrative and simile in 5.394 recur in 23.233 in reversed order:

5.394	23.233
<i>theme in narrative:</i>	<i>theme in narrative:</i>
escape from shipwreck	reunion of family
<i>theme in simile:</i>	<i>theme in simile:</i>
reunion of family	escape from shipwreck

Is this reversal²³ chance or deliberate design?—and if it is the latter, is it merely an artistic play or is more implied than that? Webster comments that ‘the shipwreck and escape (sc. in 23.233) is in fact the beginning of the restoration of Odysseus to his family,’ and he takes 23.233 as an example of ‘a direct reference from a simile to another stage of the main story.’²⁴ This is undoubtedly so; it should be added that the same can be said of the simile in 5.394: its theme, the restoration of the *paterfamilias* to his family, is also a direct reference to another—this time later—stage of the main story. But this does not yet account for the reversal.


At the point at which Odysseus’ homecoming is accomplished (*νόστος in actu*), the simile of the shipwrecked sailors recalls the most important antecedent to this ac-

²³ C. Moulton, *Similes in the Homeric Poems* 128, also speaks of ‘reversal’ in these similes but refers to something else; he means a ‘surprising reversal’ of roles: Odysseus is cast in the role of children’ (128); the ‘comparison at 5.394, in effect, places Odysseus for a moment in the role of Telemachus.’ (p. 129). In 23.233 the reversal consists in Penelope being ‘explicitly equated with the shipwrecked swimmers who struggle to land. Yet the mention of Poseidon (234), the detail that “few escape the sea” (236), the reference to the sea brine (237, cf. 6.137)—all these are applicable to the long struggle of Odysseus and his companions.’ (ibid.). Yet one wonders what the point of these reversals might be. Podlecki (“Some Odyssean Similes” 82) refers to the same phenomenon when he speaks of a ‘unique feature of several of these Odyssean similes . . . by which the poet reminds us of an important theme in the poem, but with a slight difference of focus or point of view.’ This is, to my mind, a far more appropriate description of the phenomenon than the term ‘reversal.’

²⁴ *From Mycenae to Homer* 238. Cp. C. Moulton (*Similes in the Homeric Poems* 129): ‘The vignette generally may remind us of Odysseus’ swim and landing on Scheria at the end of Book 5, or perhaps of the storm and loss of the companions after their stay on Thrinakia. . . .’ Cp. also H. Fränkel, *Die homerischen Gleichnisse* 94-95.

complishment: the rescue from the seastorm which led to the arrival in Scheria ('νόστος in potentia').²⁵ The retrospective view of the simile in 23 is matched by the foreshadowing of Odysseus' homecoming in the simile theme of 5.394 ('reunited family').²⁶ As the simile of 23.233 refers back to an event, a most important antecedent for the τέλος of the epic action, so the simile of 5.394 prefigures the τέλος itself. And the reversal of themes? It reflects the development the epic action has been undergoing between the seastorm of Bk. 5 and Penelope's ἀναγνωρισμός in Bk. 23; and this development consists in nothing less than the transition from the νόστος in potentia to the νόστος in actu, which is the contents of Bks. 5 to 8 and 13 to 23/24. The exact point at which one phase of the νόστος passes into the other is the journey from Scheria to Ithaca in Bk. 13. This point is marked by the third simile Mette adduces: *Od.* 13.31. Three times a simile expresses deeply felt joy; each time the same key words are used; each time the simile marks a crucial point of the epic action. This suggests artistic design rather than chance.

All this corresponds well to the results of the previous discussion. The following diagram is an attempt to combine and integrate the results both discussions have yielded as to the compositional use of developed similes in the *Odyssey*:



The links these similes form and the relations they bring out are essential for developing the larger themes of the poem. The

²⁵ For further details regarding this simile, cp. the fine exegesis of Podlecki, "Some Odyssean Similes" 89-90.

²⁶ Cp. Podlecki, *ibid.*: 'The detail of the sick father and his children puts us back in the context of Odysseus' return to Ithaca . . .'

three similes related to one another by the key-word ἀσπασίος may be said to emphasize and illuminate the more intimate aspects of the νόστος Ὀδυσσέως, while the repetition of the sequence *lion simile/bath/artist simile* helps develop the more universal themes inherent in Odysseus' πλάνη and νόστος.

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LUCRETIIUS' EXPLANATION OF MOVING DREAM FIGURES AT 4.768-76

The great majority of editors of Lucretius have long recognized a serious disorder in Lucretius' explanation of mental images at 4.768-822.¹ Verses 768-76 are an answer to a question which is not asked until later, at vv. 788-93; and vv. 818-22 clearly follow in sense upon vv. 768-76. Almost all editors have, therefore, resorted to one of two hypotheses: (1) following Lachmann, many have supposed that vv. 777-817 were composed by Lucretius some time after he had composed vv. 768-76, as a revision or addition which he did not fully integrate with the earlier text; and (2) following Merrill, others have supposed that all of the text from v. 768 to v. 822 was written as a single rough draft which Lucretius would have revised if he had had the opportunity.²

¹ I am grateful to the anonymous reader of the *American Journal of Philology* for valuable comments and suggestions. —Throughout the following discussion I shall use the verse numbering of Cyril Bailey's *Titi Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura Libri Sex*, 3 vols. (Oxford 1947) vol. 1: Prolegomena, Text and Critical Apparatus, Translation.

² For the first hypothesis, see Karl Lachmann, *In T. Lucreti Cari de rerum natura libros commentarius* (Berlin 1850) 255-56; J. Bernays' edition (Leipzig 1852); H. A. J. Munro's edition with a translation and notes, 2 vols. (Cambridge 1864); Adolf Brieger's edition (Leipzig 1894), as well as Brieger's article, co-authored with Fr. Susemihl, "Bemerkungen zum vierten Buche des Lucretius," part 3, *Philologus* 33 (1874) 431-48, 439-41; Carlo Giussani's edition with introductory essays and notes, 4 vols. (Turin 1896-98), esp. vol. 3, Appendix II to Book 4, 286-91; Cyril Bailey's first edition (Oxford 1900); Hermann Diels' edition and translation, 2 vols. (Berlin 1923-24); and Karl Büchner's edition (Wiesbaden 1966). Brieger and Giussani, while agreeing with Lachmann that vv. 777-817 are a later version of the problem treated at vv. 768-76 differ from the rest by bracketing vv. 768-76 rather than vv. 777-817 on the ground that it was Lucretius' intention to replace the former by the latter. Giussani in addition writes vv. 818-22 immediately after v. 776 and brackets these lines as well. —The second hypothesis, proposed by William A. Merrill in his edition with notes (New York 1907) 630, is adopted by William E. Leonard and Stanley B. Smith in their annotated edition (Madison 1942) 591; by Cyril Bailey in his second edition (Oxford 1922) and in his annotated edition in 3 vols. (Oxford 1947) (see esp. vol. 3, p. 1274 and p. 1277); and by Will Richter, *Textstudien zu Lukrez*, *Zetemata* 60 (Munich 1974) 78-82. In his discussion Richter notes that vv. 777-826 belong "zu den am schwersten

In this paper I shall argue that there is no need for either hypothesis. The disorder in the text is due entirely, I propose, to a faulty transmission; and it is readily healed by the transposition of vv. 768-76 to a position between v. 815 and v. 816. While the transposition of lines is a remedy which has been much abused in the past, in this case it is justified by very strong evidence not only of a misfit of the verses in the received text but also of a gap where they belong.

I suggest, then, that Lucretius composed the following continuous text starting at v. 814:

cur igitur mirumst, animus si cetera perdit	814
praeterquam quibus est in rebus deditus ipse?	815
Quod superest, non est mirum simulacra moveri	768
bracchiaque in numerum iactare et cetera membra.	
nam fit ut in somnis facere hoc videatur imago:	770
quippe ubi prima perit alioque est altera nata	
inde statu, prior hic gestum mutasse videtur.	
scilicet id fieri celeri ratione putandumst:	
tanta est mobilitas et rerum copia tanta	
tantaque sensibili quovis est tempore in uno	775
copia particularum, ut possit suppeditare.	776
deinde adopinamur de signis maxima parvis	816
ac nos in fraudem induimus frustraminis ipsi.	817
fit quoque ut interdum non suppeditetur imago	818
eiusdem generis, sed femina quae fuit ante,	
in manibus vir uti factus videatur adesse,	820
aut alia ex alia facies aetasque sequatur.	
quod ne miremur sopor atque oblivia curant.	

gestörten Teilen des Lukreztextes" (op. cit. p. 78). P. H. Schrijvers takes a somewhat modified view in suggesting that Lucretius repeats himself only in vv. 788-93, intended as a second version of vv. 768-70 (*Horror ac Divina Voluptas*, [Amsterdam 1970] 99-102). —Among a small minority of scholars who deny that there is any disturbance in the text, Gerhard Müller holds that vv. 768-76 are a preliminary explanation which is followed by a more profound and exact explanation at v. 777ff., in which the principle of mental selection is set out ("Die Problematik des Lukreztextes seit Lachmann," first half, *Philologus* 102 [1958] 247-83, 270-71). Similarly Mayotte Bollack claims that there is an orderly progression from the discussion of mental images to that of the relationship of mental images to the will of the subject in vv. 777-822 (*La Raison de Lucrèce*, [Paris 1978] 10-20, see esp. p. 12). I shall address this minority view along with the other two main interpretations in the arguments that follow.

Rearranged in this way vv. 768-76 follow neatly upon what has preceded. They are an answer to the second of two questions which are introduced at v. 777 with the words

multaque in his rebus quaeruntur multaque nobis 777
clarandumst, plane si res exponere avemus. 778

Lucretius acknowledges here that there are problems associated with the Epicurean theory of mind; clearly he is familiar with some harsh criticisms of the Epicurean doctrine.³ He chooses to address himself to two questions in particular. The first is: how are we able to have mental images at will? The hostile critic suggests that perhaps nature creates these for us on demand. The second question is: how are dream images able to move so smoothly and with such coordination of limbs? The critic suggests: perhaps they have been trained to do so, like players. Lucretius begins the true explanation at v. 794, as he addresses himself first, as one might expect, to the first question. The answer to this first question occupies the entire section of verses from 794 (beginning at "quia tempore in uno . . .") to 815. When this answer is completed at v. 815, we still need an answer to the second question. This answer is introduced by the words

quod superest, non est mirum simulacrum moveri

at verse 768. "Quod superest" signals the transition to the second question; and "non est mirum" follows by anaphora upon "cur igitur mirumst" of two lines back (v. 814). Lucretius now claims that it is no longer at all difficult to know the answer to the second question. The reason is that he has already supplied the answer in his explanation of the first problem. Lucretius showed here that in a single unit of perceptible time there are many subperceptible units of time, in which many images pass through the mind ready to be fixed upon by an act of mental attention. It is for this reason that we are able to call to mind one image after another, just as we will. Now Lucretius applies this explanation to the second problem. We are able to see in our dreams figures that move most expertly;

³ See Bailey's note, vol. 3 of his 1947 edition of Lucretius, pp. 1274-75, and Knut Kleve, "The Philosophical Polemics in Lucretius" in *Lucrèce, Fondation Hardt Entretiens*, vol. 24 (Geneva 1978) 39-71, esp. p. 67.

and the reason is that the quick succession of images allows the mind to fix so rapidly upon one image after another that it has the impression of a single moving image.

Next, vv. 816-22 follow directly upon vv. 768-76 to complete Lucretius' explanation of the second problem. This section has two parts. First, in vv. 816-17 Lucretius returns to a point which he made earlier in vv. 757-67, that dream images invite the false belief that they represent real persons. As he explains there, this happens because neither the senses nor the memory are then awake to convict the belief as false.⁴ All the editors have neglected this connection, as they join vv. 816-17 directly upon v. 815.⁵ While it is possible, according to Epicurean epistemology, to add a false opinion to any type of mental image at all, the type of image discussed in the lines which end at v. 815 is not at all the type which prompts the addition of a wrong opinion. For the images discussed in these lines are images evoked at will, and in particular images which give meaning to words.⁶ We use these images in order to understand; and the images do not in themselves prompt the addition of any opinion, whether true or false. Dream images on the other hand have the notorious property of inviting false opinions. In this case, we lack intellectual discrimination because we are deprived of sense perception and memory, and so we tend to ensnare ourselves in error. What makes the addition of vv. 816-17 to vv. 768-76 all the more appropriate is that Lucretius has just shown us in vv. 768-76 a special source of error concerning dream images. This is that images appear to be moving when they are not. Thus we are led to believe that there is a single moving figure corresponding to the appearance;

⁴ Lucretius explains the distinction between sensory impressions and the addition of opinions at length at 4.379-521; he includes here an example from dreaming (vv. 453-61). On the distinction between dream images and opinions, see also Diskin Clay, "An Epicurean Interpretation of Dreams," *AJP* 101 (1980) 342-65, 354 and the text of NF 6 of Diogenes of Oenoanda at p. 364 of this article.

⁵ Bailey, however, alone of all the editors, notes the anomaly; he comments on vv. 816-17 that "it is not easy to see how the idea comes in here" (vol. 3 of his 1947 edition, p. 1278).

⁶ That the first problem is that of attaching meaning to words is implied by Lucretius' explanation of a "single perceptible time" as that in which "a single utterance is made" ("vox emittitur una," v. 795). This is explained by Schrijvers (cited in note 2, pp. 103-6).

and this, Lucretius indicates in vv. 816-17, would be a mistake of our own making.

Secondly, in the following verses 818-22, Lucretius is continuing, as has long been recognized, his explanation of the supply of dream images.⁷ In the arrangement that I have suggested, "suppeditetur" of v. 818 appropriately reiterates "suppeditare" of v. 776 just three lines back; and Lucretius is now extending, in a single sequence of argument, the explanation of movement in dreams to other types of change in dreams, specifically changes of sex, of appearance, and of age.

Supposing then that there are good reasons why vv. 768-76 belong between v. 815 and v. 816, can we obtain additional confirmation from the way in which vv. 768-76 fit in their present location in the received text? It seems to me that the verses fit just well enough to make an error of placement plausible and badly enough to make it clear that the placement is a mistake. In the present location, the verses continue a discussion of dream images. Yet the explanation provided by vv. 768-76 is hardly comprehensible except as it has been prepared by vv. 794-815. Lucretius has not yet, in the present arrangement of the text, explained what is a "single perceptible time" ("sensibili . . . tempore . . . uno," v. 775) and how this is related to the supply and speed of mental images. Any student who would come upon vv. 768-76 without having first learned the distinction between perceptible and subperceptible time would surely be *very* puzzled by the occurrence of moving dream figures, contrary to Lucretius' assurance at v. 768 that "it is not puzzling."

I claimed earlier that all of the section of vv. 794-815 is intended as an answer to the first question asked by Lucretius, but at the same time provides the basis for a solution to the

⁷ See Lachmann's commentary (cited in note 2, pp. 255-56); Munro's 1864 edition, vol. 2 p. 302; Bailey's 1947 edition, vol. 3 p. 1271 and p. 1278; and others. Giussani (as already indicated in note 2) places vv. 818-22 immediately after v. 776; he is followed in this by Richter (cited in note 2, pp. 80-82). Müller claims that vv. 818-22 are closely linked with vv. 816-17 in that vv. 816-17 deal with self-deception and vv. 818-22 deal with involuntary deception (p. 270 of the work cited in note 2); this seems to me a very tenuous connection. Likewise Mayotte Bollack's suggestion that there is a movement "de l'objectif au subjectif" from vv. 777-817 to vv. 818-22 fails to show a sufficient continuity between the two parts (p. 20 of the work cited in note 2).

second problem. This claim needs some elaboration. In the past, many editors have regarded vv. 794-815 as an answer directed either entirely or primarily at the second question; and this is not unreasonable, considering that in the received text no other answer is forthcoming for the second question and, moreover, vv. 794-815 do form the basis of the explanation given at vv. 768-76. However, this leaves us without any explicit answer to the first question. Cyril Bailey attempted to meet this difficulty by suggesting that vv. 794-817 answer not only the second problem but also the first, and that while vv. 794-801 are addressed to the second question, vv. 802-17 are essential to a solution of the first problem.⁸ This is on the right track, but does not go far enough. As Bailey himself indicates in his notes, vv. 794-98 and vv. 802-15 complement each other as stating the two essential components of a solution to the first problem, (a) the rapid succession of images (vv. 794-98), and (b) the ability of the mind to fix on certain of these (vv. 802-15).⁹ These two parts together make up a continuous answer to the first problem. As for vv. 799-801, these were excised by Lachmann as inappropriate adaptations of v. 774 and vv. 771-72 respectively.¹⁰ This seems to me indisputable for vv.

⁸ Bailey, vol. 3 of his edition of Lucretius, pp. 1274-75. This is a development of a suggestion made by Giussani. Arguing against those editors who would excise vv. 777-817 as simply a repeated explanation of moving dream images, Giussani emphasizes that although the primary concern of these verses is with dreams, Lucretius also considers an additional problem here, that of evoking images at will (pp. 287-88 of vol. 3 of his edition of Lucretius).

⁹ See Bailey, vol. 3 of his edition of Lucretius, p. 1275. Schrijvers offers the same analysis that I give, except that he adds v. 799 to vv. 794-98 as essential to them (p. 99ff. of the work cited in note 2).

¹⁰ Lachmann is followed by Munro and by Bailey in his 1900 edition. Giussani keeps the verses on the ground that the explanation of dreams would be incomplete without them (p. 237 of vol. 3 of his edition), and Merrill keeps them for the reason that Lucretius is repeating himself and would have changed the verses upon revising the section (p. 632 of his edition). Bailey subsequently follows Merrill (p. 1277, vol. 3 of his 1947 edition). Schrijvers, while keeping v. 799, excises vv. 800-1 as an editor's addition which is intended to supply an answer to the second question (asked in vv. 788-93), and he thinks that vv. 788-93 were themselves put in this place by an editor intent on preserving Lucretius' own alternate version of vv. 768-70 (pp. 100-1 of work cited in note 2). Konrad Müller also keeps v. 799 and excises vv. 800-1 (in his edition of Lucretius [Zurich 1975]). In addition, he excises v. 774 and removes vv. 775-76 to a position between v. 799 and v. 803; these interventions seem to me unwarranted.

800-1, which are clearly out of place grammatically, as well as interrupt the continuity of the argument. I suggest that these two verses were added after vv. 768-76 came to occupy their present position, in an attempt to link vv. 794-815 with the second question which otherwise receives no answer after it is asked. As for v. 799, it fits well enough into the present context, although it is not indispensable and the fact that it is joined to two clearly extraneous verses makes it suspect. In sum, Lucretius offered a complete explanation of the first problem in vv. 794-815 exclusive of vv. 800-1 (and possibly also of v. 799) in order to follow this explanation, after v. 815, with an answer to the second problem, extending from v. 768 (as numbered in the received text) to v. 822.

I offer this case of a displacement of verses as one that rests entirely on evidence drawn from the verses themselves and their immediate context. The case is, I think, strong enough to be independent of any other evidence of a displacement of verses in Lucretius' text. As it happens, there are many clear examples in Lucretius' text of single verses or groups of two verses which have been transposed by as many as twenty lines by an error of transcription, and most editors agree that in one case the text shows a group of six verses which have been displaced by three lines.¹¹ As far as I can tell, there is no parallel for as many as nine verses being transposed by as many as thirty-six lines (if vv. 799-801 are discounted), as in this case. However, since the evidence for a displacement is, in my opinion, strong, I suggest that we have good reason to believe that scribal error could extend to the transposition of these nine verses. Although it is far less clear, in my view, *how* the transposition happened than *that* it happened, I think it not an implausible conjecture that a scribe who was writing about dreams and came to the end of this subject inadvertently skipped a section of text, possibly an entire leaf of text, which dealt with a new topic (and was introduced by a new heading), and continued instead with a subsequent section which again took up the subject of dreams.

If the suggested transposition is correct, then Lucretius

¹¹ See Leonard and Smith, p. 124 n. 65 of their edition, for a list of these transpositions. The group of six verses is at 5.437-42.

wrote a single, continuous, well polished account of two problems of Epicurean mental theory, and he did not in this case at least engage in double composition or fail to finish what he was writing.

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PROLE PARATA AT TIBULLUS 1.10.39

In his *ψόγος πολέμου* (1.10), Tibullus rails against the early death which results from warfare, and holds up the following as his ideal (39-40):

quam potius laudandus hic est quem prole parata
occupat in parva pigra senecta casa!

There are two current interpretations of the phrase *prole parata*. J. P. Postgate (LCL, p. 247) translates it as "when his children are begotten," and M. C. J. Putnam, *Tibullus: A Commentary* (Norman 1973) glosses it "with children (already) produced."¹ Another group, notably of French critics, interprets it to mean "au milieu de sa postérité."² The former is undoubtedly incorrect for two reasons. First, if it means "after his children are produced," then it is otiose, for offspring would certainly have come (if at all) to a man overtaken by *pigra senecta* (40). Secondly, the meaning of "at hand" (*in promptu*) for *paratus* can be paralleled in very similar passages.

At Tib. 1.7.55-56 the poet makes the following wish for Messalla:³

¹ Along the same lines K. Jacoby, *Anthologie aus den Elegikern der Römer*³ II (Leipzig 1918) 31 translates it as "mit Kindern gesegnet" and C. Carrier, *The Poems of Tibullus* (Bloomington 1968) as "who raises children." These interpretations may result from the fact that many lexicæ—including *Lewis and Short*—fail to distinguish the frequent meaning of "at hand" for *paratus*. The *Oxford Latin Dictionary* corrects this omission by giving as the first meaning of *paratus* "ready to hand, available." It does not, however, cite this passage from Tibullus, nor the one at Hor. *Carm.* 1.31.17, *frui paratis*, which had suffered the same misunderstanding as the Tibullan, until G. Carlsson, *Philologus* 90 (1935) 391-92 demonstrated that it meant *frui quae in promptu sunt*. Cf. also Tib. 2.4.1, where *dominam paratam* probably means "at hand," "available."

² M. Ponchont, *Tibulle* (Paris 1961) 76. Cf. also Mirabeau, *Élégies de Tibulle* I (Paris 1798) 363, J. André, *Tibulle* (Paris 1965), R. Helm, *Tibull Gedichte*² (Berlin 1959) 63, and G. Lee, *Tibullus: Elegies* (Cambridge 1965) ad loc.

³ M. C. J. Putnam 150 draws attention to this passage, and J. André cites Tib. 2.2.21-22, which also supports the interpretation of "with his children at hand, in his presence."

at tibi succrescat *proles*, quae facta parentis
 augeat et *circa stet* veneranda senem.

The image of an old man surrounded by his *proles* is a topic in prayers which goes back at least as far as Pindar, who at *Ol.* 5.22-23 prays that Psaumis will enjoy old age with his children in attendance:

φέρειν γῆρας εὐθυμον ἐς τελευτάν
 υἱῶν, Ψαῦμι, παρισταμένων.

This shows that the point of the ideal is not just to produce offspring, but to have them be *at hand* in one's old age. That this is the intended meaning at Tib. 1.10.39 is reinforced by verse 41, where the son is *on hand* to tend the lambs:

ipse suas sectatur oves, at filius agnos.

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LATIN CAUDA

"Latinists have been unable to identify the etymon of CAUDA."¹ Now it is well known that second conjugation verbs are frequently matched by verbal adjectives in *-idus* (*timeo* : *timidus*).² I have shown³ that these adjectives are old stative, agentive participles in **(e)do-*. Thus *tepidus* = OIr. *tee té* < **tep-(e)nt-s* = Czech *tep-l-ý*.

Therefore to *caveō* we should expect an old participle **cauedo-* > (fem.) *cauda*. The phonology is normal: *calidus* ~ *caldus*; *cautum* *cautiō* *cautēla*; *faustus*: *fauor* *faueō*. It is worth noting that such a derivation also resolves the old debate⁴ whether *cōda* developed from *cauda*, or *cauda* was a hyperform for *cōda*. The noun *cauda* would then be an ancient verbal adjective with its feminine head noun deleted, approximately 'cavens, warding off.'

The verb *caveō* shows meanings in the range 'beware, avoid; (with acc.) guard against, prevent, keep clear, keep off; (with dat.) protect'; in short, a compact early gloss would be 'fend off.' The verb could be used with objects of physical nuisances as well as of abstract undesirabilities. Cato says *Agr.* 5, 7 *cauere scabiem pecori*. In an early farming community of cattle and horses what more apposite agent of fending off flies is there than a tail?

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¹ Steven N. Dworkin, *Hispanic Review* 48 (1980) 234, in an article which makes excellent progress in finding an exact motivation for the intrusion of *-l-* (<*culo*) in Spanish *cola*. *LEW*³ 1.185 rehearses earlier inadequate guesses. *DÉLL*³ 189 declares frankly "origine inconnue." C. D. Buck *Selected Synonyms*, under the entry 'tail,' offers no proposal.

² See Ernout, *Philologica* II (1957) and my review and remarks *CP* 55 (1960) 59-60.

³ G. Bretschneider and Chr. Lehmann edd., *Wege zur Universalienforschung* (Festschrift Hansjakob Seiler) 1980.

⁴ See Dworkin 231, footnote 3.

VICUS CUPRIUS

Robert Palmer has enriched and clarified our knowledge¹ of the probable reference and early value of the *Vicus Cuprius*. He points out plausibly (370, footnote 5) that the form *cuprius* is probably a re-formation of **cupros*. He then shows (373-75) that **uicos cupros*, i.e. *Vicus Cuprius*, was in origin functionally an equivalent of *Sacra Via*.

Although Ernout-Meillet *DÉLL* s.v. *cupiō*² abstemiously avoids claiming any relation at all, a very reasonable comparison between *Vicus Cuprius* and Umbrian *Cubrar*, Sabine *cuprum*, and *cupiō* has in fact been advanced in the past; see *LEW*³ 1.312. Now it seems to me important to emphasize the nearly exact morphological equation **(uicos) cupros : cupiō = Sacra (Via) : sancīō*³ = *(in)-teger : tangō*. It would appear that **cup-ros* was a strikingly exact equivalent of *sac-ra*, at least in the Sabine of Rome.

Furthermore, the morphology of **cup-ros* beside that of *cupi-dus* is important and confirmatory. I have discussed the parallel nature of such formations (e.g. *ruber : rubidus*) in my contribution to G. Bretschneider and Chr. Lehmann edd., *Wege zur Universalienforschung* (zum 60. Geburtstag v. Hansjakob Seiler) 1980; cf. also Armen. *dalar* 'green' (: *delin* 'yellow'); *uiridis*.

Additionally, we have an excellent Celtic equivalent to our formation in OIr. *ad·cobra* 'desires' < **kuprā*.⁴ There is therefore no reason to regard *cupiō* or *Vicus Cuprius* as isolated. Indeed their detailed morphologies fit into a well defined framework.

Since a base **kup-* is thus well established for Italic and Celtic, we might look further for its attestation in Western

¹ *JIES* 1 (1973) 370-78.

² The etymon of *uapor*, OCS *kypěti*, Lith. *kūpėti* must certainly be kept distinct from *cupiō* on semantic grounds and because of the phonological absence of a laryngeal **H* in *cupiō*.

³ See *DÉLL* s.v. on the productive nasal infix.

⁴ See R. Thurneysen, *Grammar of Old Irish* 139 § 227 (e), and E. P. Hamp, *Études celtiques* 14 (1974) 198. The Irish formation here must be a denominal **kup-ro-* = *-eH_a-* (= **-ā-*) such as I have discussed in *Ériu* (in press).

Indo-European. Isolated though it is, it is hard to exclude the Germanic etymon of Eng. *hope*⁵ from consideration in this context; the semantics 'desire with expectation' of course fits well here. Kluge-Götze reflects the view that High German *hoffen* was taken from Low German. At any rate, OE *hopian* OFris. *hopia* Low German *hopen* could well be denominal. The major stumbling block here is of course the Germanic *p*. One is reminded of the problematic Eng. *up* : Germ. *auf*. etc. I must leave these questions to qualified Germanists; it is sufficient here to have rehabilitated a dialectal IE base and associated morphology.

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⁵ Merriam-Webster *Third International* suggests that *hope* may further be related to *hop* < OE *hopian* : ON *hoppa*. The latter lexeme seems plausibly related to OE *hype* > *hip*, OHG *huf*, Goth. *hups*, but a relation of this anatomical Bedeutungsfeld to ours seems far-fetched.

IS THE FIBULA A FAKE?

In view of the reports in the current press¹ I feel it may be useful to publish the following remarks which were written nearly a year ago. They result from thoughts which have developed over the past half-dozen years and more. In all of this I would like to underscore our indebtedness to Arthur Gordon, without whose resolute probing I for one would never have reflected carefully on what has proved to be important.

If indeed the entire fibula now proves to be false there remain at least the two intellectually interesting questions which I have posed at the end of my memorandum. I hope that someone better qualified than I am will provide the answers.

I circulated this memorandum a year ago. I wish I could have thanked a response that did not come.

(8 April 1981)

REMAINING DOUBTS ON THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE PRAENESTINE FIBULA

1. I still hold to my doubts reported by Gordon (*UCPCS* 16, 1975), fn. 80, p. 37. The specific points are, in addition to what is reported for Pisani (Gordon p. 16; for Faliscan evidence for -oi cf. Ve 258/59)²:

2. Since today we cannot suppose that a contraction of **fefec-* or **fefak-* would ever give *fēc-*, it is necessary to regard FHEFHAK- as a reduplication (old *perfect), equivalent to Bantia *fefac-*, and distinct from Latin *fēc-* Praenestine *fecid* Ve 367a (old *aorist). Since **dhē-* was aoristic in IE and the Italic present *fac(i)-* was formed secondarily on this stem, a *perfect *fefak-* is clearly innovative and not inherited. Morphologically, it must then be supposed that the Fibula replicated separately the innovation seen in Oscan. This is not im-

¹ I take this opportunity to acknowledge warmly the alert kindness of my old friend Jo Renger, who last week at the end of my month's stay in Berlin drew my attention to the news from Italy.

² Ve=E. Vetter, *Handbuch der italischen Dialekte* I, 1953.

possible, but it is a complexity not to be accepted lightly or routinely. In short, we should never have been simply gratified to see an "archaism" in FHE:FHAKED; we should have been astonished.

3. Though multiple puncts (triples) are known for the Lapis Niger (reported 1899), the Fibula is unique in its distribution of these (Gordon pp. 20-21). But what Gordon does not bring out, the Fibula is also oddly idiosyncratic; it has generally double puncts (à l'étrusque), but a triple precisely in the reduplication. At ca. 1887 a precise model for this existed in the Faliscan Ceres insc. (Ve 241), with its triple puncts and moreover in *pe:parai*.

4. The relation *pariō* : *pe:parai* 'pepeñ'-*faciō* : FHE:FHAKED gives a precise naïve morphological proportion for a learned philologist of that day. Even the semantics of *pariō* and *faciō* overlap.

5. Further on the reduplication model, in Ve 241 we have *medf[if]iqod* (Ve 257 *medfifiked*) 'finx-'. This could also revive, but in a different sense in *peiores*, the old observation of Krogmann 1932 (see Ve p. 334) that the engraver had an *i* in mind; cf. too Gordon p. 18 and fn. 52.

6. Within Ve 241 we have the syntactic model for the Fibula: *euio . . . zextos med f[if]iqod*. From Praeneste itself we have Ve 367a *nouios.plautios.med romai.fecid*. Perhaps the syntactic analog for the remarkable NUMASIOI is to be seen within Ve 367a in *fileai.dedit*. taken together with Ve 241 *sociai pored karai*.

7. For the *-oi* we have from Carbognano (1881) Ve 324 *zextoi* with the name matching Ve 241 *zextos*. Here too we find *folcozeo*, *folcus(i)o* etc. to support the pattern of NUMASIOI with *-S-*.

8. The shared name *Tirr(i)us* (Ve 258, 410) linking Falerii and Praeneste may be of some slight consequence in all this fabric.

As I see it at present (and so I have for the past few years)³ there are two important questions to be resolved:

I. To what degree had Deecke spoken about his solution for

³ I can't say it's fake. I just say it hasn't been shown to be in the clear. If Arthur Gordon hadn't been so thorough I never would have thought so hard about it, though I must say I've long been troubled by *fe:faked*.

F ⊕ (cf. Gordon pp. 52-53) before 1888, and how long was *Die Falisker* in the printers'? Note that Deecke's remark says only that the Fibula was *unerwartet*, and not that it was the key. See esp. Gordon 55-57.

II. Just when were the fragments of the Ceres pot (Ve 241) actually found and in how many pieces, and when were they visible? The find date of 1889 is striking.

(16 April 1980)

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GREEK HAGIOGRAPHY AND POPULAR LATIN IN LATE ANTIQUITY: THE CASE OF **BIBERATICUM*-βιβηρατικόν

Historians of the Latin language and its offspring acknowledge that late Antiquity was a crucial period in the development of Latin. At whatever point we might recognize that "Latin ceased to be Latin," it is clear that, by the fifth century, the language of Rome was undergoing far-reaching transformations in phonetics, morphology, syntax and lexicality.¹ Our knowledge of this development comes from two basic sources: the contemporaneous Latin texts and the evidence of the Romance languages, from which hypothetical intermediary forms can sometimes be deduced with compelling linguistic logic.

As abundant as some sectors of documentation may appear at first glance, the historian of late and popular Latin rarely feels sated. Although an important number of grammatical, theological, legal, historical and poetic productions have survived from the fifth through seventh centuries, the evidence on popular usage is far from complete. This is due both to the decreasing number of texts and to the sociological nature of the texts which have been preserved.² For in general, the bulk of surviving texts were written by members of the upper class—however we might define it—for members of the upper class. Their Latin displays the more or less deep influence of the rarefied, archaizing and artificial idiom propagated by the schools, the usage of which constituted a social signal of unquestioned importance.³ The most valuable evidence of a Cassiodorus or a Macrobius often comes from classical words which have undergone a semantic shift and so slip unnoticed

¹ See, in general, A. Meillet, *Esquisse d'une histoire de la langue latine* (Paris² 1931), E. Löfstedt, *Late Latin*, Instituttet for sammenlignende kulturforskning, A 25, (Oslo 1959) 1-38 and V. Väänänen, *Introduction au latin vulgaire*, Bibliothèque française et romane, A-6, (Paris² 1967) 12-13.

² See Väänänen, op. cit., p. 13-20 for an overview of the "sources for Vulgar Latin."

³ Cf., e.g., E. Auerbach, *Literatursprache und Publikum in der lateinischen Spätantike und im Mittelalter* (Bern 1958) 177 sq. and esp. 189 sq.

into classically flavored prose.⁴ Despite the increased penetration of syntactical and lexical innovation, the proportion of linguistic innovation to linguistic conservation seems quite limited, considering the probable state of contemporary popular Latin. A few surviving legal documents like the Albertini Tablets or the Ravenna papyri furnish much more insight into phonetic, morphological and even syntactical transformations. Yet their very nature as legal evidence was a powerful brake, encouraging the maintenance of outdated but familiar formulas.⁵ As for inscriptions, it would not be inaccurate to say that their numbers shrink as their interest increases.⁶ Another, as yet under utilized source for the phonetic and morphological development of Latin lies in the manuscripts produced in the sixth and seventh centuries by semilearned scribes. This includes even those texts of high culture which

⁴ A remarkable example is the slippage from *causa* (in the sense of It. "causa") to *causa* (It. "cosa") in Cassiodorus' letter collection: Å. J. Fridh, *Contribution à la critique et à l'interprétation des Variae de Cassiodore*, Acta regiae societatis scientiarum et litterarum Gothoburgensis, Humaniora, 4 (Göteborg 1968) 29-33. Cf. O. J. Zimmerman, *The Late Latin Vocabulary of the Variae of Cassiodorus with Special Adverence to the Technical Terminology of Administration*, Studies on Medieval and Renaissance Latin Language and Literature, 15 (Washington, D.C. 1944), who rightly or wrongly identifies 552 "Late Latin words" of "recent coinage" and 129 neologisms (259). It is unlikely that many of these neologisms offer evidence on popular innovations, since "in many of the neologisms . . . there is evidence of a pedantic trend in the author. That others saw these words as pedantic and avoided their use is a probable conclusion, for the *Fortleben* of his new vocabulary is . . . practically nil" (260).

⁵ C. Courtois et al., *Tablettes Albertini. Actes privés de l'époque vandale (fin du V^e siècle)* (Paris 1952) 63-80, esp. 63 and V. Väänänen, *Etude sur le texte et la langue des "Tablettes Albertini," Annales Academiae scientiarum Fennicae*, B-141, 2 (Helsinki 1965). For Ravenna: J. O. Tjäder, *Die nichtliterarischen lateinischen Papyri Italiens aus der Zeit 445-700*, 1, Acta instituti Romani regni Sueciae, in-4°, 19:1 (Lund 1955) 150-65 and 398 sq. and the detailed studies of C. M. Carlton, *Studies in Late Latin Lexicology based on a Collection of Late Latin Documents from Ravenna (A.D. 445-700)*, University of North Carolina Studies in the Romance Languages and Literatures, 54 (Chapel Hill 1965) and *A Linguistic Analysis of a Collection of Late Latin Documents composed in Ravenna between A.D. 445-700. A Quantitative Approach*, Janua linguarum, ser. pract. 89 (The Hague 1973) 25.

⁶ A recent example is N. Gauthier, *Recueil des inscriptions chrétiennes de la Gaule antérieures à la renaissance carolingienne 1, Première Belgique* (Paris 1975) 61-77.

had some application in the daily life of the provinces, texts like the Bible or legal codifications.⁷

Thanks to philologists who have provided thoughtful commentaries on texts such as the *Peregrinatio Aetheriae*, Cassiodorus, Lombard law codes and the like, our century has witnessed great progress in this area. Yet there is little hope of new discoveries which might offer major new evidence for popular Latin in late Antiquity. The time has come to explore other sectors of documentation which have been largely overlooked and which can throw piercing, if sporadic light on the development of Latin vocabulary. Chief among these are Greek texts of late Antiquity.

We may distinguish two main types of evidence in the early Byzantine sources. On one hand, a number of Latin phrases have been preserved in fossilized form by the technical treatises of a dying bilingual Antiquity. An excellent example is Maurice's *Strategikon*, whose commands and phrases from the late Latin of the Roman army have been studied by H. Mihăescu.⁸ On the other hand, numerous individual pieces of lexical information crop up in the form of Latin loan words into Greek.

The massive influx of Latin expressions into Greek of the imperial era is a phenomenon familiar to Hellenists and, as such, it has elicited a number of important studies.⁹ It has not,

⁷ See P. B. Corbett, "Local Variations of Spelling in Latin MSS," in *Studia patristica* 1, Texte und Untersuchungen, 63 (Berlin 1957) 188-93 and the interesting article of I. R. Gill, "The Orthography of the Ashburnham Pentateuch and Other Latin Manuscripts of the Late Proto-Romance Period—Some Questions of Palaeography and Vulgar Latin Linguistics," in *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 23 (1976) 27-44.

⁸ Mauricius, *Arta militară*, ed. H. Mihăescu, *Scriptores byzantini*, 6 (Bucharest 1970), generally associated with the reign of Maurice (A.D. 582-602), cf. H. Hunger, *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner*, 2, *Byzantinisches Handbuch*, 5, 2 (Munich 1979) 329-30; on the Latin, H. Mihăescu, "Les éléments latins des *Tactica-strategica* de Maurice-Urbicius et leur écho en néo-grec," in *Revue des études Sud-est européennes* 6 (1968) 481-98; 7 (1969) 155-66 and 267-80 and "Torna, torna fratre," in *Byzantina* 8 (1976) 23-35; his "Les termes de commandement militaires latins dans le *Strategicon* de Maurice," *Revue roumaine de linguistique* 14 (1969) 261-72 was not available to me. Another significant source is the citation of Latin place names in Greek texts, like Procopius *De aedificiis*: cf. H. Mihăescu, *La langue latine dans le Sud-est de l'Europe* (Bucharest 1978) 11-12.

⁹ For the early borrowings under the Principate, see L. Hahn, *Rom und Romanismus im griechisch-römischen Osten mit besonderer Berücksichtigung*

however, attracted the attention it deserves from Latinists and historians of proto-Romance.¹⁰ This is all the more true for the fact that, though much of the Latin loan material consists of military or governmental technicalia, there exists, in addition, a considerable stratum which provides insight into the lexical equipment of the more popular levels of society.¹¹ Devel-

der Sprache, bis auf die Zeit Hadrians (Leipzig 1906) 121 sq. and 22 sq. The papyri have naturally generated much work: C. Wessely, "Die lateinischen Elemente in der Gräzität der ägyptischen Papyrusurkunden," *Wiener Studien* 24 (1902) 99-151 and 25 (1903) 40-77; B. Meinersmann, *Die lateinischen Wörter und Namen in den griechischen Papyri* (Leipzig 1927); S. Daris, *Il lessico latino nel greco d'Egitto*, *Papyrologica Caesariensis*, 3 (Barcelona 1971), and H. J. Mason, *Greek Terms for Roman Institutions. A Lexicon and Analysis*, *American Studies in Papyrology*, 13 (Toronto 1974), esp. p. 3 sq. Major studies of non-papyrus material are L. Lafoscade, "Influence du latin sur le grec," *Etudes de philologie néo-grecque*, ed. J. Psichari (Paris 1892) 83-158; J. Psichari and C. C. Triantaphyllidès, "Lexique des mots latins dans Théophile et les Nouvelles de Justinien," *ibid.*, 159-277; L. Hahn, "Zum Sprachenkampf im römischen Reich bis auf die Zeit Justinians. Eine Skizze," *Philologus*. Supplementband 10 (1907) 677-718; A. Cameron, "Latin Words in the Greek Inscriptions of Asia Minor," in *AJP* 52 (1931) 232-63; H. Zilliacus, *Zum Kampf der Weltssprachen im oströmischen Reich* (Diss., Helsingfors 1935) with complements by F. Dölger, *BZ* 36 (1936) 108-17; the useful study and attempt at chronological classification by F. Viscidi, *I prestiti latini nel greco antico e bizantino* (Diss., Padua 1944) and, above all, the systematic presentation of H. and R. Kahane, "Abendland und Byzanz. Literatur und Sprache. Westliche Einflüsse in Byzanz," in *Reallexikon der Byzantinistik* 1 (Amsterdam 1972-1976) 499-640. Some interesting methodological points are made by V. Orioles, "Note preliminari ad uno studio sui prestiti latini in greco," in *Incontri linguistici* 1 (1974) 109-24. On Latin in the Eastern capital, see the fine article by L. Hahn, "Zum Gebrauch der lateinischen Sprache in Konstantinopel," in *Festschrift für M. von Schanz* (Würzburg 1912) 173-83 as well as the more recent studies by B. Hemmerdinger, "Les lettres latines à Constantinople jusqu'à Justinien," in *Byzantinische Forschungen* 1 (1966) 174-78 and G. Dagron, "Aux origines de la civilisation byzantine: langue de culture et langue d'Etat," in *Revue historique* 24 (1969) 23-56.

¹⁰ The major exception is H. Mihăescu's useful overview of the evidence: "La littérature byzantine, source de connaissance du latin vulgaire," in *Revue des études Sud-est européennes* 16 (1978) 195-215 and 17 (1979) 39-60. Unfortunately, I was able to consult this article only at the conclusion of the present study.

¹¹ The point is well made by A. Cameron, *art. cit.* p. 232: "These borrowings . . . belong almost entirely to the official or popular language." On the popular origins of this phenomenon, see Hahn, *op. cit.* p. 265 sq.; cf. Dölger, *BZ* 36 (1936) 113 and the ex. of loan words cited in H. and R. Kahane, *art. cit.*, pp. 507-9 and 528-29.

opments of the fourth century could only have encouraged this phenomenon, as the central administrative and military organs of the state were transferred to the heart of the hellenized East, and presumably were accompanied by Latin-speaking personnel.¹²

The social definition of audience which is so characteristic of late Antique literature naturally determines the most profitable areas of enquiry. The learned Greek of a Themistius or a Procopius generally seeks to avoid the barbarisms of the popular language of their own contemporaries. When Latinisms do occur, they are often unavoidable terms related to imperial institutions and they are couched in an apologetic periphrasis like "as the Romans say" or "so-called" (*καλούμενος*).¹³ The artificial nature of this *Kunstprosa* approach to common loan words needs no amplification.

There is, however, at least one literary genre whose content, tone and language tended to espouse those of the people: the Lives of the saints. More often than not, the Greek of the Lives of saints written in the later Roman empire is decidedly "lower" than that of most other texts. Of course, not all Greek

¹² Dagron, art. cit., p. 26 sq. and J. Matthews, *Western Aristocracies and Imperial Court, A.D. 364–425* (Oxford 1975) 105 sq. Viscidi's chronological breakdown of the borrowing process claims the regression he observed for s. III continued into s. IV, while s. V marks a clear upswing. Even aside from the customary lag between spoken innovation and textual attestation, we might note that his documentation is not exhaustive: the curve might well be altered by deeper study.

¹³ Procopius is considered to have known popular, spoken Latin, but not the classical idiom: E. Schwyzler, "Die sprachlichen Interessen Prokops von Cäsarea," in *Festgabe Hugo Blümner* (Zurich 1914) 303–27 (here 309–13). Examples of Procopius' pedantic way of introducing Latinisms: *βάνδον*: *καλοῦσι Ῥωμαῖοι*, *Bella*, 4, 2, 1, ed. J. Haury-G. Wirth (Teubner, Leipzig² 1962–1964) 1.423.16/17; *βερεδάριος* *οὗς δὴ βερεδάριους καλοῦσι*, *ibid.*, 3, 16, 12, Haury 1.384.4/5; *δοῦξ*: *ὃν δοῦκα καλοῦσι*, *De aedificiis*, 2, 6, 9, Haury 4.64.17 and *δοῦκας* . . . *καλουμένους*, *ibid.*, 3, 1, 28, Haury 4.86.13/14; *δομέστικος*: *δομέστικον δὲ τοῦτον* . . . *καλοῦσι Ῥωμαῖοι*, *Bella* 3, 4, 7, Haury 1.325.12/13, cf. 3, 11, 5, *ibid.* 1.361.16/17; *ἐξκουβίτωρ*: *οὕτω γὰρ τοὺς φύλακας Ῥωμαῖοι καλοῦσι*, *Bella* 4, 12, 17, *ibid.* 1.472.23/24; *μάγιστρος*: *τὴν τοῦ μαγίστρου καλουμένου ἀρχὴν*, *Bella* 4, 22, 24, Haury 2.251.5; *ῥεφερενδάριος* *καλουμένοις*, *Anecdota* 14, 11, Haury, 3.1.92.1; *ῥήξ* . . . *καλούμενος*, *Bella* 5, 1, 26, Haury 2.8.10; *σιλεντιάριοι καλούμενοι*, *Anecdota* 26, 28, Haury 3.1.163.4 etc. Compare this with the evidence of the Synoptic Gospels, where Luke's stylistic ambitions are betrayed by his substitution of Greek words for the Latinisms of Mark and Matthew: R. Browning, *Medieval and Modern Greek* (London 1969) 46.

lives are exempt of literary pretensions, nor do they mirror faithfully all aspects of the spoken language. Yet, to a greater degree than most other contemporaneous literary texts, they do display a varying proportion of popularisms on the lexical, morphological and syntactical levels.¹⁴ This is particularly true of Latin loan words which were, it would appear, so prominent a feature of popular diction.¹⁵ The relative abundance of early Byzantine hagiography and the general absence of good indices has an important implication: it is quite likely that a number of otherwise unattested popular Latin words have been preserved as popular Greek loan words. A choice illustration of this phenomenon is found in one of the most famous of Lives, that of Daniel the Stylite.

Daniel, a Syrian by origin, exercised his peculiar brand of asceticism at Sosthenion, on the European shore of the Bosphorus.¹⁶ His life was written down by an anonymous disciple, not long after the saint's death in A.D. 493. It has been preserved in two similar but distinct recensions, both of which may be the work of the same author.¹⁷ Chapter 44 of the *Life* describes a visit which emperor Leo I (457–474) paid to the

¹⁴ See J. Vogeser, *Zur Sprache der griechischen Heiligenlegenden*, (Diss., Munich 1907) vi-vii, perhaps overstating the case; cf. Dölger, *BZ* 37 (1937) 113 and the observations of Browning, *op. cit.*, p. 14, who rightly emphasizes as well the significance in this regard of popular chronicles. G. F. M. Bartelink, "Die Latinismen in der *Vita Hypatii* des Callinicus," in *Glotta* 46 (1968) 184-94 provides a useful case study which emphasizes the role of Latinisms in vulgar Greek.

¹⁵ In addition to Procopius' periphrasis, we might cite the zeal which Metaphrastes deployed four centuries later, in his efforts to purify and improve the language of his hagiographical sources: H. Zilliacus, "Das lateinische Lehnwort in der griechischen Hagiographie. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der klassizistischen Bestrebungen im X. Jahrhundert," in *BZ* 37 (1937) 302-44, esp. p. 315; "Vor allem: je grössere Bildung des betr. Verfassers, desto grössere Reinheit der Sprache. Der gebildete Geschmack hat sich immer gegen die Sprachmischung gewehrt." Cf. his conclusions, *ibid.*, p. 337-43.

¹⁶ Thus R. Janin in his annotations to A. J. Festugière's translation of the first redaction: *Les moines d'Orient*, 2 (Paris 1961) 167-68. Cf. R. Janin, *Constantinople byzantine. Développement urbain et répertoire topographique*, Archives de l'Orient chrétien, 4a (Paris² 1964) 479 and *La géographie ecclésiastique de l'empire byzantin*, 1,3, *Les églises et les monastères* (Paris² 1969) 347.

¹⁷ F. Halkin, *Bibliotheca hagiographica graeca* (=BHG; Subsidia hagiographica, 8a [Brussels³ 1957] no. 489); ed. H. Delehay, *Les saints stylites*, Subsidia hagiographica, 14 (Brussels 1923). On the second recension, *ibid.* p. xxxvii.

saint, shortly after Daniel had been ordained in unusual circumstances. The visit can be dated between April and September, 465.¹⁸ The double column which was about to become the saint's new home was a gift of the emperor.

Μετ' οὐ πολλὰς δὲ ἡμέρας καταλαμβάνει καὶ αὐτὸς τὸν προλεχθέντα τόπον καὶ θεωρήσας ἀπαρτισθέντα τὸν διχθᾶδιον κίονα, ἐπευφημησάντων αὐτὸν τῶν τεχνιτῶν, ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς βιβερατικά· εἶτα ἐλθὼν ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ ὁσίου, παρεκάλει τεθῆναι τὴν κλίμακα, ἵνα ἀνέλθων εὐλογηθῇ.¹⁹

A few days later, the emperor himself came to the aforesaid place. He saw²⁰ the completed double column and, when the construction workers acclaimed him, he gave them all *biberatica*. Then he went before the saint and asked that the ladder be set up, so that he could climb up and be blessed.

The emperor is happy with the workers and so he gives them some kind of gratuity. The obvious loan word *βιβερατικόν* occurs in none of the standard reference dictionaries to ancient and medieval Greek. Nor is the Latin original **biberaticum* to be found in the *Thesaurus linguae latinae* or any of the medieval Latin dictionaries at my disposal.

The stem of **biberaticum* is *biber-*. It comes from the noun *biber*, *biberis* or the verb *bibo*, *bibere*.²¹ The suffix *-aticum* enjoyed wide usage in the bureaucratise of the later Roman empire. It served to designate some kind of payment (e.g., *siliquaticum*).²² Etymology, then, would suggest that

¹⁸ The visit is situated between Daniel's prediction of the great fire of 465, which took place in April of that year (§41, ed. cit. 37.16-38.3; cf. rec. 2, ibid. 37.30-38.22) and the actual outbreak of that fire in September of the same year (§45, ed. cit. 42.5, but the precise datation is given only in the second recension: ibid. 42.23/26).

¹⁹ *Vita Danielis*, rec. 2, 44, ed. cit. p. 41.18/22. The passage occurs only in the second recension. The first recension skips directly to the ladder request, ibid. 41.4/6: καὶ μετ' οὐ πολὺ καταλαμβάνει τὸν προλεχθέντα τόπον, ἐν ᾧ ὑπῆρχεν ὁ ὁσίος, καὶ παρακαλεῖ τεθῆναι τὴν κλίμακα, ἵνα εὐλογηθῇ.

²⁰ For the meaning of *θεωρέω* cf. ibid. p. 41.33 and 48.24.

²¹ Other words in this very productive group include *bibaculus*, *bibator*, *bibulus*, *bibax*, *biberarius*, "*Biberius*" (sobriquet of emperor Tiberius), *bibilis*, *bibo*, *bibonis*, *bibosus*, etc. For *biber*, see A. Ernout and A. Meillet, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine* (Paris² 1967) 70.

²² M. Leumann, *Lateinische Laut- und Formenlehre*, *Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*, 2,2,1 (Munich 1963) 230; V. Väänänen, *Introduction*, p.

**biberaticum* refers to some kind of "drink payment." In general terms, we might note the age-old connection between "a drink" and a "pleasant favor" which is attested by several modern European languages (Fr. *pourboire*, G. *Trinkgeld*).²³ That this association was operative in late Antiquity is shown by at least one anecdote in a collection of Constantinopolitan *Miracles*.²⁴ Finally, a suggestive parallel is provided by the late Latin word *pulveraticum*, which occurs in imperial and Ostrogothic documents in the sense of "gratuity" or "drink-money."²⁵ It would appear then that in **biberaticum*, we have another popular Latin term for "drink-money" or "tip."²⁶

While a definitive analysis is the province of Romance specialists, we would be remiss in overlooking evidence for relating the newly attested word to the development of the Ro-

89-90 and especially H. C. Isenring, *Die lateinischen Adjektiva auf -icus und -ica* (Winterthur 1955) 75-77. *Pulveraticum* and **biberaticum* in themselves cast doubt on G. A. Meyer's chronology of the semantic (financial) development of *-aticum*, reported by D. G. Pattison, "The Latin suffix -ATICU in Early Old Spanish," in *Vox romanica* 32 (1973) 60-65 (here p. 63).

²³ Cf. below, n. 31.

²⁴ In the seventh-century *Miracles of St. Artemius*, 16 (BHG 173), ed. A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Varia graeca sacra*, *Zapiski istoriko-filologičeskogo fakul'teta imperatorskago s. peterburgskago universiteta*, 95 (St. Petersburg 1909) 1-75, here p. 16.16.20/25, a guard of the granary τὰ Κασιάριον in the capital dreams that the κόμης τῶν ὀρίων finds him sleeping on duty, berates him and then gives him a coin "so you can have a drink": καὶ ἐπιδοὺς αὐτῷ νόμισμα ἔφη: "Δέξαι ἵνα πῖης."

²⁵ E.g. *Codex Theodosianus*, 7, 13, 16 (April 17, 406), ed. T. Mommsen and P. Meyer, (Berlin 1905) 1.340.5; Cassiodorus, *Variae*, 12, 15, 7, ed. cit., p. 482.54 and, in general, the article in DuCange, *Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis*, ed. L. Favre, 6 (Niort 1886) 567.

²⁶ The career of the medieval word *biberagium-beveragium* seems concentrated in s. XIII-XIV, with an early exception from Anjou, A.D. 1129, cited by J. F. Niermeyer-C. van de Kieft, *Mediae latinitatis lexicon minus* 1 (1954-1976) 97; cf. *Glossarium*, ed. Favre, 1.647 and 648; O. Prinz et al., *Mittellateinisches Wörterbuch bis zum ausgehenden 13. Jahrhundert* 1 (Munich 1967) 1460; R. E. Latham, *Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources* 1 (1975) 196. The *Mittellateinisches Wörterbuch* notes the occurrence of a mysterious medieval word "biveraticum" in a rental register from Trent, dated A.D. 1200 and transcribed by C. Schneller, *Tridentinische Urbare aus dem dreizehnten Jahrhundert*, Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte, Literatur und Sprache Österreichs und seiner Kronländer, 4 (Innsbruck 1898) 137-39, here 138: "Item fersi(n)ge de ficto. In Imaio. I. In Aulasa. II . . . In Fabriano III. de calzaria et. III. de biueratico. . . ." Although the meaning is

mance languages. Certainly, the satellites of *bibo*, *bibere* have left many traces in various Romance dialects (cf. *biber* > O.Fr. *beivre*, etc.).²⁷ In the case of **biberaticum*, we would legitimately expect a number of phonetic transformations en route to Romance. Thus the stem's short *i* could well have been pronounced as a closed *e* (cf. Sp. *bebo* from Lat. *bibo*), while the passage of an intervocalic *b* to *v* is a commonplace of late Latin spelling and Romance phonology (cf. Lat. *bibo* > It. *bevo*).²⁸ We know too that the suffix *-aticum* enjoyed a long life in its French form of *-age*.²⁹ From the viewpoint of historical phonology then, the development **biberaticum* > Med. Lat. *beveragium* > O. Fr. *beverage* seems quite plausible.³⁰ What is more, this reconstruction is comforted by signs of semantic continuity, since, from the late Middle Ages on, Fr. *breuvage* and It. *beveraggio* are attested with the meaning "tip."³¹

not clear, Schneller identified *biueraticum* as some kind of revenue and associated it with "pepper," postulating a corruption of **piperaticum* (ibid. p. 142). The editors of the *Wörterbuch* have instead suggested (loc. cit. p. 1493) that *biveraticum* is derived from *beveragium*. Although a final answer will not be forthcoming until this document receives re-examination and perhaps a re-edition at the hands of a specialist in the archival material of medieval Trent, it appears appropriate to modify this suggestion insofar as *biveraticum* seems, to date, the surviving form closest to the newly attested **biberaticum*.

²⁷ W. von Wartburg, *Französisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* 1 (Bonn 1928) 348.

²⁸ Väänänen, *Introduction*, p. 51-52 and 59.

²⁹ W. Meyer-Lübke, *Grammatik der romanischen Sprachen* 2 (Leipzig 1894) 521-23; cf. K. Vossler-H. Schmeck, *Einführung ins Vulgärlatein* (Munich 1953) 166, Väänänen, op. cit., p. 89-90 and Pattison, art. cit.

³⁰ Since the development from the late suffix *-aticum* to *-age* seems so likely here, the new evidence renders less compelling the derivation of *beverage* from a hypothetical verb **biberare*, advanced by von Wartburg, op. cit. 1.350, n. 7 and, most recently, by J. Corominas and J. A. Pascual, *Diccionario crítico e etimológico castellano e hispánico* 1 (Madrid 1980) 657-58. In fact, it is interesting to note that some older and one recent etymologist postulated the existence of **biberaticum* to explain the Romance forms, e.g. J. A. H. Murray, ed., *A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles* 1 (Oxford 1888) 837, G. Korting, *Lateinisch-romanisches Wörterbuch* (Paderborn³ 1907) 160, no. 1358 and M. Cortelazzo and P. Zolli, *Dizionario etimologico della lingua italiana* I (Bologna 1979) 135.

³¹ von Wartburg, op. cit. 1.349 adduces the Middle and Modern French use of *breuvage*: "Mélange d'eau et de vin qu'on donne à l'équipage en sus de la ration" (s. XIV) or the modern dialectal meaning "pourboire," while Cortelazzo and Zolli, loc. cit. attest the meaning "donativi ai soldati," (s. XV-XVI).

Thus, the evidence of Romance philology complements and reinforces that of the Latin etymology and Greek parallel sources. Clearly, the Greek word *βιβερατικόν* is, to date, the sole surviving, direct, ancient witness to a popular Latin expression for gratuity, **biberaticum*. The *Vita Danielis* offers new insight into one Romance etymology. The methodological implication is clear: the systematic analysis of Latin loan words in the more popular documents of late antique Greek hagiography provides a significant and, as yet, neglected supplement to the meagre evidence on the development of popular Latin. As any reader of Greek hagiography realizes, the example of **biberaticum*, while exceptional in its clarity, is nonetheless far from isolated.

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TEXTUAL CRITICISM TODAY

In the last ten years or so a number of books on textual criticism, the history of texts, editorial technique and related themes have been published.¹ It may be useful to review them together, because certain ideas are common to all of them and, as a whole, they present an impressive body of material that can now be evaluated. Above all, these works show that textual criticism today is as essential a tool of classical scholarship as it ever was.

¹ The works included in this survey are, in alphabetical order,

A. E. Housman, *The Classical Papers*, collected and edited by J. Diggle and F. R. D. Goodyear, 3 vols. (1972). Reviewed by Le Bonniec, *REL* 51 (1973) 509f.; Momigliano, *Athenaeum* 52 (1974) 368-71; Clausen, *CW* 68 (1975) 398f.; Widdows, *CP* 71 (1976) 368-70, etc. One ought to remember that Housman expressly forbade the collection and publication of his philological papers.

E. J. Kenney, *The Classical Text. Aspects of Editing in the Age of the Printed Book* (1974). Reviewed by Willis, *Mnemosyne* 28 (1975) 423-25; Shackleton Bailey, *CP* 71, (1976) 185-87; Diggle, *CR* 27 (1977) 85f.; Grafton, *JRS* 67 (1977) 171-76; etc.

R. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship from 1300 to 1850* (1976). Reviewed by Lloyd-Jones, *TLS* 75 (1976) 1022; Burzacchini, *Maia* 29/30 (1977/8) 158-64; Kenney, *CR* 28 (1978) 131-34, etc.

L. D. Reynolds and N. G. Wilson, *Scribes and Scholars* (2nd edition, 1973). Reviewed by Stanford, *Hermathena* 99 (1975) 87; Tarrant, *Phoenix* 29 (1975) 309f.; Diggle, *CR* 27 (1977) 146, etc. There is an Italian translation of the first edition of this book, by M. Ferrari, with a preface by G. Billanovich, 1969; it was reviewed by Timpanaro, *Maia* 22 (1970) 287ff., etc.

M. L. West, *Textual Criticism and Editorial Technique applicable to Greek and Latin Texts* (1973). Reviewed by Tarrant, *Phoenix* 27 (1973) 295-300; Reynolds, *JRS* 64 (1974) 268f., etc.

J. Willis, *Latin Textual Criticism* (1972). Reviewed by Tarrant, *Phoenix* 27 (1973) 295-300; Gambareale, *Athenaeum* NS 52 (1974) 386-92; Kenney, *CR* 25 (1975) 302f.; Diggle, *JRS* 65 (1975) 242f.; Hunt, *CP* 74 (1979) 340-50, etc.

I have not included H. Fränkel's *Testo critico e critica dei testi* (L. Canfora's translation of the *Einleitung zur kritischen Ausgabe der Argonautika des Apollonios*, 1964), with an introductory note by C. F. Russo, 1969 (reviewed by Vian, *REG* 83 [1970] 227f.; Timpanaro, *Maia* 22 [1970] 285-87), though I consider it an important contribution. Robert Renehan's *Greek Textual Criticism* (1969) was reviewed by Douglas Young in *AJP* 92 (1971) 503-6 (cf. also Hunt, *CP* 66 [1971] 202ff.; Wilson, *CR* 22 [1972] 146; Vian, *REG* 83 [1970] 228f.). This very useful work is not a handbook of textual criticism but a

In *The Classical Text* (148) E. J. Kenney writes: "On the basis of experience as a reviewer I think I am justified in saying that some of the most inadequate work in classical studies that one is likely to have encountered over the last twenty years or so has been in the field of textual criticism and editing." He quotes Shackleton Bailey's opinion (expressed in 1964) that there had been no improvement in the field of editing since 1903, the year in which the first volume of Housman's *Manilius* appeared. Without wishing to detract from Housman's merits as an editor one might say that he was capable of playing fast and loose with MS evidence (see the *Addenda*, now printed in *Manilius* I, pp. 82ff.). For philological devotion to a text Pfeiffer's *Callimachus* may be considered superior to Housman's *Manilius*.

It is only fair to say that many authors are now available in good editions. It seems to me that both Budé and Loeb series have improved: one might mention the Budé Plutarch or G. P. Goold's extremely valuable *Manilius* in the Loeb Classical Library. There are also some very fine older editions in the Loeb series, e.g., the *Alciphron* etc. of Bennett and Fobes which offers the first critical text of Aelian's 'Letters to Farmers.' Teubner has given us a few very respectable texts, for instance a new *Propertius* by R. Hanslik who has collated many 'recentiores' and is courageous in adopting conjectures. Still, there are a few notable gaps, but one may hope they will be filled, because the works I am discussing here will no doubt give a fresh impulse to the technique of editing.

There is a sobering reminiscence in E. R. Dodds' charming

collection of 'variae lectiones,' some previously published, many new, all of them documenting the author's acumen and learning. I mention only his admirable defense of Erasmus' near-forgotten emendation of Suetonius, *Divus Iulius* 33 *iacta alea est* (o) (par. 47) and his remark on unnecessary conjectures (par. 37): "Bentley and Wilamowitz have provided us with the most brilliant examples of this particular aberration, but Dr. Verrall certainly deserves honorable mention." Perhaps one should speak of 'over-production' rather than 'aberration.'

Now and then I refer to recent Budé editions of classical authors which the *Journal* received as review copies. From their prefaces, as will be seen, a number of general problems can be illustrated. I am very grateful to Wendell Clausen for a number of comments which I have embodied as faithfully as possible, because they helped me to see things more in perspective.

autobiography *Missing Persons* (1977). He writes (171f.): "It had long been generally assumed that John Burnet's Oxford Plato presented a soundly and securely based text. To my dismay this turned out not to be the case, at any rate in the *Gorgias*. Owing, it seemed, to a misunderstanding between Burnet and Josef Král who made the collation for him, one of the most important witnesses to the text had been systematically misreported; a second was cited only sporadically; and the abundant indirect tradition was virtually ignored. With few exceptions the same errors and omissions recurred in the apparatus criticus to Croiset's more recent Budé edition. I thus felt myself committed by professional duty to a prolonged and time-devouring re-examination of manuscripts . . . Its contribution to the eventual text seemed to me disproportionate to the labour involved, and it tended to obscure the primary purpose of the commentary by bloating it with trivia. These trivia earned me warm commendation from such old-style scholars as Arthur Nock and Willy Theiler; but at the same time I was painfully reminded of a remark I had made in 1943, that if the love and knowledge of Greek literature ever die in this country they will die of a suffocation arising from its exponents' industry." But Dodds himself would have admitted that industry spent on collating manuscripts is industry well spent.

Part of the problem is that our critical texts are no better than our textual critics. And how does one become a good textual critic? Not merely by reading the books included in this survey, though of course they should be read, because much can be learned from them. But it is not enough.

M. L. West (*Textual Criticism*, etc.) begins with a warning (5): "I could draw up a formidable list of . . . works if I thought the student ought to read them. But textual criticism is not something learned by reading as much as possible about it. Once the basic principles are apprehended, what is needed is observation and practice, not research into the further ramifications of theory." This is excellent advice. Textual criticism is not an exact science: it is more like the art of playing a musical instrument and requires a good ear and constant practice. There is nothing like working with manuscripts and reading editions with the comments of the great critics of the past. Housman's intimate knowledge of the history of classical scholarship helped him a great deal in his work. We can learn

as much from Bentley or Markland where they are wrong as from some other scholars where they are right.

Housman never wrote a handbook, but his own editions, especially his Manilius, and his classical papers, now conveniently collected by Goodyear and Diggle, qualify as required reading.² One of the points he makes more than once is the lack of straight progress in textual criticism. He complains that a certain passage in Horace (*CCP* I 104) or Lucan (*CCP* II 529) was better understood two- or three-hundred years ago than in his own time: "This was the vulgate in the 17th and 18th centuries: benighted ages, when man had not yet invented that substitute for thinking which is now so widely popular under the name of critical method." He ends his lecture on the "Application of Thought to Textual Criticism" (*CCP* III 1069) with the words: "Progress there has been, but where? In superior intellects: the rabble do not share it. Such a man as Scaliger, living in our time, would be a better critic than Scaliger was; but we shall not be better critics than Scaliger by the simple act of living in our time. Textual criticism, like most other sciences, is an aristocratic affair, not communicable to all men, nor to most men . . ." Elsewhere (*CCP* III 1197) Housman seems to concede to modern scholars a certain disadvantage: "Another reason why neither recension nor interpretation has made strides proportionate to our increased knowledge of MSS is that the modern scholars are disadvantaged by their remoteness and estrangement from the ways of thinking and writing which were most fashionable and admired in the silver age of Latin poetry. Editors of the 17th and even of the 18th century had more in common with Statius, and were quicker to catch his meaning."

Who are the critics whom Housman most admired? Bentley

² *The Classical Papers of A. E. Housman* are an invaluable subsidy, skilfully assembled. Perhaps this is the place to mention John Sparrow's assessment of Housman (*Encyclopedia Britannica*, s.v.): "As a scholar Housman invites comparison with Richard Bentley for learning, ingenuity and controversial vigour. He led the attack on superstitious fidelity to the 'best manuscript' and 'paleographical probability' and brought to the defense of common sense in scholarship an armoury of sarcastic wit which helped to make him the most widely feared of contemporary scholars. It was not these powers, however, nor the range, depth and unfailing accuracy of his learning, but the strength and keenness of his intellect that gave to his work its quality of greatness . . ." See also n. 47 below.

and Markland, of course (though he resented being compared to Bentley), but also Horkel and Palmer—one practically forgotten, the other still underestimated today. On Horkel he says (*CCP* I 131): "Mr. Gow's certain emendation *cerebrique* in [Horace,] *Serm.* II. 3.208 was forestalled by Horkel, a critic who in a short life did more for the text of Horace than many since Bentley, though the editors, with the significant exception of Meineke, seldom deign even to record his corrections." He said this when he was still quite a young scholar, and he may have changed his opinion later. Anyone who could suggest, as Horkel did, *unco* (for *uno*) *turpior ungui* in Hor. *Carm.* 2.8.3 must have been deaf to Latin rhetoric. On Palmer (*CCP* II 471f.): "Among the critics who have emended Ovid's *Heroides* since the time of Heinsius the first place belongs to Bentley, the second to Palmer, and the third to Madvig: van Lennep and Merkel may dispute for the fourth . . .," and he concludes the paragraph with the words "Palmer was a man more singularly and eminently gifted by nature than any English scholar since Badham and than any English Latinist since Markland." This is high praise.

Of course one could compile a much longer list of critics whom Housman did not admire. His comments on their stupidity and slovenly habits are almost always entertaining. What are the characteristics of bad critics, according to Housman? Here are a few observations, culled from *CCP*:

(1) Bad critics do not read the works they edit (this was aimed at R. Ehwald and S. G. Owen): "Before I edit a work, I read it; and a quarter of a century ago I read the *Ibis* . . . I am the first editor who ever did read the *Ibis*, and down to this year 1916 I am the last . . ." (*CCP* III 976).

(2) Bad critics rely too much on punctuation: "Hermann and others who suppose themselves to have rescued the verse by trifling with its punctuation, ascribe to commas a cabalistic virtue which did not reside in the seal of Solomon" (*CCP* I 56). True, perhaps, but punctuation is often the first step towards interpretation. A misplaced comma can make a great deal of difference, as, for instance, in Caesar's lines on Terence: is it *vis/ comica . . . virtus* or *vis,/ comica . . . virtus*? The most striking recent example of this would seem to be Guy Lee's repunctuation of Tibullus 1.1.39f.

(3) Bad critics accuse the scribes of implausible corruptions: "How without gross superstition we can believe that scribes who made mistakes like this have preserved incorrupted a single word that Aeschylus wrote, I do not know" (*CCP* I 88).

(4) Bad critics sin against language, style and metrics: "The fragment of the *Antiope* published by Professor Mahaffy in the last number of *Hermathena* is emended in this month's *Classical Review* by two distinguished Grecians. Their emendations are numerous and intrepid. Dr. Rutherford 'would restore' to Euripides the senarius σὺ μὲν χερῶν τὸ πνεῦμ' ἐκ πολεμίων λαβών, which Euripides, I think, would restore to Dr. Rutherford" (*CCP* I 173).

(5) Bad critics simply do not have the ability to identify and emend a corrupt passage. Of C. Bailey's earlier edition of Lucretius (c. 1900) he says: "... what most disfigures the text is the retention, as if genuine, of corruptions expelled by our betters and restored by our contemporaries" (*CCP* II 524).

(6) Bad critics usually believe in a 'codex optimus atque praestantissimus': "Our modern editors who take little notice of Heinsius when he is scattering pearls and diamonds are quite willing to make amends by following him where he is wrong, and they all print *fit* [Ovid, *Heroides* 19.180]: it is in P, P is the best MS, scientific criticism consists in adhering to the best MS: if it gives sense, be thankful; if none, never mind" (*CCP* I 418). Or elsewhere: "How to employ the various MSS and families of MSS . . . the editors of Manilius might well learn from Bentley if they would. It is fatiguing to stand erect like him and adjust the balance: they, like King James I, must always be lolling on the neck of a favourite" (*CCP* II 526). And again: "A MS is a blind leader, and when a blind leader has a blind follower they both fall into the ditch. One thing is needful, and that is to know chalk from cheese" (*CCP* II 872). And finally: "Providence played the editors of Ovid a cruel trick; it put into their hands a 'best MS,' and that was giving gunpowder to a child" (*CCP* III 919). The imagery is always provocative, but even Housman admits (e.g. *CCP* III 921) that some MSS are better than others.

(7) Bad critics pretend to know too much. Marx, the editor of Lucilius, according to Housman (*CCP* II 683), is not very good at interpreting the words which we have in black and

white, but "in the invisible world he is quite at home. Apion, unless he was the liar Josephus thought him, called up the spirit of Homer from the dead, and ascertained from his melodious lips the true city and parentage of that widely born and many-fathered man . . . Mr Marx, like Apion, is an adept in the black art . . . He is brimful of knowledge which he can only have acquired by necromancy . . ." Hence we always ought to keep in mind Grotius' principle:³ *nescire quaedam magna pars sapientiae est*.

(8) Bad critics tend to be conservative. Purser gets praise for having finished Palmer's edition of the *Heroides* in a short time and for having corrected some of Palmer's errors, but then Housman adds: "One fault Mr. Purser has, and he ingenuously confesses it: he is a conservative critic. Now conservative critics are impulsive folk, and apt to leap before they look; and two or three of Mr. Purser's defensive operations may be said to do more honour to his heart than to his head" (*CCP* II 470).

(9) Bad critics are apt to practice 'sympathetic exegesis': "let a text be impeached as bad grammar or nonsense, and the commentator instantly overflows with fictitious details of the disorder which he alleges to have existed in the author's mind . . . Instead of probing the difficulty to find its solution, he resorts to the easier and more familiar expedient of smothering it under a cascade of figments . . ." (*CCP* II 547).

But enough of this rogues' gallery. We do need some guidance, and West provides it. Though the technique of reading and editing texts cannot be reduced to a set of simple rules, there are certain principles.

It is important to distinguish between the different types of source (West, 9): Are we dealing with a 9th-century parchment codex or a 16th-century paper MS? Are we dealing with a Greek papyrus or an Arabic translation? Archimedes' *Ὀχουμένων* (cf. Mugler in his Budé edition, vol. III, 1971, p. 4) is only preserved in Greek in a 10th-century palimpsest (C) in Jerusalem; before this witness became known the text was only available in William of Moerbeke's Latin translation which is still needed to fill the gaps in C.

To get to the sources, even today, is not always as simple as

³ After Erasmus, and followed by Gottfried Hermann; cf. R. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship, 1300–1850* (1976) 75.

it may seem. After having consulted M. Richard's *Répertoire des bibliothèques et des catalogues de MSS grecs* and after having obtained a list of MSS from the *Institut de Recherches et d'Histoire des Textes* it may still be necessary (as I have found) to visit the great libraries of Europe to look at their catalogues which reflect, in the hands of generations of librarians, the growth of old collections. Kenney (77; 84; 86ff.) has some very useful remarks on the older catalogues and the growth-process itself. Photographs and microfilms are fine, but there is nothing like a visit to the *Bibliothèque Nationale* in Paris, for example, with its crowded reading room, the huge tomes listing, rather casually, thousands of MSS and the pleasure of handling one of these codices, feeling it, smelling it, turning its faded pages. As to the necessity of seeing a MS for one's self, Wendell Clausen writes to me: "I remember collating the Pithoeanus of Juvenal at Montpellier in June 1957 and the first day discovering that it has *quiescet*, not *quiescaet* (1.126), as all edd. report—a simple misreading of the *et* ligature found elsewhere . . . One other example: 7.204. If you lift the MS and turn it into the light—an action which might get you thrown out of the Vatican—you can see, from the pressure of the pen on the parchment, that the original reading of P was *thar-simachi* . . ."

Palaeographical experience is necessary for the textual critic. Unlike textual criticism palaeography is now a science, and the progress made since the days of Bessarion, Erasmus, Robortello, Scaliger⁴ is remarkable. Maffei's brilliant insight in 1712 (R&W, 173, with bibliography, 244) represented a big step forward. But the palaeographic "method" is not an end in itself, as Housman pointed out (CCP III 1065): "... even when palaeography is kept in her proper place, as handmaid, and not allowed to give herself the airs of mistress, she is apt to be overworked."⁵

Papyrology has become an important field with its own specialists. The application of papyri to textual criticism was outlined by Grenfell in 1919;⁶ he listed cases of agreement be-

⁴ Kenney, 94ff. 102; R&W, 135; 147; 150; 170ff.; 244.

⁵ A useful bibliography is found in Martin R. P. McGuire and Hermigild Dressler, *Introduction to Medieval Latin Studies*², (1977) 240f.

⁶ Grenfell, *JHS* 39 (1919) 36ff.; cf. Kenney, 140.

tween papyri and late MSS, especially in Sophocles, Xenophon, Plato and Isocrates, and drew the conclusion that there is no such thing as the 'best' MS. Since so often the 'recentiores' preserve the true reading, the eclectic method is the only safe method. It is well known that the papyri sometimes have a text inferior to that of the medieval tradition, but occasionally they reveal the presence of a corruption where none was suspected (see West, 55ff. on Euripides' *Hipp.* 101), and not infrequently, for instance in Theocritus, a papyrus confirms a modern conjecture or at least raises it to the status of a variant. Papyri even may preserve a 'recensio' of their own (see West, 131f. on Xenophon, *Mem.* 1.3.8f.). As a kind of sequel to Pack's *Greek Papyri* (1968), Jean Lenaerts has published recently a very instructive little book, *Papyrus littéraires grecs*,⁷ with fragments from Homer, Sophocles, Euripides, Menander, etc. most of which he has identified for the first time.

Some other sources:

(a) Quotations. West, p. 11 discusses the well-known example Virgil *Ecl.* 4.62 *qui non risere parenti* where the oldest MSS of Virgil and Servius have *cui non risere parentes*. The MSS of Quintilian, *Inst. Or.* 9.3.8 give the verse in the same form as the direct tradition of Virgil, but from the context it is clear that Quintilian himself read the line, as most modern editors, following Poliziano and Schrader, prefer to read it.⁸ This probably means that the MSS of Quintilian were influenced by an already corrupt Virgilian tradition.

(b) Scholia and commentaries. West (10; 82f.; 97f.; 107) and R&W (10ff.; passim) offer good examples and good advice. There are certain difficulties in using ancient commentaries, as J. Brunschwig, in the introduction to his Budé edition of Aristotle's *Topica*⁹ explains. I have discussed¹⁰ the case of Catullus 64.23b—a line which is partially preserved in the *Scholia Veronensia* on Virgil and may be restored. More recently, Wendell Clausen (*AJP* 100 [1979] 246ff.) has discovered what

⁷ Lenaerts, in: *Papyrologica Bruxellensia* 13 (1977).

⁸ Cf. Coleman's helpful note in his commentary (Cambridge Greek and Latin Texts, 1977), and see also P. Maas, *Textual Criticism*, trans. by Barbara Flower (Oxford 1958) 36f.

⁹ Vol. I (1967) pp. cxvf.

¹⁰ *AJP* 97 (1976) 231f.

must be the original reading in Ovid, *Met.* 14.90 (*animans* for *animantem*) in the scholia to Persius.

(c) Translations. R&W (48ff.; 97; 105ff.; 132ff.; *passim*) should be consulted on this point. Brunschwig¹¹ shows the value of Boethius' translation of Aristotle's *Topica* for the establishment of the text: his MSS are several centuries older than the earliest Greek witness, and his translation is very literal.

(d) Inscriptions. Housman¹² had shown that Ovid, *Tristia* 1.11.11f. is interpolated in all MSS, even in the Trier fragment (10th century), but an inscription happens to preserve the true Ovidian phrase. On the other hand, inscriptions can be, as Housman (*CCP* III 1116) put it, "a garden of illiteracy where anyone who relishes violations of metre and accidence or syntax may fill his hands with nosegays of all the horrors dearest to his heart."

The nature of MS transmission is described by West, briefly at first (12f.), then in more detail (31ff.). These are among the most useful sections of his book, I think. To illustrate the difference between a closed and an open recension he uses a striking, almost visionary image (13f.). We should keep in mind that no ancient text has exactly the same transmission as another one. Each presents its own problems. Some texts are preserved in hundreds of witnesses, such as Homer or the New Testament; some exist in a *codex unicus*; some survive on a piece from a broken pot.

Classical scholars ought to study the peculiar problems of New Testament criticism. Here we have sacred texts composed within a century after the death of a religious leader, texts that have held a deep emotional appeal ever since. But even these texts, considered the word of God and normally copied with the greatest care, can be corrupted, and editors of the New Testament have had to face an almost impossible task. To deviate from the 'textus receptus,' essentially Erasmus' text,¹³ was practically an act of heresy, and it took cour-

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. cxif.

¹² Manilius I², p. LX and in his note on 2.130. Cf. my edition of the *Tristia*, vol. I (1967) 13.

¹³ Kenney, 69; 98ff.; 105; R&W, 186f. For some of the bizarre things that Erasmus did, see Kenney, p. 76. The term 'textus receptus' can also be applied to the transmission of classical authors: in the case of Ovid, for instance, it was represented for centuries by Naugerius' Aldine editions.

age to declare, as Bentley did, that the text should be based on the oldest authorities only. But once this was recognized many of the principles of textual criticism practised by classicists were developed by New Testament scholars; the impetus towards a theory of recension, for instance, came from Johann Albrecht Bengel in the early 18th century (R&W, 189).¹⁴

The irrational forces that can determine the course of MS transmission may be illustrated by Livy whose decades, as Traube demonstrated in a classical monograph, all had their individual fate. The story behind Petrarch's codex of Livy, now in the British Museum (Harl. 2493), is told impressively by R&W (114f.): "This volume, which originally contained books 1-10 and 21-40, was put together by Petrarch when he was still in his early twenties; part of it he copied in his own hand. The nucleus of the book is a manuscript of Livy's third decade, written about 1200 and ultimately derived, as are all the complete MSS which have survived, from the extant Puteaneus; to this central portion Petrarch added about the year 1325 a copy of the first decade, then, a few years later, of

¹⁴ I should like to discuss two textual problems in the New Testament because they have received very little attention from classical scholars. In ch. 16 of his *Letter to the Romans* St. Paul sends greetings to a fairly large number of people in a city which he had not yet visited. This chapter, and the letter itself, end in most witnesses with a doxology (16:25-27), but our oldest witness, the Chester Beatty Papyrus, now in Ann Arbor, has the doxology at the end of ch. 15, followed by a horizontal line. These anomalies could mean that *Romans* originally ended with ch. 15 (with the doxology) and that ch. 16 is actually part of a letter to the Christians in Ephesus, where Paul had been before. For some reason this portion of the text, destined for Ephesus, became attached to *Romans*. Once it was considered (as it still is today by the editors) as the last chapter of *Romans*, it became necessary to transpose the doxology from the end of ch. 15 to the end of ch. 16. Possibly Paul himself had a copy of *Romans* sent to the congregation in Ephesus; after all, it was such an essential statement of his theology that it should be read everywhere, not just in Rome; but he did add his personal greetings to the people in Ephesus. This theory would conveniently explain the omission of ἐν 'Ρώμῃ (1:7 and 15) in some witnesses. The other problem, not generally recognized, is found in 1 *Corinthians* 4:6. The words τὸ μὴ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν γέγραπται make very little sense, as Bousset in his commentary (1917) and others conceded, though more recent works are silent. Bousset mentioned someone else's "ingenious conjecture" that the virtually untranslatable words preserve a marginal gloss τὸ ΜΗ ὑπὲρ Α γέγραπται, i.e. the Α of 'ΙΝΑ which is, indeed, followed by ΜΗ. If this conjecture is right—and I think it is—the corruption must be very old, possibly as old as Paul's original letter.

the fourth. By 1329 he was the proud owner of a Livy which was more complete and had a better text than any other in existence. The various decades of Livy's *History* had followed their separate fates through the Middle Ages and it was a considerable achievement to have put three of them under one cover, especially as the fourth decade was a great rarity in Petrarch's day; the remaining extant books of Livy (41-45) were not discovered until the sixteenth century. The whole text was supplemented, corrected, annotated—and so in a sense edited—by Petrarch himself; of special value are the variants recorded in his notes to books 26-30, because these were taken from a MS independent of the Puteaneus . . .” Thus, Petrarch continued or possibly revived the tradition of the ancient ‘editors’ or ‘subscribers’ whom J. E. G. Zetzel has investigated^{14a} and of whose work he says: “It is the result of private study, and for private use; it is the collection of material for thought, not the public presentation of any considered judgment. The subscribers made an effort to supply for themselves texts that they could read of works that they wanted to read.” Since we see the same technique practised in late antiquity as well as in the early Renaissance we may assume that it was never quite lost throughout the Middle Ages and that there is perhaps more continuity in scholarly editing of a sort than is generally admitted.

A similar case of separate transmission is represented by Cicero's *Aratea*: they were detached from his prose works in antiquity and joined to the *Aratea* of Germanicus and Avienus and the *Poetica Astronomica* of Hyginus.¹⁵

West (15ff.) deals with the various types of textual discrepancy.

(1) changes for which the scribes are not responsible:

(a) author's variants. This possibility was rejected for a long

^{14a} *CP* 75 (1980) 38ff.

¹⁵ Cf. J. Soubiran, Budé edition of Cicero's *Aratea* (1972) 106. The irrational forces that determine the transmission of a text can cause a text A to be embedded in a text B. When Ruhken, in 1765, read the rhetor Apsines in the Aldine edition, he noticed a change of content and style and was able to identify a piece from a treatise by Longinus that must have lost its original place through an error in binding in a corpus of rhetorical tracts. His discovery was confirmed long after his death when a Paris MS of Apsines became known in which the intruder was missing. Cf. Luck, *Arctos*, NS 5 (1967) 99f.

time but seems to be established by now. Author's variants can occur in a more or less thoroughly revised version or in an unfinished text never issued before. Aristophanes' *Clouds*¹⁶ and Apollonius' *Argonautica* belong in the first category. In his Budé edition¹⁷ of the Hellenistic epic F. Vian deals with the problem of the *proekdosis* of the work which is attested six times in the Scholia, always in Book I. The changes, on the whole, are not considerable, but four extra lines are quoted by the Scholia after 1.800: they were probably intended to take the place of 801-3. There are also fairly substantial variants between the two hyparchetypes which Vian tentatively considers as author's variants. In some places the vulgate seems to combine different recensions.¹⁸ This kind of compromise looks like the effort of an ancient editor who was puzzled by a discrepancy in his MSS.¹⁹ The two versions of ch. 1 of Xenophon's *Cynegeticus* present a rather unusual problem: both seem to be genuine, and both are therefore printed side by side in Delebecque's Budé edition (1970); his arguments are quite persuasive and his remarks on Xenophon's literary composition and career as a writer (43ff.) deserve to be read carefully. Masqueray (quoted by Bizos in his Budé edition of the *Cyropaedia*, 1971, p. LIX) said: "Le texte actuel de l'*Anabase* est surtout l'oeuvre des modernes," a provocative thought which might open up a new approach to the whole of Xenophon's *corpus*.^{19a} It is still not clear whether the striking variants in the *Anabasis*, the *Cyropaedia* and the *Cynegeticus* go back to a revision, a 'second edition' made by the author. There is strong evidence for two ancient versions of Demosthenes' *Epitaphius*.²⁰ Philostratus probably published two different editions of his *Letters*.²¹ But there is also unfinished

¹⁶ Cf. now K. J. Dover, *Illinois Studies in Classical Philology* 2 (1977) 154ff.

¹⁷ 1974, pp. xxiff.

¹⁸ e.g. *Argonautica* 1.592ff.; cf. M. Campbell, *CQ* 21 (1971) 415.

¹⁹ J. Soubiran, in his Budé edition of Cicero's *Aratea* (above, n. 15) 138ff., deals with the peculiar conflicts between the direct and the indirect tradition. He also believes in author's corrections. Boethius seems to have revised his translation of Aristotle's *Topica* (Brunschwig, Budé edition, 1967, p. cxiii). Cf. West, 15, nn. 5 and 6; R&W, 248 and add N. I. Herescu, *REL* 39 (1961) 135ff.

^{19a} Cf. West, 131f. on *Memorabilia* 1.3.8f.

²⁰ Cf. Clavaud's Budé edition (1974) 45ff.

²¹ Cf. C. L. Kayser, *Flavii Philostrati Opera* (Teubner, 1844-46), vol. I, pp. ivf.; E. Miller, *Journal des savants* (1849) 628; 756ff.

material preserved, for instance, in Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* Book 8 and in Claudian's *Carmina Minora*.²²

(b) rhapsodes' embellishments (as seen in the 'wild papyri' of Homer) and actors' interpolations (as seen in some Greek tragedies,²³ but possibly also in Plautus). These types of alterations are discussed by West, 16; 22f.; 91; 115; 143ff.; R&W 14f.; 25; 205ff.; Kenney, 146. As long as a play was actually performed on the stage, not just read in school, it could easily happen that an actor padded his part. Such interpolations are not always easy to detect. The striking variants in some works of Aristotle can at least partially be explained as glosses and paraphrases which represent centuries of learned exegesis done on a difficult text.²⁴ In a sense, these were 'working' texts, thus belonging in the 'cookbook category' (see below). Such changes, annoying as they may be, can be called 'creative.'

(2) changes mainly due to copyists:

(a) fairly extensive rewriting, sometimes resulting in a new 'recensio.' This might happen if a scribe had literary ambitions or if he considered himself an expert on the subject. It could be done to a text which, by its nature, is never finished, for example grammatical or rhetorical works or Scholia and commen-

²² On Claudian cf. Luck, *Illinois Studies* 4 (1979) 200ff. When I wrote my contribution "Der Mensch in der frühgriechischen Elegie" for the *Festschrift Walter Marg* (in print) it occurred to me that the *Theognidea*, as we have them, might best be understood as a conglomerate of finished pieces, fragments, drafts, texts copied for the poet's own use, etc. and were published after his death as "papers from the poet's workshop."

²³ Some of the textual problems of Euripides' *Iphigeneia at Aulis* have been described by Bernard Knox, following Denys Page, in the *New York Review of Books* of February 9, 1978: "The last part of the messenger speech which concludes the play contains lines that betray total ignorance of the elementary rules of ancient Greek versification; there is at least one passage where two versions of the same short speech suggest that we are dealing with an uncorrected draft; there are structural anomalies in the brilliant prologue . . . In the manuscripts . . . (it consists) of an initial dramatic exchange, in anapaestic rhythm, between Agamemnon and his old servant, an expository iambic speech by Agamemnon, and a concluding dramatic exchange in anapaests which sends the old man on his way with the letter to Clytaemnestra. The standard . . . text of Euripides, Murray's Oxford edition, prints anapaests and iambs as two different prologues, both incomplete; this represents the editor's belief that two poets were at work here, their efforts perhaps combined by a third . . ." Knox also calls the final half of the messenger speech mentioned above "a mosaic of late antique and Byzantine iambs, overlaid with modern corrections . . ."

taries. New material, it seems, was repeatedly added to Byzantine treatises *περὶ σχημάτων* or *περὶ τρόπων*. Popular narratives, even when they were no longer transmitted orally, encouraged changes of various kinds. The Alexander Romance, for instance, exists in six different versions, dated between A.D. 300 and 700. As long as Alexander remained the hero of folk tales, the imagination of Greek and Roman storytellers was kept busy, and new episodes were filled into the old framework. There are two lives of Aesopus and various collections of Aesopic fables. Parts of the Hippocratic corpus have been revised and rearranged in antiquity.²⁴ The cookbook of Apicius grew as new recipes were being added—a natural process, as J. André in the introduction to his Budé edition (1974, pp. xiiif.), says: “C’est le type d’ouvrage d’usage courant—quel intérêt de le posséder seulement dans les casiers d’une bibliothèque?—auquel s’ajoutent constamment dans les marges de nouvelles recettes. Il est peu de livres modernes de cuisine où une maîtresse de maison n’aît glissé entre les pages des recettes découpées dans les journaux ou transcrit dans les marges celles que lui ont données ses amies. C’est peu à peu, par des éditions successives, que s’est constitué notre corpus, chaque fois mis à jour quant à la langue (celle des *excerpta*, postérieurs d’un siècle, n’est plus la même) et modifié quant au contenu par des additions, des exclusions et des pertes involontaires.” Books of this kind were really working texts, not acquired just to be read, but to be consulted, annotated, enlarged, brought up-to-date. This may be true also of some of Aristotle’s treatises, handed down within the school. A strange case is that of Maximus Planudes who actually rewrote a part of Aratus *Phaenomena* (R&W, 66; 224 and plate VI with note on p. 272). West (75f.; 97f.) gives sound advice on how to deal with a multiple ‘recensio.’

(b) inaccurate quotations, for instance from memory, are likely to occur towards the end of the passages quoted.

(c) ‘bowdlerization’: The chapter on sacred prostitution in Herodotus (1.199) is omitted in some MSS, because this aspect of pagan civilization shocked a Christian scribe. Planudes avoids embarrassing words in his Greek translations of Ovid’s *Amatoria* (R&W, 224) and in the erotic epigrams which he copied for his *Anthology*; the scribes of the *Codex Palatinus*

²⁴ Cf. R&W, 194 on Galen 15.624.

were less squeamish. One copyist of Martial changed *fututor* to *adulter*.²⁵

(d) orthographical modernization of early texts and, vice versa, attempts to restore quasi-archaic forms: *quoi* becomes *cui*, *quom* becomes *cum*, etc. West (54; 66; 69f.; 86) deals with this kind of problem. A good example is Catullus 62.215 where Lachmann restored *inscieis* for *insciis* (R) or *insciens* (V); the *-eis* spelling was still in use in the late Republic (West, 133ff.). But one should also remember Wilhelm Schulze's demonstra-

²⁵ There is an entertaining study on some less direct forms of influence of Christian thought and idiom by R. M. Ogilvie, *G&R* NS 18 (1971) 32ff. A truly amazing case (if their diagnosis is correct, as it probably is) has been brought to light recently by R. A. Coles and M. W. Haslam in their notes on P.Oxy. 3331 (*Oxy. Papiry*, vol. XLVII [1980] 53ff.): "An obscene episode from the Life of Aesop, pars. 75-76 Perry.—This particular section of the Life has a peculiar textual status. Most of the MSS omit the episode entirely, passing directly from par. 74 to par. 77. It is extant in only two MSS. (*codd. descripti* excluded): cod. Baroccianus 194, known as O (15th cent.), and, translated into Latin, cod. Lollianum 26 (Lo; 14th cent.). The texts are published by B. E. Perry, *Aesopica* I (Urbana 1952), pp. 95 and 127f. respectively . . . These two MSS., O and Lo, show textual affinity with MSS which lack the episode. Apparently no one has argued that they are independent of the rest of the tradition, or even that they had access to an extra-stemmatic source. Rather they are supposed to be descendants of an archetype from which pars. 75-76 were deleted—an act of censorship (cf. Herodotus 1.199).—The 10th cent. cod. G (Ms. 397, Pierpont Morgan Library) is the sole representative of another branch of the tradition and was published for the first time in 1952 (Perry, *Aesopica* I, 35-77). Here matters stand differently and rather oddly. Folio 49 ends in mid-sentence in par. 74, and folio 50 commences towards the end of par. 76; the text is nonsensical. But the MS itself shows no sign of physical disruption. Perry makes the most reasonable inference (*Studies* 7f.): G's scribe was reproducing the pagination of his exemplar, from which a sheet had been removed (whether out of prurience or prudery).—The papyrus represents just that portion of the text which is missing from cod. G. This compels consideration of what would otherwise be a fairly fantastic hypothesis: that here we have a remnant of the actual detachment from the MS on which G depends. Such a hypothesis, undeniably economical, encounters two objections. First, the discovery at Oxyrhynchus of a fragment of the exemplar of an extant 10th-century manuscript (first attested at Grottaferrata near Frascati towards the end of the eighteenth century) may be considered on general grounds unlikely. Secondly, the physical procedure entailed is less than straightforward. Instead of the simple removal of a leaf or two from the codex, we have to envisage first a number of columns being cut out and the severed roll repasted, and then a medieval scribe reproducing the columniation in his codex. This is rather too much to swallow; yet the coincidence remains." Not really hard to accept, considering the conflicting emotions: prudery and prurience.

tion (*Orthographica*, 1894), justly called brilliant by Kenney (126), that the knowledge of certain classical Latin spellings, carefully eliminated from the text by Renaissance scholars, had been preserved throughout the Middle Ages by the grammatical tradition. Just as brilliant I find Housman's note (*CCP* I 175ff.) in which he buries the ghost VOXOR, supposed to be Plautine for VXOR, by showing that it is merely a corruption of the old spelling VCXOR. Occasionally, Housman was tempted to introduce odd spellings (see *CCP* II 424 on *nise* or *nesi* for *nisi*; and cf. Willis, 36).

(e) scribes and scholars often 'emend' the text: West, 12; 22; 32; 50; 107ff.; 134f.; 139; 143ff.; 150.

(f) many changes made semi-consciously by scribes are not visual but phonetic or psychological in origin. A word of the same sound is substituted, for example *ἐπί* for *αἰνύ* in the Byzantine period, or a tenuis is mistaken for its aspirate, for example Aeschylus, *Cho.* 418 *πάντες* for *φάντες* (this type of corruption, observed by Housman, *CCP* I 62, has not received much attention). Spoonerisms are fairly frequent, for instance *suscipit* for *suspicit* or, as I have tried to show,²⁶ *contagio* for *cognatio*. Mental associations can play tricks, for instance *πύλαι* replaces *θύραι* (one look-alike near-synonym for another). Sometimes the word order is altered: a Byzantine scribe may move a paroxytone word to the end of an iambic line to make it scan like a dodekasyllable (R&W, 207f. on Aeschylus, *Ag.* 1106), or the rhythm at the end of a clause in classical prose might be adapted to conform to a Byzantine *clausula* (R&W, 208).

(g) there is a tendency among scribes to simplify, i.e. to produce a more 'normal' or more 'familiar' word order. Ovid, *Amores* 1.14.1 (discussed by West, 22) is a good example: *medicare tuos desiste capillos* (P S alii) becomes *desiste tuos medicare capillos* in a number of MSS.

(h) glosses sometimes push out what they are meant to explain, for instance in Sappho fr. 18 ἢ τιν' ἄλλον (*ἀνθρώπων* codd.,

²⁶ *AJP* 99 (1978) 155-58. Since then I found a misprint in Louis Untermeyer's *Modern British Poetry* (new and enlarged edition [1962] Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc.) 115; a classic 'Spoonerism' disfigures W. B. Yeats' poem "Among School Children": "Plato thought nature but a spume that plays/ Upon a ghostly paradigm of things;/ Soldier Aristotle played the taws/ Upon the bottom of a king of kings . . ."

em. Wilamowitz) ἐμέθεν φίλησθα, but sometimes the gloss replaces not the word it explains, as in *Paneg. Messallae* (*Corp. Tib.* 3,7), 56 *Aetnaeae incola rupis*, where the gloss *Cyclops* has found its way into the line above. (See West, 23; R&W, 207). At Aeschylus, *Pers.* 253 the somewhat similar line Sophocles *Ant.* 227 is written in the margin of the Mediceus: copies made from M embody the line in the text. According to K. J. Dover²⁷ this is one of the most spectacular interpolations in the medieval transmission of Greek poetry.

(i) scribes may miswrite a word in several ways without actually misreading it, mostly by partial assimilation to another word nearby; they are "more apt to assimilate than dissimilate" (Housman, *CCP* I 167).

(j) haplography, dittography and simple omission are other types of psychological error. Haplography is an elementary form of the "saut du même au même"; see R&W 204f. on Aristophanes, *Ach.* 221f.^{27a} and Lucretius 3.135. As an example of dittography West (133) discusses Catullus 61.193 *rememorare* for *remorare*, and R&W (206) cite Seneca, *Epist.* 78.14 *quod acerbum fuit ferre, [re]tulisse incundum est* (em. Bartsch). On omissions see R&W, 190; 204f.: they are more

²⁷ Dover (note 16) 142.

^{27a} Aristophanes, *Aves* 1012-14 are discussed by Eduard Fraenkel, in *Studien zur Textgeschichte und Textkritik* (the Jachmann Festschrift, ed. by H. Dahlmann and R. Merkelbach, 1959) 24. He defends the transmitted text against the conjectures of Kock, Blaydes and van Leeuwen and paraphrases ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίῳ | ξενηλατοῦνται καὶ κεκίνηνται τινες | πληγαὶ συχναὶ κατ' ἄστυ by "in Bewegung gesetzt (im Gange ist) eine gewisse Art Prügel" or "Prügel sind im Gange derart dass sie reichlich durch die ganze Stadt hin auftreten." The language of the paraphrase sounded awkward to me when I reviewed the volume for the *Anzeiger für die Altertumswissenschaft* 15 (1962) 17-19, and I suggested κεκίνηνται τινες | πληγαὶ συχναὶ κατ' ἄστυ. I still think the change is necessary, but I wanted to know Fred Schreiber's opinion: he is probably one of the best *connaisseurs* of Aristophanes in this country or anywhere. Last year he wrote: "After examining the passage and assessing the various attempts at making sense out of it, I feel that your suggestion is . . . cogent. I say this because your emendation has the virtue of being the simplest correction of these verses . . . (cf., e.g., Koch's drastic φρένες to replace . . . τίνες). Furthermore, the genesis of the corruption may now easily be explained: it is not difficult to see the natural stages through which ΠΑΗΓΑΙΣΣΥΧΝΑΙΣ became ΠΑΗΓΑΙΣΥΧΝΑΙ . . ." The -ς of πληγαὶς was lost because of haplography, and the ending of συχναὶς was then changed to agree with the noun, never mind the sense.

likely to occur with short words, but of course larger portions of text are not safe, either. Transpositions (e.g. in Propertius²⁸) are sometimes the results of omissions; when not caused by mechanical factors, such as homoeoteleuton (frequent in Lucan), they are among the most significant agreements between MSS (West, 80; R&W, 196). It happens that lines are omitted in the text and then supplied in the margin, at the bottom of a page or at the end of the poem. Housman (CCP I 56) once said that the transposition of lines was the simplest remedy to be applied to the text of any poet Greek or Roman, even simpler than the change of a single letter, and over the years he suggested many transpositions in Propertius, some quite radical (see Willis, 151ff.; Kenney, 55; 146, n. 2) and, in my opinion, implausible. But Housman had an answer ready to punish this reluctance (CCP III 969): "That form of correction which consists in transferring a verse or sentence from one place to another is . . . doubly discomposing, because the mental fatigue which it involves is twice as heavy. There are two contexts to be read and considered, not only one." To me, one of his most striking emendations, in Horace, *Sat.* 1.3.103, is based on a transposition of words: for

*donec verba, quibus voces sensusque notarent,
nominaque invenere*

he proposed

*donec verba, quibus sensus vocesque notarent,
nominaque invenere,*

i.e., as he paraphrased, 'donec verba vocesque nominaque invenere, quibus sensus notarent.' This must be a very old corruption.

(k) misreading of words through letter-confusion is common (West, 25f.; R&W, 204ff.): *A* for *Δ*; *B* for *R*, etc.

(1) misreading through wrong word division (West, 26; 54; R&W, 4; 9; 201). I have found many examples in Lucan, e.g.

²⁸ I have discussed a few examples in *AJP* 100 (1979) 73ff. (*Tekmerion: Studies in Honor of J. H. Oliver*). If a couplet omitted in the text was added at the end of a poem we may assume that the poem ended with the couplet immediately preceding the misplaced one. This can be a criterion to determine the point (often disputed in Propertius) where one elegy ended and the next one began.

coniungere or *adiungere* for *aut iungere* (6,55); *aspexit actae* for *aspexi tacitae* (6.778); *miserere gementem* for *miser erige mentem* (8.76), etc.

(m) among the more mechanical causes of corruption is the following, observed by Housman (*CCP* III 1045): "The last word of a verse is especially liable to have its inflexion altered by scribes who do not at once perceive its construction and who seek to bring it into false grammatical connexion with the word immediately preceding." It is not always the fault of the scribes, however: the Puteaneus of Statius' *Achilleid* seems to be the copy of a much older MS which had gaps, especially at the end of lines,²⁹ and I suspect this was the case in the archetype of Ovid's *Tristia*.

(n) abbreviations are a source of errors, especially in *nomina sacra*, but also in frequent words (West, 27f.; 124; 141; R&W, 201; 203). A good example is Catullus 61.125 *domini* for *diu* (reading *DNĪ* for *DIV*). On the whole, abbreviations are not misread as often as ingenious emenders would like to believe (West, loc. cit.). R&W (201) deal with *notae* and give excellent examples (cf. also their comments on some plates, e.g. V). Ancient shorthand survives here and there.

(o) insular symptoms are discussed briefly by R&W (82): these are errors which are best explained by assuming faulty transcriptions of letters or abbreviations peculiar to English or Irish hands.

Looking back at all these sources of corruption one should keep in mind an idea formulated by Housman (*CCP* III 1106) in 1926: "These . . . false lections were not all invented at once by a single malefactor: they are the gradual deposit, century after century, of human ignorance and conceit; and if any large number of them are derived from a recension, it was probably Carolingian . . . What we need are MSS in which the Carolingian vulgate has not thoroughly overlaid an old substratum."³⁰

²⁹ Cf. J. Méheust, in the preface to the Budé edition (1971, p. xLI) to the *Achilleid*.

³⁰ To emphasize this point I should like to add something about the different nature of textual problems in Shakespeare. Samuel Johnson, in his edition, distinguished various causes for corruptions in the text, and he gave lavish praise (Kenney, 58) to a conjecture made by Warburton in *Hamlet*. The non-specialist will find the description in John Dover Wilson's lively autobiography, *Milestones on the Dover Road* (1969) 153ff., instructive. Wilson, at one

The concept of a 'Carolingian vulgate' seems very useful to me: its presence can certainly be detected in authors that were widely read in the Middle Ages, Ovid and Lucan for example. But to the human factors made responsible for errors by Housman I would add boredom, fatigue and time pressure.

In a second chapter, entitled "Organizing the Data" West discusses the differences between a 'closed' and an 'open recension.' The concept of 'recension' was first applied to a classical text by Lachmann in 1816 when he was twenty-three years old (Kenney, 126f.; 135; Pfeiffer, 190), though it was not entirely new: in practice, J. A. Bengel had already used it in establishing his text of the New Testament, in 1734. Its value can best be estimated by a comparison of Burman's text of Propertius (1780) with that of Lachmann (1816); what Housman says about their difference (*CCP* I 233f.) is excellent.

Much has been written about Lachmann's method.³¹ It involves a stemma which ideally leads, when all independent witnesses are used (Housman, *CCP* I 345), to an archetype (West, 14; 53; R&W, 186ff.; 212; 247). The term 'archetype,' though not in its modern sense, can be traced back to the Renaissance (Kenney, 11): it is found, for instance, in Minutianus' edition of Cicero (Milan 1498–99), Merula's edition of Plautus (Venice 1472) and Lascaris' edition of the *Anthologia Planudea* (Florence 1494). In its stricter sense it seems to appear for the first time in Madvig's edition of Cicero, *De Finibus*, 1839 (Kenney, 105); Cobet applied it more loosely (Kenney, 119). The stemmatic theory of recension works only

time, made long lists from the 'good' quartos of obvious misprints and abnormal spellings. He was then able, by a truly providential coincidence, to apply his lists to three MS pages discovered and published by Sir Edward Maunde Thompson, in *The Booke of Sir Thomas Moore* and attributed by him and others since then to Shakespeare himself. The peculiar character of Shakespeare's own type of 'secretary' handwriting easily explains the five classes of common corruptions which appear in a dozen or so quarto texts produced by seven or eight printing houses over a period of about fifteen years. Wilson testifies that those lists of corruptions proved to be a constant help with individual problems in the text during the forty years of his editing the plays. What happened when Shakespeare revised a playhouse MS and sent the revised text to the printers can be read on pp. 166f.—a marvellous piece of detection.

³¹ On S. Timpanaro's *La genesi del metodo del Lachmann*, 1963 (also available in a revised and augmented German translation, *Die Entstehung der Lachmannschen Methode*, 1971) cf. Kenney, 101ff.

for a closed tradition, and it would seem that only few texts are transmitted in such a way that the archetype can be reconstructed. Even in a closed recension there sometimes appears to be no single archetype apart from the author's copy. The stemma alone does not tell us whether or not there was an archetype (West, 41f.). If it can be reconstructed, it should be assigned a date. Quite often the archetype is incomplete.³²

'Ueberlieferungsgeschichte' was treated scornfully by Housman but has been rehabilitated since;³³ I would agree with A. T. Grafton who writes, in his review of Kenney:³⁴ "To be sure, doubts have arisen about the simplicity which Lachmann and his followers, save perhaps O. Jahn,³⁵ attributed to the textual traditions they studied. It has become clear that few traditions are uncontaminated, and the elimination principle has become harder and harder to apply. But editing remains historical in method, since it rests on study of the historical environment in which each text is written and of the historical process by which it has been handed down to us. To this extent, all modern editors are Lachmann's heirs."

The books included in this survey have very little to say, as far as I can see, about the value of illustrations in reconstructing the history of a text. Where illustrations exist, they are important. Jachmann's monograph on the pictures found in some MSS of Terence remains to this day a brilliant piece of deduction, I think. More recently Soubiran, in the introduction to his Budé edition of Cicero's *Aratea* (1972, pp. 106ff.) has made it plausible that the superb constellations painted in the 9th-century Harleianus 647 go back to an old original, possibly produced in the 2nd century A.D.

On the elimination of MSS as one of the stages of the 'recensio' West (33; 43) and R&W (186ff.) are instructive. The principle itself was applied by Politian but not mentioned again

³² Willis, 31ff.; to his examples add Cicero's *Aratea* (Soubiran, pp. 122f. of the Budé edition) and Seneca's *Naturales Quaestiones* with curious transpositions of whole books, presumably as the result of the loss of pages.

³³ Cf. Kenney, *CR* 75, NS 25, n. 2 (1975) 303; Gamberale, *Athenaeum* NS 52 (1974) 389f.

³⁴ A. T. Grafton, in: *JRS* 67 (1977) 172.

³⁵ See my sketch of Otto Jahn in: *150 Jahre Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Bonn*, "Philosophie und Altertumswissenschaften," (1968) 144ff., especially p. 151. He had studied with Lachmann (see pp. 145f.).

before the 19th century (R&W, 128). Paradoxically, as Kenney (126.4; 138) is able to show, ruthless elimination can conjure up the ghost of a 'codex optimus atque praestantissimus,' i.e. the rigid application of a "wissenschaftliches Prinzip" may become, in the end, "unwissenschaftlich."

The term 'open recension' was coined by Pasquali, though he seems to have used it inconsistently.³⁶ In an open recension a serviceable stemma is possible, even if it is not historically accurate, and various procedures based on the stemmatic notion have their practical value (West, 39ff.). No stemmatic theory is fully satisfactory (West, 36). One of the main problems in a contaminated recension are the varying affiliations of MSS within one and the same work. Housman has shown this in the preface to his Lucan, and more recently, Brunschwig, in the preface (p. CXXIV) of his Budé edition (1967) of Aristotle's *Topica* has followed this line of investigation. On the limitations of the stemmatic method one should also consult R&W, p. 247. There seems to be a consensus that contamination took place much more often than generally believed, especially in texts that were popular (Kenney, 139; 142; Willis, 18ff.; 24ff.).

In dealing with textual variants certain rules ought to be followed:

- (1) Do not attempt to correct the author.
- (2) Select the variant that fits grammar, metre and sense.
- (3) Witnesses should be weighed, not counted. Their age is not an absolute criterion: "Age is merely a promise of merit which experience may ratify or annul . . . The worst texts of Euripides yet known to man were written in classical antiquity itself (Housman, *CCP* I 357; cf. II 779 on the MSS of the *Culex*; Kenney, 96).^{36a} The Veronensis XXVIII (26) of Books 11-16 of St. Augustine's *Civitas Dei*, an uncial MS of the 5th or 6th century offers ancient, possibly contemporary evidence for the text of this part of the work, but is, in the words of E. A. Lowe³⁷ "conspicuous for the excellence of its calligraphy rather than its text."

³⁶ C. B. Alberti, *SFIC* 40 (1968) 44ff.; R&W, 193; 248.

^{36a} Wendell Clausen points out to me that Housman was wrong about the Bembinus (Vat. 3252); it is not one of "the three main pillars on which the text should stand;" see OCT, *App. Verg.* pp. 17f.

³⁷ Quoted by Philip Levine, in the preface to his Loeb edition, vol. IV (1966) p. VII.

(4) 'Recentiores non deteriores' is an extension of the preceding rule. The 16th-century Viennensis of Xenophon's *Opuscula* and the 15th-century Laurentianus of Lucretius are examples (West, 50; R&W, 196). A younger MS may be the faithful copy of an older, lost one.³⁸

(5) From this it follows that an eclectic approach is best, but "eclecticism within scientific bounds," as Housman (*CCP* I 347) said.

(6) 'Brevior lectio potior.' This was first formulated by the Swiss theologian J. J. Wettstein, in his monumental edition of the New Testament (1751–52) which owes much to his association with Bentley. It helped him, among other things, to eliminate the additional phrases and sentences that appear in the so-called Western text, notably in the *codex Bezae* (R&W, 248).

(7) 'Difficilior lectio potior.' This principle was first recognized by Clericus (Jean Leclerc) in his *Ars Critica* (1697); see Kenney (43f.) and West (51) who reminds us that there is a difference between a more difficult and a more unlikely reading.

(8) 'Impossibilis lectio potior.' That the truth is often found in the corrupt readings of the oldest MSS was apparently first stated by the Abbé Morel in his *Eléments de critique* (1766); cf. Kenney, 7, n. 5; 45.

One can think of most medieval MSS as texts ultimately descending from ancient editions which were produced more or less carefully. The existence of such editions is revealed by ancient subscriptions.³⁹ Many extant MSS represent 'learned editions' of a kind, based on a selection of readings.⁴⁰ The textual history of Apollonius of Rhodes seems particularly revealing in this respect. The papyri reflect, beginning with the first century A.D., the use of editions with glossae, scholia and variant readings. Later, presumably as the body of annotations grew, a division between the text and the extraneous material

³⁸ Cf. P. Grimal, preface of his Budé edition of Cicero, *In Pisonem* (1966) 73.

³⁹ See R&W, 28; 35ff. on an edition of Cicero's speeches made c. A.D. 300 and the work of Asterius, the consul of 494 on the text of Virgil; see also R&W, 94; 111; 129; 219 and plate 9; Kenney, 31; 42; 128, n. 2; J. E. G. Zetzel, *CP* 75 (1980) 38ff.

⁴⁰ See Housman, *CCP* I 323 on the Neapolitanus of Propertius and H. Le Bonniec, in his Budé edition of Pliny's *Nat. Hist.*, Book 18 (1972) p. 44 on the Londiniensis Arundel. 98, 12th cent.

occurred. Later still, when the codex format had been well established, we find text and notes united again. Of the witnesses some are clearly 'learned editions,' others are unassuming 'Lesetexte,' but apparently all the 'recentiores' are more or less intended as critical editions, produced by the contamination of MSS of different families (Vian, p. LII): they contain a number of conjectures, but they also preserve old readings.

'Emendatio' is, in practice, a form of 'recensio' (Kenney, 25). The 15th-century humanists did not yet distinguish between collating MSS and correcting them.⁴¹ The first scholar to separate clearly 'emendatio ope codicum' from 'emendatio ex coniectura' seems to have been Robortello whose treatise *De Arte sive Ratione Corrigendi Antiquorum Libros Disputatio* was first published in 1557.⁴² Salmasius meant the same thing when he distinguished emendation 'e libris scriptis et ex ingenio' (Kenney, p. 20, n. 4).

To make emendations is no easy task. Even Housman (*CCP* III 954), slightly annoyed with Lindsay's prediction that the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* and certain advances in palaeography would make textual emendation easy, stated categorically: "No advance in palaeography will ever make textual emendation easy, because textual emendation depends much less on palaeography than on several other things, the chief of which is the textual emendator . . ." (cf. similar warnings against the palaeographical approach *CCP* I 123; II 635; III 929; 1095; West, 58f.). Housman illustrates this point elsewhere (*CCP* III 1059) with a famous simile: "A textual critic engaged upon his business is not at all like Newton investigating the motions of the planets: he is much more like a dog hunting for fleas. If a dog hunted for fleas on mathematical principles, basing his researches on statistics of area and population, he would never catch a flea except by accident. They require to be treated as individuals . . . If a dog is to hunt for fleas successfully he must be quick and he must be sensitive. It is no good for a rhinoceros to hunt for fleas: he does not know where they are, and could not catch them if he did . . ."

⁴¹ On Beroaldus' method cf. Orelli's edition of Tacitus (1846–48), vol I, p. xxi; Kenney, 52f.

⁴² There is a new edition, with an introduction, an Italian translation, and copious notes, by G. Pompella (1975) 123 pages.

Not so well known is the following passage from a letter by Headlam to Postgate⁴³ . . . the problems of emendation are, I suppose, empiric; what you call 'instinct' I should rather call 'observation.' The borderland where the mind, prowling among misty forms and concepts, suddenly perceives analogies with what it already knows and moves into the light . . . In the 19th century emending passages became a sort of academic parlor-game in Europe, and for many decades there was practically no German doctoral dissertation in Classics which did not, as an appendix to the main thesis, offer a few conjectures, just to document that the candidate could handle this particular technique, too. The fashion grew to absurd proportions in Holland, under the influence of Cobet, as a wonderful story, told by Kenney (122f.) after Hartman, shows: "It was then the custom that each candidate for academic honours should emend, in his own time (*domi*), a passage of Greek that had been allotted to him. This assignment was always treated as a cooperative labour. The first step was to consult Cobet's own works, the *Novae* and the *Variae lectiones*, for it was not unknown for the great man, in a fit of absent-mindedness, to set a passage which he had himself already emended. If that resource failed, '*proprio erat ingenio utendum*.' The meeting would subject each word in the passage to a minute scrutiny, suspecting corruption everywhere. When it was believed that the seat of the trouble had been identified, the peccant word or words would be written out in uncial script, followed by all the words occurring to the company that bore any resemblance to the paradosis. Eventually they would hit upon a word or phrase that commanded general support as the presumed source of the corruption. At this point they called it a day and spent the rest of the evening celebrating their feat of divination: '*de solida nocte haud parvam partem vino gaudioque dabamus*.' In the morning the first man on his feet—'*qui primus vinulum edormitasset*'—would make his way to the library to consult Stephanus' Thesaurus (a work, notes Hartman, never otherwise disturbed) and thence collect what parallels or apparent parallels he could. These were carried back to the candidate to serve as a basis for the '*brevis commentatio*' that he was obliged to produce. So, finally, the emendation was pre-

⁴³ Quoted by Penelope Fitzgerald, *The Knox Brothers* (1977) 70.

sented for Cobet's approval: a correction in, it might be, Herodotus or Thucydides, supported by parallels from the New Testament, Lycophron and Eunapius. 'Nihil tum iucundius erat quam Cobetum audire ridentem iocantemque,' says Hartman; as well he might.^{43a}

Emendations can be enjoyed. There is a close relationship between textual criticism and connoisseurship in the visual arts, for example, as Kenneth Clark⁴⁴ sees it in his autobiography: "To say whether a picture is, or is not, by Bellini or Botticelli involves a combination of memory, analysis and sensibility, which is an excellent discipline for both mind and eye. The nearest analogy is the textual criticism which was considered the ultimate end of classical scholarship from Bentley to Housman. No one complained that they were wasting their time when they emended, once again, the text of a third-rate author like Manilius. They were not even judged by the correctness of their emendations, but rather by some combination of memory, patience and elegance of mind which gave these minute revisions a quality of intellectual beauty." There it is: "minute revisions." But also: "intellectual beauty." I disagree in one point: ultimately the correctness of the emendations also becomes a criterion. On the other hand, though many excellent suggestions sink into oblivion, those that are wrong are not entirely useless: they may serve as 'diagnostic conjectures' (the term was coined by Maas) and, though implausible, may help someone else to find the truth.

The history of classical scholarship is positively swarming with conjectures forever begging to find acceptance. Of over four hundred alterations in the text of Homer proposed by Zenodotus only six are found as a reading in all our papyri and MSS, and only a further thirty-four in a majority of them; well over two hundred are never so found (R&W, 12). The results of Aristophanes' work on the text of Homer, measured in the same terms, are just as ephemeral. Aristarchus appears to have commanded more respect as an emendor of Homer, but of his

^{43a} Wendell Clausen aptly quotes from S. Timpanaro, *Contributi di filologia e di Storia della Lingua Latina* (Rome 1978) 675: "C'è senza dubbio un genere di congettura (e un tipo di congetturatore) che va sbandito dalla repubblica filologica: sono le congetture *ludibundae*, 'umanistiche' in senso deteriore, fatte per esercizio e per ostentazione di virtuosismo . . ."

⁴⁴ Kenneth Clark, *Another Part of the Wood* (1974) 150f.

almost nine hundred suggestions only ten percent are universally found (R&W, 12). Bentley's name is seen very rarely in the Oxford edition of Terence; but a collation of this standard text with Bentley's famous edition (first published in 1726) has convinced me years ago that many of the readings he found in his MSS and many of his conjectures should be seriously considered. Nor would I say that Klingner's Teubner edition of Horace (1950) does justice to Bentley's efforts.⁴⁵ What Housman (CCP I 131, quoted above 168) wrote of Horkel is no longer true of Housman himself: his name appears now about thirty times in the apparatus criticus of Hanslik's Teubner Propertius (1979)—a very respectable achievement—but only about a dozen of his conjectures, some anticipated by others, are accepted.

Part II of West's book (61ff.) offers practical guidance on how to edit a text. All this is sensible and useful. West underlines the need of collating the main MSS again, as well as those neglected by previous editors. This is the sort of thing that Dodds did for Plato's *Gorgias* (see above 165-66), Knoche^{45a} for Juvenal and that someone ought to do for Lucan, among others. It is a tedious task, and one can understand why, in the Renaissance, the drudgery of collating was often delegated (Kenney, 51), but even then scholars like Politian made their own collations and wrote their conjectures in the margins of the texts they used (Kenney, 59f.).⁴⁶

The time has apparently not yet come for MSS to be computed automatically, and to have a computer work out even a simple stemma seems not worth the effort (West, 70ff.; Kenney, 137f.; R&W, 213; 249). Machines are still best used for concordances and "the more unsubtle kind" (West, loc. cit.) of metrical analysis; but they can also be recommended for biblical and patristic studies, possibly even for stylistic studies (R&W, loc. cit.)

West (186ff.) gives excellent hints for the construction of the

⁴⁵ Klingner mentions Bentley about two dozen times in the apparatus criticus to the four books of *Odes* and accepts one change (in 3.4.69).

^{45a} But Knoche, as Wendell Clausen reminds me, never collated P: he left it for last, and then came the war (see his ed., p. xxii); as a result, his app. crit. contains between 450 and 500 errors of omission and commission in reporting P—mostly trivial.

⁴⁶ Willis, 32 ff. gives good advice on the technique of collating.

apparatus criticus; they can be illustrated from Housman's papers.

(1) It should be complete and intelligible. As a warning one may read Housman's comments on Ellis' edition of Ovid's *Ibis* (CCP III 1019f.): "An apparatus criticus constructed by Ellis is never complete and never completely intelligible. This I already knew when I undertook to edit the *Ibis*, and even if I had not known it I should have begun to learn it in the course of my task. But I did not yet know, what subsequent experience taught me, that he never in his life collated a MS, nor even grasped the meaning of the word *collation* . . ." ⁴⁶

(2) It should be lucid. Cf. Housman (CCP III 1099): "Students of Martial now live in an age which was begun by Professor Lindsay's edition of 1903, one of those works which are such boons to mankind that their shortcomings must be forgiven them. All that energy could do in the investigation or skill and industry in the collation of MSS was done, and the fruits of this labour were condensed in an apparatus criticus of the most admirable lucidity. It is true that one was obliged to form one's text for oneself, but without Mr Lindsay that would not have been possible . . ."

(3) It should not be burdened by false and trivial readings and those useless for the constitution of the text. In his review of Ellis' edition of Catullus (CCP III 625) he wrote: "If Lachmann, having no good MSS, used a bad one, is that a reason why Lachmann's disciples, having two good MSS, should use it still? Parisians ate rats in the siege, when they had nothing better to eat: must admirers of Parisian cookery eat rats for ever? . . . Secondly, if esteem for Lachmann's criticism checks Mr Ellis from discarding one of Lachmann's two chief MSS, how does this allow him to discard the other, the Santenianus? Last, and most perplexing of all, why does Mr Ellis esteem Lachmann's criticism? His own criticism is pre-Lachmannian and anti-Lachmannian, and his apparatus is just what an apparatus used to be before Lachmann and his contemporaries introduced their reforms. Lachmann who had none but bad MSS, was content with five of them: Mr Ellis, who has two good MSS, is not content with fewer than twenty bad ones into the bargain. And no MS is too bad for Mr Ellis to build conjectures on its corruptions . . ." (cf. CCP II 780).

The rules seem self-evident now, but they were not always followed. There are some early attempts at an apparatus criticus, as we understand it, in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (R&W, 43; 93; 149 have some examples), but the very slow development of this tool through the ages may well be, as Kenney (68) suggests, one of the reasons why editing became a science so late.

What other tools does the critic⁴⁷ have?

(1) He ought to read many previous editions and commentaries. This piece of advice comes from Housman (CCP III 1197) who was usually reticent about his habits: "I have not read the *Thebais* more than three times, nor ever with intent care and interest; and although in putting these notes together I have consulted a large number of editions . . . and the translations of . . ." (he lists sixteen editions and three translations) "it may well be that profitable matter has escaped me . . ."

⁴⁷ The word 'critic,' of course, has different meanings, and perhaps this is the place to tell a Housman anecdote preserved by G. H. Hardy, *A Mathematician's Apology* (1967) 61f. (my friend and colleague David Spring drew my attention to this great little book): "Exposition, criticism, appreciation is work for second-rate minds. I can remember arguing this point once in one of the few serious conversations that I ever had with Housman. Housman, in his Leslie Stephen lecture *The Name and Nature of Poetry* had denied very emphatically that he was a 'critic'; but he had denied it in what seemed to me a singularly perverse way, and had expressed an admiration for literary criticism which startled and scandalized me.—He had begun with a quotation from his inaugural lecture, delivered twenty-two years before—'Whether the faculty of literary criticism is the best gift that Heaven has in its treasures, I cannot say; but Heaven seems to think so, for assuredly it is the gift most charily bestowed. Orators and poets . . . , if rare in comparison with blackberries, are commoner than the return of Halley's comet: literary critics are less common . . .'—And he continued—'In these twenty-two years I have improved in some respects and deteriorated in others, but I have not so much improved as to become a literary critic, nor so much deteriorated as to fancy that I have become one.'—It had seemed to me deplorable that a great scholar and a fine poet should write like this, and, finding myself next to him in Hall a few weeks later, I plunged in and said so. Did he really mean what he had said to be taken seriously? Would the life of the best of critics really have seemed to him comparable with that of a scholar and poet? We argued these questions all through dinner, and I think that he finally agreed with me. I must not seem to claim a dialectical triumph over a man who can no longer contradict me but 'Perhaps not entirely' was, in the end, his reply to the first question, and 'Probably no' to the second."

Porson, it is said (by Samuel Rogers, *Porsonianana*), was a great reader of translations and apparently never wrote on any passage of an ancient author without first having looked at the different renderings available.⁴⁸

(2) The critic needs a complete list of previous conjectures: "Next to an accurate collation of the cardinal MSS a complete register of the conjectures of critics is the student's prime requisite. Nothing short of a complete register will serve: no man can be trusted to sift good from bad: some editors do not know a correction when they see one, others through childish jealousy of this scholar or that ignore his discoveries, the most candid and the soundest judgment is human and errs . . ." (*CCP* I 55).

Editing a text is, in a sense, an act of *pietas* towards an author whose work has somehow survived or has passed the test of time. As one gets to know him better and grows fonder of him and as one understands more about the ways in which texts copied by hand can be corrupted, one feels the obligation, the duty of establishing a text that comes reasonably close to what the author intended. But part of it is an intellectual game, a juggling with possibilities, almost like solving a chess problem and since only the scholars working in the same field can approve or disapprove the struggle goes on.

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⁴⁸ It is also a good ideal for an editor to translate the text he is editing, even if he does not intend to publish his translation. Shackleton Bailey said this to me years ago, and now his translations of Cicero's letters have acquired a status of their own.

ROMAN TREATIES WITH PARTHIA CIRCA 95—CIRCA 64 B.C.

Speaking of the year 66¹ the Livian epitomator (*Epit.* 100) says: *Cn. Pompeius . . . cum rege Parthorum Prahate² amicitiam renovavit*. Now the very use of the word *renovavit* shows that this was not the first occasion on which the Romans had made treaties with Parthia. Thus, while the main preoccupation of this paper will be Pompey's dealings with Parthia, a brief look at the previous treaties, negotiated by Sulla and Lucullus, will not, we feel, be out of place for two reasons. Firstly, the sources present some problems which are interesting in themselves and which have been a fruitful source of scholarly controversy. Secondly, and more important from our viewpoint, an examination will show, I believe, that the attitudes and policies of the two powers towards each other changed but little in thirty-odd years. It will emerge that Sulla's attitude towards Parthia hardly differs from that of Pompey and the problems which confronted the two powers in their relations towards each other were much the same in the sixties as they had been in the nineties.

In 96, during his pro-praetorship, Sulla was engaged in restoring Ariobarzanes to the throne of Cappadocia.³ His opera-

¹ *MRR* 2.155.

² Phraates is meant, as will be clear presently.

³ This is the date first proposed by E. Badian, which has recently been questioned. For an attempt at defence (and a bibliography of the controversy) see A. Keaveney, "Deux Dates Contestées de la Carrière de Sylla," *Les Études Classiques* 48 (1980) 149-57. Since that article was accepted for publication G. V. Sumner, "Sulla's career in the nineties," *Athenaeum* 56 (1978) 395-96 has suggested that Sulla was elected curule aedile in 99 for 98 and that after a *biennium* he was elected praetor in 96 for 95. His arguments do not, however, appear convincing. This theory seems to rest on the unnecessary assumption that Sulla, after his first electoral defeat would be forced to sue for the aedileship before making a bid for the praetorship. As a direct consequence of this it is held that Plut. *Sulla* 5.1-3 has, in error, forgotten to mention the election to the aedileship. Sumner further suggests that the games which we know Sulla held (sources in G. and C, 124) were in fact those of a curule aedile. He does not appear to have noticed that Plin. *N.H.* 8.53 says they were given *in praetura*. Thus, what appears, to me at any rate, to be on the surface

tion brought him to the Euphrates and there he became the first Roman to meet a Parthian embassy which had come *ut amicitiam populi Romani peteret*.⁴ The Parthians indeed may have been anxious to establish diplomatic ties with the successors of the Seleucids but more immediately they must have wanted to divine Sulla's intentions towards their protégé Tigranes who was now establishing himself on the throne of Armenia.⁵ For the discussions Sulla brought out three chairs. He himself sat in the middle while Orobazus, the Parthian ambassador, and Ariobarzanes sat on either side of him.⁶ By this action Sulla made it clear that Rome was to be the dominant party in the talks.⁷

The view that Sulla, by this action, gratuitously insulted the representative of a great power was prevalent in his own day and has found some champions since.⁸ According to this theory Sulla knew nothing about Parthia and treated its ambassador as the representative of a tin-pot principality whose offer of *amicitia* was to be interpreted in the way now normal for Romans: a wish to become Rome's client.⁹ But this is not a

Sumner's most compelling argument is removed, for we can now see how Sulla could promise games while still seeking a praetorship. The rest of Sumner's thesis seems to be little more than an *argumentum ex silentio* which does not appear at all compelling when set against Plutarch's plausible narrative. Finally, it may, perhaps, be remarked that there would seem to be no good reason for adopting Sumner's tentative suggestion that the clash with Caesar Strabo (*Sulla* 5.4) could possibly be dated to Sulla's consulship.

⁴ Sources: Plut. *Sulla* 5.7-8; Liv. *Epit.* 70; Fest. *Brev.* 15; Ampelius 31; Vell. Pat. 2.24.3 who erroneously places it during the first Mithridatic War. The best modern discussion is that of J. Dobais, "Les premiers rapports des Romains avec les Parthes," *Arch Orient* 3 (1931) 218-21.

⁵ On Parthian motives see T. Liebmann-Frankfort, *La Frontière Orientale dans la politique extérieure de la République romaine* (Brussels 1969) 174. On the date of Tigranes accession see Sherwin-White in *CQ* (1977) and *RE* "Tigranes" No. 1. This dating would seem to rule out the suggestion of G. Rawlinson, *The Sixth Great Oriental Monarchy* (London 1873) 134 that fear of the growing power of Armenia under Tigranes drove the Parthians to seek a Roman alliance. I do not believe that the Armenians of Plut. *Sulla* 5.6 have anything to do with Tigranes. Cf. my op. cit. in n. 3.

⁶ Plut. *Sulla* 5.8.

⁷ For another occasion on which this insult was used see Plut. *Cat. Min.* 57.1-2.

⁸ Plut. *Sulla* 5.8 with the comments of E. Valgiglio ad. loc.

⁹ See the conflicting views of Dobais op. cit. 220-21 and N. C. Debevoise, *A Political History of Parthia* (New York 1968 reprint) 46.

credible view. Was there no-one in all the East to tell Sulla who the Parthians were? Further, he was already a seasoned diplomat with notable triumphs in the Jugurthine and Cimbric Wars behind him.¹⁰ Is it likely that such a man would neglect to inform himself about the power with which he now had to deal? It has also been suggested¹¹ that Sulla would not have understood the Hellenistic modes of diplomacy within which Orobazus worked but again this seems unlikely in the case of one who was an accomplished Hellenist.¹²

So it would appear that Sulla knew perfectly well what he was about and his actions thus admit of a different explanation. So far from humiliating an envoy from a petty state he was, in fact, gaining for himself an initial advantage in negotiations with the ambassador of a great kingdom. It was not his aim to wreck the negotiations or provoke open war but to bully the Parthians in order to extract concessions from them.¹³

Obviously much of the validity of this interpretation of the meeting depends upon there being a treaty as its outcome. Most of our sources unfortunately use such terms as *συνμαχία* and *amicitia*. The latter is ambiguous since it could refer either to a treaty or simply to a state of friendship between Rome and another nation without a formal agreement.¹⁴ *Amicus* and *amicitia* may also be used in place of *socius* and *societas*.¹⁵ However, Florus 1.46.4 says that when Crassus was preparing to attack Parthia the king sent a messenger who *percussorum cum Pompeio foederum Sullaque meminisset*.¹⁶ This passage

¹⁰ Jugurthine War: see n. 23 below. Cimbric War: see A. Keaveney, "Sulla, the Marsi and the Hirpini," *CP* (forthcoming).

¹¹ By Debevoise op. cit. 46.

¹² On Sulla's Hellenism see, for example, Sall. *Jug.* 95; Cic. *Rab. Post.* 9, Plut. *Sulla* 19.10, 26.1; App. *BCiv.* 1.94.

¹³ If we were to accept the traditional date of Sulla's pro-praetorship 92 it could be argued that he treated the Parthians with disdain because he knew that at this time their empire was weakened and troubled by usurpers (cf. Debevoise 48-49). But then we should have to reckon with the uncomfortable fact that in a later troubled period for the Parthians (Plut. *Luc.* 36.5-6) Lucullus, as we shall see, still thought it worth his while to seek their alliance.

¹⁴ Cf. M. Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce et les monarchies Hellénistiques* (Paris 1921) 40, n.2, 54 n. 3, 69-70 and A. H. J. Greenidge, *Roman Public Life* (London 1901) 292-93.

¹⁵ See L. E. Matthaëi, "The Classification of Roman Allies," *CQ* 1 (1907) 185-87.

¹⁶ On the problem posed by a comparison of this and Oros 6.13.2 see below n. 28.

shows that a *foedus* was in fact signed and that the word *amicitia* in the other sources must be taken as referring to it. We may also take it that the treaty did not imply, as it often could, that Parthia was now, in effect, a client of Rome. The Romans were perfectly capable of making equitable treaties with those whom they regarded as their equals.¹⁷ Like all such agreements it must have contained clauses binding the parties to observe strict neutrality towards each other and enjoining on them not to aid each others' enemies.¹⁸ It was also customary for the parties to define, on such occasions, their spheres of influence. It seems to have been agreed now that the Euphrates should be the common frontier. Certainly the Parthian king, in Florus' account, makes it clear that Crassus was acting contrary to Sulla's treaty by crossing the river.

Sulla thus brought back to Rome the draft of a treaty which was duly ratified by the senate, probably in 95.¹⁹ But it has been argued that, treaty or no treaty, Sulla's insult to the ambassador had serious consequences for Rome's relations with Parthia. According to this theory, which is most fully propounded by Debevoise *op. cit.* 47-48,²⁰ Sulla's behaviour drove the king to seek closer ties with Mithridates and Tigranes. One's first reaction is to remark that this perhaps overestimates the value the king placed on his ambassador²¹ and further investigation reveals that the ancient evidence puts certain obstacles in the way of a whole-hearted acceptance of the theory. The source for a marriage alliance between Armenia and Parthia is Avroman parchment I and as Debevoise *op. cit.* 47 n. 70 points out this could be dated to either 87 or 23, adding "the question cannot yet be settled with certainty." Appian *Mith.* 15 is our source for the alliance with Mithridates but there does not seem to be any indication of when exactly it was concluded. But even if we concede that the marriage al-

¹⁷ The first treaty with Carthage is an obvious example cf. Polybius 3.22.

¹⁸ On these *foedera* see Holleaux *op. cit.* 39, Daremberg-Saglio 'Amicitia' and (more fully) Matthaei *op. cit.* 189-99.

¹⁹ As Rawlinson *op. cit.* 135 and n.2 rightly points out, it was beyond Sulla's competence to actually sign a treaty; cf. Greenidge *op. cit.* 283-84.

²⁰ The theory is also enunciated by K. W. Dobbins "Mithridates II and his successors: A study of the Parthian Crisis," *Antichthon* 8 (1974) 70.

²¹ Cf. further the remarks of Dobais *op. cit.* 219.

liance is to be dated to 87, and even if we assume that the alliance with Mithridates was made soon after the ambassador's meeting with Sulla, and even if we go still further to accommodate the theory and date Sulla's eastern activities to 92 (thus putting it closer to the date of the parchment) we still cannot accept that these alliances should be connected with the insult. As we shall shortly see, some thirty years later the Parthians concluded a treaty with Lucullus but at the same time they allied with Tigranes and Mithridates. In that thirty years or so one aspect, at least, of Parthian policy had not changed: they were anxious to be friends with all their neighbours but showed a marked reluctance to get involved in their quarrels. It is true to say that Parthian policy was pacific and sought to establish good relations with all who bounded her.²² It is also true to say that it was independent and governed by natural self-interest. To protect themselves and their territory they evidently felt it was best to be on good terms with their powerful and boisterous neighbours. Thus they turned as readily to the other powers, Tigranes and Mithridates, as they did to the Romans. Again and again we shall see the Parthians attempting to hold the middle ground between the great powers and I would suggest that such a clear and consistent policy negates any suggestion that piqued, by a trivial incident, they chose to embrace one power-bloc rather than another.

After this treaty of Sulla's we hear of no further contact between the two nations until some thirty-odd years later when Lucullus was campaigning against Mithridates of Pontus and his ally Tigranes of Armenia. In the winter of 69/68 Mithridates and Tigranes approached the Parthians with a view to an alliance. When Lucullus heard of this he too sent ambassadors to the king asking that he should either help the Romans or remain strictly neutral. He made all sorts of promises if they should take the Roman side but he also backed this with threats as to what he would do to them if they aided the enemy. The Parthian king replied by sending envoys to Lucullus and a treaty was concluded. Then Lucullus, through the agency of one of his officers, a certain Sextilius who had gone to the Parthian court, discovered that the king had also made an al-

²² See Dobais *op. cit.* 221-28.

liance with Tigranes and Mithridates. After this we hear of no further diplomatic contacts between the Romans and the Parthians until the time of Pompey.²³

We need not be surprised that Lucullus felt it necessary to make a new agreement with the Parthians. Treaties at the best of times are fragile things and conditions in the previous thirty years or so had not been favourable to the continuance of Sulla's treaty. The Romans expected a new king to renew his successor's *foedus amicitiae*, otherwise it would be no longer regarded as being valid.²⁴ In the interval between Mithridates II who ruled in Sulla's time and Phraates III Theos with whom Lucullus had dealings²⁵ there were several Parthian kings all of

²³ Sources for the negotiations and treaties: App. *Mith.* 87, Dio. 36.1-3 (His *ἐγκύλιον* is probably a Sextilius, cf. *RE* 'Sextilius' No. 2); Plut. *Luc.* 30.1; Memnon fr. 38.8 in Jacoby, *F.G.H.* 3B, 366. A hasty and superficial reading of Plutarch might lead us to conclude that his narrative contradicts the others and suggests that no treaty was in fact concluded. Closer investigation will show that this is not so. We must recognise that we are dealing here with a typical example of Plutarch's tendencies to abbreviate and distort the story he tells. I should like, if I may, to illustrate these with an example. If we compare the story of the capture of Jugurtha, as given by Sall. *Jug.* 102-13 and Plut. *Sulla* 3.1-6 we find that while both recognisably tell the same story there are innumerable facts in Sallust which are not in Plutarch. Further, Plutarch shifts the emphasis in such a way as to give the impression that Sulla's freedom of action was greater than it really was. Keeping this sample before us let us return to the passage which directly concerns us. In his *Sulla* Plutarch had an artistic purpose for his distortions, he wanted to magnify Sulla's achievement, and here again we can detect a similar aim. As Dobais op. cit. 230 remarks he had "le but de présenter le personnage de Lucullus sous la lumière la plus favorable." To achieve this purpose Plutarch deliberately distorts facts but his distortion does not go so far that we cannot compare them with our other sources and detect that the incidents about which they both speak are one and the same. Thus while our other sources show that Lucullus first made overtures to Parthia Plutarch says it was vice versa. Again he represents the ambassadors sent to discuss terms as discovering the Parthian treaty with Tigranes before they actually made any treaty themselves. But, here again our other sources tell us that this discovery was not made until after the Romans and Parthians made a treaty. Finally, we should note that he in fact makes no mention of this treaty. In all of this we can see that Plutarch's story is fundamentally the same as that which we find in our other sources but that for artistic purposes he tells it with compressions and omissions. In speaking of these incidents he gives them a different emphasis from that of our other sources since he is writing as a biographer and not a historian.

²⁴ Cf. Holleaux op. cit. 49 n. 2, 69 n. 1 and *RE* 'Amicitia.'

²⁵ On the significance of this fact see below.

whom, so far as we can tell, were preoccupied with their own troubles and seem to have made no effort to renew the *foedus*.²⁶ So Sulla's treaty was allowed to lapse and it was necessary for Lucullus to negotiate a new one. Once more, by a *foedus amicitiae* the Parthians became *socii et amici* of the Romans.²⁷ Like Sulla's the new treaty seems to have fixed the Euphrates as the boundary between the two powers.²⁸ Unlike Sulla's (so far as we can tell) this new treaty seems to have involved the Parthians in more than neutrality for they seem to have agreed to actually aid the Romans in their war.²⁹ Appian uses the word *ἀμύναι* with reference to the agreements which the king made with both parties, which surely implies something more than mere neutrality. We must also reckon with the presence of Sextilius at the Parthian court. What business had he there after the treaty was made? He may indeed have been a spy but he must surely have had some ostensible and respectable excuse for being where he was. I would suggest that the fact that he was an *ἄνδρα ἐπιφανῆ τὰ πολεμικά* could perhaps be taken to support the notion that he was there to help the Parthian war effort on Rome's behalf. This theory derives some confirmation from Dio's remark that the king *οὐδὲμίαν ἔτ' αὐτῷ βοήθειαν ἐποίησατο* once he discovered what he was up to and this sentence implies that, prior to the unpleasant discovery, the Romans could expect some kind of active assistance from their Parthian allies. And there is evidence to suggest that the Parthians were to attack Armenia.³⁰ They had some old scores

²⁶ On this background see Debevoise op. cit. 50-53.

²⁷ *φιλίαν τε καὶ συμμαχίαν* (Dio); *φιλίαν προκαλούμενον καὶ συμμαχίαν* (Plut.).

²⁸ Oros. 6.13.2 tells us that when Crassus invaded Parthia the king demanded to know, *cur contra foedus Luculli et Pompei avaritia inductus Euphraten transierit?* Contrary to what Debevoise 47 n. 68 says there is no mention of Sulla's treaty in this passage. In fact it appears to be at variance with Flor. 1.46.4, who, as we have seen, in narrating this incident talks of treaties with Sulla and Pompey. The discrepancy is not, perhaps, impossible to explain. No doubt the king, in his remonstrance, made reference to all the treaties that had ever been made between Rome and Parthia, pointing out that they all had fixed the river as the boundary between the two powers. While Florus chose to mention Sulla's Orosius concentrated on the newer and more important treaty of Lucullus. This importance derives in part from the relationship between the *foedus Luculli* and the *foedus Pompei* (see below).

²⁹ An *amicus* could elect to do this, cf. Matthaei op. cit. 192.

³⁰ Dio 36.45.3. On this interpretation of the passage see below.

to settle with Tigranes³¹ and in attacking him would be doing themselves, as well as the Romans, a favour.

This brings us at last to Pompey and his *foedus*. Our investigation falls naturally into two parts. We must first of all attempt to set his treaty in the context of the events of the years 66 to 64. Then we shall attempt to set it in the wider context of Romano-Parthian relations as a whole in those early years of contact between the two powers in an attempt to justify the assertion made at the outset of this paper, that the determinants which underly both Roman and Parthian policy remained in essence unchanged throughout the period despite the lapse of time and the many changes of personnel which had of course occurred.

In addition to the passage of Livy's epitome quoted earlier Dio 36.45.3 also speaks of this treaty. He says: *ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ Πομπήιος τὴν φιλίαν τῷ Φραάτῃ διὰ ταχέων ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς προσυνέθετο καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἀρμενίαν αὐτὸν τὴν τοῦ Τιγράνου προεμβαλεῖν ἀνέπεισε*. The implication of the two passages is, I think, clear. Pompey, in 66, renewed the treaty made a few years earlier by Lucullus, on exactly the same terms as before.³² It is also possible to conclude, as we did earlier, that this passage is to be taken as evidence that Lucullus had intended the Parthians to attack Armenia for it seems to imply that Pompey's aim in this was the same as Lucullus', just as his treaty duplicated the former commander's. But there is something puzzling in all of this. Why was it necessary for Pompey to renew a *foedus* made only three years before? Had he wanted to change the terms we could easily understand his action but, in fact, as we know, they were exactly the same. What seems to be a possible clue is found in Dio. He tells us, in the same passage, that Mithridates too was wooing the Parthian king and adds: *τοῦ γὰρ Ἀρσάκου τοῦ τῶν Πάρθων βασιλέως ἀποθανόντος ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ Φραάτην τὸν διάδοχον αὐτοῦ προσεδόκησεν οἰκειώσεσθαι*. From this it might be possible to infer that Phraates had but recently ascended the throne and that what Pompey was doing was following the normal Roman

³¹ Dio 36.3.2, cf. Debevoise 51, 70.

³² C. Van Ooteghem, *Pompee le Grand* (Brussels 1954) 205 n. 7 is mistaken in believing that it was Sulla's treaty which Pompey renewed.

practice of renewing a treaty with a new king.³³ But there is one fatal objection to this neat theory and it is this, Phraates was the king who made the treaty with Lucullus in the first place. According to Phlegon, Phraates' predecessor Sinatruces had died sometime in 70/69 (third year of the 177th Olympiad) and before the battle of Tigranocerta which he places in the fourth year of the Olympiad (actually 6th Oct. 69).³⁴ All of our authorities are agreed that the negotiations which led to the treaty took place after this battle.³⁵ To clinch the matter Memnon specifically says that it was with Phraates Lucullus that he made his agreement.³⁶ We must needs look elsewhere for an explanation of this business.

I would suggest that it is to be found in the time of Lucullus himself. It will be recalled that the Parthian king made an alliance with Mithridates and Tigranes as well as Lucullus. This clearly constituted a grave breach of the *foedus* since it was a pretty funny sort of *amicus* who would ally with Rome's enemies. Therefore, the treaty was regarded by the Romans as being no longer in existence. It has been argued by Dobais op. cit. 232-33 that as the king did, in fact, maintain neutrality after changing his mind about aiding the Romans, he was merely

³³ Cf. n. 24 above.

³⁴ Fr. Nos. 12.7 and 10 in Jacoby, *FGH* 3B 1164.

³⁵ Plut. *Luc.* 29-30; Dio 36.1-3; App. *Mith.* 84-87; Memnon fr. 38 in Jacoby, *FGH* 2B 365-66. Thus Debevoise op. cit. 70 would seem to be wrong in suggesting that Mithridates and Tigranes approached the king before the battle. It was their overtures after it which caused Lucullus to send ambassadors.

³⁶ Fr. 38.8. The strength of this evidence would therefore seem to contradict Dio's statement (36.3.1-3) that it was with Sinatruces—36.45.3 shows this is who he means by Arsaces—Lucullus negotiated and we must follow Dobais op. cit. 218 n. 4 in rejecting it. Dobais also remarks, "Appien *Mith.* 104 lui aussi, date le changement qui se produisit sur le trône parthe, de l'époque de l'expédition de Pompée seulement." This is perhaps a bit hard on Appian who merely describes Phraates as ἀρτί τὴν Σιντριβικὸν τοῦ πατρὸς ἀρχὴν διαδεδεγμένον a statement which is not really at variance with the evidence of Memnon and Phlegon and does not necessarily have to be interpreted in the way that Dobais does.

In passing, it should be added that there is no merit in the evidence of Ampelius 31 who says Pompey negotiated with Orodes, since he did not become king until around 57 (Debevoise op. cit. 75). It was, however, the king who reminded Crassus of the *foedus Pompei* and it is possible that Ampelius assumed from this that he had actually made the treaty.

following one of the options Lucullus had originally put before him and thus had not really broken the treaty. This theory ignores the fact that, legally speaking, the king was in breach of the treaty by his other alliances and this must have had some weight with the Romans. It also fails to take account of how the Romans, religiously speaking, must have looked on Phraates' action; they felt that those "who attempted to alter a tittle" of the treaty would incur the special enmity of the gods.³⁷ Most of all, Dobais' theory, viewing the matter in comfortable retrospect, fails to take into account how Lucullus in 68 must have viewed the matter. Here he was faced by a king who had performed a sacriligious act by breaching one of the most fundamental clauses in any *foedus amicitiae* and what guarantee had he that the king would not actively aid Rome's enemies in accordance with his treaties with them? It is impossible, therefore, not to conclude that Lucullus held the treaty to be broken both legally and factually speaking. However, the king's neutrality must in time have come to be regarded favourably by the Romans. His lack of action clearly showed that he was not at heart hostile to them and it was thus possible for Pompey to seek a new agreement. It must have been felt that a formal treaty would doubly assure his neutrality and was preferable to having it rest on his goodwill alone. Further, as the clause about Armenia shows, they had not given up hope of getting some active help from him.³⁸

The story of Pompey's *foedus* does not end here for the ink was scarcely dry when complications arose. In 66 Pompey defeated Mithridates and expelled him from Pontus; he then turned his army against Armenia.³⁹ That kingdom was already in an uproar. Tigranes jr. had risen against his father Tigranes Sr.⁴⁰ He had fled to the Parthians and asked for their help. Dio at

³⁷ Flor. 1.46.6, cf. Matthaei op. cit. 190.

³⁸ It has sometimes been suggested that, as a matter of course and without any particular reason, kings renewed their *foedera* with Rome several times during their reign but this theory rests on weak evidence (see the important discussion of Holleaux op. cit. 64-68) and seems to run contrary to the Roman view of the nature of a *foedus* (Matthaei op. cit. 190). But even if we accepted the validity of this theory it need not be invoked here since, as we have tried to show, the *foedus Luculli* had been definitely broken.

³⁹ *MRR* 2.155.

⁴⁰ Dio. 36.50.1.

this point⁴¹ makes a most curious observation: he says that Tigranes jr. persuaded Phraates to invade Armenia, although the king hesitated as to what he should do because of his treaty with Pompey. This is odd to say the least. Why should the king worry about invading Armenia when this was what Pompey had wanted him to do? There are two possible solutions but we must first narrate the rest of this story before we attempt to outline them. Phraates duly invaded Armenia and got as far as Artaxata to which he laid siege. However, when he saw this was likely to prove a lengthy business he retired, leaving part of his force with Tigranes jr. Tigranes sr. now took the field and defeated his son.⁴² Tigranes jr. at first thought of taking refuge with Mithridates but soon realised that he was now in no position to help anyone and so he turned once more to Parthia. Phraates now encouraged him to throw himself on Pompey's mercy for, says Appian, he was mindful of his own friendship with the Roman commander. Tigranes jr., therefore, went over to Pompey, who had by now invaded Armenia, and even acted as his guide.⁴³

Let us now go back to that controversial passage of Dio. One possible solution of the problem is to transport this hesitation of the king's to another place in the narrative sequence of 66-64. In telling us of the events of 64 Dio 37.6.4 narrates the story of another Parthian invasion of Armenia, which is genuine but adds the detail that he was accompanied by Tigranes jr., which is spurious since, as we shall shortly see, the latter was now a prisoner in Roman hands. It is generally held that Dio has confused the details of this invasion with the earlier one and it is thus not outside the bounds of possibility that the story of Phraates' hesitation has been moved from its proper place in this passage where it would certainly make more sense since the Parthian king was now attacking an *amicus populi Romani*.⁴⁴ However, there are a number of objections to this argument. While we certainly know that Dio 37.6.4 is wrong concerning Tigranes jr. we have, unfortunately, no means of confirming our suspicion about Phraates'

⁴¹ 36.51.1.

⁴² Dio 36.51.2; App. *Mith.* 104.

⁴³ Dio 36.51.2-3; App. *Mith.* 104; Plut. *Pomp.* 33.1.

⁴⁴ Dio 36.53.6.

hesitation in Dio 36.51.1. Imputing errors to our source without support from elsewhere is a dangerous business and it becomes even more hazardous when we discover, as we shall shortly, that Dio's reference to Tigranes in 37.6.4 may be plausibly explained without labelling the passage as a doublet of 36.51.1. Further, if it is possible to give an explanation of the king's hesitation in the place where Dio puts it, then the argument for moving it elsewhere is weakened still more.

If we consider that the *foedus* with Pompey had been made almost immediately after the latter's arrival in the East, then is it not strange that Phraates should wait so long before invading Armenia as he had been asked to do so? A certain interval separated the signing of the treaty from the actual invasion. It is, I think, legitimate to infer from this that the Parthians were playing their old game; they wanted Rome's friendship but saw no reason to become involved in her quarrels. Phraates was none too keen on helping Lucullus and he was now showing the same reluctance with Pompey. It is true that the Parthians had claims on part of Armenia, but both now, and later, they preferred to pursue these claims by diplomatic means, if at all possible.⁴⁵ At all costs they seem to have wanted to avoid a clash with Rome or anybody else. Hence Phraates' hesitation even when he did finally agree to invade. Support for his son-in-law⁴⁶ might be a convenient pretext for invasion but Phraates must have realized that Pompey sooner or later meant to invade Armenia and there was a real possibility his troops would clash with the Romans which would be fatal to the *foedus* he prized so much. His other actions are consistent with this view. He pulled out of Armenia when he saw there was a danger his troops would be involved in a long siege since this would bring them into conflict with Pompey when he began his advance.⁴⁷ He also advised Tigranes jr. to make his peace with Pompey, again because of his worry over the *foedus*. Clearly he felt now, and later, some responsibility towards his son-in-law, especially as it was in his own interests in the matter of the disputed territories, but he was not prepared

⁴⁵ See further below.

⁴⁶ Plut. *Pomp.* 33.6.

⁴⁷ Dio 36.52.1-3.

to embroil himself with Rome for his sake.⁴⁸ The rest of the story of these years seem to confirm this thesis.

Pompey, after overrunning Armenia, reconciled Tigranes and his son. The father was restored to his ancestral dominions while the younger received Sophene.⁴⁹ In the next year, 65, Pompey, after further victories over the Albanians and other Caucasian and Colchian peoples,⁵⁰ was met by a Parthian embassy. Phraates was still worried about the *foedus* and well he might. It had already been broken once by the Romans when one of Pompey's officers Gabinius had marched from the Euphrates to the Tigris. In these circumstances he looked for its renewal. He was also upset by the continuing Roman presence in Armenia since he himself had just taken the bold step of occupying Gordyene.⁵¹ It is impossible not to conclude that he had taken this last step at the behest of and—ostensibly at least—in support of his son-in-law Tigranes jr. The young man had fallen foul of Pompey and had been put into chains.⁵² It was after this that we are told⁵³ he μεταξὺ Παρθαίων ἐπεθίξων. This can surely only mean that he appealed to the Parthians to aid him and it seems likely enough that Gordyene was the price he was willing to pay for their help.⁵⁴ It clearly suited the king of Parthia to continue the familial loyalty he had already shown the previous year.

Pompey said nothing to the ambassadors about renewing the

⁴⁸ Debevoise op. cit. 72 n. 8 proposes that we reject as spurious the notice in Dio 36.45.3 where Pompey requires the Parthians to invade Armenia and accept only 36.51.1 as the correct version of events. But, as I have tried to show, it is possible to bring the two passages into accord. Further, we might ask if it is so remarkable that Pompey looked for active aid from the Parthians when Lucullus had done so only a few years previously?

⁴⁹ App. *Mith.* 104; Dio 53.2-4; Plut. *Pomp.* 33.4.

⁵⁰ *MRR* 2.154.

⁵¹ Dio 37.5.2-3; Plut. *Pomp.* 36.2.

⁵² App. *Mith.* 105 and Dio 36.53.3-4 give differing reasons as to why he met with this fate. Plut. *Pomp.* 33.5, after his fashion, offers an abbreviated version of the account in Dio 36.52.4-53.4.

⁵³ App. *Mith.* 105.

⁵⁴ I do not know if any significance is to be attached to the fact that Appian alone among our sources says that Pompey allotted both Gordyene and Sophene to Tigranes jr. while the others assign him only Sophene. On the further remark in Appian that Gordyene went to Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia after Tigranes' disgrace see Debevoise op. cit. 73-74.

treaty. Instead he demanded that the Parthians hand back Gordyene. As the ambassadors had no instructions about this they made no answer, so Pompey wrote a few lines to Phraates and took the opportunity to insult him by addressing him as 'king' instead of by his proper title 'king of kings.' Nor did he bother to wait for a reply but despatched one of his officers Afranius to clear the Parthians out of Gordyene. This task was accomplished without bloodshed since the Parthian king offered no resistance and retreated before the Romans. On his way home Afranius took the opportunity to break the *foedus* once more by passing through Mesopotamia.⁵⁵

Needless to say the matter did not rest there. The Parthian king sent a second set of ambassadors with two requests. Firstly he asked that Tigranes jr. should be handed over to him, as he was his father-in-law. Pompey's reply to this was that the young man belonged to his father and not to his father-in-law. Nor did Phraates obtain much satisfaction when he put his second request. He asked that the Euphrates should be fixed—doubtless by a renewed *foedus*—as the frontier between the two empires but Pompey merely remarked that a just frontier would be settled.⁵⁶ This was too much, even for the conciliatory Phraates. In the spring of 64 he launched an attack on Armenia and, after a preliminary defeat, succeeded in overrunning Gordyene. Our source for this is the controversial passage of Dio, 37.6.4 which we have had reason to discuss earlier. In the light of our delineation of Phraates' constant loyalty to and support for Tigranes jr. it is now possible, perhaps, to suggest that this mention of Tigranes jr. cannot be strictly termed as doublet of 36.51.1. I would suggest that what Dio found in his source was something to the effect that it was in support of Tigranes jr. that Phraates invaded Gordyene. This will not seem altogether implausible if we remember that his previous invasion of that region had been at the young man's behest and if we also recall that a short time before he had tried to pry him from Pompey's clutches. We could then postulate, perhaps, that Dio, confused by the similarity to the invasion mentioned in 36.51.1, mistakenly took his source as meaning

⁵⁵ Dio 37.5.2-5; Plut. *Pomp.* 36.2, 38.2.

⁵⁶ Dio 37.6.3; Plut. *Pomp.* 33.6. The mention of the frontier question in both sources shows they are talking of the same incident.

that Tigranes jr. was actually present in the Parthian army. After this invasion both sides turned once more to Pompey. The Parthians complained about Tigranes sr. and of the treatment they had received from the Romans. At the same time they asked for the *foedus* to be renewed and expressed a willingness to become *socii et amici populi Romani* once more. Tigranes made much of the fact that he was an *amicus* of the Romans and as such deserved their help. Pompey's reply was to send three arbitrators whose decision was accepted by both sides as they recognised that their quarrel would only work to the advantage of their common foe, Rome.⁵⁷

Although we hear of no further contacts between Pompey and the Parthians after the despatch of the arbitrators, we must assume, if the above thesis is correct, that the *foedus* between the two powers was renewed circa 64.⁵⁸ The ancient evidence certainly seems to support this notion. We have already seen that both Orosius and Florus say that the king of Parthia regarded Pompey's treaty as being still valid at the time of Crassus' invasion.⁵⁹ Further, we also have evidence which shows that it was still held to be in force even at the time of the civil war between Caesar and Pompey.⁶⁰

We must now turn to the second part of our task and try to set Pompey's *foedus* and actions within the context of Romano-Parthian relations up to this time. It will be recalled that when the king of Parthia approached Sulla he was preoccupied mainly with one thing. He was, above else, anxious to be on friendly terms with Rome in order to secure his own territories which of course at this time included Armenia as a satellite. As a result of this preoccupation he also, some time later made an alliance with Mithridates and the now powerful Tigranes. As I have previously emphasised this should not be seen as an act of hostility against the Romans but as a logical and necessary move on the part of one who, in his own inter-

⁵⁷ Dio 37.6.5-7.4; Plut. *Pomp.* 39.3; App. *Mith.* 106. On the settlement which was reached see Debevoise op. cit. 75.

⁵⁸ D. Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia minor* (Princeton 1950) vol. 1, 361 and vol. 2, 1228 n. 22 seems to assume that it was only now that Pompey concluded a treaty with Parthia. This cannot be correct.

⁵⁹ Cf. n. 14, 27.

⁶⁰ Justin 42.4.6. Cf. Lucan 8, 218-20, 229-32.

ests and that of his kingdom, wished to establish friendly relations not just with Rome but all major powers in the area who presented a potential threat.

Thirty-odd years later, with a different king on the throne, little has changed. This incumbent, as I have already remarked, pursued the same policies as his predecessors. He allied himself with both sides but showed a marked reluctance to help either. We are specifically told that he felt neutrality to be in his best interests and that the wisest policy for Parthia was to let the Romans and their enemies pursue an evenly balanced struggle, since this would keep them busy and they would have no time to interfere with her.⁶¹ It is true, however, that one new factor, not present in 96, caused him to lapse for a little while from this policy and that factor was Armenia. The Parthians were never reconciled to its independence under Tigranes and the king, tempted by the possibility of reconquest, did momentarily allow himself to be persuaded to aid Lucullus. On maturer reflection, however, he swiftly abandoned this hazardous course and skilfully wriggled out of his commitment. We are nowhere actually told that Sextilius was a spy; all that is said is that the king suspected him of being one. If he really was engaged in espionage then this must have seemed like a heaven-sent opportunity for one who was looking for a let-out. On the other hand, if he was innocent, he was a useful peg on which to hang a charge which would conveniently allow the king to renege on his obligations. Two things are clear: the king did not think it politic to be too closely involved with the Romans and he did not intend to endanger his kingdom by provoking a war with them or anyone else in order to recover Armenia.

And I would maintain that this was precisely the policy he adopted towards Pompey, a policy which had altered little in thirty years. Almost all of Phraates' energies were directed towards the maintenance of friendly relations with Rome. Once he had concluded the treaty Phraates was worried about doing anything contrary to it which might lead to a breach with Rome. And as Roman power grew apace so did Parthian unease. We find that every embassy which Phraates sends to the Romans tries without fail to patch up the broken agreement

⁶¹ Dio 36.3.3.

and have it confirmed once more. So far from invalidating this view of Parthia's anxiety to be on good terms with Rome the history of their entanglement with Armenia serves only to confirm it further. We find Phraates constantly trying to reconcile his obligations to Tigranes jr. and his own territorial claims on the one hand with his desire to avoid provoking Rome on the other. It will be recalled that his first invasion took place only after much hesitancy and that he withdrew when a clash with Rome seemed likely. After the second incursion we find his envoys before Pompey and his troops pull out without a fight when Afranius appears. Further, his last invasion took place finally after he had already sent two embassies to Pompey, only to find himself personally insulted, his request for the renewal of the *foedus* rejected and his demand for return of his son-in-law refused. And even after he had occupied Gordyene, Phraates still sought a peaceful solution to the problem. His ambassadors came to Pompey yet again looking for a renewal of the *foedus* and when arbitration was offered he readily accepted it. If we were to attempt to sum up Parthian foreign policy in those years we would say that it had as one of its main objectives the maintenance or renewal of friendly relations with Rome. Their Armenian policy was rigorously subordinated to this primary aim. Only when all attempts to find a peaceful solution failed did the Parthians turn to war, and then with the greatest reluctance. On the other side it would seem that the policy pursued by Pompey differed little either from that of his predecessors. The Romans, as represented by their commanders, would appear to have been anxious to avoid hostilities with Parthia. Thus, neither Pompey nor those who had gone before him had any mandate from the senate to make war.⁶² And none of the commanders, doubtless realizing full well the difficulties they were likely to involve themselves in⁶³ made any attempt to disobey and seek *gloria* by attacking Parthia.⁶⁴ What successive commanders did do was engage in the fine art of brinkmanship by bullying and insulting the Par-

⁶² App. *Mith.* 106; Dio 37.7.1-2.

⁶³ See sources in previous note.

⁶⁴ It is true that some sources (principally Plut. *Luc.* 30.2) credit Lucullus with the design of an attack on Parthia but Dobais' arguments (op. cit. 231-33) against acceptance of them seem to me to be very persuasive.

thians in order to extract concessions from them but always stopping short of the point at which provocation might lead to war. Thus Sulla insulted the ambassador sent to meet him and Lucullus uttered dire threats against the king. The only difference between Pompey and his predecessors is that he went further than they with his brinkmanship. At the outset of his campaign with matters still uncertain, he was quite prepared to renew the *foedus* but with Mithridates and Tigranes humbled his attitude changed. Pompey had now no real need of Phraates' friendship and so he could see no reason why he should not impress him with the majesty of Rome especially as the king was likely to prove difficult over Armenia. So successive Parthian envoys found the Roman commander haughty and aloof and unprepared to contribute anything of worth to the discussions. Pompey had, however, gauged to a nicety now for it was safe to pursue this policy. The Parthians could endure insults—they must have been used to them from the Romans by now—they would put up with minor and transitory border incursions and they would give up some Armenian territory, if this could be done without too much loss of face. Further than this they could not be pushed and Pompey knew it. When he realised that he had indeed pushed the Parthians to the limit Pompey's policy became more conciliatory. Warned by Phraates' attitude that the high-handed manner had yielded all that it could he did not send his troops a second time to Gordyene but offered mediation, which saved honour on both sides and which he must have known the king would accept.⁶⁵

Thus, in a sense, Pompey's treaty marks the culmination of a period of Romano-Parthian relations, a period in which, despite minor difficulties, both powers managed to co-exist peacefully, a period which was destined to be brought to an abrupt end by the mad adventure of Crassus.

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⁶⁵ Cf. the remarks of Dobais op. cit. 238-39.

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MARCUS AURELIUS AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AT ATHENS

I

THE EFFECT ELSEWHERE OF WHAT MARCUS AURELIUS DID AT ATHENS

Aurelius Victor, *De Caesaribus* 16.12 attributes the universal grant of citizenship to Marcus Aurelius, *Data cunctis promiscue civitas Romana*, but no modern student of the Roman Empire has any difficulty in recognizing that the error arose because Caracalla, the actual author of the *Constitutio Antoniniana*, was called M. Aurelius Antoninus Augustus Pius as if he and his father truly belonged to the family of the Antonines. The epithet Pius or *Eusebēs*,¹ important to all emperors after A.D. 175, did not help Victor, but Ulpian as cited in the *Digest* 1.5.17, Cassius Dio 78.9.5 and P. Gies. 40 I all make it quite clear that the *Constitutio Antoniniana* with the universal grant of citizenship was from Caracalla. Aurelius Victor did not invent the important information about a universal grant of citizenship but made a false inference about the author from the latter's name. He was surprisingly careless but not dishonest.

Similarly, the illustration of Marcus Aurelius' innocence in *De Caes.* 16.9 contains important information disfigured by Aurelius Victor's unnecessary and mistaken inferences. Marcus was so innocent and wise *ut is Marcomannos cum filio Commodo, quem Caesarem suffecerat, petiturus philosophorum turba obtestantium circumfunderetur, ne expeditioni aut pugnae se prius committeret, quam sectarum ardua ac peroculta explana visset*. Everyone knows that Marcus Aurelius did leave Rome to wage war on the Marcomanni in 169 and took his son Commodus along in 178, when his son was already

¹ J. H. Oliver, "The Piety of Commodus and Caracalla," *GRBS* 19 (1978) 375-85.

Augustus. In 169 Commodus was still only Caesar. It is easy to see how Victor could confuse the two occasions. Doubt is certainly possible, though 178 seems much the more likely occasion.²

The modern student is of course astonished to read that the philosophers wished Marcus to settle for them difficult questions which could be called *perocculta* (o) or *occulta* (p). The thought of Epicureans approaching even an emperor who was a Stoic to settle questions of secret doctrine is too absurd for serious contemplation. But that Marcus Aurelius seemed to contemporary philosophers a man of wisdom, mildness, innocence, education (*sapientiae lenitudinis innocentiae ac litterarum fuisse*) and accordingly sympathetic seems to us unobjectionable, in fact highly probable. It is merely what they wanted which in Victor's account is absurd.

Did Victor invent the anecdote? Obviously not, because he cited the anecdote as proof of the innocence of Marcus Aurelius as he defended him against the slander that Marcus had poisoned Lucius Verus. The story about the *turba philosophorum* justified Victor in rejecting the slander; if the story had not been generally known and accepted as true, it would not have served his purpose.

The philosophers sought, not the answers to doctrinal questions, but to questions concerning personal exemptions from liturgies and to questions concerning freedom of the schools as institutions to manage their own affairs and yet to enjoy governmental protection of their endowments. These were the usual problems, the *ardua ac perobscura* which a well intentioned emperor could settle for them, and which Aurelius Victor ignorantly misrepresented as *ardua ac perocculta* questions of dogma.

Why, then, do we hear of it only from Aurelius Victor? Probably because the desiderated rulings never eventuated. Marcus presumably uttered a few words of explanation and admonition but gave no orders and composed no constitution.

Antoninus Pius, the emperor who immediately preceded Marcus Aurelius, had been rather unsympathetic to philoso-

² In his brief and sensible comment A. Birley, *Marcus Aurelius* (Boston-Toronto 1966) 283, n. 1 could, I think, have ignored the suggestion that Aurelius Victor invented the anecdote.

phers in the constitution where he granted immunity to a fixed number of physicians and teachers according to the size of the city (*Digest* 27.1.6.2 and 7). He wrote:

Of philosophers a number has not been specified because the philosophers are rare. But I think that those who are outstandingly rich will voluntarily offer the advantages of their wealth to their ancestral cities; were they to be niggardly with their property, they will from this very fact be already exposed as no philosophers.³

The *turba philosophorum* had been unable to obtain from Marcus Aurelius the favorable settlements they expected. Marcus did not reverse the policy of Antoninus Pius but put them off perhaps with an admonition to behave like genuine philosophers. One could not expect that kind of speech to be preserved in the *Digest*, but it may have inspired the constitution which Commodus, probably the early Commodus still guided by his father's *amici*, finally promulgated, as one infers from *Digest* 27.1.6.8.

Another problem concerned philosophical schools because of a strict regulation which in the writer's opinion went back at Athens to Vespasian rather than Augustus.

The philosophers had received the blame for radical solutions to social problems when revolutions failed, e.g. for Agis and Cleomenes and the Gracchi, and particularly for the revolution at Athens in the time of Mithridates. In their political theories they aroused suspicion among Romans of the Late Republic and Early Principate. Vespasian took an interest in higher education as such, but medicine rather than philosophy was the true beneficiary, though the reestablishment of Successions or their confirmation may have prepared the way, even if these organs reflected suspicion and a desire to control teaching. The real interest in the status and protection of philosophical schools begins with the effort made by Plotina, who had adopted Epicureanism, to free the "friends" from the necessity of always having a Roman citizen as their Successor. She had a well attested influence on Hadrian in regard to the chief center of philosophy, Athens.

³ In general compare V. Nutton, "Two Notes on Immunities," *JRS* 61 (1971) 52-63.

In an article entitled "Arrian in Two Roles"⁴ we connected the new freedom allowed to the Epicurean community (and other Successions at Athens) with the appointment of a new kind of control in Greece, first Plutarch as a procurator with the *ornamenta consularia*, then the "philosopher" Aemilius Juncus *cos.* 127 as *legatus Augusti pro praetore* to the free cities of Greece, then Flavius Arrianus as *ἐπατικὸς φιλόσοφος* (so attested in Athens) under Antoninus Pius. Since the pro-consul of Achaia was a senator of merely praetorian rank, the presence of a consular official in the free cities protected the philosophical schools even from his interference, as well as exerting a possibly restraining influence on the philosophical schools.⁵

Under Marcus Aurelius there seems to have been no continuation of this kind of separate control. Although the brothers Quintilii, both consulars, combined the offices of pro-consul of Achaia and corrector of the free cities as a board of two undifferentiated and equal colleagues, they had in these troubled times more serious worries than the philosophical schools. The first impression is that the philosophical schools were left pretty much to themselves, until Marcus reorganized the cultural administration of Athens, founded chairs and established the Sacred Gerusia with estates of its own.

It seems that in A.D. 176, after embassies and negotiations, the Sacred Gerusia was established to support the cult of Athena at Athens⁶ and to judge the suitability of candidates for the new professorships of philosophy which Marcus Aurelius

⁴ *Hesperia* Suppl. XX (1981)

⁵ The later distinction between Achaia and Graecia (*GRBS* 21 [1980] 75-80) may have owed much to this policy of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius. The distinction between Achaia (= usually the Roman province) and Achaea (= the territory of the Achaeans League) is obscured by R. J. Penella, "Eutropius 5.6.1: *Athenae, civitas Achaiae*," *AJP* 101 (1980) 447f., who did not cite or even read *GRBS* 21 (1980) 75-80, where the distinction is explained by Oliver, but the point which Penella tries to make is, I think, a valid one. Mithridates, who invaded whole districts, invaded a second continent when he sent Archelaus to Achaia (not Achaea). This is the old use of 'Achaia' to mean 'Greece.'

⁶ In addition to the material collected by the writer in *The Sacred Gerusia* (*Hesperia* Suppl. VI, 1941) see J. H. Oliver, *Marcus Aurelius . . .* (*Hesperia* Suppl. XIII, 1970) 84f. on the purpose and date, and S. Follet, *Athènes au II^e et au III^e siècle* (Paris 1976) 140f.

actually founded in 176 with salaries to be paid by the fiscus.⁷ The presidency of the court which selected the philosophers who were the first incumbents was assigned to Herodes Atticus, and this fact increases the interest of a passage (*Noctes Atticae* 9.2) in which Aulus Gellius reports the contempt of Herodes Atticus for mendicant philosophers. Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.19.24 and 28 and other writers of the second century, particularly Lucian, criticized philosophers who in their conduct belied their profession. Against the background of many false philosophers in the second century as well as a rich philosophical tradition the petitions which came to Antoninus Pius and then to Marcus Aurelius from individuals and schools may easily be visualized.

In 176, however, the emperor did something special for philosophers, not everywhere, but at the old home of philosophy, Athens, the intellectual capital of the East. Hopes elsewhere undoubtedly rose as a consequence, and it is no surprise that in 178 the emperor's decision to undertake personally a dangerous war left many expectant philosophers in a state of shock. A *turba philosophorum* besieged him, apparently in vain.


Since this siege by excited philosophers took place in or near Rome, we may safely infer that he admonished them in Latin. Though his words have not come down, we may ask ourselves if the curious Latin words in a Greek epitaph at Athens are not an echo, since reverberations from what Marcus Aurelius said would surely have been felt in Athens. The epitaph, whether or not it contains an echo, is an interesting document, which in the writer's opinion reflects controversies of the second century about the behavior of true philosophers and the leadership of philosophical communities.

II

EPITAPH OF A PHILOSOPHER AT ATHENS

A columnar grave monument with lettering of a hand unrecognizable at Athens cannot be easily dated, but the letters are

⁷ The four (or less likely eight) professorships represented the four main schools of philosophy. The evidence and the scholarly discussion since 1908 are reviewed and criticized by the writer in *Marcus Aurelius* . . . 80-84.



not unlike those of monuments elsewhere from the third century after Christ. J. Kirchner, who placed it "aetatis infimae," first published it among the addenda on p. 887 of "pars tertia, fasciculus posterior" (1940) as *IG* II² 11606a. It was republished by M. N. Tod, "A Teetotaller's Epitaph," *Hermathena* 77 (1951) 20-24 (cf. J. and L. Robert, *Bull. ép.* 1954, no. 100), then by W. Peek, *Griechische Vers-Inschriften* (Berlin 1955) no. 1841. We can best present the problems by reproducing the drawing from *IG*.

ΟΙΚΙΤΙΣΩΔΕ
ΗΡΑΚΛΙΟΣ
ΥΔΡΟΠΟΤΗΣ
ΖΩΝΤΩΝΦΙ
⁵ΦΛΟΣΔΟΥΚΑ
ΤΟΡΘΑΝΩΝ
ΟΥΔΕΙΣ.

As Tod recognized, there are two possible interpretations of *τις*. It could be indefinite as Tod preferred, or it could be interrogative with a question mark after *ὡδε*. Peek (like the Roberts) chose the latter and included the epitaph among the "Dialog-Gedichte." The word *ὕδροπότης* emphasizes the ascetic character of the deceased. The fourth line begins *ζῶν τῶν*, not *ζώντων*, because the word *θανών* requires the contrast *ζῶν*.⁸ In life he was a man of importance but in death a nobody. The emendation *τῶν φι(λων)* occurred to Hiller von Gaertringen but was rejected by Kirchner in favor of *φι* for 500. Tod, Peek and the writer cannot accept the iota of *φι* as a mark indicating a numeral. We return to von Hiller's interpretation, which at Athens makes the deceased a member of some philosophical sect. In *IG* II² 1099 the dowager empress Plotina writes to her fellow-Epicureans *Πλωτεῖνα Σεβαστῇ πᾶσι τοῖς φίλοις χαίρειν*.

Kirchner and later Peek (but not Tod, who emended *ζῶν τῶν φι{φ}λ(ων)δουκάτορ*) interpreted the letters *ΦΛΟΣ*: as the Latin word *flos*. We too accept this, and consequently, the curious presence of two Latin words (*flos ducator*) to explain as well as the incomplete engraving of the word *φι(λων)*. The loss of the last three letters of *φιλων* can be understood as inadvertence by

⁸ For the contrast between life and death see Richmond Lattimore, *Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs* (Illinois Studies 28, Urbana 1942) 177 and Timothy E. Gregory, *GRBS* 20 (1979) 272 and 269, no. 13.

the stonecutter as he began a new line. Though overlooked in the cutting, the last three letters may have been painted on. Of the two Latin words the first is supported by the parallel *ἀνθος ἐταίρων* in *IGUrbRomae* 1217, and should not be disputed, but for both of them to be immediately recognizable they must have been familiar to the friends from the Latin wording of something like a memorable speech or grant of privileges to philosophers.⁹ The friends could not be expected to respond to words chosen at random from Latin literature or to be face-tious on a gravestone.¹⁰

Peek no. 1841 reads as follows:

οἱκί τις ὧδε; / — Ἡράκλειος / ὑδροπότης, /
ζῶν τῶν φι(λῶν) / φιλῶς, δουκάτορ, θανῶν / οὐδείς.

With this arrangement the epitaph consists of two senarii, the second stichus certainly a senarius, the first also if one lengthens the last syllable of the name.¹¹ Since senarii are common, the meter ought to be right, even though the rare word *ducator*, studied by Tod, led him apparently nowhere. Tod, a teetotaller, who welcomed Heraclius as a member of a total abstinence society, thought that the word *δουκάτορ* probably indicated the presidency, but he expressed surprise in n. 4 at this curious designation, when *προστάτης* would have done just as well or even better. On the other hand, the Athenian society of the Iobacchi¹² had a priest as chief officer. We do

⁹ Compare V. Nutton, "Two Notes on Immunities: *Digest* 27, 1, 6, 10 and 11," *JRS* 61 (1971) 52-63 with bibliography.

¹⁰ Usages like Plautus, *Cas.*, prol. 18, *ea tempestate flos poetarum fuit*, as cited in *TLL*, s.v. *flos* B 2, or Catullus 84.1, *O qui flosculus es Iuventiorum*, are worth citing for the meaning but were not likely to have influenced the Athenian composer of the epitaph. For the right environment see rather the famous speech of the emperor Claudius to the senate on the tablet at Lyons, *ILS* 212, col. II, 1-4: *Sane novo m[ere] et divus Aug[ustus av]onc[ulus m]eus et patruus Ti. Caesar omnem florem ubique coloniarum ac municipiorum, bonorum scilicet virorum et locupletium, in hac curia esse voluit.*

¹¹ Leslie Threaght, "Unmetrical Spellings in Attic Inscriptions," *California Studies in Classical Antiquity* 10 (1978) 169-94, says on p. 183, "The treatment of proper names in epigraphical verse texts has special difficulties." It is particularly amusing to see how the difficulty was handled by the author of *IGUrbRomae* 1189.

¹² *IG* II² 1368, studied particularly by M. N. Tod, *Sidelights on Greek History* (Oxford 1932) 85-93.

not believe in the total abstinence society and its president, because we interpret the word ὕδροπότης as suitable for a philosopher. For the connection between the profession of philosophy and the drinking of water instead of wine one may cite Lucian, *Bis Accusatus* 16, where Academy, who converts Polemon to philosophy, ὕδροποτεῖν τε (αὐτὸν) κατηνάγκασεν καὶ νήφειν μετεδίδασκεν. In *MAMA* VII 96 at Laodicea Combusta a member of the Encratite sect has composed an epitaph which concludes, εἰ δέ τις τῶν οἰν[ο]ποτῶν ἐπενβάλη εἴσχι πρὸς τὸν Θ(εο)ν καὶ Ἰη(σο)ῦ(ν) Χ(ριστό)ν.

The Latin word *ducator* may be hard to support by an exact parallel, but it can be understood, I think, through its implied opposite *sectatores*, which brings to mind the term *secta* often used of a philosophical community as by Plotina in her Latin letter to Hadrian, which forms part of *IG* II² 1099 published on stone at Athens. The true meaning of *ducator* in a philosophical context is surely "one who inspired a following of *sectatores*." It should be distinguished from *educator*, a term which has recently turned up in an Ostian inscription of A.D. 200,¹³ wherein a certain P. Calpurnius Princeps is described as *equo publico donatus, omnibus honoribus functus, educator*. The designation *educator* clearly commanded respect. The man was prominent in three spheres: in the Roman citizenship, in the municipal life of Ostia, and in a third environment which may have been that of a philosophical sect.¹⁴ Nevertheless, in the Heraclius epitaph at Athens an emendation <ῆ>δουκάτορ could not be defended; quite apart from metrical considerations the loss of the eta could not be easily explained like that of the three last letters of φίλων, and two errors of omission would be much more serious than one.

If the first determination, that Heraclius was a philosopher, one of the friends who formed a society living according to some recognized set of principles, is right, it follows that he represented the flower of the group, or, to express it as the

¹³ Inscription cited by J. H. D'Arms, *AJP* 97 (1976) 393.

¹⁴ The student of Roman Athens will think of *IG* II² 3704, where T. Flavius Glaucus describes himself as ποιητής καὶ ῥήτωρ καὶ φιλόσοφος and a kinsman as φιλοσόφων καὶ ὑπατικῶν καὶ Ἀσ[τ]ραρχῶν ἔκγονον καὶ ἀπόγονον, the latter a reference to the triple distinction of Greek Culture, Roman political life and Asiarchy. Plutarch might have been honored at Chaeronea with a tricolon like that for Princeps at Ostia.

dowager empress Plotina expressed it in the above mentioned epistle to all the friends (*IG* II² 1099), he was one of τῶν διαφέρειν δοξάντων κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν λό[γ]ω[ν] τ[ῶν] [ῥήμ]ετέρων καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὴν διάθεσ[ιν] τ[ῶν] [ῥήθ]ῶν ὑπεροχῇ, “those who win recognition as outstanding in the power of our doctrines and, accordingly, in the superiority of their own moral condition.”

Heraclius was a fine flowering of what a philosopher should be (*flos*), a model for *sectatores* to follow (*ducator*). For the latter idea many occurrences of the word *secta* are worth citing, but three will suffice: Cicero, *Cael.* 17.40, *nos, qui hanc sectam rationemque vitae, re magis quam verbis, secuti sumus*; Cicero, *Brut.* 31, *quo magis tuum, Brute, iudicium probo, qui eorum philosophorum sectam secutus es*; Quintilian 5.13.59, *inter duos diversarum sectarum velut duces*.

To summarize our opinion, the epitaph is a very interesting one because it contains two non-technical Latin words. If these two words had been technical terms, the reason for their use would probably have been obvious, but as it is, the words have to be explained both for their meaning and their selection.¹⁵ The meaning, we think, has been demonstrated. Why they were selected can only be conjectured. There is some evidence, and we have offered a conjecture in conformity therewith. The epitaph of Heraclius reflects impressive words (of Marcus Aurelius?) in Latin.

III

THE ORGANISATION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AT ATHENS, A.D. 75–235

After the two preceding sections were submitted to the editor, Georg Luck drew the writer's attention to the important book of John Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London 1977), which has a chapter V on “The Athenian School in the Second Century A.D.,” where it is said on p. 233;

¹⁵ Another matter of interest is the way the Latin words are spelled in the Greek script. The composer rendered the “u” of *ducator* with *ov*, which is normal, but the long “o” of *flos* with omicron rather than omega. A Latin epitaph at Athens in Greek script for comparison may be found in *Hesperia* 10 (1941) 244-46, no. 44.

In A.D. 176 (Dio Cassius LXXII, 31) the Emperor Marcus Aurelius established at Athens four Chairs of Philosophy, in Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism and Epicureanism, endowing each with an annual salary of 10,000 drachmae. Herodes Atticus was given the task of appointing the first incumbents (Philostratus VS 566); after that they were appointed by 'the vote of the best citizens' (Lucian, *Eunuchus* 2), a vague phrase, perhaps denoting a special committee, perhaps the Areopagus. Lucian, in the sketch just mentioned, gives a most amusing account of the election to the Chair of Peripatetic Philosophy in about A.D. 179. After 176, then, we may assume that the leading Platonist in Athens is holder of the Chair of Platonic Philosophy.

We may start with Lucian, *Eunuchus* 2. The speaker reports that two philosophers had been arguing but not about doctrines. ὁμόδοξοι γὰρ ἄμφω καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων. δίκη δὲ ὁμῶς συνειστήκει καὶ δικασταὶ ψηφοφοροῦντες ἦσαν οἱ ἀριστοὶ καὶ πρεσβύτατοι καὶ σοφώτατοι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἐφ' ὧν ἂν τις ἡδέσθῃ παρὰ μέλος τι φθεγζάμενος, οὐχ ὅπως ἐς τοσαύτην ἀναισχυντίαν τραπόμενος.

By substituting *Eunuchus* 3, "the vote of the best citizens," for *Eunuchus* 2, Dillon has concealed the fact that the real choice of this, the second appointee (the first being the Platonist) was made by a special court of good and wise elders, surely the Sacred Gerusia consisting of sacred elders (*ἱεροὶ γέροντες*) and familiar to all students of Roman Athens from other inscriptions and from eleven imperial letters engraved on marble.¹⁶ It was founded in or about A.D. 176 in order to support the cult of Athena, chief deity of Athens and goddess of wisdom.

We turn next to the statement of Philostratus, VS 566-7 (73 Kayser), which runs as follows in Wright's Loeb translation: "Marcus assigned to Herodes the task of choosing the Platonic philosophers and the Stoics, Peripatetics and Epicureans, but this man (sc. Theodotus professor of rhetoric) he himself chose," etc. This means that Marcus assigned the philosophical candidates to Herodes and took the rhetorical candidates for himself, obviously in an effort to achieve the greatest im-

¹⁶ See n. 6 above.

partiality and fairness. We may ask ourselves what kind of officer Herodes was supposed to be. In some Roman courts a presiding officer merely presided; in other courts the magistrate, who alone had *imperium* and *iurisdictio*, gave orders but was expected to have a *consilium* of knowledgeable advisers. It was inexcusable for a magistrate to reach a decision like Verres without consulting his own *consilium*. Roman decisions were often published with a list of the advisers, because a judge wished, not to give credit to friends, but to take credit for caution.

As for Dillon's suggestion that Lucian, *Eunuchus* 2 (read "3") denotes "perhaps a special committee, perhaps the Areopagus" (rather than the Sacred Gerusia), a now famous edict or letter of Marcus Aurelius was at this time demanding a purge of unworthy members of the Areopagus,¹⁷ which, accordingly, cannot enter into consideration.

How was the annual salary of 10,000 drachmae for each professor handled? It was not up to the imperial secretary *a rationibus* to make sure in the future that the professor was paid on time each year. Estates were transferred immediately from the fiscus to the Sacred Gerusia to support festivals, professorial salaries, etc.¹⁸ The imperial letters contain references to a local imperial procurator and to estates of the Gerusia. They remained at the disposal of the Gerusia, presumably until the reign of Maximinus Thrax, who confiscated endowments.

The following sections of Dillon's chapter are devoted to the literarily attested philosophers Nicostratus, Calvenus Taurus, Atticus (no relation of Herodes Atticus),¹⁹ Harpocraton of

¹⁷ *Hesperia* Suppl. XIII (1970), no. 1 and S. Follet, *Rev Phil* 53 (1979) 29-43.

¹⁸ On how endowments were founded and protected see B. Laum, *Stiftungen in der griechischen und römischen Antike* (Leipzig-Berlin 1914); J. H. Oliver, *The Ruling Power* (Trans. Amer. Philos. Soc. 43/4, 1953) 963-79; K. J. Rigsby, "Am Imperial Letter at Balbura," *AJP* 100 (1979) 401-7; P. Herrman, "Kaiserliche Garantie für private Stiftungen," *Studien zur antiken Sozialgeschichte: Festschrift Friedrich Vittinghoff* (Köln-Wien 1980) 339-56.

¹⁹ On p. 248 Dillon writes: "'Atticus' is a rather curious name to be borne by an Athenian, if indeed Atticus was an Athenian. It is possible that he was connected with the great house of Herodes Atticus." 'Atticus' is a more common name than he thinks in the epigraphical indexes of *Hesperia* and *The Athenian Agora* XV. The philosopher is equally likely to be a non-Athenian like Calvenus Taurus.

Argos, and a certain Severus. As far as I know, none of these is attested as diadoch and none even appears in an Attic inscription.

Without claiming that the schools at the Academy and Lyceum still existed in this period²⁰ we admit that *studia* or *διατριβαί* specializing in this or that branch of philosophy or rhetoric, *οἱ περὶ Ταῦρον*, etc., flourished. Even *diadochoi* are well known, first the diadoch par excellence, e.g. Flavius Menander of the Flavian and Trajanic periods²¹ and Varius Caelianus of the Hadrianic period.²²

Secondly, since the Stoics and Epicureans tended to remain apart, there had to be special *diadochoi* for them, e.g. the *διάδοχος Στω[ικός]* T. Coponius Magnus of Hagnous perhaps in the Trajanic period,²³ Julius Zosimianus, *τὸν διάδοχον τῶν ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος λόγων*, non-Athenian, dated sometime in the second century,²⁴ and Aurelius Eurycleides of Eupyridae, *τὸν διάδοχο[v] τῶν ἀπὸ Ζήνωνο[ς] λόγων* known from two inscriptions which postdate A.D. 125.²⁵ The Epicurean *diadochus Athenis* Popillius Theotimus appears in Plotina's above mentioned, famous dossier of *IG II² 1099*, and reference to *δι[αδοχῆς] τῶν Ἐπι[κουρ]-* in another Hadrianic document.

In the present state of our knowledge it is entirely possible that the three *διαδοχαί* ceased to exist in 176 (or 174) with the cultural reorganisation of Athens by Marcus Aurelius. In that case a new *διαδοχή Πλάτωνος* was founded in the fourth century with the establishment of a new endowment.

After 176 a local official appears at Athens with the title *ὁ ἐπὶ τοῦ Μουσείου*, known from *Hesperia* Suppl. XIII (= Oliver,

²⁰ Dillon discounts the Academy; J. P. Lynch, *Aristotle's School* (Berkeley 1972) the Lyceum.

²¹ His son, Flavius Pantaenus, priest of the Philosophical Muses, built and adorned a library, which he dedicated to Athena Polias, the emperor Trajan and the city of the Athenians (*HTHR* 72 [1979] 157-60). The library was not just for Platonists or Aristotelians.

²² The material on Caelianus has been brought together in my article, "The *Diadochē* at Athens under the Humanistic Emperors," *AJP* 98 (1977) 160-78, but on p. 176 I should have used and cited A. E. Raubitschek on the reference to the *apokēryxis* of Themistocles, "Die Verstossung des Themistokles," *Hermes* 84 (1956) 500f.

²³ *IG II² 3571*.

²⁴ *IGII² 11551*.

²⁵ *IG II² 3801 and 3989*.

Marcus Aurelius . . .), no. 20 on pp. 105-7. This man, Cassianus Antiochus qui et Synesius, was also archon of the Panhellenes, certainly one of the highest ranking men in the Greek world. His date falls in the Severan period, and his wife bore the congenial name *Ἀντωνία ἡ καὶ Σωκρατική*.

In the present state of our knowledge nothing prevents us from speculating whether *ὁ ἐπὶ τοῦ Μουσείου* took the place of the three *diadochoi* (and the emperor's representative) after 176.

The organisation of the Platonic Academy in the fourth century may have been very different from the organisation of philosophical schools in the second century after Christ. In the fourth century the students gathered around one outstanding Platonist who was the recognized successor (*διάδοχος*) of Plato. He taught Platonism himself, encouraged students, and represented the interests of the philosophical community. It is natural to think that he derived his functions in some way from the main (non-differentiated) diadoch of the second century after Christ, but it cannot be proved that the diadoch of the first and second centuries was always the outstanding Platonist or teacher of philosophy in the Athens of his time. Apparently Varius Caelianus was a teacher, but others may have been chosen for their familiarity with the Philosophical Muses, yes, but also or even more for their ability to defend the material endowment and the library in a Roman court of law. The dowager empress Plotina's ideal diadoch may have won out as everyone's choice in the fourth century without having emerged on all occasions in the second.

The Latin translations of a commercial man's Greek *Expositio Totius Mundi et Gentium* dated around 359/60 speak of Athens having particularly *studia* and historical monuments and the Acropolis.²⁶ The *studia* may have formed some loosely knit "università degli studi" after 176 but there were other Athenian centers of higher learning which, before 176, preferred to remain quite independent.

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²⁶ J. H. Oliver, "Achaia, Greece, and Laconica," *GRBS* 21 (1980) 75-80.

REVIEWS

FRANK J. FROST. *Plutarch's Themistocles: A Historical Commentary*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980. Pp. xiii + 252. \$17.50.

With A. J. Podlecki's *The Life of Themistocles* (1975) and Frank Frost's new commentary on Plutarch's *Life*, the study of Themistocles and the critical period before and after the Persian Wars has been put on a new footing. Both consider the Themistocles tradition, are comprehensive in approach, and make good research tools. Where Podlecki synthesized and surveyed the literary and archaeological evidence for the purposes of his own reconstruction, Frost marshalls the evidence analytically to allow others to sort out the problems that emerge from scrutinizing a text. He has done us a service, for Plutarch's *Life of Themistocles* has long needed a commentary.

This volume contains seven chapters, a list of frequently used editions (of which the generally available Loeb is not one), a judiciously selected bibliography, and an index of proper names. The two opening chapters introduce the literary tradition about Themistocles and the subject of Plutarch as biographer and historian. The remaining chapters, the commentary proper, divide the *Life* under five headings: Themistocles' pre-war career (Plut. *Them.* 1-5), Xerxes' invasion (*Them.* 6-11), Salamis (*Them.* 12-17), the hero's triumph and decline (*Them.* 18-23), and his flight and exile (*Them.* 24-32). Two maps show the Aegean basin and the straits of Salamis, and the genealogy of Themistocles' family is illustrated schematically.

The discussion of the literary tradition centers, of course, on the fifth and fourth centuries. Frost has not convinced me of all his views about the fifth century, though the minor writers come off well; he is persuasive on the fourth century, and incomplete on the later Hellenistic tradition. The reader should watch for the author's methodological assumptions. For example, he outlines what Herodotus and Thucydides say, but not all will agree that "in general, both writers were more interested in events than in ideas" (18). In particular, students of the so-called post-modernist Thucydides may be surprised that "Thucydides' belief in the general's foresight is further revealed in the speech of the Athenian answering the Corinthian accusations at Sparta" (11). We should not identify Thucydides' belief with any one speaker's opinion, and elsewhere (1.138.3) Thucydides seems to caricature Themistocles: οὔτε προμαθῶν . . . οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἐπιμαθῶν dramatically restricts both his οἰκεία ξύνοσις and the verb προεώρα. Thucydidean *pronoia*, the providential virtue of statesmen, is not attributed to Themistocles who, presumably, operated more on intuition than *pronoia*, more on insight than informed foresight. His skill lay in guesswork and improvisation; he had no controlling view of

society. It is also not true, then, that "because of the historian's style, it was almost impossible to misunderstand him" (13).

The fourth-century tradition is better examined and I like the division into philosophical and political theorists with Ephorus in a category by himself. As evidence, however, that after the death of Pericles the *dēmos* first chose non-aristocratic leaders, I would not cite *Ath. Pol.* 28.1 without noting Eupolis fr. 117 (K) to the same effect. For, as Frost knows (86), comedy may leave its imprint in written history.

The treatment of the Hellenistic literature, however, has a major gap because the so-called *Letters of Themistocles* are not mentioned. Frost had alluded to them earlier, but only to doubt that the epistles drew systematically on Hellanicus' *Atthis* or any other single source. Yet, more than our other evidence, these letters illustrate the rhetorical exercises with which Frost repeatedly characterizes the Hellenistic classroom. Nor does he use the Second Sophistic here as more than a label for these same exercises and schoolrooms. These fictitious letters demonstrate how Plutarch's near contemporaries could rationalize and romanticize Themistocles' career, and so they could abet us in understanding both Plutarch and the Second Sophistic. Moreover, for the latter part of the *Life* (acknowledged as the Themistocles romance), the letters will be used about a dozen times. They sometimes lend support (188, 194, 205), sometimes expand the discussion (156, note 42; 193), and sometimes are exposed as incongruous (204, 206, 213). A clear statement of how they should be used would have facilitated our own musings.

The analysis of the literary tradition informs much of the book and the author might have added details to the non-literary evidence and traditions (cp. 37-38) that probably influenced the literateurs. The Themistocles Decree would have a place here. Its present text had a reciprocal relationship with oratory, as we know, and Frost also knows that Plutarch followed either the decree or a source that did (117f.). Social institutions in various cities, known to both Plutarch and Frost, emphasized the hero and his legend, cp. the annual festival of Lampsacus (which Themistocles had held "for wine") and the hereditary rights there of one line of his descendants (220), the oracle of Dodonaean Zeus that probably represents a lost popular tradition (217), and the hereditary honors of Plutarch's old school chum, the Stoic Themistocles of Athens (235). (My favorite example, not cited by Frost, is the case of C. Iulius Nicanor who was hailed at Athens [IG II² 3788] as "the new Themistocles." He probably led the Greek team and won—as he should have!—the re-created Battle of Salamis during Augustus' great *naumachia* at Rome in 2 B.C. At Athens, for many years thereafter, the Athenian ephebes also re-enacted this battle.) Surely these phenomena affected what was thought and written about Themistocles especially in popular literature. An historian, compelled to speculate at length about Plutarch's humanity and contemporaneity (46), ought to have a considerable opinion about these matters as well.

Frost's fondness for Plutarch shows in his portrait of the man: Plutarch is an educated gentleman, traveller, and essayist with a faulty, but still enviable, memory. For these reasons, Frost distinguishes Plutarch as biographer, not as historian, and equips us (55-59) with a few rules for reading the *Lives*: (a) as Plutarch's familiarity with an author or data increases, so does his casualness in using the data; (b) Plutarch has read, at some time, every author he cites; (c) we should know his opinion of sources he names; (d) when he names none, we should not name them for him; (e) every *Life* is different and no passage should be quoted out of context (however large or small that may be); and (f) we must not forget Plutarch's habit of free association. This discussion is full; I would only add Alan Wardman's *Plutarch's Lives* (1974) to the recent scholarship on Plutarch (40).

The commentary is what it claims—historical and designed for advanced students and scholars. The beginner will not find help with his Greek nor will the palaeographer find much space given to the *topoi* of his subdiscipline. Although any work, ancient or modern, produced in the manner of Plutarch will have questionable usages and misspelled or misused words, Frost digresses on textual matters only when an historical point is at stake or when it shows Plutarch at work. (This last interest is a *Leitmotiv* throughout the book.) The commentary lays out the basic issues and indicates the most important *testimonia* and recent discussions. Extensive footnotes have additional references to ancient and modern works. Though the author's own views naturally find expression here, he is not polemical.

The five chapters of commentary (chs. 3-7) break at natural divisions in Plutarch's narrative. The knottier problems posed by the subject get attention and, in emphasizing the ancient *testimonia*, Frost rightly balances the historical with the historiographical. (The latter can never be far from this reviewer's mind because of the impact made by the introductory chapters. Another user of the commentary, not reading from front to back, might be less affected.) There is enough detailed exposition of the Herodotean material used in both this *Life* and Plutarch's *De Herodoti Malignitate* to provide a firm basis for a careful study of the historical and the merely historiographical in Plutarch's conception.

At suitable points important excursuses treat matters omitted or obscured by Plutarch: the conflicting chronological traditions on which he drew, the events of the archon year 493/2, the *ostracophoriae*, the chronology of the Salamis campaign, that campaign itself and the evidence for it, the downfall of the statesman, and the Themistocles romance. On familiar cruxes like political movements in Themistocles' Athens or the perennial questions of chronology, no one's opinion will win universal approval, but Frost proceeds with caution.

My reservations are few. An *index locorum* would be too cumbersome, but more cross-referencing within the commentary would have helped. Frost believes the Themistocles Decree belongs essentially to the fifth century and his various discussions of it can be found handily

in the index under its mover's name. If, on the other hand, a scholar, worried about Themistocles' early life, looks for the date of his (first?) marriage, he will be shortchanged. Cross-references point in neither direction between ch. 3 where the basic discussion of Themistocles' young manhood occurs and ch. 5 (144) where Hdt. 8.75, the firmest evidence of the date, is mentioned incidentally in this connection. Unless one already knows the extraneous name of Sicinnus and this obscure use of Hdt. 8.75 (!), only accident will find the reference in this commentary.

Frost prints no text of the *Life*, and so when he repeats or paraphrases Plutarch's information, it is useful. Only once (126), and even then on a small point, does he unquestionably misrepresent the Greek. At *Them.* 11.1 Themistocles was not afraid that Aristides would go over to the barbarian; rather, he perceived that the Athenians feared this.

Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery and this author shows his appreciation of Plutarch by a professional *mimesis*. As Plutarch can be the tourist taking day trips from a resort town to visit historical sites (100), Frost speaks of motoring on the Corinth-Athens highway (149) and feeling the numinous near the Temple of Artemis Proseoa (110). We find Frost in other Plutarchean poses. He notices Themistocles' mistake about the wildest colts making the best horses (69), gives his personal, but incomplete, view about oracles (100), comments on the proclivities of pigeons (132), criticizes the *Los Angeles Times* for believing the absurd about Themistocles (133), and knows about the average speeds of modern sailing yachts (164). Perhaps the most Plutarchean touch of all is the quotation from Cavafy's *Sa-trapeia* with which the book concludes. All this is good fun and enlivens the commentary.

When Professor Frost closed this manuscript in April 1977 in Athens, he had concluded a much interrupted project that began fourteen years before in New York City. To judge from the result, his effort was worth our waiting.

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R. G. M. NISBET and MARGARET HUBBARD. *A Commentary on Horace: Odes, Book II*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1978. Pp. xvi + 355. \$29.95.

Nisbet and Hubbard's commentary on *Odes* II is clearly a major piece of classical scholarship and an important contribution to the corpus of Horatian criticism. Especially in the English-speaking world, it joins its sister-volume on *Odes* I as the most detailed and useful commentary available. Aimed at a purely professional audi-

ence, grand in both scope and comprehensiveness, it provides handy bibliographies for each of the twenty Odes of Book II, as well as elaborate examinations of major critical disputes concerning such issues as interpretation, textual reading, colometry. N-H frequently offer thought-provoking alternatives of their own, or revive older theories which have fallen into disuse. One of the commentary's greatest strengths is the care that its authors take to delineate the literary traditions within which a given poem is set. Classical Greek and Hellenistic antecedents, influences by and upon fellow Roman poets (e.g. Lucretius, Catullus, Virgil, Propertius), philosophical ethos (e.g. Stoic, Epicurean, Peripatetic) of a particular poem, and specific parallels in diction and thought are richly cited. Perhaps most importantly in this regard, N-H are careful not to lose sight of the forest for the trees: catalogues of parallels generally do not stand on their own, but lead into thoughtful discussions of the poet's clever and original remolding of diverse traditions into a uniquely Horatian unity. N-H's treatment of *Odes* 2.5 (*Nondum subacta*) may be taken as exemplary of this sort of analysis. The basic topic is traced back to classical Greek lyric (Anacreon's *πῶλε Θρηκίη* [fr. 417]); the complication of the original topic by hints of at least two others (the reproach to a disdainful woman and the self-consolation, "I-could-do-better") is examined; Sapphic and Catullan parallels are noted; the movement of the poem "from the iambic to the elegiac mood"—i.e. to "the artificial, amoral world of Hellenistic poetry" (p. 79)—is perceptively analyzed and seen to give the Ode affinities with the world of the *Epodes*.

Another primary critical concern of the commentary has clearly been to explicate the "sharp verbal wit" (p. 255) of Horace. Individual niceties of diction, especially those revealing Horace's penchant for oxymoron, are noted in abundance.¹ N-H's notes on the first eight lines of *Odes* 2.9 (*Non semper imbres*) may stand as a more extended example of their careful attention to the subtleties of Horatian diction: after perceptively noting that "Horace's elaborate imagery is particularly suited to a neoteric [the elegist Valgius] who may have found pathetic fallacies congenial" (p. 137), they proceed to a series of notes (e.g. on *imbres*, *manant*, *vexant*, *stat glacies iners*, *laborant*, *viduantur orni*) which pick out the double application of these words to nature (the lines' explicit subject) and to the mental upheaval of the poem's addressee.

A further virtue of the commentary is their refreshing admonition against an overly solemn reading of Horace's poetry. Pointing continually to the poet's ironic, witty, and often deliciously mock-

¹ See, e.g., on *Aequam memento rebus in arduis* (2.3.1): "there is a characteristic verbal contrast between the 'even' mind and 'uphill' circumstances"; or on *laborat . . . trepidare* (2.3.11-12): "[*trepidare*] makes a pointed contrast with *laborat* ('is at pains to scurry'), and is significantly placed in the swifter decasyllable."

grandiose *persona*, they analyze sensitively and persuasively the humor (in one sense or another) of several poems in Bk. 2. These include *Odes* 2.4 (*Ne sit ancillae*: I especially like their interpretation of the *renuntatio amoris* at the end of the poem as maliciously hypocritical); 2.6 (*Septimi Gadis*); 2.8 (*Ulla si iuris*); 2.9 (*Non semper imbres*); 2.13 (*Ille et nefasto*: their catalogue of the humorous literary traditions of the first half of this poem is especially helpful); and, to an extent, 2.17 (*Cur me querellis*). They correctly deny to 2.19 (*Bacchum in remotis*) the sort of extremely serious, Romanticizing interpretation it often receives.

On the other hand, the virtues of the commentary are to an extent tempered by corresponding flaws. Comprehensiveness mounts to turgidity; sensitivity yields to overinterpretation. Nisbet and Hubbard have, I think, been guilty of a certain critical self-indulgence. This is no work of Matinian bees; there are times when its flow seems distinctly *lutulentus*, and one might wish that its authors had been stricter in *stilum vert[endo]*. Unelaborated talk of "anguished assonances" (at 2.1.29) communicates little to the reader whose auditory sense may be less finely tuned than the authors' (though the phrase itself provides an admirable example of the classical habit of duplicating-in-describing a particular stylistic phenomenon). And the reader may find himself leaving certain profound-sounding notes with the feeling that they could surely be comprehended if only there were time or sufficient concentration (see, e.g., on 2.8.6: "the verbs that end lines 5-7 show a progression in their prefixes [*ob-*, *e-*, *pro-*] that makes a contrast with the carefully contrived anticlimax of the previous stanza [*poena, dente, ungui*]"). The commentary suffers from some obscurity of expression even in less subjective contexts. Complex textual discussions are often difficult to follow;² the effect of elaborate hypothetical prosopographies can be to stun.³ I read N-H's note on the Xanthias of 2.4.2 several times, trying to decide whether they took him as an imaginary character from the hybrid Greek-Roman world of Horace's *Odes* or as a deliberate pseudonym for a

² See, e.g., their defense of the reading *non secus ac bonis* at 2.3.2, where no positive case is presented for the reading they choose; after their "not A, not B, not C, not D," we wait in vain for a clearly-explained "but E."

³ See, e.g., their examination into the identity of the elusive Postumus of 2.14 (pp. 223-24), esp.: "The affairs of Aelius Gallus were almost fraternally intertwined with those of Seius Strabo, who was prefect of the praetorian guard at the end of Augustus's reign, and thereafter of Egypt: the former was father by adoption of Sejanus, the latter by blood . . . ; the former was patron of Strabo the geographer, the latter may have given him his name . . . Now Seius on his mother's side was nephew of Terentia, the childless wife of Maecenas; his own equestrian family came from Volsinii in the south of Etruria just as Maecenas came from Arezzo in the north. Here we have a nexus of relationships [I'll say!] that makes it possible that Propertius Postumus, and in particular Aelia Galla, should be celebrated by two writers in Maecenas's circle."

real (blond) Roman, and remained unsure—until a passing comment on *Odes* 2.5 (“... if the subject-matter was too discreditable for an eminent friend, a Xanthias or Thaliarchus could easily have been invented” [p. 77]) tipped the balance toward the latter.

To say further that as often as not I disagree with N-H on both major and minor points of explication is not to detract from the value of their work. Such differences are endemic to the relationship between the commentator and his audience. I might repeat here a comment from Cairns’ review of N-H’s first volume:

Their judgments of their predecessors’ work and their own contributions are such that inevitably much future work on Horace *Odes* I will take the form of criticism of their commentary. It is nevertheless instantly recognizable as a great commentary of lasting importance. . . .

(Francis Cairns, *JRS* 61 [1971] 305-6)

However, it may be of some value to the reader of this review for me to list and react to some of the critical stances taken by N-H on specific *Odes*.

I shall mention individual points first. They correctly take the *tu* of 2.5 (*Nondum subacta*) as addressed to the poet himself (though their bland assertion that “a tactful ironist like Horace” would never impute middle age or failing powers to “even his imaginary friends” [p. 77] prompts from me a rude, “Who says?”). As mentioned above, their explication of this poem is generally quite good, but their judgment of it is marred by a bit of squeamish overreaction. The poem opens with a picture of a calf, not yet old enough for yoking, not yet old enough for breeding; in the third stanza, a new image is added, of the unripe grape; in the fourth, these two comparisons are applied to the unattainable Lalage. Surprisingly, two lines concerning the calf (*nec [valet] tauri ruentis / in venerem tolerare pondus* [3-4]) have been sufficient to bring down upon Horace charges of brutality, crudity and “ultra-realistic directness,” and to lose for the poem N-H’s unqualified approval (“... the poem turns out to have subtlety as well as ingenuity, though not indeed the supreme Horatian virtues of humanity and sense” [79-80]). Even if we allow N-H the dubious prerogative of condemning Horace for not being Horatian enough and grant that *Nondum subacta* is not so unremittingly allusive as its Anacreontic prototype, surely it should be conceded that what would be “brutal” if applied directly to the girl is merely matter-of-fact in the husbandry *exemplum* in which it is situated (“It’s not good business to breed your calf too early”).

N-H’s discussion of 2.9 (*Non semper imbres*) is again generally excellent (see also above, p. 230). They properly emphasize that Mystes was a fiction rather than a real person; they rightly attribute to malicious wit the suggestion (so often taken seriously) that Valgius and he turn to celebration of Augustus’s military exploits (17ff.); and they correctly rate the poem “a high point of Augustan urbanity” (p. 138). However, I was disappointed to see that they cling to the old saw that Horace was inimical to the conventions of love-elegy.

In their explication of 2.12 (*Nolis longa ferae*), I was delighted to see them conclude that *domina Licymnia* (13) must refer to the poet's own mistress, rather than to Maecenas's wife Terentia. (In a marvelous piece of critical having-your-cake-and-eating-it-too, they then turn around—perhaps not altogether unconvincingly—to contend that a veiled allusion to Terentia is intended.)

They explicate well the Lucretian fount from which 2.16 (*Otium divos*) is drawn, and they properly note the Callimachean elements of the aesthetic/philosophical credo sketched by the poet in the final stanza. On the other hand, I could wish that they had underlined more emphatically this stanza's paradoxical conflation of the catchwords of both sides of the *ars-ingenium* polemic. I am further puzzled by the fact that N-H have chosen not even to mention the pun (*Parca non mendax* = a Fate true to her name, or truly *parcus* -a -um: cp. Callimachus's *ὀλίγος*) proposed by Bücheler and accepted today by many critics.

N-H are on the right track when they deny solemnity to 2.19 (*Bacchum in remotis*), but I think they err in dismissing the possibility that this Hymn to Bacchus is largely a poem about poetry (see p. 6)—i.e. a poem in which the poet temporarily assumes wholeheartedly (though with tongue in cheek) the prerogatives of a type of poetic inspiration (that born of *ingenium*, or the side of the polemic assumed by the *vinipotores*) which is normally tempered in his poetry by adherence to Alexandrian aesthetics (based on *ars* and advocated by the *aquae potores*).

My objection to N-H's treatment of *Odes* 2.1 (*Motum ex Metello*) is more fundamental. Pointing to phenomena of diction characteristic of prose (and specifically of history) and to what they see as a difference in tone from Horace's other political poems ("here for once he speaks not simply as a panegyrist but with the judiciousness and authority of a historian" [p. 11]), they paint a picture of 2.1 as essentially a pastiche of quotations from Pollio's history. I prefer to adduce N-H's oft-expressed principle that Horace delighted in evoking in his poems the ethos of their several addressees, rather than looking for quotations from Pollio and strict adherence by the poet to the historian's conception of events. On the other hand, N-H may be right, and this would stand as another example of genial disagreement, if I did not have more serious objections to the way in which they have made their case. After a single generalized supporting reference to three turn-of-the-century German works, they proceed to a series of dogmatic and speculative assertions of specific borrowings by Horace from Pollio; their notes are peppered with *must be's*, *can only's*, *might be's*, and *presumably's*. In addition, their initial judgment that 2.1, with its supposedly non-Horatian "judiciousness," differs radically in tone from the other political poems seems to me to be based on very shaky ground. Even N-H point out the poem's close similarity in tone to *Odes* 1.35; apparently they do not see the illogic of classifying 2.1 as so unique it must be drawn from an outside source (Pollio), then going on to point out its close affinities with a poem which they

concede to be "Horatian." This illogic is recapitulated in miniature in their note on 2.1.2 (*vitia*), where the strongly moral word impels them to the prompt assumption that its appearance is attributable to Pollio's historical stance ("Pollio seems to have engaged in pessimistic moralizing in the manner of Sallust or Tacitus"); it is only after they have traced the usage to Pollio in this way that they note, almost parenthetically, the parallel view of civil war in Horace's own 1.35.33ff. (one might add also 1.2.21-24, 29-30; see esp. *vitio parentum* [23]). It is similarly ironic that Horace's view that "the Civil War gave comfort to the Parthian enemy" (see at 2.1.29, *Latino*) must be attributed to a putative derivation from Pollio, although the same topic is traced by N-H only two lines later (at 2.1.31) to Horace's seventh Epode (9ff.); the related theme that civil strife could only be expiated by attack on an external enemy is found (*pace* N-H) at 2.1.5, just as it is at 1.2.22, 29, 51-52 and 1.35.38-40. One final, more particularized, point of disagreement: at line 21, N-H opt for Beroaldus and Bentley's *videre* (for the *audire* of the MSS), despite Fraenkel's impassioned plea to the contrary:

Is it really asking too much when we expect a reader of Horace to feel how beautifully *iam nunc . . . perstringis auris . . .* is taken up by *audire . . . iam videor* and to let his senses as well as his mind respond to the appeal? Ordinary readers would probably not have stumbled if they had not been impressed by the cleverness of some ancient schoolmaster.

(E. Fraenkel, *Horace* [Oxford, 1957] 236)

N-H make, I think, a fundamental error in their evaluation of the tone of *Odes* 2.7 (*O saepe mecum*). After summarizing the poem as lively, charming, and a "masterpiece of tact" (p. 108), they continue:

Yet in spite of all its charm the poem to some extent offends. Philippi was the most savage conflict of two violent decades . . . ; yet Horace treats Brutus, who had raised him up, with disrespectful irony (2n.), and his fallen *comites* with Homeric bluntness (12n.). He cannot be blamed for abandoning the certainties of his youth, and no doubt felt that he had made a foolish mistake; but it is disconcerting to find him describing so terrible an experience with discreet jokes and elegant allusions. The whimsicality of his treatment may be attributed not just to the frivolity that covers hurt but to political discretion. Yet after all, he could have said nothing.

(p. 109)

The evidence N-H cite for Horace's disrespect for Brutus and lack of sympathy for his fallen comrades is notably unconvincing. At line 2 (*deducte Bruto militiae duce*) they posit an unbelievable *ὀνόνοια*—that *deducte* here suggests "incompetent manoeuvres" (their single supporting parallel is also over-read), and that a play may even be intended on the name Brutus (i.e. "stupid"). Rather, *deduco* is clearly chosen as a technical term from the military vocabulary, with no hint of ineptitude; one might as well argue that *deducta* of a bride (another technical term) can imply that the marriage is to be an unhappy one. Their suggestion (p. 106; cf. nn. 11-12) that Horace's description of his fallen comrades (*cum fracta virtus, et*

minaces / turpe solum tetigere mento) reflects his resentment of their social superiority is similarly overdrawn (they rightly take *tetigere mento* as an epicism for "biting the dust" on the battlefield).

Secondly, their imputation of "whimsicality" and "frivolity" to the poem—based on the supposedly mock-grandiloquent phrasing of the poem's first two lines and the repeated use of literary allusion (in the *ρίψασπις* [10], in *tetigere mento* [12], and in the poet's rescue by Mercury [13-14])—is equally ill-judged. There is irony in these lines, but it is not humorous irony. If the language of lines 1-2 is indeed exaggerated, this exaggeration is intended not as a jibe at Brutus, but as an ironic comment by the poet on the gulf between his own and Pompeius's youthful enthusiasms and the bitter reality which has squelched them; this same contrast is picked out by the play between the active *fregi* (i.e. *diem*, of their pre-Philippi drinking parties [7]) and the passive *fracta* (i.e. *virtus* [11]: *pace* N-H, this affecting phrase refers not only to Brutus himself, but to the whole Republican cause, most significantly to Horace and Pompeius themselves). Nor is the adoption of literary allusions to describe the battle and its aftermath whimsical in the least. N-H themselves point out the "sinister" quality and "meaningful reticence" of *sensi* (10: i.e. *Philippos* . . .); when the poet then turns to conventional Greek topics for defeat and escape, this conventionality is clearly not frivolous, but distancing: it is only by ironic retreat from realistic description of the grim battle that the poet is able to "cover hurt" here. The hidden pain of the Ode is momentarily bared in the final two stanzas, when the poet proposes to get himself and the friend of his lost youth royally drunk (*non . . . sanius bacchabor, dulce . . . furere est* [26-28]) on *oblivioso* (=λαθικηδής) *Massico* (21): this is to be no celebratory toast, but a hard-drinking revel whose primary purpose is to blot out the pain of the past. I am one who feels that the Horatian corpus would be the poorer if Horace had here chosen to "say nothing."

One final point on 2.7: N-H's discussion of the *ρίψασπις* (in which they conclude essentially that it was a figure of speech and totally irrelevant to the literal experiences of Horace the soldier) is excellent. Would that it might allay further argument on this topic.

There is one area in which my differences with N-H amount to differences in critical philosophy. I find that their commentary suffers from a certain habitual overparticularization of interpretation. Too much emphasis is laid on searches for such specifics as the locale the poem is set in, the date of composition, and the identity of an addressee. N-H set the symposium of 2.11 (*Quid bellicosus Cantaber*) in the elegant upper-class *horti* of its addressee, Quinctius, and that of 2.7 in the garden of Horace's own town-house. When they perceptively note on the latter passage that the laurel-tree of line 19 is symbolic, so that we "need not ask whether Horace's house is likely to have boasted such an amenity," I wonder why they don't carry that principle one step further and concede that neither need we ask in what kind of a house, or in what province, these parties are to take place. Surely the conventional *locus amoenus* introduces us to an imaginary landscape

(half-Greek, half-Roman: see, e.g., G. Williams, *Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry* [Oxford 1968] 295ff.)—a poetic world peopled by Lyde's and Phyllises, into which the poet invites select friends, and in which—if they are lucky—they might even come across the choruses of nymphs and satyrs that Horace sports about with at *Odes* 1.1.31.

Placing the composer of the ninth Epode in the hatch of a Liburnian galley (as N-H do at 2.6.8) or inquiring which foul winter storm occasioned *Odes* 1.2 (*Iam satis terris*)—as N-H did in their first volume—involves a basic misunderstanding of the poetic process. Does the poet really finish pumping out his cellar and go upstairs to write *Odes* 1.2? Isn't it more reasonable to concede that he might just as easily have written it on a sunny day in July or after a particularly mild winter—or at whatever creative moment the parallel between cosmic and human misfortune happened to become uppermost in his mind?

But enjoining classical scholars not to look for a poem's date would be like holding back the tide; and, in fact (if not in certain theories), judicious application of sure knowledge of the external circumstances from which a poem has arisen may help the interpretive process. But when the search for a poem's date is coupled with questions concerning prosopography (like date of composition, an inevitable facet of the interpretation of a classical text)—and when (as is most often the case) evidence on these issues is either ambiguous or highly speculative—then critics must exercise extreme caution to let their reading of the poem color their judgment of the external evidence, rather than to allow their hypotheses concerning date or addressee to determine their interpretation of the poem.

Many of N-H's discussions of particular *Odes* implant in me an uneasy suspicion that they may be reversing these priorities—perhaps only because their normal introductory format (by which *Realien* such as prosopography and date are discussed at great length and preliminarily to any attempt at interpretation) so indicates. But in N-H's treatment of *Odes* 2.10 (*Rectius vives*), our differences in philosophy come to a head. Is the Licinius of Horace's Ode to be identified with Maecenas's polyonymous brother-in-law, the conspirator against Augustus? Is the conspiracy to be dated to 23 or 22 B.C.? Is our Ode to be assigned to a time before Murena's fall from favor, or to after his disgrace, or (as N-H advocate, following Hanslik) to some midway point (on the assumption, of course, that this Ode's Licinius does equal that conspiracy's Murena)? N-H's exhaustive presentation of the possibilities achieves unintended effects: rather than laying the arguments to rest, it persuades me that these questions are so vexed that any definitive answers are impossible (barring fortuitous shifts in the sands of Egypt); it confirms my sense that N-H, like others, have allowed their reading of the poem to be unduly swayed by these external questions; and it occasions a plea that the poem be allowed to speak for itself. It is my contention that if one came to the poem knowing nothing of Murena or his fall from grace (as I was once,

mercifully, able to do), it would read most naturally as an elegant piece of general philosophizing in the Peripatetic mode, containing no hint that its conventional admonitions have any special point or sinister relevance to the current status of its addressee's fortunes. *Si male nunc* (17) is a truly hypothetical, generalized conditional ("Say [i.e. imagine] things are bad now . . ."), not a statement of the addressee's actual plight at the moment of composition (as N-H assume); the imperative *appare* (22) and the second-person gnomic future *contrahes* (23) are equally generalized—of exactly the type, in fact, that N-H describe on *latius regnes* (2.2.9): "as often in *diatribe*, the second person can refer to the world at large rather than the direct recipient" (cp. p. 290, on 2.18.17).

In summation, however, let me revert to the positive: the amount of space I have devoted to disagreement with N-H should not be presumed to belie my general admiration for this work. This commentary is so useful and so thought-provoking that for any student of Horace to fault it seriously would smack of biting-the-hand-that-feeds-you.

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RAYMOND J. CLARK. *Catabasis: Vergil and the Wisdom Tradition*. Amsterdam, Grüner, 1979. Pp. 246. Hfl. 60.

The hero's descent to the Underworld to confront the ultimate mystery of life and death is one of the richest motifs of classical literature and lies at the core of the ancient epic tradition from *Gilgamesh* to the *Aeneid* and on to the *Divine Comedy*. The fragmentary remains of the catabasis—tradition, which culminates in the grand but elusive synthesis of *Aeneid* 6, form the subject of this book, a revised 1969 Exeter dissertation inspired by the work of W. F. J. Knight. Its value lies in the competent collection of widely dispersed material, literary, cultic, and archaeological. Its weaknesses are the lack of a well organized progression of ideas, the absence of a comprehensive theoretical organization (e.g. on the relation between catabasis and initiatory themes or the epic of quest in general), a tendency to over-document the obvious, and the dissertational *déformation* of labyrinthine wandering in subordinate detail. There are scattered excellent observations on specific passages, but little that is radically new for the interpretation of Homer or Virgil. Unfortunately the discussion of Virgil in the last two chapters zigzags through the abundant sources in a fragmented and confusing way, giving little sense of the place of Book 6 in the epic or the peculiarly Virgilian stamp of the recast traditional elements.

Chapter 1 provides a useful survey, particularly welcome to classicists, of new developments in the study of the early Near Eastern descents to the Underworld. The division into "fertility tradition" (descent to bring back a lost divinity of vegetative life) and "wisdom

tradition" (descent to acquire knowledge about the way of the dead) is helpful; but C. could have pointed out how the Homeric *Hymn to Demeter*, which seems superficially to belong to the "fertility tradition," actually integrates both (*h. Dem.* 480-82 and 486-94). The discussion of *Gilgamesh* (28) might have made more of the close Homeric parallels (e.g. tablet X.iv.9ff. of the Assyrian version, *ANET*² p. 92, and Odysseus' crossing from Calypso to the Phaeacians). The relevant parallels between the Sumerian fragment, *Gilgamesh, Enkidu, and the Nether World*, and Odysseus' meeting with Anticleia or Achilles' with the shade of Patroclus are passed over (cf. tablet XII.78ff., *ANET*² pp. 97-99, and *Il.* 23.59-107), though they are important for the tradition and for later classical echoes. The discussion of the journey to the Far West instead of underground (31) would profit from consideration of the new fragments of Stesichorus' *Geryoneis* (though C. cites Page's 1973 *JHS* article in a footnote). Had C. been able to read Burkert's article on the Stesichorus fragments ("Le mythe de Géryon," *Il mito greco*, edd. B. Gentili and G. Paioni [Rome 1977] 273-83), he might have been less closed to possible connections with shamanism (33f.).

Chap. 2 offers a good refutation of alleged inconsistencies in the Nekyia of the *Odyssey* and an interesting treatment of the fusion of catabasis and necromancy, with particular reference to Odysseus' Thesprotian "lie" in *Od.* 14 and 19 and the recent discovery of the Oracle of the Dead (on which see now Colin Hardie's Appendix to Austin's commentary on *Aen.* 6, Oxford 1977). C., however, pays insufficient attention to the deliberate break in the narrative frame at *Od.* 11.333, which separates the non-Trojan from the Trojan ghosts. Given the quasi-prophetic relevance of Agamemnon's advice, as C. points out, there is perhaps good reason for him to drink the blood (11.390), unlike Achilles (11.467-72) or the others (11.541f.). There is no reason to think that Odysseus has followed Ajax into the Underworld at 11.563 (77), though this fact hardly makes Odysseus' journey less of a catabasis.

Chap. 3 discusses the surviving fragments of "Heracles' Descent," conjecturally restored by Norden and now confirmed by papyrus fragments of a possibly Pindaric narrative, as Lloyd-Jones showed in an important article (*Maia* 1967). Chap. 4, on Orpheus' catabasis, agrees that such a tradition influenced *Alcestis*, *Symposium*, and of course the Fourth *Georgic*; but C.'s arguments against a pre-Virgilian successful descent by Orpheus are wholly subjective and unconvincing (124), nor does he take sufficient account of the differences between the Virgilian and Ovidian versions.

The fifth chapter, about Theseus, has interesting remarks on Ariadne and Helen as pre-Greek vegetation goddesses, Minos' labyrinth as a sacred tomb, and his movement between a bull-king in a cave-tomb and an all-devouring ruler of the dead. The development of Knight's theories about labyrinths, Troy as a "Death-City," and Cretan dance-themes is engaging but highly speculative: one wishes that C. had transposed here some of his scepticism about Servius and

Frazer on the Golden Bough, pp. 198-203. It is surprising that C. does not make some use of Euripides' *Helen*, the books of G. R. Levy, and the work of Santarcangeli (1974) and Bourgeaud (*Rev. Hist. Rel.* 14 [1974] 1-27). His "catabatic mould" for Theseus in Bacchyl. 17 (142) should have included initiatory patterns (see *Eranos* 77 [1979] 23-37).

The two closing chapters on *Aeneid* 6 basically follow Norden on Virgil's integration of earlier catabaseis, but add some recent material on the divergent legends of the sibyls and a *nekyomanteion* at Avernus (for a rather more lucid account of these see Hardie's Appendix, supra). Tending to read Virgil with the literalism of the old Quellenforschung, C. often exaggerates false problems, e.g. the question of when Charon last saw the Golden Bough, 6.408f., on which see Austin's sensible comment ad loc., or the apparent difficulty that the Sibyl, not Aeneas, carries it (191ff., 217f.). In arguing for similarity between the Bough and the golden wand of Hermes *psychagogos*, whose role the Sibyl would be reflecting, C. not only fails to quote the crucial phrase which distinguishes her manner of carrying the Bough from that of the god's staff (*aperit ramum qui veste latebat*, 6.406; cf. p. 191), but also neglects the fact that Aeneas, not the Sibyl, is the one to place it, finally, at Proserpina's threshold in 632-36. Aeneas, not the Sibyl, remains the focal actor in the movements of the Bough; and hence C.'s parallel with Hermes' wand needs qualification. The close parallels of 6.406 with Ap. Rhod. 3.867 and 1013, pointed out by Norden, also tell against C.'s view.

Readers familiar with the problem of Virgil's ambivalence toward his hero will marvel at the ease with which C. brushes aside the contradictory or unreconciled elements in the Underworld: the clash between what Otis called the "mythological" and "philosophical" conceptions, the "strange behaviour" of the Bough (186), the Gates of Dreams. C. conveys little sense of what such passages might mean for Virgil's rethinking of the tradition (see pp. 180ff., 186, 224). The book is useful for documenting the sources which Virgil might have used, but fails to do justice to the new spirit in which he used them. This is not a book for beginners. Despite its shortcomings, however, it offers advanced students of epic and myth much careful research in a difficult area.

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PIERRE CHANTRAINE. Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque. Histoire des mots. Tome IV-2 Φ - Ω et Index. Paris, Éditions Klincksieck, 1980. Pp. 1165-1368.

Pierre Chantraine at the time of his death in June 1974 left in manuscript the material for the first part of Fascicle IV of his dictionary, together with a few entries commencing with $\phi\alpha$ -. What he left unfinished has been completed by three of his pupils, Jean Taillardat,

Olivier Masson and Jean-Louis Perpillou, and the work of each of these has been examined not only by the other two but also by Françoise Bader and by Michel Lejeune, who wrote the preface to IV-2. Thus the task of completing the work of the great French Hellenist has fallen to a small group of scholars whose devotion to his memory is matched by their professional competence. We find the same abundant listing of derivative formations, including personal and local names, under the various entries, as in the earlier fascicles, and the same careful thought and good sense in the presentation and discussion of etymologies at the end of the entries. Among the many word-families which fall under the last four letters of the alphabet only a few can be commented on here.

φλέγω: here we find cited *Φλέγγρα*, ancient name of Pallene on the Chalcidic peninsula, *Φλέγγρας Πεδίων*, where Zeus destroyed the giants with lightning, *Φλεγγραία πλάξ*, *Φλεγγραία (πεδία)*, the ethnics *Φλεγγῶναι* and *Φλέγνυες* and the bird-epithet *φλεγγῶας* (with reference to its reddish-brown color) but miss *Φλεγγῶας*, best known perhaps through Vergil, *Aen.* 6.618-20, in the list of sinners punished in Tartarus. S. Eitrem, *R.-E.*, 20¹ (1941) 268R, suggests an ancient association between the name of the Phlegyes and their burning of the temple at Delphi.—*φοῖνιξ*: here the situation is complicated, for the present dictionary and Frisk each have five entries, though not in quite the same order. The chief problem is the question of whether the use of the word as a color-term or as an ethnic was earlier, but there is a further complication: whether the use as a color-term is always to be associated with the purple dye manufactured by the Phoenicians from the *murex* or whether it has some quite different source. Frisk, although he cites a number of divergent views, is non-committal in certain respects. The dictionary here under review favors the idea that the Phoenicians were designated by the Greeks *Φοίνικες* 'red people' because of their sun-burnt complexion and that the color-term *φοῖνιξ* (the first of the five entries for this word) is an extended stem of *φοινός* 'red.' The proper sense of 1 *φοῖνιξ* as a dull or tawny red (*fauve*), applicable to a bay horse or ox, is insisted upon; the sense 'purple' fails to fit many of the Homeric passages where it has been alleged. The argument in general closely follows Chantraine, *Studi Classici* 14 (1972) 7-15. As for 3 *φοῖνιξ* (2 *φοῖνιξ* in Frisk) 'date-palm,' both take it from the ethnic *Φοίνιξ* because of the tree's near eastern origin, while for *φοῖνιξ*, name of a type of lyre, Frisk cites the testimony of Semos of Delos that the lyre was made from the wood of the date-palm and mentions as an alternative possibility the derivation of the name from its Phoenician origin, while Chantraine's continuators cite the notion of wood from the date-palm only to reject it and explain the name as that of *l'instrument phénicien*. As for the name of the mythical bird (Frisk 4 *φοῖνιξ*, Chantraine 5 *φοῖνιξ*), both cite the theory of Egyptian origin, Frisk with apparent favor, Chantraine with more skepticism.—*χαίτη*: to the compound derivatives here cited may be added *βαθυχαίτης*, epithet of the Mede in the epitaph on Aeschylus.—*χίλιον*: on the often raised question of connection with Latin *mille*

the *Dictionnaire* is a non-committal. E. P. Hamp, *Glotta* 46 (1968) 274-78, defended it with detailed discussion of the phonology; prefixation of **smī* 'one' is necessary.—*χῦλός* 'juice, sap (of plants)' and the semantically similar *χῦμός*, which is subordinated under the same entry, are naturally brought into connection with *χέω* 'pour,' but the present dictionary, like that of Frisk, notes the difficulty of the long *υ*. Several explanations are offered: 1) *vocalisme populaire expressif* (Vendryes); 2) derivation from **χυ-σλο-*, *-σμο-* as alternants to *χυλο-*, *-μο-*, with lengthening after loss of *-σ-* (Schulze); 3) derivation from "quasi-participles" **ghus-lo-*, *ghus-mo-* (Pokorny 448; scarcely different from 2). Actually this type of variation in vowel-length between semantically similar forms of otherwise identical phonemic structure is not altogether rare, though the alternants do not usually occur in the same language. Skt. *bhūtāh*: Gk. *φῦτός*; Skt. *vīrah*, Lith. *výras*: Lat. *vīr*, OIr. *fer*; Lat. *vīrus*: Skt. *viṣam* 'poison' come to mind, while within Greek Frisk groups together *θῦμός* (semantic development 'Rauch, Hauch, Geist, Mut') and *θύμον* 'thyme,' which however Chantraine separates. For Skt. *bhūtāh*, as well as for the root aorist forms *ábhūt*, Gk. *ἔφῦ*, it is customary to explain the base *bhū-* as a disyllabic base in zero grade, a base which, if both syllables were in full grade, would have the form **bhew-ā*, or in laryngeal terms **bhew-eð*. For *χέω* the evidence for disyllabic bases of the type in question is poor at best—Whitney's *Roots* has *bhū-* 'be,' but *hu-* 'sacrifice' (that is, pour oblations)—but at least the forms in question come from roots of the same structural pattern, that is, roots ending in *y* or *w*, and there may even have been a certain amount of analogical spread of the *ī* or *ū*.—1 *ψύχω* 'refroidir, rafraichir' and 2 *ψύχω* 'souffler': Frisk keeps the two together along with *ψυχή*, *ψυχρός*, etc., but Chantraine separates them, taking *ψυχρός* with 1 and *ψυχή* with 2, following Benveniste's rejection of semantic development of 'blow' to 'cold.' To this reviewer it does not seem difficult to admit such a semantic development and so to group all the words under one family.

The index includes the Mycenaean Greek words and the words cited from non-Greek languages, amounting to around fifty pages in all. It is followed by a partial list of bibliographical references.

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A PORTRAIT OF HECATE

A striking portrait of an extraordinary goddess appears at the center of the *Theogony*. The goddess, called Hecate, is depicted as a deity closely involved in the affairs of the community with powers broadly founded in the natural world. The characteristics of this curious goddess are the subject of my paper—first the picture of Hecate that emerges from the text of Hesiod and then an examination of the Hesiodic portrait in light of the archaeological evidence.

I. *The Textual Evidence*

The Hymn to Hecate (*Th.* 411–52) proclaims a goddess whose unique powers cut across natural boundaries of earth, sea and sky and remain independent and undiminished under Zeus' rule:

The son of Cronus neither constrained her nor took away anything of what she obtained by lot among the Titans of early day, but she holds, as the division was initially in the beginning . . . honors on earth, in heaven and on sea (*Th.* 423–27).¹

Although Hesiod makes Hecate's freedom to exercise extraordinary power dependent upon Zeus' dispensation (e.g. 412–15)

¹ I use throughout the texts established by Martin L. West, *Hesiod: Theogony* (Oxford 1966) and *Hesiod: Works and Days* (Oxford 1978). The major arguments for and against the authenticity of the Hecate-passage are discussed by Friedrich Solmsen, *Hesiod and Aeschylus* (New York 1949) 51, n. 169, and West (*Theogony*) 276–80. Both authors reject the theory that the passage is a later interpolation.

and frames the description of her broad powers (429–47) with specific references to Zeus' practice of preserving and granting honor (411–28, 448–51), he in no way diminishes her godhead which plays an important role in the life of men.

Expressions of Hecate's immediacy in the lives of men and her benevolent nature form a recurring theme in the Hymn. This is particularly true of the central section (429–47), which recites her broad involvement in the political and personal affairs of men. The fostering presence of the goddess means success and renown in courts and assemblies, in battles and athletic contests, and in horsemanship (429–39). Hecate's presence extends also to the more mundane affairs of life, where her favor means a good catch at sea and success in animal breeding (440–47). Finally, she is a nurse of the young, a *κουροτρόφος*, and in this capacity joins company with the Muses, who attend upon favored princes from the time of their birth (*Th.* 81–82), and with Gaia, who raised the young Zeus on Crete (479–80). The Oceanids also "bring up men from boyhood" (*ἀνδρας κουρίζουσι*; 347), but only Hecate in the *Theogony* holds the title of *κουροτρόφος* (450, 452).²

Hecate is a direct force in human life, and the account of her activities illustrates this immediacy. Three times *παράγινεται* describes her personal involvement in affairs of state, wars and games, in all of which she has power to aid and advance her favorites (429, 432, 436). She is said to "sit by" kings (434) and "stand by" horsemen (439). From the political assembly to the farmer's stable, Hecate is seen as a vital factor in the success of human endeavor:

For even now when any one of men on earth propitiates the gods by making auspicious sacrifices according to custom, he calls upon Hecate by name (*Th.* 416–18).

Hecate's presence in such prayers, especially if she is invoked with other gods, may reflect only ritual. The lines (419–20) which

² There is literary evidence that Hecate was worshipped as a *κουροτρόφος* in cult: schol. to Ar. *Vesp.* 804: 'Εκάταιον- ἱερὸν Ἐκάτης, ὡς τῶν Ἀθηναίων πανταχοῦ ἰδρυομένων αὐτὴν ὡς ἔφορον πάντων καὶ κουροτρόφον. (Fr. Dübner, *Scholia Graeca In Aristophanem* [1877; Hildesheim 1969] 153). Cf. *Orph. Hymn.* 1.8. Hecate was believed to be present at the three most important moments in life: at birth, marriage and death. See Lewis Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States* (Oxford 1896) II, 519. Hecate's beneficent functions are also discussed by Martin Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* (Munich 1967) I, 722.

immediately follow these, however, state that when Hecate is well disposed (*πρόφρων*) she accepts prayers (*εὔχαι*) and rewards the suppliants with wealth (*δλβος*). Hecate's presence in these prayers seems more than ritualistic, and the mention of *δλβος* anticipates the detailed account of her blessings in lines 429–52. The lines quoted above may also mean that men summon Hecate when they want to gain favor with the gods in general (*ἰλάσκονται*), as though Hecate were an intermediary between men and gods. Such an interpretation would not be inconsistent with her personal involvement in men's lives or with her extraordinary *τιμή* among the gods.

Hecate's extraordinary role in the affairs of men is underscored by her relative independence in the divine genealogy. Hesiod makes her the daughter of Perses and Asteria (409–11), whose own parents are the Titans Phoebe and Coeus (404), but he is careful to emphasize Hecate's status as an only child:

Although an only child, the goddess received not less of her share of privilege and honors . . . but even more, since Zeus honors her (*Th.* 426–28).

A similar statement follows immediately upon the enumeration of her powers (448–49). The genealogy provided for Hecate makes her, through her aunt Leto (406), the first cousin of Apollo and Artemis (918–20). Though technically contemporary with them, Hecate is clearly older and has closer affinities to the Titans than to the Olympians. The fact that Hecate is also the sole offspring of a less celebrated branch of the family makes her extraordinary position of honor among the younger gods all the more remarkable, if not actually anachronistic. The emphasis on Hecate's status as an only child is generally viewed as an example of Zeus' fairness in preserving the rights of a deity who has no brothers to defend her claim. The absence of siblings, however, might also suggest an original genealogy outside the Olympian family, especially since the mention of Hecate as an only child frames the recitation of her independent powers and, on both occasions, is accompanied by a statement of the honor which Zeus and the other gods accord her.

As with Hecate's genealogy, Hesiod seems at pains to define the source of her *τιμή*. Zeus, we are told, honored Hecate exceedingly (*περὶ πάντων . . . τίμησε*; 411–12) and gave her "splendid gifts" (*ἀγλαὰ δῶρα*; 412), specifically a share (*μοῖρα*) of earth and

sea (413). Hecate also "obtained her share of privilege" (ἐμμορε τιμῆς; 414) in heaven, where she was especially honored among the gods (τετιμένη . . . μάλιστα; 415). After mentioning the respect accorded Hecate on earth and her power (δύναμις; 420) to grant wealth and great honor (πολλή . . . τιμή; 418) to mortals, Hesiod returns to a broader definition of her powers, which are now shown to predate Zeus.³ Among the descendants of Gaia and Uranus, Hecate obtained by lot her rank or province (τιμὴν ἔλαχον; 422) and she holds her appointed lot (αἶσα; 422), which Zeus neither constrained (ἐβήσατο) nor took away (ἀπηύρα; 423). She holds the gift of honor (γέρας; 427) on earth, heaven, and sea, in keeping with the original division (δασμός; 425) of power among the Titans. Hesiod's use of a form of λαγχάνω ("obtain by lot") in this context suggests Hecate's independent participation in an earlier division of power and has a different connotation than the use of μείρομαι ("have one's share of a thing") in line 414 (ἐμμορε), where the verb seems rather to suggest Zeus' own benevolent role in the distribution of τιμή. Again, when Hesiod states that Hecate's status as an only child did not damage her standing with Zeus but won her all the more honor, he returns to a form of μείρομαι (ἐμμορε τιμῆς; 426). There is similar ambiguity in defining the source of Hecate's power as κουροτρόφος. Although Hesiod specifically assigns this role to Zeus' dispensation (θῆκε δὲ μιν Κρονίδης κουροτρόφον; 450), he concludes the Hymn with the statement that Hecate was a κουροτρόφος "from the beginning" (ἐξ ἀρχῆς; 452), an expression used in line 425 to describe her original powers among the Titans. Further ambiguity exists in the phrase μετ' ἐκείνην (450) which states that Zeus made Hecate a κουροτρόφος over all those born "after her." Since Hecate was contemporary with the Titans (424), the implication is that Zeus gave her this honor before his own rise to power. If there was an independent religious tradi-

³ The τιμή that Hecate grants men (418) is probably esteem in general or social status bound up with the material blessings (δῶρος) she bestows. The τιμή that Zeus grants is prerogative or office (e.g. *Th.* 396) and the glory attached to it. The distribution of τιμή plays an important part in the *Theogony* (e.g. 74, 112, 393), and the entire Titanomachy is described as a struggle to retain it (881–82). For a discussion of τιμή in Hesiod, see Solmsen (above, note 1) 10–18. Cf. Arthur W. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility* (Oxford 1960) 63–64. For the τιμή-motif as evidence for the authenticity of the Hecate-passage, see Fr. Pfister, "Die Hekate-Episode in Hesiods *Theogonie*," *Philologus* 84 (1929) 1–9.

tion surrounding Hecate, it would account for Hesiod's difficulty in comfortably defining her *τιμή* in relation to Zeus.

An independent religious tradition would also explain why Hecate overlaps other deities and therefore seems to have a different *γέρας* from theirs in the same area of human endeavor. She is linked specifically to Poseidon in matters of fishing (441) and to Hermes in matters of animal breeding (444), but her wide range of activities involving courts, assemblies, battles, and games touches as well upon the realms of Zeus, Ares, and Athena, at least. Hecate is honored by men and gods alike, and line 428 may be taken to mean that far from reducing Hecate's original powers, although her only-child status might have permitted it, Zeus out of honor for the goddess actually increased them. Zeus' reasons for honoring Hecate, which presumably go beyond affection or familial ties, are never mentioned by Hesiod. Hecate's extraordinary position of honor with Zeus is all the more striking because her powers, unlike those of Styx (385-88), for example, are in no way required by Zeus, but actually run across the lines of his orderly dispensation.

The unpredictability of Hecate's favor is a recurring theme in the Hymn, as when Hesiod states that great honor comes easily to him whose prayers a "well disposed" (*πρόφρων*) Hecate accepts (419). Her unpredictability is particularly pronounced in the nineteen-line segment commencing at 429, where declarations of Hecate's powers alternate with repetitions of her independence in wielding them. This striking sequence commences with *ὃ δ' ἐθέλη* and is echoed by five other *ἐθέλω*-phrases appearing at the ends of the lines, in the manner of a liturgical refrain. The sequence moves from a general statement of Hecate's independence in granting favor to mortals to specific instances of the working of her will. Princes, politicians, warriors, horsemen, fishermen, and herdsman are all recipients of her favor "if so she will." The opening declaration of Hecate's ability to support and profit men is repeated at 436, and the use of *προφρόνεως* ("in a well disposed manner") at 433 echoes *πρόφρων* at 419, where Hecate's anticipated response to men's prayers is mentioned earlier:

429	<i>ὃ δ' ἐθέλη</i>	<i>μεγάλως παραγίνεται ἡδ' ὀνίνησιν</i>
430	(Politicians)	<i>ὅν κ' ἐθέλησιν</i>
432	(Warriors)	<i>οἷς κ' ἐθέλησι</i>

433	προφρόνεως	
[439]	ἐσθλή (Horsemen)	οἷς κ' ἐθέλησιν
435	ἐσθλή	
436	ἔνθα θεὰ καὶ τοῖς παραγίνεται ἡδ' ὀνίνησι	
438	ρεῖα	
442	ῥηδίδως	
443	ρεῖα (Fishermen)	ἐθέλουσά γε θυμῷ
444	ἐσθλή	
446	(Herdsmen)	θυμῷ γ' ἐθέλουσα

Scattered throughout this sequence are a number of strongly positive words which demonstrate the beneficent working of her will: μεταπρέπει (430), νίκην, κῦδος (433), νικήσας, καλὸν ἄεθλον (437), κῦδος (438), ἀέξειν (444), βριάει (447). Although Hecate is presented positively as a goddess whose primary concern is to help men, it is inherent in her "will" to withhold her favor and even to punish men. The full spectrum of Hecate's power becomes clear in her relations with fishermen and herdsmen, and only in this context do any moderately negative words appear. "Easily the glorious goddess, *willing it so*, grants a large haul and easily she takes it away (*ἀφείλετο*) as soon as sighted" (442-43). The flocks and herds, says Hesiod, "*willing it so*, she increases from a few and reduces (*μείονα θῆκεν*) from many" (446-47). The "ease" of Hecate's actions is expressed three times in these lines (438, 442, 444).

The negativity inherent in the formula of divine prerogative (*αἶ κ' ἐθέλω*) is highlighted in the *Works and Days* in the Fable of the Hawk and Nightingale, as the hawk uses superior strength to justify acts of violence and injustice:

Wretched one, why do you shriek? Someone stronger than you now holds you tight and you must go wherever I lead you, even though you are a songbird. I shall make my dinner of you, *if I will* (*αἶ κ' ἐθέλω*), or I shall set you free (*Op.* 207-9).

The citing of the alternative actions available to the hawk recalls the verbal pattern used to describe Hecate's power.⁴ While

⁴ For the Fable as a statement of inexorable divine power, see, most recently, Charles Beye, *Ancient Greek Literature and Society* (New York 1975) 109, and Berkley Peabody, *The Winged Word* (Albany 1975) 253. An etymology of Hecate's name from ἔκητι ("Willing Goddess") has been suggested by Peter Walcot, "Hesiod's Hymns to the Muses, Aphrodite, Styx and Hecate," *Symb Oslo* 34 (1958) 11-12.

Hecate herself in no way resembles the hawk in Hesiod, the full spectrum of her power admits the possibility of negative will.

In addition to stressing Hecate's freedom of will, the rhythmic repetition of *ἐθέλω* in lines 429–47 serves to reinforce the goddess' benevolence and as such may reflect an aspect of her actual worship. Three times in this sequence Hecate is declared to be "good" (*ἐσθλή*; 435, 439, 444). Expressions of Hecate's independence in granting favor recall the opening lines of the *Works and Days* in which the wide range of Zeus' power is set forth:

Through him mortal men are celebrated and uncelebrated, named and unnamed, at the will of great Zeus (*Διὸς μεγάλῳ ἔκκῃτι*). For easily (*ῥέα*) he fosters (*βρίδει*) and easily (*ῥέα*) he destroys whom he has fostered; easily he brings down the prominent and prospers (*δέξει*) the obscure; and easily (*ῥεῖα*) he straightens the crooked and shatters the haughty (*Op.* 3–7).

The verbal parallels with Hecate are obvious. Such sweeping statements of divine prerogative are not inconsistent with a deity of Zeus' magnitude—or with one of unusual local prominence.

The only other instance in the *Theogony* of this use of *ἐθέλω* occurs in the account of the Heliconian Muses, who proclaim their ability to make false things seem true and to speak the truth "when they will" (*εἴτ' ἐθέλωμεν*; 28). There are other parallels between the Muses and Hecate. The Muses wait upon honored princes who settle disputes with "honest judgments" (85–86):

Upon his arrival in their midst, the people accord him god-like honors with gentle reverence, and he is distinguished among the assembled (*Th.* 91–92).

Of Hecate it is said:

She sits with respected kings in judgment and whom she wills is distinguished in the assembly among the people (*Th.* 429–30).

The description of Hecate's relationship to the state may have been intended to illustrate her personal involvement in the highest of human activity. It is significant, though, that the Muses and Hecate, whose divine prerogatives and independence are explicitly stated in the *Theogony*, should alone be described as physically present in the political endeavors of men (80–86;

429–30). There is an unusual immediacy to both which suggests that Hesiod knew them as real figures of religious cult. Both function as *κουροτρόφοι*, although the Muses limit their attentions to princes (81–82). Hesiod's encounter with the Muses on Helicon had a profound effect on his life (*Th.* 22–34; *Op.* 656–59). Correspondingly, the characteristic of Hecate most stressed is her closeness to men and her presence in their daily affairs.

In the exercise of her broad powers, Hecate overlaps with other deities in the same areas of human endeavor. Among the gods, she possesses unique status and honor, and among men, the full prerogative of demonstrating her powers. She is also a goddess who receives and answers men's prayers. The textual evidence, then, declares Hecate to be a goddess of especial prominence and the object of religious devotion. There is external evidence of a strong religious tradition surrounding the Muses; for Hecate, there is essentially only the Hesiodic portrait.⁵ We may examine Hesiod's depiction of Hecate in greater depth by comparing it with the archaeological evidence.

II. *The Archaeological Evidence*

Very little can be said with certainty about the early Hecate. Her origins appear to lie in the Near East, particularly in Caria, where personal names compounded with her name are common and where monuments, although of a late date, are numerous.⁶

⁵ G. S. Kirk, "The Structure and Aim of the *Theogony*," *Hésiode et son influence* (Entretiens Fondation Hardt 7; Geneva 1962) 77–80, discusses some untraditional elements in Hesiod's accounts of the Muses and Hecate. For the antiquity of the cult of the Heliconian Muses, see Martin Nilsson, *Griechische Feste von religiöser Bedeutung* (Leipzig 1906) 440; Mayer in *RE* s.v. "Musai" XVI.1 (1933) cols. 696–98; Peter Walcot, *Hesiod and the Near East* (Cardiff 1966) 166; and West (*Theogony*) 152. James G. Frazer (ed.), *Pausanias' Description of Greece* (Cambridge 1897; Reprint New York 1965) V, 141, 147–48 and 150–52, describes in detail the archaeological remains, excavated by the French School from 1881–1891, of the Muses' temples at Thespiac and in the Grove of the Muses on Helicon. Cf. Peter Levi (ed.), *Pausanias: Guide to Greece* (Penguin; Middlesex, England 1971) I, 364 n. 143 and 369 n. 160. For the joint worship of the Muses and Eros at Thespiac, see Paus. 9.31.3 and Plutarch (*Amat.* 1).

⁶ This has been shown by Nilsson, *Griech. Fest.* (above, note 5) 397, n. 3, and *Gesch. gr. Rel.* (above, note 2) 722. Hecate's Carian origins are also argued by

In Caria, Hecate enjoyed much of the dignity and political importance accorded her by Hesiod. She was the protectress of Stratonicea, together with Zeus Panamaros, and enjoyed cult-unions with various deities, including Gaia.⁷ Her other eastern cults, particularly the orgiastic mysteries on Aegina and Samothrace, involved features, such as the offering of dogs, more in keeping with the later Hecate.⁸

The earliest inscriptional evidence for the cult of Hecate is sixth century and occurs on an altar in the temple of Apollo Delphinus at Miletus, where Hecate appeared with Apollo as the protectress of entrances.⁹ She retained this role in the West and a triple statue of her as Hecate-Epipyrigia stood in the fifth century near the entrance to the Athenian Acropolis on the site of the later temple of Nike (Paus. 2.30.2).¹⁰ The earliest known representation of Hecate, however, depicts the goddess in single

Theodor Kraus, *Hekate: Studien zu Wesen und Bild der Göttin in Kleinasien und Griechenland* (Heidelberg 1960) 24–56. A list of names compounded from Hecate (Hekat/o) is included in Ernest Sittig, *De Graecorum Nominibus Theophris* (*Dissertationes Philologicae Halenses*) 20 (1912) 62–67.

⁷ Hecate's temple at Stratonicea and her role as protectress of the city with Zeus Panamaros are examined by Alfred Laumonier, *Cultes indigènes en Carie* (Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome 188; Paris 1958) 344–425. The Carian Hecate was widely worshipped in the East and enjoyed cult-unions with various gods (423–24).

⁸ Annual *telestai* to Hecate on Aegina, which lasted until the fourth century A.D., were reputed to have been founded by Orpheus (Paus. 2.30.2). For Hecate's orgiastic mysteries on Samothrace, see Kraus (above, note 6) 66–70, and Nilsson, *Griech. Fest.*, 398–400. Hecate's numerous cults in the Near East and Greece are listed by Steuding in *RL* s.v. "Hekate" I.2 (1886–1890), cols. 1885–1888.

⁹ The boustrophedon inscription recording the dedication to Hecate by the *prytaneis* Euthras and Leodamas is sixth century, but the altar may be seventh. For the inscription and a discussion of Hecate's and Apollo's roles as guardians of the gateways at Miletus, see Kraus (above, note 6) 11–13. N. J. Richardson (ed.), *The Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (Oxford 1974) 155 and 328–29, suggests that Hecate at Eleusis was identified with Artemis Propylaea, who shared a temple with Poseidon at the entrance to the sanctuary. This temple was part of the early Propylaea, which may have dated to the Archaic Period (p. 7). Cf. Otto Kern, *Die Religion der Griechen* (1926; Berlin 1963) I, 245–46, who proposes a specific sanctuary in which Hecate, Poseidon and Hermes were worshipped jointly. For the dating of the *Hymn to Demeter*, see Richardson (supra) 5–12.

¹⁰ The proper name of the Hecate-Epipyrigia, made by Alcamenes, was Artemis-Hecate: A. S. Murray, *A History of Greek Sculpture* (London 1890) II, 141, n. 1. This statue is also discussed by Frazer (above, note 5) III, 264–65. A thorough survey of the different types of Hekataea from the fifth century to the Roman era is found in Kraus, 95–187.

form, as Hesiod most certainly envisioned her. The terracotta statuette from sixth-century Athens shows Hecate seated stiffly on a throne and wearing a long gown and headpiece. She looks very matronly, and only the inscribed dedication of her worshipper distinguishes the goddess as Hecate.¹¹

Textual evidence for Hecate's early presence in the cult at Eleusis is provided by the *Hymn to Demeter*. In the Hymn, Hecate lives in a cave (24–25) and carries a torch (52) but is not strongly chthonic. In the *Theogony*, Hecate seems totally without chthonic associations. If she had any in the Archaic Period, which were not related specifically to her role in the chthonic cult at Eleusis, Hesiod is silent about them. Hecate's underworld characteristics and identification with black magic did not begin to dominate in literature until the late fifth century with the appearance of Euripides' *Medea* (395–97).¹² Theodor Kraus theorizes that Hecate was transformed from a great goddess, like the Hesiodic Hecate, into a goddess of witchcraft through identification with the Thessalian road-goddess Einodia, who appeared in Athens in the fifth century carrying with her the strong traditions of Thessalian witchcraft. The earliest representations of Hecate in triple form (Hekataea) date, in fact, to this period.¹³

¹¹ Pausanias (2.30.2) mentions Myron's archaized wooden statue of a single Hecate, which was part of her cult at Aegina. The statuette of Hecate, now in the Berlin Antiquarium (Mus. #TC 7729), is inscribed ΑΙΓΩΝ ΑΝΕΘΕΚΕΝ ΘΕΚΑΤΕΙ. The depiction recalls the seated Cybele figures. Several rock formations, resembling thrones, were dedicated to Hecate in the Hellenistic Period on the islands of Chalcis and Rhodes. These mountain-thrones are discussed by Kraus, 26–29, and A. B. Cook, *Zeus* (Cambridge 1925) I, 141–42. A double rock-cut throne on Chalcis was dedicated to both Zeus and Hecate.

¹² In *h. Cer.* 438–40, Hecate is the attendant of Persephone and often appears with her on vases (Richardson, note 9, 155 and 295; Farnell, note 2, 549–51). For copious notes on Hecate's demonic nature, see Erwin Rohde, *Psyche*, trans. W. B. Hillis (New York 1925) 322–25 and 590–95. The demons associated with the later Hecate are discussed by B. C. Dietrich, *Death, Fate and the Gods* (London 1965) 20 and 342–43. Cf. *Op.* 122–26 and 252–55.

¹³ Hecate was also known as Pheraea from Pherae and her cult was widespread in Thessaly. Einodia as a cult-title was associated with Artemis, Selene and Persephone. One of the fragments from the *Catalogue of Women* calls Artemis εἰνοδία: R. Merkelbach and M. L. West (eds.), *Fragmenta Hesiodica* (Oxford 1967) 13, #23a. On the identification of Einodia with Hecate, see Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Der Glaube der Hellenen* (Berlin 1931) I, 173–76. Cf. *Orph. Hymn.* 1.1: Εἰνοδίαν Ἐκάτην κληίζω, τριποδίτην ἑρανῆν. The association of

In central Greece, Attica and Boeotia appear to have had the strongest cults of Hecate, although the archaeological evidence, consisting largely of Hecataea, is fifth century and later.¹⁴ Hecate's presence in the cult at Eleusis, as supported by the Homeric Hymn however, argues for an earlier arrival in Greece. Kraus would place her arrival as early as the Mycenaean Age (pp. 20–23). The absence of monuments from an earlier period does not preclude her presence in Greece. Since Hecate in the *Theogony* had a broad, personal involvement in the affairs of men, she might well have enjoyed private or even family cults in Archaic Greece, as she did in fifth-century Athens when altars were erected to her in front of individual homes.¹⁵

Hesiod's portrait of Hecate may be profitably compared with the depictions on two Boeotian vases of the eighth century, which are roughly contemporary with Hesiod. The first, a

Hecate and Hermes may derive from their connection with roads and crossroads, for in later times offerings were set out for Hecate at the crossroads and she herself was known as "Antaea" (cf. *h. Cer.* 52). For Hecate's connection with roads, see Farnell (above, note 2) 552–54. Female trinities as a Boeotian cult-type are examined by A. Schachter, "Some Underlying Cult Patterns in Boeotia," *First International Conference on Boeotian Antiquities* (McGill Univ.; Montreal 1972) 17–26.

¹⁴ For the transmission of the cult of Hecate from Asia Minor to Greece, see Laumonier (above, note 7) 424, and Walcot (above, note 5) 27, who links Hesiod's father to a group of Hecate-worshipping emigrants from Aeolian Cyme who settled in Boeotia for several years before setting out with the Chalcidians and Eretrians of Euboea in the second half of the eighth century to found Cyme in Italy. West (*Theogony*) 278, suggests that the frequency of Cr(e)ius, Coeus, and Astraeus as men's names in the Archaic Age may be a reflection of the popularity of Hecate. That a local festival of Hecate in Boeotia provided the occasion for the first performance of the *Theogony* has been proposed by B. A. van Groningen, *La Composition littéraire archaïque grecque* (Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen 65 [2]; Amsterdam 1958) 269–70. See H. T. Wade-Gery, "Hesiod," *Phoenix* 3 (1949) 87, and West (*Theogony*) 44–45 and 278, for the theory that the Hecate-passage was composed specifically for the funeral games of Amphidamas at Chalcis.

¹⁵ For these household altars, see Wilamowitz (above, note 13) 170–71. The antiquity of the cult of Hecate in Boeotia is also argued by Paul Mazon (ed.), *Hésiode* (Budé; Paris 1964²) 21–24, and by Rohde (above, note 12) 323, who evaluates Hecate's role in the *Theogony* thus: "Hecate has here become so much the universally revered goddess that she has lost all definite personality in the process. The whole is a telling example of the sort of extension that might be given to a single divinity who had once been the vital cult-object of a small locality."

painted amphora, depicts a goddess with outstretched, wing-like arms above which are large waterfowl. She is flanked by fierce-looking lions with raised feet and protruding tongues, and on her skirt is a large fish.¹⁶



At first glance, the figure on the vase seems to be the typical *πότνια θηρῶν*. The clustering of living creatures around her, particularly the lions who face her and touch her skirt with their paws, illustrates her dominance over them. The same goddess, presumably, could either foster animal life or destroy it, in the manner of Artemis in the Homeric Hymn:

The peaks of the lofty mountains tremble and the shaded wood resounds terribly with the screams of wild beasts. Earth shudders and the sea teeming with fish, but the determined goddess roams everywhere killing the race of wild beasts.

(*h. Dian.* 27.6–10)

¹⁶ An illustration and discussion of the vase now in the National Museum at Athens (Mus. #5839) can be found in Otto Kern, "Elfenbeinrelief aus Kleinasien," *Mitteilungen des deutschen archäologischen Instituts* 50 (1925) 160–62, and Jane Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* (1922³; Reprint New York 1955) 265–66. Although Farnell (522–23) identifies the figure on this vase as Artemis, he points out that the depiction is an example of the widespread artistic motif of the *πότνια θηρῶν*.

The other side of Artemis 'Αγροτέρα (II. 21.470) is her role as protectress of wild animals, especially the young (e.g. Aes. Ag. 135-38; Xen. Ven. 5.14)

Superficially, the goddess on the vase could represent Hecate. The lions, fish and birds suggest the three realms of nature (earth, sea, and sky) in which Hecate is declared to be powerful. Her powers, however, are defined in terms of "human" rather than "wild" nature. Earth (γᾱῖα) for Hecate seems to mean the human world, befitting her role among kings, warriors, horsemen, and herdsmen. On sea (θάλασσα), she is goddess of fishermen. Her τιμή in the sky (οὐρανός) is defined as her honored position among the gods who inhabit the heavens (e.g. 415), rather than her power over the creatures of the air, who are not mentioned. Three of Hecate's animals, the ox, goat, and sheep, are specified by Hesiod (445-46), but they are domesticated, not wild animals. Hecate's power over animals seems directed primarily toward their breeding (444-47). She appears in the pens as the farmer's helper rather than as a huntress in the wilds, like Artemis in the Hymn. After describing Hecate's role among animals belonging to men, Hesiod declares her to be a *κουροτρόφος* (450, 452) who also cares for the young of men.

Although Hecate in the *Theogony* does not function as a *πότνια θηρῶν* or, more generally, as a nature-goddess, the description of her broad powers may be founded in such a religious orientation. Hecate is not simply powerful, but she is powerful specifically over land, sea, and heaven, the natural realms suggested artistically on the vase by the lions, fish, and birds. Even if Hesiod is using earth, sea, and sky as a generality to mean "everywhere," he depicts Hecate actively involved in two of these realms of nature. She is active on earth assisting seven classes of men, and she is active on sea assisting the fishermen. Working with Poseidon, Hecate gives of the contents of the sea or she denies it. When Hecate deprives the fisherman of his haul, she does not simply "take it away," but literally she "takes it for herself" (*ἀφείλετο*). If not *metri causa*, the middle voice may hint at some proprietary interest in the creatures of the sea themselves. It is noteworthy that red mullets were sacrificed to Hecate in the Eleusinian Cult (Ath. 325 B-D). Further, the sharp duality of nature inherent in a *πότνια θηρῶν* may be detected in repeated statements of Hecate's freedom of will, as discussed

earlier. Hecate's ambivalence, in fact, becomes most pronounced in the two areas of concern which are closest to wild nature—fishing (442–43) and animal breeding (446–47). One might ask how exactly Hecate lessens the stock (*καὶ πολλῶν μείονα θῆκεν*), “willing it so.” Does she simply prevent new additions to the herds and flocks? Or does she bring untimely death to the existing animals through disease or her own neglect?


The context in which Hesiod defines Hecate's powers may have been influenced by her genealogy. Hecate is first cousin to Artemis, who undeniably embodies characteristics of a *πότνια θηρῶν* and has other associations with nature.¹⁷ Artemis also has a negative potential among men (*II.* 21.483–84; *Od.* 11.171–73). Hecate's name seems to correspond to Apollo's title *Hekatos* (from *ἑκατηβόλος*), which was applied also to Artemis (e.g. *Ἄρτεμις ἑκάτα*; *Aes. Supp.* 676). Hecate and Artemis were identified with each other from an early date and they eventually had in common at least a dozen cult-titles.¹⁸ In Hesiod, though, Hecate is an esteemed goddess involved in the highest affairs of men and especially different from Artemis in her role as goddess of royal judgment and war.

The second Boeotian vase, a stamped amphora, shows a goddess with uplifted arms who is flanked by two small female figures on either side of whom stands an upright lion heraldically posed. The frieze under the goddess is filled with a parade of animals, possibly deer, and the goddess herself wears a prominent crown, from which hang branch-like projections:¹⁹

¹⁷ Artemis' connection with nature is examined at length by Farnell (427–38). Artemis was goddess of water (e.g. *Λιμναίτις*; Paus. 4.4.2), woodland and trees (e.g. *Καρναίτις*, *Κεδρεαίτις*, and *Ανγοδέσμα*), possibly even fish (as Eurynome at Phegaleia in Arcadia; Paus. 8.41.4). The quail and lion were sacred to her, but she was also identified with the hare, wolf, deer, wild boar, and bear (e.g. *Βραρπονία*). For archaic nature cults in general, see Edward M. Bradley, “*Theogony* 35,” *Symb Oslo* 44 (1969) 12–14, and Martin Nilsson, *Greek Folk Religion* (New York 1940) 8–18, for their survivals in modern Greece.

¹⁸ On the similarity of Hecate and Artemis, see Heckenbach in *RE*, s.v. “Hekate” VII.2 (1912) cols. 2769–71; Farnell, 516–19; and Kraus, 15–17 and 24–26. Cf. Eur. *Phoen.* 108 where Hecate is invoked as the child of Leto. Hecate later seemed to function as the dark side of Artemis.

¹⁹ The vase, slightly later than the first Boeotian vase, is also housed in the National Museum at Athens (Mus. #5898). A picture and discussion of the vase are found in Kern (above, note 16) 161, and Harrison (above, note 16) 264–65, who urges caution about giving the figure a specific name. At least one art



The vase appears to depict a *κουροτρόφος* with arms raised over the heads of the young women standing closely by her sides. In this respect, the goddess could represent Hecate. The pose of the figures, in fact, calls to mind the later Hecataea which depict maidens encircling a herm of Hecate.²⁰ But what of the branches on the goddess' crown? Hecate is the attendant of Persephone in the *Hymn to Demeter* (438–40), but she has nothing directly to do with vegetation in the *Theogony*. Hecate's power on earth (*γαῖα*) seems confined to the inhabited earth rather than to the ground itself (*humus*) or to its cultivation. Hesiod does not say that Hecate, in the manner of Gaia, feeds all creatures on earth (cf. *h. Terr. Mat.* 30.2–7), nor does he mention agriculture in his account of her broad powers among men.

It is curious that Hecate, who is so widely active on earth, has nothing directly to do with the earth itself in the *Theogony*. We may wonder why Hesiod has not depicted Hecate working alongside the farmer in the fields. Since she does appear in the herdsmen's pens, we may assume that her exclusion is not simply a matter of status. Hecate's broad powers would involve her in

historian has identified the goddess as Leto giving birth to Apollo (John Boardman, *Art and Architecture of Ancient Greece* [London 1967], pl. 82), although there is no detail to substantiate that identification.

²⁰ A survey and pictures of these Hecataea appear in Kraus, 129–52.

some way with most classes of society. Although she sits with kings, she is not aristocratic like the Muses. Since Hesiod specifies her role with animal husbandry and excludes any mention of agriculture, we may conclude that Hecate's link with nature, whatever its extent, is closer to the *πότνια θηρῶν* than to the earth-goddess. This is consistent with her genealogical link with Artemis.

It is also possible that Hecate was assigned no *τιμή* in the earth's productivity because that function was closely associated with another deity of established local cult. The cult of Gaia or the earth-goddess was widespread in Greece and Hesiod mentions one of her cult-titles at 117 (*εὐρύστερνος*). He also assigned a popular cult-title of the Earth to the Woman of the *Works and Days*, calling her Pandora.²¹ It is noteworthy that two other major areas in which Hecate has no share, music and sex, are identified with deities for whom there is evidence of local cult—the Muses of Mt. Helicon (Paus. 9.29.1–4) and Eros of Thespieae (Paus. 9.31.3; Plut. *Amat.* 1).

The resemblance of the Hesiodic portrait of Hecate to the depictions on the two Boeotian vases is strengthened if we allow the possibility that the flanking birds and lions on the first vase and the lions and border of animals on the second vase are merely decorative motifs and do not necessarily designate a *πότνια θηρῶν* as such. Keith DeVries, studying Boeotian fibulae of the ninth to seventh centuries, postulates a "formulaic character" to such designs as swastikas, stars, birds, lions, and deer. He makes a distinction between "flanking units" and "representational units" on both the fibulae and pottery of the period.²²

²¹ Literary and inscriptional evidence for the cult of Gaia in Greece has been catalogued according to locale by Friedrich Wilhelm Hamdorf, *Griechische Kultpersonifikationen der vorhellenistischen Zeit* (Mainz 1964) 72–73. For other cult-titles of Gaia, see Albrecht Dieterich, *Mutter Erde* (Leipzig 1925) 36–38. For various compounds built on *-δορος* used to describe the earth's bounty, see Otto Lendle, *Die „Pandorasage“ bei Hesiod* (Würzburg 1957) 63–64. Demeter is also called *Πανδώρα*. Cf. *Op.* 117 and 173.

²² "Oral Poets and Fibula Incisers," *Teiresias* (Supp. 2, 1979) 67–69. By the early seventh century, *πότνια-θηρῶν* figures appear on Boeotian fibulae. DeVries describes (p. 68) a fragmentary headband from Thespieae which he suggests may correspond to Pandora's crown of animals in the *Theogony* (581–84). Cf. Nicole Loraux, "Sur la race des femmes," *Arethusa* 11 (1978) 50–51. A number of the Boeotian fibulae are reproduced in Bernhard Schweitzer, *Greek Geometric Art* (New York 1971) 205–16.

The heraldically posed lions on the second vase seem secondary to the central unit of goddess and maidens, although the lions may suggest the "dangers" from which the goddess, as *κουροτρόφος*, protects her charges and over which, therefore, she has control. In the depiction of *κουροτρόφος* we may catch a glimpse of the Hesiodic Hecate.

It is more difficult to see Hecate in the depiction of the *πότνια θηρῶν* on the first vase since the birds and lions are part of "wild" nature in which Hecate is given no obvious role. It is striking that the goddess on this vase is not, in the usual manner of a *πότνια θηρῶν*, holding the animals by the necks or legs to demonstrate her absolute power over them. It is doubtful, however, that the birds and lions could merely be "flanking units" because of their position above and below the goddess' arms. In any case, the animal's head and leg, which do flank the goddess, are not common motifs and may reflect some aspect of her nature, such as a connection with animal sacrifices, but this is only speculation.²³ The fish is a striking feature and presumably important to the goddess' depiction since it appears on her skirt. The fish is not regularly part of the "wild" nature associated with a *πότνια θηρῶν* since a *θήρ* is a wild animal specifically. The fish must suggest the goddess' association with the sea and fish, perhaps even with fishermen. In this regard, we may detect Hecate. Although there are some suggestive similarities between the Boeotian vases and the Hesiodic portrait, it is impossible to identify either depiction as Hecate. There are details which conflict with the Hesiodic portrait, and those that appear to correspond cannot be identified with certainty.

III. Conclusion

We are left finally with Hesiod's portrait of Hecate—an esteemed goddess personally involved in many areas of human life, but one whose origins and true nature lie hidden behind the

²³ An interesting interpretation of the figure on this vase as the "archetypal goddess of opposites" is offered by Erich Neumann, *The Great Mother*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Bollingen Series 47; New York 1955) 275–76. Copious illustrations of geometric designs and motifs are provided by Schweitzer (above, note 22) 32–118, and Boardman (above, note 19) 119–48.

brilliance of her extraordinary *τιμή*. Hesiod's portrait of Hecate is unique. It is her earliest appearance in Greek literature and nowhere else is she depicted so reverently. Statements of Hecate's independence in bestowing blessings occur as a refrain in the recitation of her broad involvement in the affairs of men. Hesiod is careful to stress that Hecate acts "as she will," both in the halls of princes and in the herdsmen's pens. Hesiod, perhaps, is eager to encourage the "willing" side of a goddess whose face we shall have to be content to view in shadow.

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HYMN. VEN. 140 AND THE USE OF ἄποινα

εἰπεῖν πατρί τ' ἐμῷ καὶ μητέρι κηδομένη περ·
οἱ δέ κέ τοι χρυσόν τε ἄλις ἐσθῆτά θ' ὕφαντήν
140 πέμψουσιν, σὺ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγλαὰ δέχθαι ἄποινα

Aphrodite is making a request to Anchises about the conventions to be preserved prior to their wedding and specifically about her dowry. Scholars have found the use of ἄποινα in this context "strange."¹ In a basic treatment of the subject, Finley could offer no explanation, and various suggestions have not been convincing. The claim that the word is used for "dowry"² has rightly been called "unzutreffend,"³ and the notion that a technical term for compensation has been so misused⁴ is equally deserving of the epithet. Most recently, Cassola⁵ has revived an interpretation, a form of which goes back as far as Matthiae.⁶ Probably, he suggests, the poet is thinking of the situation in which the stranger is deprived of all judicial protection and could be made the slave of anyone: at the moment at which Aphrodite

¹ M. I. Finley, "Marriage, Sale and Gift in the Homeric World," *RIDA* ser. 3, vol. (1955) 167-94, at 171, 182 n. 47. Cf. B. Suhle, *De hymno Homérico quarto* (Progr. des staedtischen Gymnasiums Stolp 1878) 22: "Vocabulum ἄποινα . . . talem vim habet qualem neque ullo Homeri loco habet neque Homeri aetate accepisse videtur."

² A. Gemoll, *Die Homerischen Hymnen* (Leipzig 1886) and T. W. Allen, W. R. Halliday, E. E. Sikes, *The Homeric Hymns*² (Oxford 1936) ad loc.

³ K. Rüter in *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos*, 1094.

⁴ E. Heitsch, *Aphroditehymnus, Aeneas und Homer*, Hypomnemata 15 (Göttingen 1965) 29-30. The claim was challenged in a review by J. A. Davison, *Gnomon* 38 (1966) 645-49, at 646: "'recompense' (i.e. the technical meaning of the word) is exactly in point here: Anchises will have to pay a big 'bride-price,' but he can expect to receive even more from his bride's parents." The obvious difficulty with this formulation is that no bride-price is mentioned nor is an exchange of gifts between bride and groom even implied.

⁵ F. Cassola, *Inni omerici* (Milano 1975) 551-52, followed by E. Bickerman, "Love Story in the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite," *Athenaeum* n.s. 54 (1976) 229-54, at 231 n. 8.

⁶ A. Matthiae, *Animadversiones in hymnos Homericos* (Leipzig 1880) 362: *retributio pro respecta et servata filia*. So A. Baumeister, *Hymni Homerici* (Leipzig 1860) 261.

seeks to be accepted as a legitimate wife but fears to be taken as a slave or concubine, she thinks of the dowry as a compensation ("riscatto").

Thus, two interpretations, dowry or compensation. The first is unnecessary: the conventional mention of a dowry in this context is satisfied by lines 138–39. The second interpretation is correct,⁷ though not for reasons yet stated, for it depends upon literary—not social—conventions.

I suggest that *HVen* 92–140 is modeled on a conflation of a particular scene from the *Odyssey* and a typical scene in the *Iliad*. The element common to both is supplication and the relationship between the suppliant and the supplicated, viz., that the former is totally in the power of the latter. It is this relationship which is here exploited by the poet, for Aphrodite, as suppliant, is only apparently in the control of Anchises.

It has been noted in passing⁸ that the model for the dialogue between Aphrodite and Anchises is the meeting of Nausicaa and Odysseus in *Odyssey* 6, but the parallels seem not to have been spelled out in detail. When Odysseus first hears the sound of Nausicaa and her companions, he compares it to the sound of nymphs (6.123–25).⁹ He addresses Nausicaa as *ἄνασσα* (6.150), wonders if she is divine or human and, if divine, compares her to Artemis (6.150–52). Anchises addresses Aphrodite as *ἄνασσα* (92) and thinks she may be one of a number of goddesses—his list begins with Artemis (93)—or one of the nymphs (97–99).

When Odysseus begins his request proper, he notes that it is Nausicaa to whom he has come first (6.175–76: *σὲ γὰρ κακὰ πολλὰ μογήσας/ἐς πρώτην ἰκόμην*¹⁰) uses the language of suppli-

⁷ So Rüter, op. cit., 1093, although he is wrong to class Aphrodite with Andromache's mother and Chryses' daughter as instances of "erbeutete oder geraubte Frauen" for whom "Lösegeld" must be paid.

⁸ Allen-Halliday-Sikes ad 92.

⁹ *HVen* 99 = *Od.* 6.124. A. Teske, *Die Homer-Mimesis in den homerischen Hymnen* (Greifswald 1936) 49–50 thought that the model of vs. 97–99 was *Iliad* 20.8, 9 (= *HVen* 99), which mention wood-nymphs and river-nymphs, and that the poet produced an "Erweiterung seines Vorbildes" by adding mountain-nymphs from the *Odyssey*. But there is no thematic connection with the *Iliad* in these lines, and it is the mountain-nymphs who are most apt to the situation of Anchises, who finds himself *ἐν ἀκροπόλοις ὄρεσιν πολυπιδάκου Ἰδης* (54).

¹⁰ For the connection between *ἰκνέομαι* and supplication (*ἰκεσία*), see E. Benveniste, *Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes* (Paris 1969) 2.253, and note Alcinous' words to Odysseus (7.301): *σὺ δ' ἄρα πρώτην ἰκέτευσας*.

cation (6.149: *γουννοῦμαί σε*), compliments her parents and brothers (6.154–55) and refers to the possibility of her wedding and dowry (6.158–59). Aphrodite remarks that she has come to Anchises (130: *αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ σ' ἰκόμην, κρατερὴ δέ μοι ἐπλετ' ἀνάγκη*), uses the language of supplication (131: *ἀλλὰ σε πρὸς Ζηνὸς γουνάζομαι ἥδ' ἐ τοκῆων*), compliments his parents and mentions his brothers (132–35), and refers to a wedding with dowry (142). It is through one of these parallels—the motif of supplication¹¹—that *ἄποινα* is to be explained.

Not found in the *Odyssey*, the word occurs twenty-seven times in the *Iliad* and always means compensation. In twenty-one of these occurrences, it refers to compensation preceded by urgent supplication. In book 1, it is used seven times to describe or refer to the ransom of Chryses' daughter (13 = 372, 20, 23 = 377, 95, 111); in book 24, seven times of the ransom of Hector's body (137, 139, 276, 502, 555, 579, 594). The remaining seven instances are of supplication on the battlefield: Adrestus, Peisander and Hippolochus (6.46, 49 = 11.131, 134), Dolon (10.380), Lycaon (21.99) and Hector (22.349).¹²

Now these scenes contain typical, i.e. repeated, elements, four of which are relevant to *HVen.*: (1) the language of supplication;¹³ (2) a request;¹⁴ (3) an imperative of *δέχομαι* addressed to the person supplicated;¹⁵ (4) the *ἄποινα*, whether specified¹⁶ or not. So, in the *Hymn*, (1) *γουνάζομαι* (131); (2) *δεῖξον* (134), *πέμψαι* (137); (3, 4) *ἀγλαὰ δέχθαι ἄποινα* (140).

The way in which the poet has combined and adapted the Homeric scenes in the dialogue between Anchises and Aphrodite anticipates the later reversal in their relationship and is particularly relevant to the persona Aphrodite assumes. This part of the

¹¹ Cf. J. P. Gould, "Hiketeia," *JHS* 93 (1973) 74–103, especially 75 ff., for his distinction between ritual and figurative supplication.

¹² Four times the word is used of reported instances of past (2.230; 6.427; 11.105) or future (24.686) compensation; twice of Agamemnon's promises to Achilles (9.120 = 19.137).

¹³ Chryses, *λίσσεται* (1.15); Adrestus, *λαβὼν ἐλίσσεται γούνων* (6.45); Dolon, *λίσσασθαι* (10.454); Peisander and Hippolochus, *γουνάζεσθην* (11.130); Tros, (20.469); Lycaon, *γουννοῦμαι* (21.74); Hector, *λίσσομαι* (22.338); Priam, *λίσσόμενος* (24.485).

¹⁴ *λύσαστε* (1.20); *ζώγρει/εἴτε* (6.46; 10.378; 11.131); *μὴ με κτεῖνε* (21.95); *μὴ με ἔα* (22.339).

¹⁵ *δέχεσθαι* (1.20); *δέξαι* (6.46 = 11.131); *δέδεξο* (22.340).

¹⁶ Specified: 6.48 = 11.133; 10.379; 23.340.

dialogue (lines 95 ff.) begins as if it is Anchises who will play the role of Odysseus but that role is taken over by Aphrodite when the motif of supplication is introduced. The language she uses is suited to her fictitious situation. In the formal language of supplication, *σε πρὸς Ζηνὸς γουνάζομαι ἡδὲ τοκῆων ἐσθλῶν*, the mention of the parents of the supplicated leads into her compliment to them, and this is balanced toward the end of the scene by her reference to her own (supposed) parents. Again, the phrase *ἀγλαὰ δέχθαι ἄποινα* is particularly suitable, for it is found in Homer only in reference to Chryses' ransom of his daughter (*Il.* 1.23 = 377).

The main point in the use of the supplication-motif is to set up the specific relationship whereby it is totally in the power of the supplicated to grant what is requested.¹⁷ Anchises accepts Aphrodite's persona by summarizing (145–48) the words she had used to establish that persona (110–11, 121, 125–26): it is the concomitant recognition¹⁸ of that power which inspires the boast that no man or god will prevent him from bedding Aphrodite immediately. Like the Greek warriors of the *Iliad*, he rejects supplication.

But this relationship is impermanent. With the coming of dawn, Aphrodite asserts her authority: "*Ὀρσεο, Δαρδανίδη* (176).²⁰ On recognizing²¹ who she is, Anchises acknowledges her authority and, for the last time in the poem, speaks:

184 καὶ μιν λισσόμενος ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα
187 ἀλλὰ σε πρὸς Ζηνὸς γουνάζομαι αἰγιόχοιο.

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¹⁷ Cf. Gould, 80–81.

¹⁸ Note especially *ἰκάνεις* of 147, picking up *ἰκόμην* of 130.

¹⁹ In line 151, Anchises specifies Apollo: this may be another reference to the Chryses' scene.

²⁰ Nausicaa to Odysseus, after she has begun to grant his requests: "*Ὀρσεο δὴ νῦν ζεῖνε* (6.255).

²¹ The model here (181–82) is Helen's recognition of Aphrodite (*Il.* 3.396–98).

THE CASTING VOTE

Aeschylus *Eumenides* 734–41 runs (OCT):

Αθ. ἐμὸν τόδ' ἔργον, λοισθήϊαν κρῖναι δίκην·
 ψῆφον δ' Ὀρέστη τήνδ' ἐγὼ προσθήσομαι.
 μήτηρ γὰρ οὐτις ἔστιν ἢ μ' ἐγείνατο,
 τὸ δ' ἄρσεν αἰνῶ πάντα, πλὴν γάμου τυχεῖν,
 ἅπαντι θυμῷ, κάρτα δ' εἰμὶ τοῦ πατρός.
 οὕτω γυναικὸς οὐ προτιμήσω μόρον
 ἄνδρα κτανούσης δωμάτων ἐπίσκοπον.
 νικᾷ δ' Ὀρέστης, κἂν ἰσόψηφος κριθῇ.

which I would translate prosaically:

Athena "This is my task, to make the last judgment of the case; I will add this vote of mine to Orestes. For there is no mother who bore me, and I honour the male in all things, except for getting married, with all my heart, and I belong very much to my father. Thus I will not give preference to the fate of a woman (wife) who killed her man (husband), the guardian of the palace. Orestes wins, even if the judgment is by equal vote."

Some ten lines later it emerges that the contingency mentioned by Athena has in fact occurred. She announces that the number of votes, which have been counted in the meantime, is equal, and the long chain of crime and punishment in the house of Atreus is broken; for the first time in the *Oresteia*, the killer is not himself to be killed. It is hardly surprising that so crucial a passage has attracted a good deal of critical attention,¹ which revolves around two issues. The first issue is—what is Athena doing? The traditional view, discussed at length by Müller, Verrall, and Thomson, and accepted by Campbell, Croiset, Winnington-Ingram, Podlecki, Fagles and most other scholars, is that she is giving a casting vote to break a tie; but Hermann's argument, accepted by Wilamowitz, Kitto, and Vickers and restated by Gagarin, is that she votes as an ordinary member of the jury and thus creates a tie. The second issue is even more important. Why

¹ See the bibliography at the end, section A. Works there mentioned are cited by author only.

is she doing whatever she is doing? Could not Aeschylus have given her an argument less personal and (apparently) frivolous² for deciding so weighty an issue?

Before we attempt to decide these questions, it is as well to look at what has gone before. Orestes has avenged his father by killing his mother at the express command of Apollo, backed up by the most weighty threats.³ He is now on trial before the court of the Areopagus; Athena is president, the Furies are prosecuting, Apollo himself defending. Clearly, his action can be viewed in different lights; one may stress the justice of revenge and the restoration of legitimate rule, as do Homer and Sophocles, or the horror of matricide, as does Euripides. In the *Choephoroi* both are allowed to appear. What of this play?

Both sides, clearly, have at least one strong argument. Apollo is surely justified in arguing the sacredness of the institution of marriage (213–21); the Furies, in maintaining that no city can stand if patricide and matricide go unpunished (508–25). Other arguments are less convincing.⁴ The Furies have no real justification for ignoring other types of murder (212) or refusing to take any account of motive (427). Apollo has a long string of dubious arguments (614–21, 625–39, 644–51, 657–66) in which he urges that the authority of Zeus is to be put above the judicial oath, that a woman's life is intrinsically of less value than a man's, that death is an irrevocable penalty, and that the mother is not a true parent but only a receptacle; the first two arguments are doubtful, the third ambivalent, and the fourth (even if it was bolstered by the authority of Anaxagoras⁵) ignores the natural

² See especially Ferguson, Golden, Livingstone, Lloyd-Jones, Pohlenz, Rose, Smyth, Vellacott, Verrall, and Wilamowitz.

³ E.g. *Choephoroi* 271–96, 1029–33, *Eumenides* 203; Vellacott's attempt to disprove this as inherently improbable and as refuted by the claim of the Furies (*Eum.* 313–15) that they do not harm the innocent (and so cannot have been the agents of Apollo, as Orestes had said) is a prime example of the 'documentary fallacy' (A. J. A. Waldock *Sophocles the Dramatist* [Cambridge 1966] 11–24). The principle to apply is that of E. R. Dodds (*Bacchae* ed., Oxford 1944) xlv: "An audience must inevitably accept stage personages and stage happenings as being—for the purposes of the play—what they profess to be, unless someone on the stage knows better and says so."

⁴ On the weakness of the arguments on both sides see e.g. Grillparzer, Lebeck, Reinhardt, Richter, Smyth, Snell, Treston, and Winnington-Ingram; full references are in section B of the bibliography.

⁵ Aristotle *De Generatione Animalium* 763b. His own view is that the father provides the form, the mother the matter (*ibid.* 729a).

feelings of the audience and can hardly have been psychologically convincing. On the majority view,⁶ the arguments balance, and both sides have recourse to threats (711–20) in an attempt to clinch the case. This balance appears because Aeschylus has made it appear. He could have tipped the scales decisively in favour of Orestes in several ways. The argument of Apollo on parentage could have been presented as conclusive, and Kuhns and Vickers especially are inclined to see it as such. But it is not so in the play; it is followed by the further disputation in which Apollo barely holds his own, and although Athena uses his example (herself) she does not draw his conclusion. Thomson (followed by Fagles) has a long argument to demonstrate that the subordination of women to men was essential to the law of property which was the basis of Athenian society, but this view is not reflected in the text. We would be inclined to stress rather the restoration of legitimate rule (Schottlaender) or the fact that Orestes was not a free agent and that the will of Zeus must prevail (Perrotta); these have indeed been touched on, but do not seem to be in view at the crucial time. Alternatively, if he were prepared to take liberties with his myth, he could have weighted the scales against Orestes by giving him improper motives, so that the argument that he is fulfilling the will of Zeus loses its force, and he becomes fully guilty. This seems to be the case of Agamemnon at Aulis, but only Vellacott maintains it for Orestes, and his citations are selective if not downright misleading. Aeschylus seems to be preparing us for an equally divided jury.

But is the jury equally divided before Athena votes? At this stage we must distinguish three situations:

- (a) The actual practice at Athenian trials, especially trials before the Areopagus
- (b) An alternative version of the myth, according to which Orestes was tried at Athens before a jury of the Olympian gods
- (c) The trial as presented in the *Eumenides*.

There is no major difficulty with respect to (a). The question of a tied vote would not often arise, since the number in a jury was usually odd. But presumably it could arise even then. The Areo-

⁶So e.g. Dirksen, Kitto, Lloyd-Jones, Maddalena, Nodder, Reinhardt, Said, Smethurst, Winnington-Ingram, Wolf: full references in bibliography.

pagus was a different case. Since all members served on juries the number of the jurymen would, at the classical period, be indefinite, even though it was fixed at 31 in later Roman times;⁷ a tied vote could thus arise normally. Whenever a tie arose, it was broken in favour of a defendant.⁸ What is less clear is whether Athena is regarded as casting the tie-breaking vote. Euripides⁹ specifically links the rule with the case of Orestes in two of the three passages which refer to this trial, and Julian states as a general rule that the tie-breaking vote is the vote of Athena. Pollux speaks of the archon basileus, the president of the Areopagus, voting with the jury, and it is tempting to see this as the device by which the vote of Athena as first president was symbolized; the evidence, however, is late, and it is not clear that a casting vote is meant. Lucian, on the other hand, twice records an appeal to Athena to give a vote in favour when there is a majority of one against the defendant, so as to produce a tie. This could not have been the historical practice (so that a majority of at least two would have been required to condemn) but is rather based on a mythological precedent, which we shall soon see.

The variant version (b) of the trial of Orestes is also fairly clear; it is referred to by Euripides' *Orestes*, Demosthenes, and the *Panathenaic Oration* of Aristides. Here the jury was the twelve Olympian Gods, so Athena's vote would presumably have been required to make the voting equal, and this is spelt out in detail by the later scholiast on Aristides; in spite of which, the earlier scholiast and that on the *Orestes* still have her using a casting vote after the other votes were equal. Clearly we have a contamination of the two traditions, and we may suspect that the scholiasts are merely guessing. But at least we have a mythological parallel for Lucian, so that he need not have had the *Eumenides* in mind in referring to the vote of Athena.

Direct evidence on the meaning of this passage is, as Gagarin stresses, to a considerable extent ambiguous; the first passage from the *Iph. Taur.*, the Parian marble (if correctly restored) and

⁷ Gagarin "The vote" p. 126 with references; the number 31 is from the scholiast on line 746, but the text may have been altered (Thomson).

⁸ E.g. Antiphon *De Caede Herodis* 51, (Aristotle) *Problems* 29.13, Strabo 9.2.4.

⁹ Euripides *Iph. Taur.* 1471–72, *Electra* 1268–69; for other references see bibliography section C.

Apollodorus merely say that the votes were equal without making it clear how this equality was achieved. A scholiast on the *Eumenides*, which gives the number of the jury as 31 (if its text is sound) would seem to point to Athena voting thirty-second; but another scholiast, also of doubtful text (restored by Hermann) runs: "I will add the last vote, by which, whenever they are equal, the defendant wins."

One passage of Aristeides¹⁰ is quite explicit; the votes were equal before Athena voted, and this is the casting vote of Athena which still produces acquittal when the votes are tied. It is natural to interpret the two passages of Euripides already cited¹¹ in the same way. The link with the principle 'equal votes acquit' strongly suggests that he is dealing with a human jury whose votes were equally divided. He mentions only Athena, which is odd if he is here following the version of trial by the twelve Olympians found in his *Orestes*, in which Athena (presumably) voted last and tied the vote by doing so. He was certainly well acquainted with the *Oresteia*, as even a superficial reading of his *Electra* shows; is it not most likely that he is following Aeschylus here? His version seems to show that the casting vote in a tied jury was regarded as the 'vote of Athena' in fifth-century Athens. It is not surprising that Gagarin sees these passages as the main threat to his position, and is reduced to warning us not to be misled.

It is time to return to the text of the play itself. We have already established that Aeschylus is preparing us for a tie. Gagarin argues that the tie *includes* the vote of Athena, who votes twelfth. His basic reasons are:

(1) The voting is accompanied by ten couplets (711-30), spoken alternately by the Furies and Apollo, and a final triplet; these eleven speeches provide for eleven voters (so also Kitto); (2) Athena's language (735) strongly suggests that she actually has a voting pebble in her hand. What does she do with it, and how is this displayed on the stage? The simplest assumption is that she puts it in the urn soon after mentioning it and before the count starts in 742, so that it is counted with the others; on any other assumption the audience could have been left in doubt about what had happened. Kitto adds (3) that it is very effective

¹⁰ Orationes 2.24.

¹¹ Footnote 9.

for Athena to vote as a member of the jury at its first trial: "Certainly it would be no trivial lesson, if, the next time these citizens served as jury, they felt that the unseen goddess was one of their number, judging in a spirit of reason and mercy."

These points are less than convincing. In (1) we have to explain the unexpected triplet. It is (perhaps) more likely that it provides for the last juror to vote and retire and Athena to come forward than that it provides for two jurors to vote. But surely it could even more easily provide for no jurors to vote, but for Athena to cross to the voting urns?¹² With respect to (2), I would agree that Athena has a voting pebble in her hand at 735. She emphasizes that it is the *last* vote and that she *will* cast it *in addition*, which language at least seems to leave it open to her not to at once put it in an urn. She is waiting to see if the votes are equal (741); if not, no responsibility will rest with her. In 751 Apollo refers to *one* vote saving a household; this seems to be preparing us for a single vote. In 752–53 Athena announces that Orestes is acquitted since the votes are equal. It is reasonable to assume that she ostentatiously adds her vote to a pile from one of the urns (which vote the audience will easily assume to be for acquittal) as she does so. She does not need to say what she is doing or why, as she has said this immediately before. There is every reason for her to say nothing. She is about to act as mediator between the Furies and the Athenians, and she must not unnecessarily provoke them now; her vote must appear an automatic sequel to her already announced intention, not a personal verdict against them. (3) is clearly a purely subjective opinion, derived from Kitto's general thesis that the divine and human levels operate simultaneously in Greek tragedies.

The arguments on the other side are considerably stronger. Verrall points out that in 471–72 Athena expressly disclaimed any intention of deciding the case. Can she now vote to overrule the human jury to which she has entrusted it? Thomson also sees an inconsistency with 795–96, in which she tells the Furies that they have not really been defeated because the votes were equal. More significant, surely, are the reactions of Orestes and the Furies. If Athena's vote produced the tie, the human votes going against Orestes, we would expect Orestes to be indignant with the Athenians and extremely grateful to Athena; the Furies, on

¹² The argument for 10 jurors is developed in Verrall *Camb. Prael.* loc. cit.

the other hand, would be well disposed to the Athenians and furious with Athena. What do we in fact find? Orestes (754-77) does indeed express first his gratitude to Athena, as in all courtesy he must, but he continues with an enthusiastic restatement of his promise (289-91) that his successors will be faithful allies of Athens. The Furies divide their reproaches (778-92, 808-23) between the "new gods" and the Athenians, but are especially heavy on the latter; they do not mention Athena by name. Does this not fit the assumption that the human votes were equal, and Athena gave the casting vote?

Let us try to look at the possibilities as they may have appeared to the dramatist. He wants the cases for and against Orestes to balance. This would suggest an equal vote on the human jury. Orestes must, however, be acquitted. He probably found already established the legal principle that equal votes acquit. This would be hopelessly undramatic. Athena must vote in person as (perhaps) she was already deemed to have symbolically voted in other cases. But if her decisive vote is announced after the equality of human votes has been established, the natural sequel will be for the wrath of the Furies to be turned on her, and the subsequent scene, in which she acts as a mediator between her city and them, will be difficult to stage. No; let her declare her preference for Orestes before the decisive moment, so that it is not clear that her vote will be counted and the immediate wrath of the Furies can be avoided, and let the balance of responsibility rest with the jury, not with her.

She must, however, give a reason, and here there is a difficulty. Will not the reason destroy the balance that Aeschylus has been at pains to establish? Will it not commit him to one side or the other, when neither side can be regarded as altogether right or wrong? This, I would maintain, is the basic reason why her vote is given on personal grounds. She does, it is true, repeat Apollo's argument that the male should have preference over the female, just as in 685-706 she repeated the argument of the Furies that fear is a necessary element in a civilized state. Although she was used as an example by Apollo to demonstrate that the mother is not a parent, she does not draw this conclusion herself. Rather, she gives the one reason which could never be used as a precedent in any actual trial and thus breaks a deadlock which was on moral grounds insoluble. What juror in the future will ever be

called upon to vote who is the direct offspring of Zeus and has never had a mother?

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THE DEBATE-SCENES IN THE *AJAX*

The sharp personal and philosophical conflicts in which Greek tragedy abounds take many forms, but the poets often cast them in a fairly standard pattern to be referred to here as a debate-scene or *agōn*, identified and studied in detail some time ago by Jacqueline Duchemin.¹ It consists of two long speeches by the antagonists, followed by a series of quick exchanges, usually in stichomythia. This pattern of dialogue may occasionally be used for things other than debates. For example, the *Ajax* opens with an exchange of speeches, then of stichomythia, between Athena and Odysseus, but the scene is aimed at explaining Ajax' attack on the cattle, not at airing any disagreements between Odysseus and his divine patroness. It is not a true *agōn*. In general, however, when we find the pattern of long speech—long speech—stichomythia, we find an *agōn* in a recognizable Greek sense of the word—a contest or debate.

Duchemin regards the *agōn* form as a fairly late creation, born of Sophokles' interest in dramatic clashes and nurtured by Euripides' fascination with sophistic debate.² Yet we find it at work in late Aischylos. The so-called "carpet-scene" in the *Agamemnon* (855-943) follows the *agōn* form very nicely, with a long speech in which Klytaimnestra hypocritically welcomes her returning husband and urges him to walk on the tapestry, a shorter speech in which Agamemnon refuses, and some stichomythia in which they argue the matter out.³ The scene does not begin as a debate,

¹ Jacqueline Duchemin, *L'AGŌN dans la tragédie grecque*² (Paris 1968). Her "définition sommaire" of the form appears on pages 39-41. Of critical works on Sophokles, the most important for this paper, cited hereafter by author's name only, are: C. M. Bowra, *Sophoclean Tragedy* (Oxford 1944); Luigi F. Coraluppi, "Interpretazione dell'*Aiace* di Sofocle" *Dioniso* 42 (1968) 115-42; G. H. Gellie, *Sophocles: A Reading* (Melbourne 1972); G. M. Kirkwood, *A Study of Sophoclean Drama* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1958); Gennaro Perrotta, *Sofocle* (Milan 1935); Thomas G. Rosenmeyer, *The Masks of Tragedy* (Austin 1963); R. P. Winnington-Ingram, *Sophocles: An Interpretation* (Cambridge 1980); and the commentaries of Lewis Campbell (Oxford 1881), R. C. Jebb (Cambridge 1896), J. C. Kamerbeek (Leiden 1953), and W. B. Stanford (London 1963).

² Duchemin 108-23.

³ The discussion of the *Agamemnon* in Duchemin 46f. omits this scene altogether. The omission is understandable given the broad scope of Duchemin's

but it soon falls into a form (or the playwright pushes it into a form) which admirably suits its true nature—a battle of wits and wills, in which Klytaimestra's victory over her husband on the palace steps foreshadows her later victory in Agamemnon's bath. This presentation of a latent struggle in the debate-scene form seems too neat to be accidental. Aischylos may have meant his audience (or at least its more sophisticated members) to recognize the form as a regular way for characters in tragedy to conduct a debate, or he may simply have counted on their sensing the underlying conflict from the pattern of the dialogue (so well suited for scenes of conflict) without consciously identifying the form of the scene. Either way, the "carpet-scene" shows the *agōn* form in action as early as 458 B.C., and suggests that it was sufficiently well established even then for a playwright to use it to comment on the content of the scene to which it gave shape.

If Aischylos could do this in the *Agamemnon*, then we may expect further exploitation of the debate-scene form in later plays, when it was better established, hence more likely to be used by playwrights and recognized by audiences. Indeed, it is put to some interesting uses in Sophokles' *Ajax*, which critical consensus places well after the *Agamemnon*, though still early among Sophokles' extant plays. It is a play in which debate-scenes are especially important, for it contains three of them, and they take up just over a quarter of its length.⁴ The first of these scenes is not overtly a debate, but (rather like Aischylos' "carpet-scene") it uses the *agōn* form to bring out a conflict lying beneath the surface. The second and third provide the denouement of the play with its structure, and also with some important clues to its meaning.

I.

The first scene under consideration begins with Ajax' first monologue (430–80), where the hero broods over his disgrace,

study, but her conclusion (46, 108–12) that Aischylos never used the fully developed *agōn* form should be modified.

⁴ *Ajax* and *Tekmessa*, 430–544; *Menelaos* and *Teukros*, 1047–1162; *Agamemnon*, *Teukros*, and *Odysseus*, 1226–1375. I omit the prologue, for reasons given in the opening paragraph of my text. Duchemin 56 considers the play "particulièrement riche au point de vue qui nous intéresse."

considers the different courses of action open to him, and resolves to kill himself. The speech's close reasoning and careful consideration of alternatives would make it a good debate-piece, but it remains a monologue, intended only to help the proud and isolated hero work out his dilemma in his own mind.⁵ When he finishes, however, the scene shows some signs of turning into a debate. The Koryphaios makes a short comment (a common practice in debate-scenes),⁶ and Tekmessa makes a speech of her own (485–524—50 lines to his 51), urging Ajax to live and addressing herself to the issues raised in his monologue. After this, the form of the debate-scene continues, for the Koryphaios again makes a brief comment, and we launch into a run of short exchanges (stichomythia twice broken by distichs) between Ajax and Tekmessa (527–44). However, the debate itself seems at an end. Ajax, no more inclined to debate now than when he began speaking, ignores Tekmessa's words, changes the subject abruptly, and calls for his son Eurysakes. The stichomythia is concerned with getting Eurysakes on stage, in preparation for Ajax' second monologue, his address to his infant son (545–82). There is no debate (for Tekmessa does not defy Ajax' command), and the subject of the long speeches, whether Ajax should live or die, is dropped.⁷

So we seem to have a highly disjointed debate-scene, perhaps even a mass of unrelated material which fell into the *agōn* form by accident. However, closer inspection of the text shows that there is an issue which ties the long speeches and the stichomythia together: not the immediate question of Ajax' suicide, but a more abstract concern, the nature of nobility. This central theme appears in all parts of our debate-scene.

⁵ On the monologue as Ajax' preferred means of self-expression, here and elsewhere, see Perrotta 135f., Heinrich Weinstock, *Sophokles*³ (Wuppertal 1948) 49f.

⁶ Duchemin 152f.

⁷ Duchemin, noting the abrupt change of subject between the long speeches and the stichomythia, takes the short exchanges after Ajax' second monologue (585–95) as the real conclusion of this *agōn*, the material at 527–44 being part of an interlude with Eurysakes. This appears as a suggestion on pages 56f. and becomes more definite with repetition (115, 137, 147 note 1, 218). This is awkward, and I hope to show that it is unnecessary. Those who wish may see the whole long scene at 430–595 as a vast complex *agōn* with three long speeches and two runs of stichomythia, a debate-and-a-half; but the sections with Eurysakes are, as we shall see, no mere interlude.

Ajax' first monologue shows him to be fairly obsessed with his standing and responsibilities as a member of his family—that is, with being *εὐγενής*, “noble,” or more literally, “well born.”⁸ When he catalogues his woes, the first item on his list, elaborated at some length, is his failure to win honors comparable to those which his father won in an earlier war at Troy (434–40). When he turns to consider what to do about his plight, Telamon haunts him again. He immediately rejects the idea of returning home, because facing his father without a prize to match his father's would be unbearable (460–66). He decides to commit suicide, at least partly to show his father that he is true to his nature, a real son of Telamon (470–72). To cling to dear life would be shameful (*αἰσχροτόν*, 473). He sums up his speech with a pithy declaration that the man who is “well born” must either live honorably or die honorably. That is all there is to the matter:

ἀλλ' ἢ καλῶς ζῆν ἢ καλῶς τεθνηκέναι
τόν εὐγενῆ χρεή. πάντ' ἀκήκοας λόγον.

(479f.)

In replying to this speech, Tekmessa proves herself an able debater. She accepts Ajax' values and appropriates his ethical terms, but redefines them to recommend a different course of action.⁹ Where Ajax is moved by the claims of the family (the pressure to equal his father's achievements, the fear of facing his father in disgrace), Tekmessa presses family claims of a different sort. She speaks at length of her dependence and that of their son Eurysakes on Ajax. She also speaks of his parents' need for him

⁸ On Ajax' preoccupation with *εὐγένεια* and on the ways it shapes his attitudes towards both his father and his son, see T. B. L. Webster, *An Introduction to Sophocles*² (London 1969) 57f., Gellie 10f., Winnington-Ingram 30f. On the theme generally, see Gregory Bernard Elftmann, “Nobility of Birth in Sophoclean Drama” (diss., Pennsylvania 1973).

⁹ The connection between the closing lines of the two speeches is widely noted, but it goes deeper than these lines only. For fuller analysis, see Kirkwood 105f. and Robert M. Torrance, “Sophocles: Some Bearings,” *HSCP* 69 (1965) 269–327 at 276–78. Critics sometimes stress Tekmessa's failure to communicate with Ajax or even to understand his world: Torrance *ibid.*, Karl Reinhardt, *Sophokles*³ (Frankfurt 1947) 30. She is even castigated for *maladresse* by Georges Méautis, *Sophocle: Essai sur le héros tragique* (Paris 1957) 29f., 33. Yet her skillful approach to the hero by invoking the things he holds most dear—family, nobility, honor—deserves credit. Her failure to change the least changeable of men is inevitable; her attempt is nevertheless impressive.

(506-9), and considering Ajax' fear of returning to Telamon, Tekmessa's plea "not to abandon your father in dire old age" (506f.) is especially appropriate. Where Ajax thinks it is shameful (*αἰσχρόν*, 473) to go on living, she reminds him that if he dies his enemies will mock his dependents with boasts which will be "shameful (*αἰσχρά*) to you and your family (*γένει*)" (505).¹⁰ Where Ajax is determined to be like his father in honor and prestige, Tekmessa applies the principle that like begets like metaphorically. "It is favor," she says, "which always gives birth to favor," *χάρις χάριν γάρ ἐστιν ἢ τίκτουσ' ἀεί* (522).¹¹ Where Ajax ends his speech with a maxim on nobility, she will match him epigram for epigram. Her speech concludes:

*δτου δ' ἀπορρεῖ μνηστis εὖ πεπονθότος,
οὐκ ἂν γένοιτ' ἔθ' οὗτος εὐγενῆς ἀνὴρ.*

(523f.)

Thus the key word *εὐγενῆς* appears in the final line of each of the long speeches in this debate.

In short, Ajax' case for dying and Tekmessa's case for living rest on conflicting ideas of *εὐγένεια*. For Ajax, being "well born" means valuing honor more than life itself. For Tekmessa, it means showing consideration for one's family and friends. For him, it is something rough, stern, and challenging. For her, it is something gentle and humane.

The stichomythia which follows Tekmessa's speech does not mark a complete change of direction. Rather, it develops the *εὐγένεια* theme by turning our attention to Ajax' son Eurysakes, who is indisputably "well born." The gentle Tekmessa has sent the boy away, and she makes a certain effort to shield him when Ajax orders him to be brought back. The rugged Ajax insists on seeing the child, even on having him face the scenes of slaughter

¹⁰ She goes on to urge him to "show respect" for his parents (*αἰδεσθαι*, 506, 507). Ajax has not used the word *αἰδώς* or its cognates in his speech, but the idea is central to his decision to kill himself.

¹¹ The idea that favor ought to be reciprocated is a commonplace, but it usually appears without the birth-metaphor which is so appropriate to the context here. (Commentators cite Soph. *O.C.* 779, Eur. *Hel.* 1234; Kamerbeek quotes an exception from Seneca, *gratia gratiam parit*). The Chorus gave Tekmessa a lead when it said that Ajax' first monologue was not a "changeling (i.e. ignoble) utterance" (*ὀπὸ βλητὸν λόγον*, 481)—a phrase whose appropriateness to the *εὐγένεια* theme has been noted by Stanford.

on stage (cf. 545–47). Their contrasting attitudes towards their son involve particular applications of the general principles which the long speeches present.

These matters call for fuller explanation. Tekmessa does not openly defy Ajax' demand to see Eurysakes, but she does protect the child by a marked slowness in complying with it.¹² She drags out the simple business of getting Eurysakes on stage to a full eighteen lines, and the lines are nearly all in stichomythia, a pattern of dialogue well suited, and widely used, for scenes of strife. Formal considerations aside, the text shows repeated overtones of a sort of domestic conflict more common in comedy than in tragedy. Tekmessa, told to do as she is ordered (527f.), is quick to promise obedience: "But dear Ajax, I will obey you in everything" (529). She is less quick to give it. When Ajax, a plain man, tests her obedience with a plain command (530), she answers with an explanation for Eurysakes' absence, which is quite different from obedience: "Oh, but I sent him away out of fear" (531).¹³ In the next few lines, she delicately presents the reason for her fear: the raging Ajax might have killed his son. Ajax admits as much, and Tekmessa follows up this advantage to drive home the point that she was right: "Well then, I took care to prevent that" (535). Ajax approves her caution (536), and Tekmessa asks, "What then might I do for you under these circumstances?" *τί δῆτ' ἂν ὥς ἐκ τῶνδ' ἂν ἀφελοῖμί σε;* (537). She knows very well what Ajax wants. She is asking, as Stanford and Jebb have noted, because she hopes he will change his mind. Indeed, her phrasing of the question invites him to change it: *δῆτ'* and *ἐκ τῶνδ'* urge him to consider the circumstances under which he calls for his son, while *ὥς*, the optative verb, and the reiterated *ἂν* make her question as casual and as hypothetical as possible. But Ajax, here as in larger matters, refuses to change; he repeats his order (538). Tekmessa stalls again: "Oh, but he is being kept nearby by attendants" (539). Here as in 531, she is explaining rather than complying. This time Ajax refuses to be diverted. "Why is he delaying?" he demands (540), and the delay evidently

¹² Noted by the commentators on 531 (Campbell, Jebb) and 537 (Campbell, Jebb, Stanford), but extending beyond these two lines.

¹³ "Tekmessa is divided between obedience and fear, and interposes an excuse" (Campbell). On the force of *καὶ μὴν* ("Oh, but . . ."), which here raises an obstacle even while professing obedience, see Campbell and cf. Jebb.

continues, for he complains of it again when he next speaks (543), after Tekmessa finally summons the child. Through all this talk, Tekmessa does not venture to defy Ajax openly, but her protectiveness and tender regard towards her son are not hard to see. Her feelings towards Eurysakes reflect the idea of *εὐγένεια* which she set forth in her long speech—humane concern for others, particularly for one's family.

Tekmessa can express herself in this matter only through hesitation and delay, but Ajax can speak his mind openly, and the attitude which guides him through the stichomythia with Tekmessa needs less time to explain. We see it in the opening lines of his second monologue, where repeated appeals to the ideas of birth and breeding show that we are dealing with yet another appearance of the theme of *εὐγένεια*:

Lift him up, lift him here. He will not be afraid at seeing this gore from fresh slaughter, not if he is really mine. It is necessary to train him at once in the rough ways of his father and to make his nature like mine. My child, be luckier than your father, but in other ways like him, and you won't be base. . . . You must show among your father's enemies what sort of man you are, and from what sort of father you were raised.

(545-51, 556f.)

These precepts for the boy's upbringing put into practice the concept of *εὐγένεια* which Ajax expressed in his first monologue. The father's rugged nature is to be cultivated in the son, so that Eurysakes will resemble Ajax even as Ajax has striven to resemble Telamon. The boy must show his lineage by a strong heart and (as we see by the reference to "this gore from fresh slaughter" at the beginning of the speech) a strong stomach. This talk shows Ajax' verdict on the previous debate. He completely rejects Tekmessa's idea of *εὐγένεια* and upholds his own.

II.

We turn now to the end of the play—the protracted dispute over Ajax' burial. This sequence of scenes has often been criticized as irrelevant and undramatic. The charge of irrelevance has been amply refuted. The play's finale pays a measure of respect

to Ajax' greatness, shows the smallness of the post-heroic world which is left after his passing, exalts the humanity of Odysseus in contrast to both the stark individualism of Ajax and the pettiness of the Atreidai, and insures Ajax' hero-cult through proper burial. The charge of being undramatic dies harder, and is even conceded by some admirers of the play.¹⁴ Indeed, a plausible case can be made for it. Exhibit A is the unseemly length of the debates. Nearly 400 lines separate Menelaos' entrance, with his ban on the burial, from the play's end. Large stretches of that time are filled with undignified wrangling which does little to advance the action or discuss the issues of the play, and which wastes a good deal of breath on such irrelevant matters as the supposed ignobility of archery (1120–23) and the scandals of Agamemnon's ancestors (1290–98).

Exhibit B is the compounding of this tedium by putting Teukros through two debates with the two Atreidai in turn, even though both debates are on the same subject. Some critics merely notice this doubling without accounting for it.¹⁵ Others undertake to explain it, generally with inadequate results. The explanations which I have seen, arranged roughly in ascending order of credibility, are as follows. (1) The scenes show a progression from mere wrangling (Menelaos-Teukros) to more sensible dis-

¹⁴ The charge goes all the way back to the often-quoted scholium on 1123 that Sophokles "wishing to stretch the play out grew cold and undid its tragic pathos." The scholiast's most ardent modern champion is A. J. A. Waldock, *Sophocles the Dramatist* (Cambridge 1951) 49–79. Critics often concede that the play's ending is an anticlimax (Cedric Whitman, *Sophocles: A Study of Heroic Humanism* [Cambridge, Mass., 1951] 44, 63; Richmond Lattimore, *The Poetry of Greek Tragedy* [Baltimore 1958] 78), though perhaps an anticlimax which the playwright had to allow in order to present something he thought more important than exciting drama, such as a full discussion of the play's themes (Gellie 23–26) or the contrast between Ajax and Odysseus (Arthur Platt, "The Burial of Ajax," *CR* 25 [1911] 101–4). Against all this we should keep in mind the testimony of Jebb xlv note 1 that an 1882 Cambridge production showed "that the *Ajax*, as a whole, is a thoroughly effective play for the stage, and that its power of holding an audience is not diminished by the death of the hero at a comparatively early moment in the action." Jebb's Cambridge was not Sophokles' Athens, but the living theatre is a far better place than the scholar's study to decide questions of dramatic effect.

¹⁵ Duchemin 57, 115; Gellie 23. Oddly, Duchemin's discussion of pairs of related debate-scenes (142–44) ignores the *Ajax*, perhaps because she regards such pairs as an invention of Euripides' later years (123).

cussion (Agamemnon-Teukros) to the triumph of "reason and decency" (Odysseus-Agamemnon).¹⁶ But this credits the Agamemnon-Teukros debate with too much sobriety. For example, the genealogical slurs which it involves show no progress towards reason and decency. (2) The scenes display differences in the characters and attitudes of the two Atreidai.¹⁷ But the extent of the difference is questionable, and in any event not sufficiently important to justify the time spent in displaying it. (3) Menelaos and Agamemnon represent different principles or points of view—either civil and military authority respectively,¹⁸ or the general hatred of the army towards Ajax and the particular enmity of the Atreidai.¹⁹ This is similar to (2), though it looks beyond character-drawing for its own sake. Like (2), it creates distinctions which are neither clear in the text nor significant to the interpretation of the play. (4) The scenes show Teukros' courage and tenacity to an advantage by prolonging his struggles in defense of his brother.²⁰ This is true as far as it goes, but it is doubtful that Teukros is important enough to justify the time spent on him. (5) Menelaos and Agamemnon together represent the same point of view, that of the post-heroic world generally. The doubling is used to indicate that their attitudes are widespread.²¹ This reversal of (3) has much to recommend it, though the highly personal character of the Atreidai's resentment, and of the charges made by and against them, limits their value as representatives of post-heroic society generally.²² (6) The doubling serves "to prolong the controversy sufficiently for a gradual

¹⁶ Bowra 50f., followed by F. J. H. Letters, *The Life and Work of Sophocles* (London/New York, 1953) 145.

¹⁷ Coraluppi 139 note 59.

¹⁸ Suggested by S. M. Adams, *Sophocles the Playwright* (Toronto 1957) 39.

¹⁹ Valdis Leinieks, "Aias and the Day of Wrath," *CJ* 69 (1974) 193–201, at 200f. If that is what Sophocles was trying to do, he confused matters by having Menelaos speak for the army, then having Agamemnon speak for Menelaos.

²⁰ Tycho von Wilamowitz, *Die dramatische Technik des Sophokles* (Berlin 1917) 65f., seconded by Perrotta 132f. and Hugh Lloyd-Jones, "Tycho von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf on the Dramatic Technique of Sophocles," *CQ* n.s. 22 (1972) 214–28, at 221.

²¹ Rosenmeyer 191f.

²² In particular, lines 1069–72, 1093–96, 1100–1102, 1237, 1290–98, 1310–12, and 1350 seem to be spoken by, or to, Agamemnon and Menelaos as individuals rather than as representative specimens of society.

tension of interest."²³ Set against the subtle arguments just reviewed, this is appealingly simple and probably right, but still capable of improvement. We need to explain how Sophokles achieves dramatic suspense and (since there is something more in these scenes than dramatic fireworks) what it means for our understanding of the play.

The length of the argument over Ajax' burial and the appearance of two Atreidai rather than one are the products of an intelligent artistic choice. Sophokles has built the conclusion of the *Ajax* around the *agōn* form, creating two debate-scenes and inviting his audience to contrast them. The first follows the *agōn* form quite regularly and ends in deadlock. In the second, the *agōn* form is disrupted, and in that disruption lies the resolution of the conflict. Choosing this structure meant protracting the ending of the play, for debate-scenes take time. However, the play's finale is not a static tableau or a mass of confused wrangling. It moves steadily towards a definite goal, slowly, but with an order and a grandeur which we can appreciate once we understand its structure.

The first debate-scene begins with Menelaos' entrance at line 1047. After a brief opening, he and Teukros launch into a textbook example of an *agōn*. Menelaos delivers a long speech in which he complains of Ajax' insubordination and treachery, then forbids burial of the body. The Koryphaios makes the customary short comment on the speech. Teukros responds with a long speech, again with a comment from the Koryphaios, reminding his adversary that Ajax was his own master, not Menelaos' underling, and declaring that the body will be buried despite Menelaos' wishes. This is followed by a singularly futile round of stichomythia, in which the discussion manages to sink beneath the low level on which it began. Menelaos insults Teukros for being an archer (1120-23), and Teukros calls Menelaos a crook (1135, 1137). Neither party persuades the other, and neither seriously tries to. The whole affair is an utter deadlock. The graceless exchange of "parables" after the stichomythia (1142-58) emphasizes the futility all the more, for these short concluding speeches show so much more passion than thought or elo-

²³ Jebb xlii. This appeal to dramatic effect is similar to (4), but without the concentration on Teukros.

quence.²⁴ Menelaos exits angrily, and we are left with only the prospect of further quarreling—or as the Chorus puts it, “there will be a struggle (*dyōn*) of great discord” (1163).

The expected struggle comes just sixty lines later, after a short interlude in which Teukros stations Tekmessa and Eurysakes by the body and the Chorus sings a brief ode. At line 1226, Agamemnon enters and begins another debate-scene with his long speech, again followed by a comment from the Koryphaios. Teukros replies with a long speech of his own. The differences between the two Atreidai and between the tones of the two debate-scenes in which they appear are minor and hard to identify. Agamemnon (we are told) is less shrill than his brother, perhaps more genuinely interested in principles, certainly more dignified, in any event a more formidable opponent. On the other hand, his scorn for Teukros as a bastard and a “barbarian” shows a vicious streak beyond what we find in Menelaos.²⁵ Teukros’ heartfelt lament at how quickly Ajax’ services have been forgotten (1266–89) includes some of the finest poetry in the second part of the play, but his lengthy comparison of Agamemnon’s lineage with his own (1290–1307) is a forceful reminder that this debate-scene is no nobler than its predecessor. Basically, the second debate is a continuation, or even a repetition, of the first. Agamemnon enters to take up his brother’s cause, and in fact his speech opens with a reply to an argument made by Teukros in the previous debate, which has been reported to Agamemnon in the meantime (1226–34, recalling 1097–1106). The jealousy, spite, and vituperation of the earlier *agōn* all reappear. More important, the old sense of futility from the previous *agōn* persists. Teukros and Agamemnon are every bit as stubborn, every bit as likely to end in a deadlock, as Teukros and Menelaos. As Teukros’ long speech comes to an end, the audience has every reason to expect this replay of the earlier debate-scene to continue with another round of acrimonious, but inconclusive, *stichomythia*.

At this point, however, Sophokles introduces a complication into the debate-scene form. The Koryphaios makes his cus-

²⁴ See Bowra 54f.

²⁵ Most critics regard Agamemnon as superior to Menelaos: Jebb xliii, Rosenmeyer 192f., Coraluppi 139, Gellie 25. *Contra*, see Winnington-Ingram 65: “More authority, certainly; more dignity, if it is more dignified to call your opponent a bastard than a bowman.”

tomary two-line comment at the end of Teukros' speech (1316f.), but instead of offering the usual bland reflections on the preceding speech he turns to welcome Odysseus—for Odysseus now comes to the rescue, not simply of Ajax' body but of this whole entangled scene. His arrival keeps the expected stichomythia from beginning. Instead, he engages Agamemnon in some dialogue which falls into three parts: first, some short exchanges (mostly distichs) where he gains Agamemnon's attention (1318–31); second, a speech defending Ajax' right to burial (1332–45); and finally, some stichomythia in which he answers Agamemnon's objections and wins his consent (1346–69). These distinct sections mark distinct stages in Sophokles' transformation of the *agōn* form. In the first, Odysseus brings the futile debate-scene to a halt, sparing us the deadlock which we saw in the Menelaos-Teukros debate. In the second, he starts the *agōn* up again, for his speech at 1332–45 is an abbreviated long speech, making the case he might have made in greater detail if it had been his debate from the beginning.²⁶ Finally, he finishes the debate by engaging in stichomythia with Agamemnon. It is a rather long piece of stichomythia by Sophoklean standards.²⁷ Its length is a special reminder to the audience that we are watching the last phase of a debate-scene—the scene which began earlier with the long speeches of Agamemnon and Teukros. Thus the *agōn* which was broken with Odysseus' entrance is put back together and completed, with Odysseus supplanting Teukros as the defender of Ajax' right to burial.²⁸

It remains for us to say a few words about the effect of this formal *tour de force*. What is Sophokles telling us about his play by presenting these debate-scenes as he does? Since the two scenes are contrasted in form and result (regular vs. irregular, futile vs. successful), we may approach this question by looking at some further contrasts which they present.

²⁶ Duchemin 150.

²⁷ Twenty-four lines. For rapid dialogue, Sophokles prefers mixtures of distichs and single lines to the rigors of pure stichomythia (Duchemin 220f.). Few runs of stichomythia in the extant plays approach 24 lines. Only five exceed it, and some of those only slightly. They begin at *Ant.* 730 (28 lines), *O. T.* 1007 (40 lines), and *El.* 385 (30 lines), 1023 (27 lines), and 1176 (33 lines).

²⁸ Odysseus' function as a replacement for Teukros in the *agōn* form is noted briefly by Duchemin 137, 147 note 1.

Consider first the contrast between the two defenders of Ajax' right to burial. When Teukros is replaced by Odysseus in the final *agōn*, we see Teukros' defiance replaced by Odysseus' attitude of conciliation, Teukros' skittish pride (so evident in his quickness to resent slurs on his weaponry and his ancestry) replaced by Odysseus' patience, Teukros' stubbornness replaced by Odysseus' readiness to try persuasion. This does not mean that Odysseus is good and Teukros is bad. Teukros is too sympathetic a character for so simple a conclusion, and (as often in Sophokles) his weaknesses are the dark side of his strengths—courage, forthrightness, and loyalty. However, the two debate-scenes at the end of the play do make his limitations apparent. He alienates where Odysseus reconciles; he fails to secure Ajax' right to burial where Odysseus succeeds.²⁹

This contrast further reflects on Ajax, or at least on Ajax' brand of heroic virtue. As others have noted, Teukros is a surrogate for Ajax in the final scenes of the play, a small-scale copy of his brother.³⁰ Though a lesser man than Ajax, he is still bold and proud as his brother was bold and proud, and to a degree he carries on Ajax' spirit in the post-heroic world which is left after Ajax' death. The contrast between the rugged, self-assertive heroism of Ajax and the more enlightened, humble, and humane civic virtue of Odysseus—an important theme in this play—is carried forward in the final debate-scenes through the contrast between Odysseus and Teukros.³¹

Beyond this, there is something more important. Sophokles did not write a double *agōn* simply to compare Odysseus with Ajax' brother whom he supplants, but with Ajax' enemies whom he opposes—in fact, with all the rest of the post-heroic world. The sense of frustration and deadlock which reigns over most of the double debate-scene is produced by the pride, jealousy, and small-mindedness which Teukros and the Atreidai have in common. They all take part in the obstinacy, the name-calling, the eagerness to score debater's points, and Teukros' position as

²⁹ This is not entirely a matter of character, for Odysseus' position as an enemy of Ajax (which he mentions at 1336, 1347, and 1355) is a powerful help in persuading Agamemnon. However, character is certainly a factor.

³⁰ Bowra 50, Stanford xlv, Gellie 22f., Winnington-Ingram 61.

³¹ See Kirkwood 103.

the most stubborn mortal left after Ajax' death is hardly beyond dispute. Odysseus' humility, moderation, and reason come as a refreshing relief to the wrangling of them all—refreshing because Sophokles withholds Odysseus from the stage for so long and brings him in only after the other characters have become so obviously and hopelessly deadlocked. Thus the double debate-scene provides an effective showcase for Odysseus in two ways. It first displays the need for him, then presents his merits.³²

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³² An earlier version of this paper was read at the meeting of CAMWS in Columbia, South Carolina, on March 27, 1980.

SENSE-PAUSES AND RELATIVE DATING IN SENECA, SOPHOCLES AND SHAKESPEARE

There is very little reliable evidence for the absolute dating of Seneca's tragedies: the only fixed point for any individual play is a *terminus ante quem* of A.D. 54 for the *Hercules Furens*, established by the fact that *HF* is parodied in *Apocolocyntosis*.¹ In this situation the critic must turn to internal evidence, and particularly to stylistic criteria, in the hope of establishing at least a relative order of composition. This article will suggest that Seneca's use of sense-pauses may provide such evidence. For purposes of comparison we shall also examine the relationship between the pause-test and chronology in the three Greek tragedians and in Shakespeare. While the chronological significance of the pause-test for Shakespeare has long been recognised, the possibility that it may be chronologically significant for Seneca and Sophocles has not, so far as I know, been suggested before. This paper is therefore somewhat exploratory in nature; it may well be that, if the general validity of the test is accepted, others will find more refined methods of applying it.

This line of enquiry was first suggested to me by the observation that there is a wide variation among Seneca's dramas in the freedom with which speeches are permitted to end, and subsequent speeches to begin, within the iambic line. For example in *Thyestes* more than one-third of all speaker-changes occur

¹ See O. Weinreich, *Senecas Apocolocyntosis* (Berlin 1923) 63 ff., 112 ff.; and on the date of *Apocol.*, which almost certainly belongs to November or December of 54, see Miriam T. Griffin, *Seneca* (Oxford 1976) 129 fn. 3. The last full discussion of the dating and chronological order of the tragedies is that by O. Herzog, "Datierung der Tragödien des Seneca," *RhM* 77 (1928) 51-104; for more recent surveys of the question see I. Muñoz Valle, "Chronología de las Tragedias de Séneca," *Humanidades* 19 (1967) 316-30, and M. Coffey in *Lustrum* 2 (1957) 149-51. Supposed allusions to contemporary events have often been used in attempts to date the tragedies; here I can only agree with the learned recent editor of the *Agamemnon* that "the evidence that has been adduced will not bear inspection" (R. J. Tarrant, ed., *Seneca Agamemnon* [Cambridge 1976] 6). Equally insubstantial is the attempt by M. A. Cervellera in *RCCM* 15 (1973) 19-34 to use word-division in tribrachic and anapaestic feet as a dating criterion; the author believes *inter alia* in anapaestic second feet in trimeters (29).

within the line (48 out of 128, or 37.5%), whereas in *Oedipus* the figure is only 14.6% (21 out of 144). This wide divergence called for some explanation, and it seemed to me that the high figure for *Thyestes* reflected a greater degree of flexibility on the poet's part in handling speaker-changes, which might well suggest a relatively late date of composition. The figures for all the genuine plays (except *Phoenissae*)² are as follows:

	Total speaker-changes	Speaker-changes within line	Latter as % of former
<i>Oedipus</i>	144	21	14.6
<i>Phaedra</i>	109	17	15.6
<i>Agamemnon</i>	105	19	18.1
<i>Troades</i>	125	23	18.4
<i>Hercules Furens</i>	133	34	25.6
<i>Medea</i>	120	36	30.0
<i>Thyestes</i>	128	48	37.5

However, it was clear that it would be unwise to rely heavily on speaker-changes alone, as the number of speaker-changes occurring within the line in a Senecan tragedy is too small to yield reliable statistics. This point is well illustrated by the *Agamemnon*, where out of a total of 19 speaker-changes within the line, almost half (9) come from a single passage of antilabe (791-99). Clearly this passage has a disproportionate influence on the figure for the play as a whole.

Nevertheless, I observed that the frequency of speaker-changes within the line was related to the more general phenomenon of sense-pauses within the line. The figures for sense-pauses are as follows.³ (For the purposes of this paper I count only notable

² *Phoenissae* is scarcely comparable with the other plays in this regard because it consists largely of long speeches, so that the total number of speaker-changes is only 29; of these seven fall within the line. *Hercules Oetaeus* and *Octavia* are excluded as spurious. The text on which my counts are based is that of G. C. Giardina (Bologna 1966). I exclude from the count speaker-changes which occur in situations which preclude a change within the line, i.e. those at the end of each Act and of each Ode.

³ I exclude the Odes, and any material not in iambic trimeters in the Acts. To facilitate checking of my figures I give the gross totals for each Act, first of all sense-pauses, then of those within the line.

Ag. I 36, 11; II 145, 42; III (408 ff.) 115, 38; IV (693-753, 775-807) 74, 28; V 114, 38. Pha. I 125, 39; II (358 ff.) 264, 98; III (824 ff.) 95, 30; IV (989 ff.) 72, 20; V

sense-pauses, i.e. those represented by full stop, question or exclamation mark, colon or semi-colon, bracket, dash, inverted comma.⁴ Sense-pauses at speaker-changes are included.⁵)

	Total sense-pauses	Sense-pauses within line	Latter as % of former
<i>Agamemnon</i>	484	157	32.4
<i>Phaedra</i>	637	219	34.4
<i>Oedipus</i>	525	193	36.8
<i>Medea</i>	530	250	47.2
<i>Troades</i>	639	304	47.6
<i>Hercules Furens</i>	719	352	49.0
<i>Thyestes</i>	569	310	54.5
<i>Phoenissae</i>	479	274	57.2

These results seemed to me of great interest and value, for three reasons. First, like the figures for speaker-changes, they reveal wide variations which require some explanation. Second, unlike the speaker-change figures, they are not much affected by local and specific phenomena such as antilabe. To put their value more positively, they measure a characteristic which runs right through the structure of the trimeter verse, and affects each single sentence from first to last. Third, the characteristic of the

(1154ff.) 81, 32. *Oed.* I 67, 21; II (202-22, 239-402) 115, 30; III 123, 53; IV 110, 31; V 45, 24; VI 65, 34. *Med.* I 33, 15; II 142, 63; III 171, 82; IV (670-739, 752-70, 843-48) 44, 18; V 140, 72. *Tro.* I 34, 16; II 121, 47; III (409-704, 736-813) 286, 137; IV 117, 61; V 80, 43. *HF* I 76, 35; II 211, 85; III 138, 66; IV 119, 66; V 175, 100. *Thy.* I 62, 39; II 138, 84; III 112, 51; IV 107, 51; V (885-919, 970-1112) 150, 85. *Phoen.* 1-319 238, 137; 320-62 27, 12; 363-442 49, 21; 443-664 167, 104.

⁴ It is perhaps regrettable that one must rely on modern punctuation, but I see no alternative. It seems a reasonable assumption that the punctuation marks mentioned do indicate the main syntactical divisions of the discourse. I count a sense-pause wherever one (or more) of these punctuation marks appears. No doubt a somewhat inflexible procedure, but at least consistent; and it ensures that my results can easily be checked. Sometimes there are two or even three punctuation marks at a single sense-pause, e.g. full stop with inverted commas marking the end of a quotation followed by inverted commas opening another quotation: rare in Sen. *Trag.*, but common e.g. in Horace's *Satires* (cf. footnote 18). In such cases, of course, I count the sense-pause, not the punctuation marks.

⁵ This procedure seems to me essential to achieving that complete analysis of the structure of the verse, from the first sentence to the last, which is the chief value of the pause-test. To omit sense-pauses at speaker-changes would give an incomplete picture, in which each speech would be shorn of its final sense-break.

verse which they measure is presumably determined to a large extent by the poet's *instinct*. Seneca's use of antilabe at *Ag.* 791-99 was the result of a conscious decision, but no-one would suppose that he consciously decided to write that play with one-third of all sense-pauses within the line: clearly he wrote in that way because it felt right and sounded right to him when composing, and it is not difficult to accept that that largely instinctive feeling would evolve over a period of time. My hypothesis was, then, that a high figure in the pause-test results indicated greater confidence on Seneca's part in handling the iambic line, and therefore a comparatively late date. At an apprentice stage, I supposed, the poet cautiously used the line as a sense-unit and shaped the sense to fit within it, but with greater experience he could allow the sense to flow over the end of the line, and indeed create an attractive conflict between the metrical units and the free-flowing sense-units. Clearly one would not want to claim any significance in a variation of one or two per cent, but the differences between *Oedipus* and *Medea*, and again between *HF* and *Thyestes*, seemed large enough to warrant dividing the plays tentatively into three groups: an early group, composed of *Ag.*, *Pha.* and *Oed.*; a middle group, made up of *Med.*, *Tro.*, and *HF*; and a late group, consisting of *Thy.* and *Phoen.*

It remained necessary, however, to test the hypothesis that an increased proportion of mid-line pauses is chronologically significant. For this purpose I turned first to Sophocles. The results are as follows:⁶

	Total sense-pauses	Sense-pauses within line	Latter as % of former
<i>Ajax</i>	662	139	21.0
<i>Antigone</i>	555	121	21.8
<i>Trachiniae</i>	537	143	26.6
<i>Oedipus Tyrannus</i>	810	226	27.9
<i>Oedipus Coloneus</i>	772	229	29.7
<i>Electra</i>	795	264	33.2
<i>Philoctetes</i>	761	254	33.4

⁶ The text used is that of the Budé edition by Dain and Mazon (I³ 1967, II³ 1968, III² 1967). I list gross totals episode by episode as in footnote 3. For episode division I follow Klaus Aichele in W. Jens (ed.), *Die Bauformen der griechischer*

At first sight these figures correlate to a remarkable degree with what is known, or generally believed, concerning the chronology of Sophocles' plays.⁷ *Ajax* and *Antigone* stand where they should, at the beginning of the list; *OT* arguably occurs in the correct position, in the middle; and *Electra* and *Philoctetes* rightly stand towards the end. Indeed it might be tempting to make extravagant claims for the chronological significance of this test, if it were not that comparison of the figures for *Philoctetes* and *OC* shows the need for caution. The comparison reveals a difference of about 4% between plays which were presumably written at approximately the same time. We must therefore acknowledge that, in this respect as in others, Sophocles' style varied not only with time but with the needs of the individual play and indeed the individual scene. Given such a margin of error, it is clearly impossible to draw any conclusions from these figures about the dating of *Ajax* relative to *Antigone*. On the other hand the figure for the *Trachiniae*, even given this margin of error, may reasonably be regarded as an argument for

Tragödie (Munich 1971) 50f. In all the Greek tragedians, as in Seneca, my figures cover only complete iambic trimeters. I have included trimeters which occur within lyrics but were probably spoken; for these I use, in the interests of convenience, the lists given by Ceadel, *CQ* 1941 69f., 84f. (in footnotes). Figures for these are given for each play under the rubric 'lyric' (with the exception of *Phil.* 730–31, 733–35, 737–38, 740–49, which I count as part of an episode). *Ajax* 1–133 100, 20; 263–347, 430–595 167, 42; 646–92 26, 6; 719–865 78, 13; 975–1184 129, 29; 1223–1401 106, 18; lyric (adding 428–29, 961–73) 56, 11. *Antig.* 1–99 60, 14; 162–331 86, 15; 384–525, 531–81 142, 38; 631–780 91, 10; 883–928 20, 3; 988–1114 81, 18; 1155–1256 57, 19; lyric 18, 4. *Trach.* 1–93 45, 9; 141–204, 225–496 198, 59; 531–632 46, 14; 663–820 83, 22; 896–946 21, 7; 1044–1258 131, 30; lyric 13, 2. *OT* 1–150 81, 22; 216–462 159, 50; 513–648, 697–862 204, 49; 911–1085 157, 42; 1110–85 76, 23; 1223–96, 1369–1514 109, 31; lyric (adding 1367–68) 24, 9. *OC* 1–116 76, 22; 254–509 162, 49; 549–667 88, 24; 720–832, 844–75, 891–1043 167, 47; 1096–1210 87, 31; 1249–1446, 1500–55 135, 37; 1579–1669 44, 15; lyric 13, 4. *El.* 1–85 38, 12; 251–471 146, 45; 516–822 190, 68; 871–1057 138, 35; 1098–1231, 1288–1383 177, 55; 1442–1507 61, 26; lyric 45, 23. *Phil.* 1–134 82, 14; 220–390, 403–506, 519–675 251, 75; 730–826 92, 45; 865–1080 176, 70; 1218–1401, 1418–44 160, 50.

⁷ They provide a much more useful criterion than antilabe alone, which has often been used in discussions of dating. Antilabe is too small a phenomenon to be statistically significant, and its use is heavily influenced by particular dramatic situations; v. Kitto in *AJP* 1939 179–83. Sense-pauses on the other hand permeate the whole structure of the dialogue. Naturally antilabe contributes to the sense-pause total, since it involves speaker-change within the line.

dating that play after *Ajax* and *Antigone* rather than before them.⁸

At any rate, it would be a contentious person who denied any chronological significance to the figures. Their most striking aspect is the considerable difference between the early plays, *Ajax* and *Antigone*, and those known or generally considered to be later, *OT*, *Electra*, *Philoctetes* and *OC*. The Sophoclean results, then, bear out the hypothesis that *large* variations in the results of the pause-test are likely to be chronologically significant. If we look back at Seneca's tragedies with this point in mind, it is evident that such large variations do exist between the three proposed groups. The gap between group 2 and group 3 (5.5%) is larger than that which separates Sophocles' *Ajax* and *Antigone* from the rest of his plays; while the gap between groups 1 and 2 is almost twice as large (10.4%). The possibility remains strong, therefore, that the pause-test figures for Seneca allow us to distinguish an early, middle and late group, though the differences between individual plays in these groups are too small to be chronologically significant.

Aeschylus and Euripides both proved less helpful than Sophocles, though for different reasons. To take Aeschylus first, three of his plays, *Persae*, *Septem* and *Supplices*, contain too little material to yield meaningful statistics: each play has only two episodes containing noteworthy numbers of trimeters,⁹ whereas it is necessary to have the 'averaging' effect of several such episodes in order to provide figures that are at all useful. The figures for the other plays are as follows (first total sense-pauses, then those within the line, then the latter as a percentage of the former): *Agamemnon* 471, 89, 18.9%; *Choephoroi* 366, 67, 18.3%; *Eumenides* 354, 58, 16.4%; *Prometheus Vincitus* 431, 92, 21.3%.¹⁰

⁸ The Budé editors place *Trach.* before *Ajax* and *Antig.*, and T. F. Hoey has recently argued for a date c. 450 B.C. in "The Date of the *Trachiniae*," *Phoenix* 33 (1979) 210ff. Studies of the style and language of the play have generally placed it early, though not necessarily before *Ajax* and *Antig.*; in particular E.-R. Schwinge, *Die Stellung der Trachinierinnen im Werk des Sophokles* (Göttingen 1962) dated it before 438 B.C. On the other side, metrical studies by H. A. Pohlsander, *AJP* 84 (1963) 280ff., and D. S. Raven, *AJP* 86 (1965) 225ff., tend to suggest a date closer to *OT*.

⁹ As a yardstick I have used the figure of 75 trimeters. Few episodes in Sophocles, or Acts in Seneca, fall below this figure, but several Aeschylean episodes do.

¹⁰ The text used is Page's O. C. T. The gross totals episode by episode are: *Ag.* 1-39 14, 4; 258-354 57, 7; 489-680 98, 18; 810-974 78, 14; 1035-71, 1074-75,

But since *PV* is of uncertain date and authorship, this tells us very little. The only point worth noting is that the three plays of the Oresteian trilogy are reasonably consistent in their use of sense-pauses within the line, but that even here there is a margin of error of 2.5%.

In the case of Euripides a more definite conclusion can be drawn, but it is not one which sheds much light on Seneca. I give the plays here in what would be widely (though not of course universally) accepted as their approximate order of composition.¹¹

	Total sense-pauses	Sense-pauses within line	Latter as % of former
<i>?Rhesus</i>	448	115	25.7
<i>Alcestis</i>	616	163	26.5
<i>Medea</i>	693	199	28.7
<i>Heraclidae</i>	597	174	29.1
<i>Hippolytus</i>	721	210	29.1
<i>Andromache</i>	596	198	33.2
<i>Hecuba</i>	640	199	31.1
<i>Supplices</i>	566	177	31.3
<i>Electra</i>	747	223	29.9
<i>Hercules</i>	640	199	31.1
<i>Troades</i>	478	139	29.1
<i>Iphigenia in Tauris</i>	796	230	28.9
<i>Helen</i>	974	295	30.3
<i>Ion</i>	818	246	30.1
<i>Phoenissae</i>	763	210	27.5
<i>Orestes</i>	883	268	30.4
<i>Bacchae</i>	599	170	28.4
<i>Iphigenia in Aulide</i>	637	187	29.4

1078-79, 1083-84, 1088-89, 1093-94, 1098-99, 1105-6, 1112-13, 1119-20, 1130-31, 1138-39, 1148-49, 1178-1330 145, 30; 1343-1406, 1412-25, 1431-47, 1577-1640 79, 16. *Cho.* 10-21 8, 4; 84-151, 164-305, 479-584 175, 24; 653-718, 730-82 71, 16; 838-54, 872-934 69, 12; 973-1006, 1010-17, 1021-64 43, 11. *Eum.* 1-116, 131-42 75, 15; 179-253 48, 7; 276-306 11, 2; 397-488 53, 9; 566-777, 794-807, 824-36, 847-69, 881-915, 1021-31 167, 25. *PV* 1-92, 101-13 67, 14; 193-276, 298-396 102, 24; 436-525 38, 7; 589-92, 609-86, 696-876 146, 33; 907-1039 78, 14.

¹¹ Text used: Murray's O. C. T. In the following figures I use the term 'lyric' as in footnote 6. *Rhes.* 52-130, 137-94, 201-23 114, 27; 264-341 52, 9; 388-453, 467-526 64, 12; 565-674 81, 25; 754-819, 833-81, 915-92 125, 38; lyric 12, 4.

My strong impression in compiling these figures was one of a uniformity which is in complete contrast to the variations in the Senecan figures. The only possible sign of chronological significance lies in the fact that the lowest figure among the certainly genuine plays is that for the earliest, the *Alcestis*. The verdict on the significance of this figure must, I think, be *non liquet*: it would be rash to assume chronological significance when the difference from the *Medea* is only a little over 2%, but equally rash to deny the possibility.¹² What is clear is that from *Medea*

Alc. 1-27, 38-76 53, 10; 136-212 45, 11; 280-392, 416-34 86, 25; 476-567 86, 14; 606-740, 746-860 173, 52; 935-61 17, 7; 1006-1158 148, 42; lyric 8, 2. *Med.* 1-95 57, 18; 214-409 129, 36; 446-626 105, 28; 663-758, 764-823 128, 28; 866-975 75, 24; 1002-80, 1116-1250 174, 45; 1293-1388 68, 17; lyric 7, 3. *Held.* 1-74 41, 13; 109-287, 297-352 146, 42; 381-607 147, 43; 630-701, 709-47 111, 30; 784-891 60, 18; 928-1052 83, 27; lyric 9, 1. *Hipp.* 1-57, 73-120 66, 17; 267-361, 373-524 192, 64; 596-668, 680-731 88, 24; 776-810, 885-1101 190, 55; 1151-1267 67, 21; 1296-1341, 1389-1461 90, 20; lyric 28, 9. *Androm.* 1-102 58, 19; 147-273 83, 21; 309-463 111, 42; 545c]765 128, 42; 802-24, 866-1008 99, 32; 1047-1165, 1231-82 104, 40; lyric 13, 2. *Hec.* 1-58 21, 6; 216-443 155, 43; 484-628 84, 32; 658-83, 721-904 153, 48; 953-1024 67, 20; 1035-55, 1107-1292 148, 47; lyric 12, 3. *Suppl.* 1-41 10, 5; 87-270, 286-364 176, 49; 381-597 132, 45; 634-777 92, 32; 838-917, 925c]54 68, 22; 1031-71, 1080-1113, 1165-1231 97, 30; lyric 3, 0. *El.* 1-111 55, 16; 213-431 178, 42; 487-584, 596-698 196, 49; 747-858 93, 48; 880-87, 998-1146 189, 59; 1238-91 30, 9; lyric 6, 0. *Herc.* 1-106 51, 14; 138-347 124, 38; 451-636 150, 43; 701-33 27, 9; 822-54 11, 2; 922-1015 52, 21; 1086-1177, 1214-1426 256, 77; lyric (excluding 819) 15, 3. *Tro.* 1-97 55, 13; 292-307, 341-443, 462-510 92, 31; 608-781 113, 29; 860-1059 123, 41; 1123-1215, 1260-86 57, 17; lyric 12, 2. *IT* 1-122 68, 21; 236-391 85, 31; 467-642, 657-826, 900-1088 458, 128; 1153-1202 58, 10; 1284-1489 118, 39; lyric 9, 1. *Hel.* 1-163 129, 39; 252-329, 386-514 158, 48; 528-624, 698-1106 373, 105; 1165-1300 145, 41; 1369-1450 55, 18; 1512-1620, 1642-87 92, 35; lyric 22, 9. *Ion* 1-81 36, 14; 237-451 213, 64; 566-675 54, 16; 725-62, 800-58, 923-1047 205, 53; 1106-1228 63, 26; 1261-1438, 1510-1605 220, 63; lyric 27, 10. *Phoen.* 1-102 46, 15; 261-90, 355-587 184, 52; 690-783 81, 17; 834-1018 145, 48; 1067-1282 97, 34; 1310-34, 1352-1479, 1582-1709 170, 35; lyric 40, 9. *Or.* 1-135 81, 21; 208-315 83, 25; 356-728 279, 76; 844-956, 1018-1245, 1311-52 287, 96; 1554-1681 117, 39; lyric 36, 11. *Bacch.* 1-63 19, 3; 170-369 110, 31; 434-518 80, 17; 642-861 156, 46; 912-76 56, 18; 1043-1152 51, 18; 1200-1367 119, 34; lyric 8, 3. *IA* 1-103 20, 7; 303-16, 402-542 128, 40; 607-750 141, 31; 801-54, 917-1035 131, 46; 1098-1275, 1402-73 193, 57; 1532-77 23, 6; lyric 1, 0.

¹² It is by no means inconceivable that the incidence of internal sense-pauses increased in the first half of Euripides' career, from the *Peliades* of 455 on, and levelled off in the second half, from the *Medea* on. If the *Rhesus* were genuine, the low figure for that play might be added tentatively to other stylistic indications that it is among the earliest of the extant plays (cf. William Ritchie, *The Authenticity of the Rhesus of Euripides* [Cambridge 1964] especially 348 ff.), but its authenticity is too uncertain to permit any conclusion to be drawn.

on we have a series of plays which are remarkably consistent with regard to sense-pauses, almost all of them falling in the range 28.4 to 31.3. Given such a narrow range, one or two exceptions might be expected by the law of averages, and symmetrically one appears on the high side (*Andromache* at 33.2) and one on the low (*Phoenissae* at 27.5).¹³ I conclude that Euripides' style, while it evolves steadily in some other respects, notably in its use of resolutions, remains essentially static in regard to the matter in hand. This throws no light on Seneca, whose style is anything but static in this regard.¹⁴

¹³ The question of the authenticity of certain lines in *Phoen.* is of course relevant here. In reaching my figures I have excluded the following passages: 1104-40 and 1221-58, which are generally regarded as spurious, and 1586-90, 1595-1614, 1688-89 and 1703-7, which are condemned by E. Fraenkel, *Zu den Phoenissen des Euripides* (Munich 1963) 86 ff. Without these deletions the overall figure for the play would be 27.4. Since the authenticity of the whole passage 1582-1709 has been questioned, it may be noted that the pause-test figure for those lines is 16.8%, unusually low by Euripidean standards. The figure for the play minus 1582-1709 is 29.5, well within the usual Euripidean range.

¹⁴ Since resolutions have been mentioned, I should say that I do not regard variations in their overall frequency from play to play as chronologically significant in Seneca. In the following table the figures in the first two columns are drawn from W. Strzelecki, *De Senecae trimetro iambico quaestiones selectae* (Krakow 1938) 92f. (but I count each proceleusmatic as two resolutions rather than one).

	Total resolutions	Total trimeters	Resolutions per 100 trimeters
<i>Ag.</i>	603	709	85.0
<i>Oed.</i>	600	741	81.0
<i>Pha.</i>	753	951	79.2
<i>HF.</i>	802	1048	76.5
<i>Med.</i>	603	691	87.3
<i>Tro.</i>	776	920	84.3
<i>Phoen.</i>	519	664	78.2
<i>Thy.</i>	604	767	78.7

The variations here from the norm of about 81 resolutions per 100 lines are not very great; contrast the large range in Euripides (where the variations are generally, and rightly, accepted as chronologically significant), from 6.3 per 100 lines in *Hippolytus* to 49.5 in *Orestes* (Ceadel, *CQ* 1941 6). It therefore seems reasonable to regard Seneca's style as essentially unchanging in this respect from play to play. (I suspect, however, that a detailed study of the distribution of resolutions would find interesting local variations reflecting changes in dramatic content.)

But although the figures for Aeschylus and Euripides taken separately neither support nor refute my hypothesis, an interesting point emerges if we compare them with each other and with the figure for Sophocles. There is clearly a *general* tendency for the incidence of internal sense-pauses in tragic trimeters to increase through the last two-thirds of the fifth century. This general movement strengthens my supposition that an increasing incidence of internal sense-pauses is a natural result of increasing familiarity and experience with the iambic trimeter.

Since two of the three Greek tragedians had proved less than entirely helpful, I turned next to Shakespeare, since it is readily evident that his style evolved considerably in this and other ways between the early and the late plays. In this area of Shakespearean scholarship a curious situation exists. On the one hand the chronological significance of the pause-test has been recognised since the nineteenth century; and yet, despite the amount of research done on Shakespeare, no satisfactory statistics are to be found. The only complete set of statistics available is that given by E. K. Chambers in his monumental *William Shakespeare: a Study of Facts and Problems*, published in 1930 (Vol. II, Appendix H, Tables V and VIII 4-7). But Chambers himself gave notice that this "rests upon a rather rough count" (II 407). More important, it is open to a serious statistical objection. Chambers arrived at his percentages by dividing the number of lines containing internal sense-pauses by the total number of blank-verse lines in the play concerned. This procedure makes the quite erroneous assumption that the overall *frequency* of sense-pauses (whether within the line or at line-end) remains constant from play to play. In fact the frequency varies considerably, as one might expect: for example, *Romeo and Juliet* has an average of approximately 71 sense-pauses per 100 blank-verse lines, as against only 63 in *As You Like It*. Clearly, where the frequency of sense-pauses is greater, there is more opportunity for mid-line pauses to occur. A further objection to Chambers' method is that it makes no distinction between lines containing one sense-pause and those containing two or more.¹⁵ The only

¹⁵ These objections vitiate not only Chambers' own conclusions but also the attempt by K. Wentersdorf to construct a "metrical index" based on Chambers' figures and on other metrical and stylistic tests ("Shakespearean Chronology and the Metrical Tests" in *Shakespeare-Studien*, edd. W. Fischer, K. Wentersdorf [Marburg 1951] 161-93).

satisfactory method, therefore, is to express the number of sense-pauses occurring within the line as a percentage of the total sense-pauses for the play.

Nevertheless Chambers' figures leave no doubt that there is an enormous increase in the proportion of sense-pauses occurring within the line from the beginning to the end of Shakespeare's career. In order to make his figures at least partially comparable with my own for the classical dramatists, I have added to his total of lines containing internal sense-pauses (Tables V 4 and VIII 6) his figure for "split lines," i.e. those divided between two or more speakers (Tables V 2 and VIII 4). The resulting figure has been expressed as a percentage of the total full blank-verse lines in the play (Tables V 1 and VII 4), and the results are given below. K. Wentersdorf has made the valuable point that the Histories are written in a more formal style than the other genres and should therefore be listed separately.¹⁶ I give the dates regarded as most probable by Wentersdorf on the basis of external evidence and of several stylistic features, adding *Two Noble Kinsmen* which he omits. An asterisk indicates that the figure is not for the whole play, but for the portion regarded by Chambers as Shakespearian.

1588-89	Titus Andronicus	13.8		
1589-90	Comedy of Errors	15.7	1 Henry VI	10.7
1590-91			2 Henry VI	11.5
			3 Henry VI	12.7
1591-92	Taming of the Shrew	20.5*	Richard III	14.9
1592-93	Two Gentlemen of Verona	15.1		
1593-94	Love's Labour's Lost	15.9		
1594-95	Midsummer Night's Dream	21.5	Richard II	15.2
	Romeo and Juliet	27.6		
1595-96	Merchant of Venice	24.4	King John	17.4
1596-97	Merry Wives of Windsor	24.2	1 Henry IV	18.0
			2 Henry IV	18.1
1597-98	Much Ado About Nothing	26.1		
1598-99	Julius Caesar	26.2	Henry V	17.0
1599-1600	As You Like It	23.9		
	Twelfth Night	29.4		
1600-1	Hamlet	32.6		
1601-2	Troilus and Cressida	29.9		
1602-3	—			

¹⁶In the article cited in footnote 15.

1603-4	Measure for Measure	37.4		
	Othello	40.7		
1604-5	All's Well	40.0		
	Timon of Athens	40.9		
1605-6	King Lear	45.8		
	Macbeth	46.4		
1606-7	Antony and Cleopatra	54.3		
1607-8	Pericles	45.2*		
	Coriolanus	47.4		
1608-9	Cymbeline	56.0		
1609-10	Winter's Tale	50.2		
1610-11	Tempest	51.4		
1611-12	—			
1612-13	Two Noble Kinsmen	52.0*	Henry VIII	54.6*

In view of the unsatisfactory nature of these figures, I have as a temporary palliative prepared my own figures, on precisely the same basis as for the classical dramatists, for eight of the plays, and give them here (first total sense-pauses, then those within the line, then the latter as a percentage of the former): *Richard III* 2416, 477, 19.7%; *Richard II* 1516, 351, 23.2%; *Romeo and Juliet* 1949, 602, 30.9%; *King John* 1554, 438, 28.2%; *Henry V* 1007, 323, 32.1%; *As You Like It* 627, 224, 35.7%; *Antony and Cleopatra* 2210, 1417, 64.1%; *Coriolanus* 1857, 1232, 66.3%.¹⁷ These figures confirm that some of the anomalies in Chambers' figures

¹⁷ Text used: *The Riverside Shakespeare*, edd. G. Blakemore Evans, Harry Levin, Boston 1974. For purposes of checking I again give gross figures for each Act, first for all sense-pauses and then for those within the line. Incomplete blank-verse lines have not been considered. It should be noted that no two counters will reach exactly the same totals for a given Shakespearian play, because of the difficulty of deciding whether certain lines are in blank-verse or not. However, these instances are not so common as to have a drastic effect on the results. *Richard III* I 654, 119; II 302, 74; III 492, 67; IV 626, 141; V 342, 76. *Richard II* I 304, 42; II 359, 77; III 306, 79; IV 188, 51; V 359, 102. *Romeo and Juliet* I 464, 139; II 342, 97; III 588, 197; IV 256, 73; V 299, 96. *John I* 188, 42; II 305, 74; III 387, 109; IV 386, 122; V 288, 91. *Henry V* I 197, 56; II 227, 83; III 137, 42; IV 350, 109; V 96, 33. *As You Like It* I 113, 39; II 239, 92; III 118, 44; IV 76, 33; V 81, 16. *Antony and Cleopatra* I 324, 197; II 498, 315; III 578, 381; IV 502, 325; V 308, 199. *Coriolanus* I 445, 292; II 267, 181; III 483, 303; IV 294, 204; V 368, 252. The following are the more notable passages which have been omitted as not in blank verse: *Richard III* I i 192-202, iv 86-90, 98-160, III ii 1-3; *Henry V* II i 1-45, 54-59, 63-65, 69-71, 80-106, 113-27; ii 145-50; iii 1-3, 6-46, 57-64; III ii; iv; vi 1-20, 23-24, 30-38, 50-56, 58-87, 90-136; vii; IV i 49-82, 85-229; ii 2-7; iv

are the result of statistical inadequacies. Thus the figures derived from Chambers give *As You Like It* a lower percentage than *Romeo and Juliet*, *Henry V* a lower percentage than *John*, and *Coriolanus* a much lower percentage than *Antony and Cleopatra*, though in each case it is the second play which is earlier; in each instance the properly constituted figures remove the anomaly. On the other hand, it is very probable that correctly constituted figures would uncover other anomalies; this is suggested by the large gap of 5.7% between *Richard II* and *John*, written within a year or so of each other.

The task of preparing a complete set of figures on a reliable basis must be left to a Shakespearian specialist, who would be better equipped than I to overcome technical difficulties (notably the decision whether certain lines are in blank verse or prose, cf. Chambers I 256) and to interpret the results in the light of current scholarship on questions of Shakespearian chronology. At all events, for our present purposes the general result is not in doubt: a steady increase in the Histories, and at a higher level in the other plays, with minor fluctuations and inconsistencies such as that already established between *Richard II* and *John*.

Since differences in genre appear to be reflected in the pause-test results for Shakespeare, it is opportune to note here that in Seneca's tragedies we are dealing with works of the same genre, which are therefore strictly comparable. The same is true, of course, of Sophocles' tragedies. If this were not the case, it would be possible to argue that the variations in the pause-test results were due to generic differences rather than to development of the poet's style.¹⁸

1-6, 12, 17-18, 21, 25-31, 33-37, 40-77; vii 1-54, 92-103, 106-15, 119-69; viii 1-40, 43-44, 46-56, 62-73, 116-18, 121; V i 1-79; ii 102-329, 336-42; *Romeo and Juliet* I i 1-64; ii 38-44, 57, 59-60, 62-76, 78-81; iii 100-3; v 1-15; II iv 1-174, 176-78, 198-217; v 38-45; III i 5-37, 39-49, 75-83, 96-104; IV ii 3-9; v 102-46; *As You Like It* I i; ii 1-220; iii 1-40; II iv 1-21, 46-61; v; vi; vii 174-90; III ii 11-435; iii; iv 1-46; v 66-71; IV i; ii; iii 1-5, 39-74, 163-78, 181-82; V i; ii 1-76, 109-23; iii; iv 35-115, 120-22, 125-46; epilogue; *Antony and Cleopatra* I ii 1-9, 14-16, 18-22, 24-30, 35-37, 40-78, 131-75; II ii 103-6, 171-90; vi 82-136; vii 1-16, 24-36, 41-52, 113-18; III v 1-12; xi 25-34; V ii 245-78; *Coriolanus* I i 1-54, 57-61, 79-86, 93-95; iii 1-26, 48-111; v 1-3; II i 1-159; ii 1-36; iii 1-47, 63-111, 132-37; IV iii; v 1-54, 148-235; vi 138-145, 153-58; V ii 24-81, 93-111; iv 1-34.

¹⁸ Horace's *Satires* and *Epistles* illustrate the fact that the form in which a poet is writing may strongly influence his use of sense-pauses. Professor Niall Rudd

At this point, then, I may sum up my conclusions on the pause-test. Sophocles and Shakespeare support my initial hypothesis that large changes in the proportion of sense-pauses occurring within the line are likely to be chronologically significant. It remains my view that Seneca's tragedies may be divided on this basis into three groups, not of course with certainty but with a reasonable degree of probability. I rest my case on the size of the gaps between these groups, which seems large enough to compensate for the degree of error inherent in such figures.

It would be wrong to leave the sense-pause figures for Seneca without considering at least briefly their general significance, quite apart from the question of their chronological import. What they reveal is a remarkable degree of flexibility in Seneca's style, at least in this one aspect. This flexibility is seen first in the degree of variation between one play and another: to take the two extremes, the figure for *Phoenissae* is not so far from being twice that of the *Agamemnon*. It is also seen in the absolute figures for the group 3 plays, in the middle and upper 50's. The highest rate for any surviving Greek tragedy is 33.4, and the figure for a book of the *Aeneid* picked at random (Book 2) is 36.4. In fact the rates for group 3 are paralleled, among the authors studied in this paper, only in Horace's *Satires* and in late Shakespeare. These comparisons should certainly help to modify the traditional view of the Senecan trimeter as a monotonous and inexpressive verse-instrument.

To return to the question of chronology: so far we have achieved a reasonable probability. How could the degree of probability be raised or brought to the level of near certainty? Only if other types of internal evidence support the grouping which I have proposed. I should like to mention two such pieces of evidence.

points out to me that the *Satires* consistently have a much higher proportion of sense-pauses within the line than the *Epistles*, although the *Satires* are the earlier work. As a rough indication of the difference, my count of a sample of the *Satires* (I 1, 3, 9, II 2, 3, 6) produces a figure of 64%, as against 36% for a sample of the *Epistles* (I 1, 2, 7, 16, 18, II 1, 2). I cannot do better than to quote Professor Rudd's explanation (given in correspondence): "The key to this particular difference seems to be 'dialogue.' Where Horace is reporting a character's speech, he tends more often to ignore the line-units. And as there is more direct speech in the *Satires* it follows that enjambment is more frequent." Seneca, on the other hand, is writing in a form which is consistent throughout, i.e. the trimeters of tragic drama.

Particularly striking corroboration is provided by Seneca's treatment of final *o*. As is well known, there was an increasing tendency, which accelerated during the first century A.D., to shorten final *o* in poetry in certain classes of words: third-declension nouns in the nominative singular, verbs in the first singular of the present and future tenses, particles, adverbs, numbers, pronouns, gerundives (first shortened in Seneca), imperatives.¹⁹ Although poets differ widely from each other in their use of this license, it seems a reasonable hypothesis that a large increase in its use within the work of a single author in a single genre is chronologically significant.²⁰ In Seneca the numbers of instances of long and short final *o* in the classes of words mentioned above are as follows:²¹

		-o long	-o shortened
Group 1	<i>Agamemnon</i>	13	13
	<i>Phaedra</i>	12	11
	<i>Oedipus</i>	7	8
Group 2	<i>Medea</i>	12	8
	<i>Troades</i>	8	12
	<i>Hercules Furens</i>	14	16
Group 3	<i>Thyestes</i>	10	36
	<i>Phoenissae</i>	5	42

¹⁹ See Austin's note on Verg. *Aen.* 2.735, and R. Hartenberger, *De O Finali* (diss. Bonn 1911).

²⁰ The possibility of using final *o* as a dating criterion is suggested by Cervellera, loc. cit. (fn. 1) p. 31, who however fails to present the evidence properly; she lists only examples of long *o* in three plays, and that incompletely.

²¹ These figures are based on lists prepared by myself and checked against Hartenberger's lists for Senecan Tragedy. Naturally they include only those cases where the quantity is guaranteed by metre. I have excluded from the count four words (*duo, ego, modo, nescio in nescioqui/-quis*) in which final *o* is regularly short in Sen. *Trag.* and for some time before, and two words (*retro, ultro*) whose final *o* is regularly long in Sen. *Trag.* and remains long in Statius and Martial. The figures may easily be checked, and I therefore forbear from giving line-references to each instance counted.

It is of some incidental interest to note the comparable figures for *Octavia*: final *o* is long eleven times, and shortened only once. The extremely low figure for shortened *o* may be added to other stylistic indications that *Oct.* is not a Senecan play. The figures for *HO* (-o long 23 times, shortened 15 times) show a similar frequency to the genuine plays of groups 1 and 2, if we allow for the greater length of *HO*; the unknown author of that play cannot be denied a talent for mimicry.

There is nothing to choose here between groups 1 and 2, but a definite increase in the incidence of shortened *o* in group 3. The change is so striking as to suggest that Seneca decided, before writing *Thy.* and *Phoen.*, that he could use the licence much more widely than before. The change is particularly evident in the treatment of verbs, in which the figures for shortened final *o* (first singular, present and future) are: *Ag.* 1, *Pha.* 4, *Oed.* 1; *Med.* 5, *Tro.* 2, *HF* 5; *Thy.* 18, *Phoen.* 27. Here again the figures for groups 1 and 2 are inconclusive, but we find a remarkable increase in the plays of group 3. It should be noted that there is also a remarkable increase *between Thy. and Phoen.* in the frequency of all forms of shortened final *o* and particularly in first singular verb forms. This is obscured in the gross figures by the brevity of *Phoen.*, which is only three-fifths the length of *Thy.*, but it becomes evident if we calculate the average frequency per 1000 lines of these phenomena:

	-o shortened: all forms	-o shortened: first-singular verbs
<i>Thyestes</i>	32	16
<i>Phoenissae</i>	63	41

If it is accepted that the figures for final *o* have some chronological significance, then clearly we shall regard *Phoen.* as the later of the Group 3 plays and thus the last of Seneca's dramatic compositions.

In evaluating the final *o* figures it is instructive to analyse the distribution of metrical shapes of words with shortened final *o*:

	<i>Ag.</i>	<i>Pha.</i>	<i>Oed.</i>	<i>Med.</i>	<i>Tro.</i>	<i>HF</i>	<i>Thy.</i>	<i>Phoen.</i>
A. uu	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	1
B. -u	7	4	3	6	4	9	18	22
C. uuu	4	6	3	1	7	4	8	7
D. u-u	1	1	0	0	0	3	3	2
E. --u	0	0	1	0	1	0	4	5
F. uuuu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
G. uu-u	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
H. -uuu	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
I. -u-u	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

It will be clear from this table that in group 3 Seneca's use of shortened *o* changes not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. Not only is there an increase in the type most commonly found in groups 1 and 2 (viz. type B), but also a disproportionate increase in certain types which rarely occur in groups 1 and 2 (viz. A and E); while shortening on quadrisyllables other than the *aliquando* type (viz. types F, H and I) occurs only in group 3. My general conclusion is, then, that both quantitatively and qualitatively Seneca's use of shortened final *o* strongly suggests that the pause-test is correct in identifying *Thy.* and *Phoen.* as Seneca's last plays; this in turn tends to confirm the general validity of the pause-test as a dating criterion for Seneca.

The second piece of corroborative evidence concerns the varying degrees of complexity to be found in the metres of the choral odes. The complex polymetric and polyschematic patterns, which constitute a notable metrical feature of the Senecan corpus, are in fact restricted to four plays: polymetric odes are confined to *Oed.* (405–15, 472–505, 710–35) and *Ag.* (589–637, 808–66); polyschematism is found again in *Oed.* (in conjunction with polymetric passages in 403–508), in *Pha.* (736–823, 1123–53) and in the wedding-song and conjuration-scene of *Med.* (56–115, 740–842). On the sole basis of this uneven distribution, one would be inclined to group these four plays together within the corpus. In the context of the present enquiry, however, it is a striking fact that three of the four plays are identified by the pause-test as constituting group 1. This seems to me strong confirmation of the groupings indicated by the pause-test. The evidence from metre and from the pause-test, when taken together, suggests that at an early stage in his writing of tragedy, Seneca experimented with complex and ambitious metrical schemes; and that he later abandoned them, except in one play of group 2, in favour of the simple but sometimes very effective patterns of anapaests or of lyric metres used *κατὰ στίχον*.²²

²² On the metrical evidence alone, K. Münscher suggested an *increase* in the complexity of metrical patterns used by Seneca, culminating in the polymetric schemes of *Ag.* and *Oed.* (*Philologus* Suppl. 16.1 [1922] 88–95). However, his opinion that these were the latest plays was strongly influenced by his belief (*ibid.* 86–88) that Seneca learnt the theory of *derivatio*, on which the polymetric odes are based, from the metrical handbook of Caesius Bassus. Since that book was dedicated to Nero, *Ag.* and *Oed.* could not have been written, he thought, before A.D. 54; this would mean that they could not be Seneca's earliest plays, and he

It may be objected that this view of the choral metres is contradictory to my assumption of an *increase* in complexity in the trimeters. But in fact two quite different types of complexity are involved. The complexity seen increasingly in the trimeters is natural and, I believe, largely instinctive; flexibility would be a better word for it. On the other hand the complexity of the polymetric odes is a highly conscious and artificial matter, in which Seneca deliberately exploits the principles of *derivatio*.

If the chronology proposed in this paper is accepted, it will inevitably have large consequences for critical understanding of the plays at all levels. I take two small examples. The first concerns the dramatic technique whereby the chorus, at the end of an ode, refer to some action occurring onstage (usually the entrance of a character) and thereby lead in to the following Act. These transition-passages are not evenly distributed throughout the corpus: of the nine certain examples, eight are contributed by *Ag.*, *Pha.* and *Oed.*²³ If my proposed grouping of the plays is accepted, it will be possible to regard this technique as one which characterised the group 1 period and was thereafter largely abandoned.

The second example is even more minute, and concerns the behaviour of the word *retro*. In the nineteenth century the language and metre of *Agamemnon* was scrutinised²⁴ for evidence concerning the play's authenticity, which had been in doubt since before Bentley's time. It was noted²⁵ *inter alia* that in *Ag.* the word *retro* is five times used unadventurously as an iambus at line-end, and only once elsewhere in the line as a spondee; in *Oed.*, twice as an iambus at line-end and twice as a spondee; in

therefore interpreted the phenomena of the odes as indicating that they were the latest. But it seems probable that the principles of *derivatio* antedate Caesius Bassus, in which case Seneca need not have learnt from him; see Schanz-Hosius §385, F. Leo, *L. Annaei Senecae Tragoediae* (Berlin 1878-79, reprinted 1963) I 132f. and *Hermes* 24 (1889) 280-301. The decrease in complexity suggested above seems to me at least as probable *a priori* as the increase proposed by Münscher.

²³ The certain examples are: *Ag.* 408ff., 693f., *Pha.* 358f., 824ff., 989f., 1154f., *Oed.* 911ff., 995ff., *HF* 202ff. I am inclined to follow Kapnukajas in regarding *HF* 893f. as addressed to Hercules, which would add a tenth example.

²⁴ Notably by G. Richter, *De Seneca Tragoediarum Auctore Comment. Philol.* (diss. Bonn 1862) 14-29, and by Leo in his edition (cf. fn. 22) I 89-134.

²⁵ Cf. Richter p. 14.

the other plays, always as a spondee (20 times). Such a detail is in itself merely a straw in the wind; but if *Ag.* (whose authenticity is no longer questioned) and *Oed.* are accepted as early plays, the change can be seen as related to chronology. The proposed chronology would call for a re-evaluation not only of such details, but also of larger questions of dramatic technique and structure; but this must await some assessment of the criteria and results presented here.

There is also a consequence for the absolute dating of some of the plays, as the reader will have noticed. If my proposal is correct, the plays of group 1 must be earlier than those of group 2, which includes *HF*; and since we have a *terminus ante quem* of A.D. 54 for *HF*, the plays of group 1 must also belong before the reign of Nero. However, it will be seen that the two pieces of evidence on which this conclusion is based, viz. the relative dating of all the tragedies and the absolute dating of *HF*, are independent of each other. In other words a critic who accepts my relative dating is not *ipso facto* obliged to accept the absolute dating of *HF*, and vice versa.

One further consequence may be noted briefly and tentatively in conclusion. The degree of development revealed by the pause-test would seem to require a considerable period of time. How long a period one cannot guess: poets differ, and even a single poet's development may not be uniform. But it seems to me likely that the writing of the tragedies was not a brief flirtation with Melpomené, but rather an interest to which Seneca returned over a number of years.

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Concluding note. I should like to express my thanks for helpful advice to Professors F. M. Ahl, C. J. Herington, S. E. Scully, P. L. Smith and R. J. Tarrant, and to the Journal's anonymous referee. I am also grateful to Mr. Geoffrey Finch for checking my Shakespearian figures.

THE RHETORIC OF ADVOCACY AND PATRON-CLIENT IDENTIFICATION: VARIATION ON A THEME

Perhaps the most interesting ramification of the traditional patron-client relationship of ancient Rome was the profound effect it exercised upon the Roman judicial system. Unlike the typical procedure in an Athenian court of law, where the plaintiff and defendant ordinarily spoke on their own behalf, the Roman litigant normally enlisted one or more *patroni*, rhetorical advocates, to speak in support of his case. The implications of such a "rhetoric of advocacy"¹ are manifold, particularly with regard to the scope of rhetorical ethos, for in Rome it is not only the ethos of the litigants which now comes into play, but the characters of the *patroni* as well. Thus, in the hands of a rhetorically skillful advocate, particularly one endowed with a very strong personality, the rhetoric of advocacy can be an extraordinarily powerful weapon.

The flexibility of this system gives Cicero the opportunity for a powerful display of advocacy in his first public *causa*, the *Pro Roscio Amerino*, in which he defends Roscius against the attack of Sulla's threatening henchman, Chrysogonus.² At various points in the oration, Cicero speaks as advocate, on behalf of Roscius, pleading his client's case, delineating his own character, his client's character, and the ethos of his adversaries (e.g., 2-5). At another time, Cicero identifies himself with his client and actually speaks in first person (32, 145), stirring the emotions of the judges and arousing great sympathy for Roscius. On still other occasions, the orator consciously distinguishes himself and his words from his client and his client's thoughts (e.g., 129, 143); this distinction enables him to attack Chrysogonus and represent himself as acting against the wishes of Roscius. Not only did the speech secure the acquittal of Roscius but it also displays a variety of artistic ethos unprecedented in Greek or Roman oratory.

¹ The best discussion of the rhetoric of advocacy is George Kennedy's article, "The Rhetoric of Advocacy in Greece and Rome," *AJP* 89 (1968) 419-36.

² This paragraph summary of the speech is heavily indebted to Kennedy's lengthier discussion, *ibid.* 429-32.

Cicero's speeches during and subsequent to his consulship are noteworthy for the effective employment of such aspects of the rhetoric of advocacy, and in particular for the use of patron-client identification. The election of the *novus homo* to the consulship and his crushing of the Catilinarian conspiracy endowed the ethos of the orator with great *auctoritas*, on par with that of former *patres patriae*; taking full advantage of the circumstances, Cicero the *patronus* "puts on the authority of one who has knowledge of the truth,"³ and invokes the weight of his *auctoritas* to lend persuasion in defense of his clients. By identifying himself with his clients and their causes with his cause, Cicero bestows upon their defenses a measure of his own authority. The speech on behalf of Sulla, accused in 62 B.C. of complicity in the Catilinarian conspiracy, illustrates the use of this tactic. The major thrust of Cicero's line of defense is his assurance that the consul who had thwarted the conspiracy would never dare to defend one of its perpetrators. Identification with Sulla's cause is almost immediate:

. . . sed, ut ille [Torquatus, the prosecutor] vidit, quantum de mea auctoritate deripuisset, tantum se de huius praesidiis deminuturum, sic hoc ego sentio, si mei facti rationem vobis constantiamque huius officii ac defensionis probaro, causam quoque me P. Sullae probaturum (2).

Thus, Sulla's cause is the cause of Cicero; client and patron are both on trial; Cicero's *auctoritas* and force of character, when allied with Sulla, carry the day.

The *Pro Flacco*, delivered three years later, as the threat of exile stalks dangerously close, again displays Cicero's identification with his client, client's cause with patron's, and Cicero's pressing need to justify himself, all of which account, in a way, for a dual defense. In the exordium of the speech (4-5), Cicero identifies the attack upon Flaccus with the mounting assault upon himself by Clodius; conversely, he views the defense in the same light. This theme is reiterated later in the speech: the union of the defense of the defendant Flaccus with the defense of the defender Cicero is striking, first in section 96, "Nos iam ab iudicibus nominamur, in nos crimina finguntur, nobis pericula comparantur," and then again in section 97, where the first person

³ Quintilian, 4.1.46: ". . . auctoritatem induat vera sentientis."

plural pronoun (*nos*) yields to the first person singular and Cicero, not Flaccus, becomes the focal point of the speech:

Qua re, si quis illuc me vocat, venio; populum Romanum disceptatorem non modo non recuso sed etiam depono. Vis absit, ferrum ac lapides removeantur, operae facessant, servitia sileant; nemo erit tam iniustus qui me audierit, sit modo liber et civis, quin potius de praemiis meis quam de poena cogitandum putet (97).

This identification of client and client's lot with patron and patron's lot accomplishes for Cicero a double purpose: it enables him to wring from his ex-consular ethos a few last drops of *auctoritas* in defense of his client; in defense of himself and in hope of allaying the very real danger that surrounded him, it allows him to recall his service and devotion to the Republic.

In the following year, Cicero suffered the threatened exile, and although he describes his recall in glowingly triumphant terms,⁴ the *post reditum* speeches are marked by similar attempts at justification, this time for his retreat into exile without a fight. The device of patron-client identification is prominent again, but is marked by an interesting variation: Cicero, the advocate who, according to his calculation, has saved the State a second time by sacrificing himself to exile,⁵ employs his own ethos and *auctoritas* in support of his client; but because he views himself as being in some sense on trial, he depicts himself as a "client" and chooses for himself an extraordinarily powerful "patron"—the *res publica*.

Throughout the speeches which follow Cicero's return, as well as others which deal with the events of 58 B.C.,⁶ there is a conscious effort at identification, implicit or explicit, of Cicero with the Republic. His wounds are the wounds of the State, his exile her exile, his recall and return her recall and return, his *causa* the *causa rei publicae*. A stirring passage from the *Post reditum in Senatu* will help to illustrate this point:

⁴ Cf. e.g., *Att.* 4.1.4–5; *Sest.* 131; *Pis.* 34–35, 51–52.

⁵ *Sest.* 49: ". . . et unus rem publicam bis servavi, semel gloria, iterum aerumna mea."

⁶ *Red. Sen.*, *Post red. ad Quir.*, *Dom.*, *Har. Resp.*, *Prov. Cons.*, *Sest.*, *Vatin.*, *Balb.*, *Pis.*

Sed cum viderem me non diutius quam ipsam rem publicam ex hac urbe afuturum, neque ego illa exterminata mihi remanendum putavi, et illa, simul atque revocata est, me secum pariter reportavit. Mecum leges, mecum quaestiones, mecum iura magistratum, mecum senatus auctoritas, mecum libertas, mecum etiam frugum ubertas, mecum deorum et hominum sanctitates omnes et religiones afuerunt. Quae si semper abessent, magis vestras fortunas lugerem quam desiderarem meas; sin aliquando revocarentur, intellegebam mihi cum illis una esse redeundum (34).

Passages similar to this one, which express or imply Cicero's identification with the State, are to be found in abundance in any of the *post reditum* speeches.⁷ The *Pro Sestio*, however, Cicero's speech on behalf of the tribune who championed his cause and the orator's own political manifesto, displays the most artful use of patron-client identification in combination with Cicero's identification with the State.

Cicero begins the identification subtly in section 15 where he describes the act of Clodius' adoption into plebeian status as a bow (*arcus*) stretched against him, but in reality against the entire Republic ("... intentus est arcus in me unum, sicut vulgo ignari rerum loquebantur, re quidem vera in universam rem publicam . . ."). The identification is articulated more explicitly in paragraph 31:

Mihi autem hoc propositum est ostendere, omnia consilia P. Sesti mentemque totius tribunatus hanc fuisse, ut adflictae et perditae rei publicae quantum posset mederetur. Ac si in exponendis vulneribus illis de me ipso plura dicere videbor, ignoscitote; nam et illam meam cladem vos et omnes boni maximum esse rei publicae vulnus iudicastis, et P. Sestius est reus non suo, sed meo nomine: qui cum omnem vim sui tribunatus in mea salute consumpserit, necesse est meam causam praeteriti temporis cum huius praesenti defensione esse coniunctam.

This important passage clearly expresses the link between Sestius and Cicero and Cicero and the State: the wound of exile

⁷ See e.g., *Red. Sen.* 4, 16, 17-18, 25, 34, 36; *Post red. ad Quir.* 14, 16; *Dom.* 17, 63, 73, 99, 137, 141, 146; *Har. Resp.* 15, 17, 45; *Prov. Cons.* 45; *Vatin.* 8; *Pis.* 21, 25, 77; *Balb.* 58.

inflicted upon Cicero was the gravest wound inflicted upon the State; furthermore, Sestius is a defendant not on his own account but on Cicero's—his defense is the defense of Cicero. Thus patron Cicero identifies himself with client Sestius, but in another sense identifies himself and his *causa* as a client of the patron State. The two metaphors employed by Cicero in this passage to make the identification more explicit, the image of the State as a wounded or afflicted body⁸ and the reference to the movement for Cicero's recall as the *causa*, or "court case" of the State, will become the chief vehicles for the subsequent identification of Cicero with the Republic.

In fact, perhaps the most remarkable passage in the speech in terms of the force with which it unites Cicero with the State employs the metaphor of the wounded, afflicted body. Of his enemies' behavior after they forced him into exile, Cicero says this: "statim me perculso ad meum sanguinem hauriendum, et spirante etiam re publica ad eius spolia detrahenda advolaverunt"(54). In this extraordinary passage, Cicero almost becomes the State!

Such images of the afflicted State and Cicero himself abound in the speech. Earlier (24) the orator had described the alliance into which Gabinius and Piso had entered with Clodius: they handed over the republic to Clodius, prostrate and fettered, and then ratified the pact by the shedding of Cicero's blood ("... si ipsi prius tribuno plebis adflictam et constrictam rem publicam tradidissent. id autem foedus meo sanguine ictum sanciri posse dicebant"). At another point in the speech (78), Cicero speaks of his enemies "feeding on the lifeblood of the State" ("rei publicae sanguine saginantur") while he is away; earlier he had called Clodius a "devourer of his country" ("me ipsum ut contempnit helluo patriae! 26).⁹ Those mobs that met and voted for

⁸ Cf. other points in this speech for the use of this metaphor; e.g., 1, 5, 24, 31, 17, 81, 135.

⁹ An interesting and very artistic complement to the image of the Republic as a wounded or afflicted body is the image of Clodius (and/or Piso and Gabinius) as the wounder or the pestilence which has afflicted it. Cf. e.g., 33: "... in contionem ab illa furia ac peste patriae, maximo cum gemitu vestro, illa omnia quae tum contra me contraque rem publicam agebantur voce ac sententia sua comprobaverunt"; 78: "An veri simile est ut civis Romanus aut homo liber quisquam cum gladio in forum descenderit ante lucem, ne de me ferri pateretur, praeter eos

the legislation against him he characterizes as "frenzied furies flocking together as it were to the funeral of the State" ("... furiae concitatae tamquam ad funus rei publicae convolant," 109). In each of these examples Cicero, the *patronus* of Sestius, identifies himself implicitly or explicitly with the Republic which, in turn, functions in a sense as *patronus* for Cicero's defense.

That Cicero considers the State his *patronus* is further emphasized by the continual reference to his *causa*, i.e., the movement for his recall, as the *causa* of the State. Just as Cicero the patron had (in section 31) identified his cause (*meam causam*) with the defense of Sestius, his client ("cum huius praesenti defensione esse coniunctam"), so does Cicero as "client" identify the Republic's (i.e., his patron's) *causa* with his own.

In paragraph 67 we see Pompey the Great "taking up the cause of the State" ("accessit ad causam publicam") as he puts into motion the process for Cicero's recall. Cicero describes the result: "decrevit senatus frequens de meo reditu Kalendis Iuniis" (68). The tribune Milo, in turn, took up the cause of the State ("adiit igitur T. Annius ad causam rei publicae," 87); his purpose: "ut civem patriae recipere vellet ereptum" (87).

Sestius, as tribune-elect and tribune did no less for the cause of the State: he travelled to Caesar for the sake of the Republic.

nam hoc primum iter designatus rei publicae causa suscepit; pertinere et ad concordiam civium putavit et ad perficiendi facultatem animum Caesaris a causa [i.e., Cicero's *causa*] non abhorreere (71).

The outcome: "abiit ille annus; respirasse homines videbantur nondum re, sed spe rei publicae reciperae" (71). What Cicero means to say, of course, is that men sighed in the hopes that *he* might be restored. The implications of the use of the technical term *causa* in such contexts are obvious: the movement for the recall of Cicero, his *causa*, becomes in the courtroom the *causa*

qui ab illo pestifero ac perduto civi iam pridem rei publicae sanguine saginantur?"; 53: "illo, inquam, ipso die—die dico? immo hora atque etiam puncto temporis eodem mihi rei publicae perniciēs, Gabinio et Pisoni provincia rogata est" (in reference to the day of Clodius' bill); these examples illustrate both Cicero's identification with the State and identify his enemies as the pestilence which has afflicted it (him).

of the patron, the State. Sestius, the client of Cicero, defended Cicero's cause; and Cicero's cause is the cause of the State, his patron.

This *causa rei publicae*, i.e., the *causa Ciceronis*, at length prevailed. The orator, recalled in near triumph, assesses the situation in these terms:¹⁰

At cum de dignitate mea ferebatur, nemo sibi nec valetudinis excusationem nec senectutis satis iustam putavit; nemo fuit qui se non rem publicam mecum simul revocare in suas sedes arbitraretur (112).

Thus, the return of Cicero meant the return of the Republic. Those who labored for Cicero's recall were in reality laboring for the recall of the State. Sestius, by working for Cicero's cause, was actually working for the *causa rei publicae*; Sestius is now supported in return by Cicero who is in turn supported by the State.

As the orator finishes his peroration, he again identifies himself and his lot with Sestius (145, 147); even here the connection between Cicero and the Republic does not go unmentioned: "Video P. Sestium meae salutis, vestrae auctoritatis, publicae causae defensorem, propugnatorem, actorem, reum" (144). The speech ends, not with an affirmation of his client's innocence, but rather with a reaffirmation of Cicero's connection with the State and a plea to respect his own *auctoritas*. By their vote for acquittal the jury can renew Cicero and give new life to the State ("... me reficere et renovare rem publicam," 147).

Qua re vos obtestor atque obsecro ut, si me salvum esse voluistis, eos conservetis per quos me recipavistis (147).

The speech on behalf of Sestius is, in terms of the skillful use of the options opened by the rhetoric of advocacy, a *tour de force*. The patron Cicero defends his client not so much on the strength of a logically constructed proof as by the weight of his own personal influence, *auctoritas*, which, in turn, is given further clout by the support of the State (*res publica*). Throughout most of his public career, Cicero felt the need to defend himself, first for his handling of the Catilinarian conspira-

¹⁰ Cf. also 128.

tors and subsequently for the result of that handling, the shame of banishment. Most of the speeches which Cicero delivered on behalf of clients during these periods represent not only the defenses of those clients but, so to speak, Cicero's as well. In the *Pro Sestio*, Sestius' *causa* is supported by and identified with the prestigious patron Cicero, the consular orator, recalled to Italy in triumph, the savior of the State for a second time. In turn, Cicero the "client" is supported by and identified with the Republic: a veritable chain of authority is created which supports the case of Sestius! This clever method of investing one's case with authority was, no doubt, partly responsible for Sestius's acquittal as well as for posterity's judgment that when Cicero *patronus* spoke, he "put on the authority of one who had knowledge of the truth."

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EZEKIEL THE TRAGEDIAN AND THE PRIMEVAL SERPENT

A casual remark that J. J. Scaliger made without, I suspect, much thought or consideration and probably not believing that anyone would take it seriously has nevertheless been taken up by many editors and students of Ezekiel's *Exagoge*.¹ Scaliger quoted ten trimeters from Epiphanius' *Panarion Haeresium* 64.29.6 and observed that he believed them by Ezekiel (though he did not claim they belonged to the *Exagoge*). They deal in the main with the serpent and Cain's murder of Abel:

ὦ πᾶσιν ἀρχὴ καὶ πέρας κακῶν ὄφεις,
σύ τ' ὦ βαρὺν τίκτουσα θησαυρὸν κακῶν
πλάνη, τυφλοῦ ποδηγὲ ἀγνοίας βίου,
χαίρουσα θρήνοις καὶ στενάγμασι βροτῶν,
ὅμεις ἀδέσμονες εἰς ὕβρεις ὁμοσπόρων
τὰς μισαδέλφους ὀπλίσαντες ὀλένας
Καὶν μολῶναι φοινίῳ πρῶτον λύθρῳ
ἐπείσατον γῆν, καὶ τὸν ἐξ ἀκηράτων
πεσεῖν αἰώνων πρωτόπλαστον εἰς χθόνα
ὅμεις ἐτεκτήνασθε.

Two centuries later L. M. Philippson, an early editor of the *Exagoge*, picked up this suggestion and gave it his qualified approval.² He prints the verses as the final ten lines of the *Exagoge*, but his comments do not suggest that he considered them part of this play.³ Shortly thereafter F. Dübner printed them after his text of the *Exagoge*, with a heading that suggested the verses might be by Ezekiel.⁴ But in recent years a number of scholars have more or less promoted (and even extended) Scaliger's view. A. M. Denis has printed the passage among the

¹ *Thesaurus Temporum Eusebii Pamphili* (Amsterdam 1658²) 402.

² *Ezechiel des jüdischen Trauerspieldichters Auszug aus Egypten und Philo des Älteren Jerusalem* (Berlin 1830) 18f.

³ See p. 13. However, it is not true that Philippson assigns the verse to a different play, as Trencsényi-Waldapfel (infra n. 6) claims (158).

⁴ *Christus Patiens, Ezechiel et Christianorum Poetarum Reliquiae Dramaticae* (Paris 1846) 8. He did not categorically condemn the verses, as Trencsényi-Waldapfel asserts (ibid.).

fragments of Ezekiel, with a comment that it may be prologue or epilogue.⁵ Trencsényi-Waldapfel has argued that it is from the *Exagoge* and precedes the section on the Phoenix which begins *ἕτερον δὲ πρὸς τοῖσδ' εἶδομεν ζῶον ξένον*.⁶ He points out nicely that at *Exodus* 15:22 the Jews begin their journey through the desert of Sur and that the Midrash tells us that this desert was filled with snakes.⁷ This would have given Ezekiel the opportunity for introducing the appearance of the snake and the homily on it. Y. Gutman, though he has reservations, tends to believe that the passage is from the *Exagoge*, noting additionally the importance of snakes in the desert-narrative at *Numbers* 21:6–9.⁸ Failing however to perceive how the tenor and substance of this passage could jibe with the contents of the *Exagoge*, he concludes that the verses must have belonged to a choral passage with generalizing tendencies and remarks the habit of late Greek tragedy to incorporate homiletic choral sections of less than perfect relevance to the context of the drama.⁹ One must wonder where Gutman gets his notion of such a choral passage in iambic trimeters.¹⁰

Before embarking on a discussion of these views, it may be worthwhile to observe that one who is predisposed to see this passage as part of the *Exagoge* might have a few additional arguments at his disposal. If the serpent is to be associated with the account of the Phoenix, we can note that both are symbols of immortality.¹¹ In addition there are Jewish (and Christian) texts which set the Phoenix and the serpent in opposition, the one as model of virtue, the other as that of sin.¹² There is also a tradi-

⁵ *Fragmenta Pseudepigraphorum Quae Supersunt Graeca* (Leiden 1970) 216.

⁶ *Acta Orientalia* 2 (1952) 158.

⁷ *Mechilta d'Rabbi Ismael*, edd. Horovitz and Rabin (Jerusalem 1960²) 153.

⁸ *The Beginnings of Jewish-Hellenistic Literature*, vol. 2 (Jerusalem 1963) 153f.

⁹ See too his remarks on pp. 12f.

¹⁰ For alternation of lyric and spoken metres, see Barrett *ad Hipp.* 817–51 (p. 319); on the choral trimeters hard upon choral song at *Hipp.* 871–73, see his comments *ad loc.*

¹¹ For the serpent as symbol of immortality in Egypt and its relation to the *benu* bird, see R. T. Rundle Clark, *University of Birmingham Historical Journal* 2 (1950) 117ff.

¹² E.g., *Jerahmeel* 22; cf. Lactantius *Phoenix* 71f. in its context. There are also Jewish amulets which appear to show a Phoenix attacking the primeval snake. See E. R. Goodenough, *Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period*, vol. 2 (New York 1953) 242f.

tion of Moses "warring" against serpents (Jos. *AJ* 2.245-47; cf. *Jerahmeel* 45). Thus, we have some additional associations through which Ezekiel might have brought snakes into a play on the Exodus.

Is there, however, any evidence or good reason to support the attribution of these verses to Ezekiel? As noted above, the idea goes back to the authority of Scaliger and one suspects that had a lesser scholar offered the opinion it might never have been repeated. I have remarked that it seems to me that Scaliger himself did not take the matter very seriously. In part one senses this from the fact that he offers no argument whatsoever and makes the point in a tone that does not suggest that he expects approval. But there is more. Every scholar who discusses this passage vis-à-vis Ezekiel harks back to Scaliger, yet not a one takes note of Scaliger's comment on this snake-passage a few years earlier in his *first* edition of the *Chronicon*.¹³ There he makes his identification of the author in virtually identical, hesitant language, but the author is different! He is "Eleazar Pontifex Ierosolymorum." Again, there is neither argument nor elaboration. Presumably Scaliger is speaking of the High Priest who plays so important a role in *Aristeas*. While it is true that Ezekiel is not so completely outrageous a choice as Eleazar, the very fact that Scaliger could offer such an identification is a good indication of how little concerned he was with the whole question, and was content to toss off one answer after another without any serious consideration of the problem.

There may be an argument against Ezekiel's authorship on metrical grounds.¹⁴ In these ten (9½) verses there is not a single resolution. Of course, Ezekiel could—and indeed occasionally did—go ten or more verses without a resolution, but not often. In our fragments, the only instances of ten or more consecutive (i.e., consecutive insofar as Polyhistor's quotation goes) verses without resolution are 213 (possibly 207) to 235 and 255-64 (cf. 90-97). According to J. Strugnell, there are 101 resolutions in the 269 lines of the *Exagoge*.¹⁵ This is testimony to an unusual affection for resolution. One wonders what the statistical proba-

¹³ Leiden 1606, p. 242.

¹⁴ See C. F. Müller, *De pedibus solutis in tragicorum minorum trimetris iambicis* (Kiliae 1879) 23.

¹⁵ *HTR* 60 (1967) 454.

bility is that a random choice of ten consecutive lines in the work of Ezekiel would produce not a single resolution. Thus, this may tell a bit against Ezekielian authorship.¹⁶

Since there is not enough extant of the *Exagoge* to be wholly certain whether or not such a passage could make sense within it, and even were we fairly certain that it could not, the possibility might be open that it came from another play by Ezekiel. The fundamental question seems to be whether it is likely that this is the work of a (Hellenistic) Jew. The tenor of the passage seems manifestly Christian, with its powerful emphasis on the serpent as the great source of ill for humankind, the notion of the "fall," etc. There appears to be a virtual association here of the serpent and Satan (note the context at Methodius *de resurr.* 1.37). It is true that there are occasional Jewish sources in which such views can be found in one degree or another,¹⁷ but the tenor of the passage is predominantly Christian, not Jewish. Both the language and the allied conceptions also point in this direction. The twin villains in this metaphysic are *ὄφεις καὶ πλάνη*, a conjunction which is Christian but seems not Jewish. When Philo speaks allegorically of the primeval serpent, he talks sometimes of *ἀπάτη*, but essentially of *ἡδονή*.¹⁸ The Christian conjunction may go back to *Rev.* 12:9, *ὁ ὄφεις ὁ ἀρχαῖος, ὁ καλούμενος Διάβολος καὶ ὁ Σατανᾶς, ὁ πλανῶν τὴν οἰκουμένην ὅλην*. *πλάνη* itself is rather rare in Jewish Greek texts of "sin" or "moral error,"¹⁹ but commonplace in the church fathers of moral error, heresy, paganism, deceit of the devil (see Lampe s.v.). The *Epistula ad Diognetum* offers valuable parallels: at 12.3, *πλάνη τοῦ ὀφείως*; 12.6, *ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀφείως πλανᾶται*; at 12.8 *ὄφεις* and *πλάνη* are coupled as subjects and appear to be virtual equivalents.

To my knowledge, every scholar who has treated this passage with reference to Ezekiel (with the exception of Gutman) has identified its source as Epiphanius. Gutman alone has noted that the verses appear in the earlier church father Methodius, though

¹⁶ Perhaps the second foot spondee in verse 9 (unless this be some strange use of correction) also argues against Ezekielian authorship.

¹⁷ *Apoc. Abr.* 23, *Apoc. Mosis* 15ff., Bab. Tal. *Shabbat* 146a, *Pirke de'Rabbi Eliezer* 14, *Jerahmeel* 22, *Pesiqta de'Rabbi Kahana* pp. 57f. (Mandelbaum).

¹⁸ See *Leg. All.* 2.71ff., 3.59ff., especially 3.68.

¹⁹ See Philo *Praem.* 163; *Wisdom* 1.12, 12.24. Note some manuscripts at *Sirach* 11.16.

he seems (it is not entirely clear) not to realize that Epiphanius is merely transcribing from Methodius the section in which these trimeters appear.²⁰ All this may seem inconsequential, but it is in fact entirely pertinent to our discussion. For the awareness that these verses are independently found only in Methodius can make a significant difference in our evaluation of their authorship, especially when we focus clearly on the introductory words. In his discourse here on Satan (*ὁ Διάβολος*) Methodius remarks, *ἐπέρχεται δέ μοι καὶ ἑμμέτρως εἰπεῖν* (or *ἑμμετρὸν <τι> εἰπεῖν*) and then proceeds to the ten trimeters. All other considerations aside, the natural way to understand these words is that Methodius now turns from prose to verse, i.e., that these verses are his own. There are indeed, as Bonwetsch points out in his apparatus here,²¹ a number of parallels elsewhere in Methodius to the language of these trimeters. More important, we know from Methodius' writings that he was familiar with some classical Greek poetry and that he had poetic inclinations of his own, occasionally composing in verse.²² Consequently, it is only natural to conclude that these ten verses are his.²³

To sum up: Although many students of Ezekiel believe or suspect that these verses are the work of the Jewish tragedian, there is no reason whatsoever to credit this view.

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²⁰ Indeed, because of grave deficiencies in the transmission of Methodius' *de resurr.*, we know these Greek verses cited by Methodius *only* through Epiphanius.

²¹ *GCS* vol. 27 (Leipzig 1917).

²² See V. Buchheit, *Studien zu Methodius von Olympos* (Berlin 1958) 156f. and his article at *RhM* 99 (1956) 17–36.

²³ The final half-line is puzzling. Rather than seeing Methodius as a disciple of Vergil and Vergilians like Hosidius Geta, I suspect that he simply had no qualms about the incomplete verse since it ended the composition. Indeed, what can one expect from a writer who will complete a poem of four hexameters with a pentameter (*Symp.* 8.12)?

AD CHARITONEM 1.3.7

εὔκολοι δὲ τοῖς ἐρῶσιν αἱ διαλλαγαὶ καὶ πᾶσαν ἀπολογίαν ἡδέως ἀλλήλων προσδέχονται (Blake¹ p. 5.21–22).

Hic, ut suspicor, latet versus trochaicus tetrametrus catalectic, aliquantulum propter homoeoteleuton corruptus, videlicet: *εὔκολοι δὲ τοῖς ἐρῶσιν <εἰσιν> αἱ διαλλαγαί*. qui versus, collatis fragmentis Menandreis 697 (833) Koerte *λυκοφίλιοι μὲν εἰσιν αἱ διαλλαγαί* et 567 (797) *ὀργὴ φιλοῦντων ὀλίγον ἰσχύει χρόνον* (quorum alterum eundem finem ac noster et alterum similem significationem² habet), forsitan Menandro attribuendus sit. ad alios locos ubi auctor noster Menandri vel alterius poetae comici versus aut citavit aut adumbravit, inspicias exempla quae conguessit Blake in p. 135 indicis analytici nominum propriorum suae editioni additi; cf. etiam A. D. Papanikolaou, *Chariton-Studien* (Hypomnemata 37; Gottingae 1973) 23–24. hac in re dignum est memoratu Charitonem in capitulo sequenti duabus sententiis Menandrum redolentibus usum esse, videlicet: 1.4.2 *γυνή δὲ εὐάλωτόν ἐστιν, ὅταν ἐρᾶσθαι δοκῇ* (cf. fr. 290 [352] *καὶ φύσει πῶς εὐάγωγόν ἐστι πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἐρῶν*) et 1.4.3 *καὶ γὰρ εἰ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν πάσης Σικελίας εὐτυχῶν* (cf. fr. 542 [791] *κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐστι τοῦτο, χρηστὸς εὐτυχῶν, <πόλει>*). de forma versus nunc restituti vide E. W. Handley, *The Dyskolos of Menander* (Cantabrigiae, Mass. 1965) 60.

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¹ W. E. Blake, *Charitonis Aphrodisiensis de Chaerea et Callirhoe amatoriarum narrationum libri octo* (Oxonii 1938).

² Cf. J. P. D'Orville, *Charitonis Aphrodisiensis de Chaerea et Callirhoe amatoriarum narrationum libri viii*, ed. 2 (Lipsiae 1783) 224.

PONTICUS' INSPIRATION: PROPERTIUS 1.9.15

i quaeso et tristis istos compone libellos,
et cane quod quaevis nosse puella velit!
quid si non esset facilis tibi copia? nunc tu
insanus medio flumine quaeris aquam.

(Prop. 1.9.13–16)

What is the *facilis* . . . *copia* in 15? Some older editors, such as Paley, thought it meant *scribendi materies*.¹ Kuinoel and Postgate, however, took *copia* as *copia amoris* or *copia puellae* ("What if you were debarred from your love," Postgate paraphrases), and recent commentators have almost invariably concurred (Butler and Barber, Enk, Richardson ad loc.; Shackleton Bailey *Propertiana* 26–27 and W. Stroh *Die römische Liebeslegie als werbende Dichtung* [Amsterdam 1971] 23 ff.). Ponticus has easy access to the girl, who is a slave (*et tibi nunc quaevis imperat empti modo* [4]), although he foolishly fails to see this (*nunc tu/insanus medio flumine quaeris aquam* [16]).² Only J. T. Davis of recent critics has thought that the older editors could be right; he suggests that *copia* is deliberately ambiguous.³

The strongest argument for interpreting *copia* as *copia amoris* or *copia puellae* is that adduced by Shackleton Bailey (*Propertiana* 27), that *copia* in Propertius always has an erotic context. However, it should be noted that Propertius uses the word only on three other occasions, and that in two of these instances a dependent genitive gives the word its precise meaning (2.20.24 *lecti copia*; 3.8.39 *furandae copia noctis*) while the immediate context of the third makes its meaning clear (2.33.43–44 *semper*

¹ So, too, Phillimore. Broekhuysen compared Ovid *Am.* 1.1.19–20 *nec nihi materia est numeris levioribus apta/aut puer aut longas compta puella comas*. Rothstein glosses it as "Begabung."

² Rudolf Helm, *Propertius: Gedichte* (Berlin 1965) translates: "Schlimm wohl wäre es, wenn dir die Möglichkeit fehlte!" and Watts, in the Penguin translation; "It's not as if she shunned you."

³ "Quid si non esset facilis tibi copia? A Note on Propertius 1.9.15," *Latomus* 31 (1972) 503–6.

in absentis felicior aestus amantes:/elevat assiduos copia longa viros). In 1.9 neither a dependent genitive nor the immediate context suggests that *copia* is to be understood as *copia amoris* or *copia puellae*. Quite the reverse, in fact. What Propertius is talking about in the lines immediately preceding this one (9–14) is not love but poetry. The transition is therefore very awkward, as Jacoby long ago maintained.⁴ Nor is this difficulty obviated by Stroh's contention that 9–14 are to be seen as a kind of parenthetical comment on love-poetry, with 15 continuing the line of thought which Propertius left at 8 (Stroh op. cit. 29). This is, in fact, only an acknowledgement that there is a problem here. It is also difficult to see what force, if any, *etiam* has in *necdum etiam palles* (17), if what Propertius has said in the previous couplet is "You have easy access to your girl" and particularly difficult to understand *nec te decipiat quod sit satis illa parata* (25) if Propertius has already addressed Ponticus on the subject of the girl's accessibility.⁵ In fact, access to the girl in an elegiac context is of little importance; what matters is not her availability but that she should reciprocate the lover's love.

It is preferable, therefore, to assume that *copia* takes its colouring from what immediately precedes it (as, indeed, it does at 2.33.44). Ponticus is told by Propertius to drop his epic poem and *cane quod quaevis nosse puella velit* (14). The *copia* which he possesses is, therefore, a *copia canendi*, and *copia* here would be easily intelligible to readers acquainted with *copia* in a rhetorical context: cf. Vergil *Aen.* 11.378 *larga quidem, Drance, semper tibi copia fandi*: cf. also Quintilian 10.5.8, Sallust *Cat.* 51.4 and *OLD* s.v. *copia* 6. Macrobius refers to a *genus copiosum dicendi* and cites poetic examples: cf. Sat. 5.1.7 ff. *Facilis* also suits the context well: cf. *OLD* s.v. *facilis* lld. This can also be defended on other grounds. When Propertius tells Ponticus that he is unaware of his possession of the *facilis copia*, he does so by the words *nunc tu/insanus medio flumine quaeris aquam*. As Shackleton Bailey points out, the proverb almost invariably refers to want amid apparent plenty and is one which has its

⁴"Drei Gedichte des Properz" *RM* 69 (1914) 411.

⁵Enk saw this difficulty and referred his readers to his comment on 1.3.11: "in hac verborum iunctura *etiam* supervacuum est."

origin in the myth of Tantalus.⁶ Here, however, Propertius uses it in a way unparalleled in earlier literature, of failure to see the obvious.⁷ Why, then, one should ask, has he chosen to use a well-known proverb in this unusual way? The answer is probably that he wants his readers to see in *aqua* and *flumine* more than a literal meaning. They are here, as so often in poetic discussions of literary creativity in both Latin and Greek, the symbol of inspiration,⁸ the inspiration which Ponticus cannot find although he is in a situation in which it should come easily to a love-poet, namely a love-affair. The identification of the composition of love-poetry with the experience of a love-affair has, of course, already been established in this book and, in particular, it appears at the beginning of 1.7, the other poem addressed to Ponticus. There Propertius tells the Epic poet:

*Dum tibi Cadmeae dicuntur, Pontice, Thebae
armaque fraternae tristia militiae . . .
nos, ut consuemus, nostros agitamus amores . . .*
(1.7.1-2, 5)

and *agitamus amores* clearly refers both to the love affair itself and to the poetry about it.

So in lines 13-16 Propertius is telling Ponticus that he does have a *facilis copia*, a wealth of material from which to draw inspiration for writing *quod quaevis nosse puella velit*.⁹ Then, in

⁶ Shackleton Bailey *Propertiana* 27. To his examples add Ovid *Am.* 3.7.51 (of Tantalus) *sic aret mediis taciti vulgator in undis*, Maximianus 1.185-86 *non aliter sitiens vicinas Tantalus undas captat, et appositis abstinet ora cibis*, Lucretius 4.1100 *in medioque sitit torrenti flumine potans*.

⁷ After Propertius, cf. Ovid *Trist.* 5.4.9 *nec frondem in silvis, nec aperto mollia prato/gramina, nec pleno flumine cernit aquas*. (Ovid makes it clear that he is using the proverb in its "new" sense by adding two other examples of failure to see the obvious) and Petronius *fr.* 35.5 (= *PLM* 95.5) *flumine vicino stultus sitit*.

⁸ Cf., for example, Prop. 3.1.6 *quamve bibistis aquam?* 2.10.26 *sed modo Permessi flumine lavit Amor* 3.3.15 *Quid tibi cum tali, demens, flumine*, Vergil *Ecl.* 6.64ff., Martial 4.31.5, 8.70, 12.11.2, Callimachus *Hymn Ap.* 110ff., *AP* 7.55.5-6 (Alcaeus Mess.), 9.64.5 (Archias). See also Pfeiffer *ad schol. Callim. fr.* 2 (vol. 1.11), Francis Cairns, "Horace *Odes* III.13 and III.23," *L'Antiquité Classique* 46 (1977) 532-33, and most recently N. B. Crowther, "Water and Wine as Symbols of Inspiration," *Mnemosyne* 32 (1979) 1-9.

⁹ For an ingenious but unconvincing interpretation of this line, see Archibald Allen "A Piece of Advice," *Hermes* 102 (1974) 621-22. As for the problematical line 13 *i quaeos et tristes istos compone libellos*, if the text is right I think the only possible interpretation is that of Hertzberg, who gives *compone* its meaning

17 ff., he goes on to tell Ponticus that his love will deepen, and so the necessity for writing love-elegy, which traditionally softens the girl's heart, will be all the more pressing. Thus *etiam* in 17 does have a force, adding a further reason for Ponticus to start writing elegy now. The train of thought from 9 to 24 is: "Ponticus, write elegy to win over your girl. You do have plenty of material on which to draw, even if you do not see it in your passionate state. Furthermore, your condition is going to get worse (so get down to writing now)." The advice, incidentally, parallels that given later to Lynceus (2.34.42 ff).

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"compose." Even more difficult than taking this to mean "to shut up" in a context of poetic composition is to believe that Propertius would refer to Ponticus' *Thebaid* (or even the Greek originals for the word, as Rothstein suggests) with the word *libelli*. *Tristes* must refer to the common belief of the ancients that elegy was primarily the medium of lamentation (see Nisbet and Hubbard on Hor. *Odes* 1.33.2) and from *istos* we are perhaps meant to assume that Ponticus had taunted Propertius with reference to *tristes*. . . . *elegi* (so Conrad Rossberg, *JClPh* 127 [1883] 68), as Horace taunts Tibullus with his *miserabilis* . . . *elegos* (*Odes* 1.33.2-3) and the elegist Valgius with his *flebilibus modis* (*Odes* 2.9.9).

PROPERTIUS 4.7.94: A REPLY

In a recent issue of *AJP*, June W. Allison has argued that *mixtis ossibus ossa teram* (Prop. 4.7.94) is echoed in *CIL* 6.2.9293 (*CE* 1136) 2 *ossibus hic uxor miscuit ossa meis*, the similarity between the two lines not having been noted, she believes, "by any modern editor or commentator."¹ Her argument is, in part, based on her failure to find any "other epitaph or literary passage which uses the verb *misceo* to refer to the union of bones [or] any which contain the word *ossa* repeated in such close proximity."²

I think it should be pointed out that the epitaph in question has been cited as a parallel for the Propertian line by others, including Paolo Fedeli (in his excellent yet often overlooked commentary³) and myself (*BICS* [1977] 83). More important (as I argue in the *BICS* article) *misceo* and its compounds are, so far from being unparalleled, quite common in such contexts: cf. e.g. *Consol. ad Liv.* 163 *miscebor cinerique cinis atque ossibus ossa*, Ovid *Ars* 3.21 *cineres miscebimus*, Dessau *ILS* 8469 *ossibus permixtis*, 8640 *commixta ossa*, Prop. 2.8.23 *sua cum miserae permiscuit ossa puellae*. For *ossa ossibus*, cf. *Consol. ad Liv.* 163 (above), Ovid *Her.* 12.122 *nostraque adhaerent ossibus ossa tuis*.

While conclusive demonstration of the independence of the two authors is impossible, it seems to me as likely, indeed more likely, that both are writing within an 'epitaphic' tradition, especially since Propertius seems deliberately to utilise the formulae of epitaphs elsewhere in this poem on his dead mistress.⁴

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¹"Propertius 4.7.94" *AJP* 101 (1980) 171.

²Op. cit. 173, note 9.

³*Properzio Elegie IV*, testo crit. e comm. a cura P. Fedeli (Bari 1965).

⁴See Elmar Schulz-Vanheyden *Properz und das griechische Epigramm* (Diss., Munster 1969) 90f., 151ff.; *BICS* 24 (1977) 83.

THE EARLIEST INACCURATE CITATION OF PROPERTIUS

Recently in this journal Prof. J. E. G. Zetzel drew attention to the earliest surviving literary citation of Propertius and suggested that it deserves more attention than it has received.¹ That Lactantius at *Div. Inst.* 2.6.14 apparently cited 4.1.11–14 in the order 13, 14, 11, 12 is recorded in Hosius' Teubner text (3rd ed. 1932) and in the Burman-Santen edition (Utrecht 1780), whence it is reported by W. R. Smyth.² The fact has not been discussed recently in print, and Prof. Zetzel has performed a service in giving it fresh exposure. While he rightly seems to favour the view that Lactantius' citation is in error, he assigns to certain hypotheses a much higher degree of plausibility than they merit.

He states that an argument can be made for either order, but his own diffident defense of Lactantius' order (that 13–14 describes the selection of the Senate from the Quirites, 11–12 the meeting of that Senate) is quite unlikely. Line 14 does refer to regular sessions of the Senate, but 13 concerns the manner of summoning the *comitia centuriata*.³ It is possible, of course, that Lactantius misunderstood 13; if he did not, then it seems unlikely that he began his citation with an irrelevant line. After the citation, Lactantius takes up briefly three words that appear in it, *centum* (14) and *pellitos patres* (12). The size of the original Senate was well known (cf. Liv.1.8.7.), and Lactantius is concerned with the character of the first Senators; one could argue, therefore, that only 11–12 are strictly necessary to his point and that 13–14 were added as an afterthought, whether by Lactantius himself or by a scribe or early reader who noticed that Propertius, like Lactantius, gives the number one hundred.

¹ "The Earliest Transposition in Propertius," *AJPh* 101 (1980) 314–15.

² *Thesaurus Criticus ad Sexti Propertii Textum* (Leiden 1970) 127; Smyth's reference to "codices quidam" betrays his source (Burman says "in nonnullis codicibus").

³ Cf. Rothstein ad loc.; the same conclusion, without supporting arguments, in Butler and Barber. The iterative *cogebat* tells strongly against referring the line to the first selection of Senators. Lactantius' order also produces an unattractive collocation of *senatus/senatu* in consecutive lines (14, 11).

Lactantius' order would also obscure the progress of ideas in the passage. The elegy begins by contrasting certain monuments of Augustan Rome with their primitive counterparts; 11 continues this movement with its apparent reference to the Curia Iulia. But there was no Curia at the period Propertius describes, and so attention is shifted to the Senators themselves and their rough garments; this in turn leads to a broader depiction of early Rome's agricultural character. Thus the *bucina*, a shepherd's horn, was used instead of the *cornu*⁴ to summon the *comitia*, and the Senate met not in a building but *in prato* (or, with Heinsius' conjecture, *in prati saepe*). Further examples of rusticity follow, lack of awnings in the theatres (and perhaps lack of theatres; 15), bad breath in the audience not yet masked by scents (16), religious rites of appropriate simplicity (17-26). No such clear progression can be discerned if the lines are read in the order of the citation.

If Lactantius' quotation is not correct, then Zetzel offers a second possibility, that "it reflects a very early stage of manuscript dislocation." If it does, it does so only for the tradition of Lactantius, for an inaccurate citation, even if it could securely be attributed to the manuscript of Propertius that Lactantius used, is simply irrelevant to the direct tradition unless supported by some part of it. Minor dislocations and inaccurate citations occur whenever texts are copied by hand and quotations made from memory; a couplet displaced in Lactantius' copy has nothing to do with possible dislocations in some ancestor of the Propertian archetype, unless it has happened by some curious accident that the only two early copies of Propertius for which we have evidence were both disordered, or unless all copies of Propertius had suffered different dislocations by the third or fourth century (the disagreement between Lactantius and our manuscripts precludes our supposing, for instance, that damage to the author's own copy or a single very early copy is responsible). Neither possibility seems likely. What is interesting about the citation has already been suggested in Shackleton Bailey's note on 4.1.14.⁵ Lactantius apparently read *prato* and

⁴ Propertius may be following a tradition similar to that found at Varro, *L.L.* 5.24.117, who says that the *cornu* was formerly made *bubulo e cornu*.

⁵ *Propertiana* (Cambridge 1956) 216.

saepe, both of which have been thought corrupt by some; if Lactantius and the Propertian archetype agreed in a corrupt reading, then that indeed would be something to report.

The earliest citation of Propertius, accurate or otherwise, is by the metrician Caesius Bassus, if he is the same as the first-century poet Caesius Bassus; he cites 2.1.2 without the author's name (*Grammatici Latini* ed. Keil 6.264.10).⁶

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⁶On this citation and its relevance to the question of the original form of the Propertian *corpus* see B. L. Ullman, "The Book Division of Propertius," *CPh* 4 (1909) 45-51.

THE FIVE EMPIRES: A NOTE ON A PROPAGANDISTIC *TOPOS**

Since J. W. Swain published his article in *CPh* 35 (1940), scholars have accepted the notion that a topos of the rise and fall of four empires (Assyria, Media, Persia, Macedonia), where Rome is the fifth and everlasting one, was imported to Rome from Asia Minor after the Roman-Syrian war (189/8 B.C.). From then on, it was used by Greek and Roman writers to express Rome's incomparable greatness and durability as a world empire (*dynasteia*).¹ I should like to point out some problems regarding the acceptance of this hypothesis, and to suggest that such a topos may have become commonplace in Rome only in the second half of the first century B.C. It is also difficult to prove that the topos was imported from the east in the second century B.C. On the contrary, the topos of "four plus one" empires seems to draw upon the theory of the rise and fall of empires found in Greek historiography from Herodotus and Ctesias onwards.

Scholars have based their assumption that the five empires topos was used in Rome from the second century B.C. onwards on passages from Aemilius Sura, Ennius and Polybius,² the evidence of all three of which can, I believe, be questioned.

* My thanks to Professor D. Asheri and Dr. J. Geiger for their helpful suggestions.

¹ Cf., among others, J. W. Swain, "The theory of the four monarchies opposition history under the Roman empire," *CPh* 35 (1940) 1-21; S. K. Eddy, *The King is Dead* (Lincoln 1961) 16-35; D. Flusser, "The four empires in the Fourth Sibyl and in the book of Daniel," *Israel Oriental Studies* 2 (1972) 148-75; L. F. Hartman, and A. A. di Lella, *The Book of Daniel* (New York 1978) 31-33. Cf. also H. Fuchs, "Zur Verherrlichung Roms und der Römer in dem Gedichte des Rutilius Namatianus," *Basler Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Altertumskunde* 42 (1943) 49-51; W. Baumgartner, "Zu den vier Reichen von Dan 2," *Theologische Zeitschrift* 1 (1945) 17-22; D. Winston "The Iranian component in the Bible, Apocrypha and Qumran," *History of Religions* 5 (1966) 189-92.

² See in particular, Swain, art. cit. 2-5 (he does not mention Polybius); D. Flusser, art. cit. 153-62, and also: M. Noth, "Das Geschichtsverständnis der alttestamentlichen Apokalyptik," *Gesammelte Studien zum Alten Testament*² (München 1960) 248-61; A. A. T. Ehrhardt, *Politische Metaphysik von Solon bis Augustin* 1 (Tübingen 1959) 253-55.

Aemilius Sura, otherwise unknown, is said to express the five empire topos imported from the east to Rome after 189/8 B.C. The relevant passage from his 'Chronology of Rome' is preserved as a gloss in Velleius Paterculus 1.6.6: "Aemilius Sura de annis populi Romani: Assyrii principes omnium gentium rerum potiti sunt, deinde Medi, postea Persae, deinde Macedones; exinde duobus regibus Philippo et Antiocho, qui a Macedonibus oriundi erant, haud multo post Carthaginem subactam devictis summa imperii ad populum Romanum pervenit. Inter hoc tempus et initium regis Nini Assyriorum, qui princeps rerum potitus est, intersunt anni MDCCCXCIV." "Aemilius Sura says in his book on the chronology of Rome: The Assyrians were the first of all races to hold world power, then the Medes, and after them the Persians, and then the Macedonians. Then through the defeat of Kings Philip and Antiochus, of Macedonian origin, following closely upon the overthrow of Carthage, the world power passed to the Roman people. Between this time and the beginning of the reign of Ninus king of the Assyrians, who was the first to hold world power, lies an interval of nineteen hundred and ninety-five years."

The passage has been dated by Swain and others to 189-171 B.C., because Sura alludes to Zama, Cynoscephalae and Magnesia as historical stages in Rome's attainment of her *summa imperii*. H. Peter and M. Schanz already felt that it was difficult to date the passage,³ and I would like to add some further doubts: a) let us assume that we had no date preserved for Aemilius Lepidus' passage in Sall. *Hist.* 1.55 which runs as follows: "Nam quid a Pyrrho, Hannibale, Philippoque et Antiocho defensum est aliud quam libertas et suae cuique sedes . . .". "For what did (their forefathers) defend against Pyrrhus, Hannibal, Philip and Antiochus, if not our liberty and our own hearthstones. . . ?". Swain would then have dated it exactly as he did Aemilius Sura's passage. The dramatic date of the speech is 78 B.C.⁴ b) Sura may have thought (even two hundred years after 189/8 B.C.), that Rome had reached her *summa imperii* after

³ H. Peter in *Historicorum Romanorum Reliquiae* (Stuttgart, reprint 1967) 2, CCX puts Aemilius Sura among "scriptores aetatis omnino incertae." M. Schanz, *Geschichte der Römischen Literatur*³, 2, 2 (München 1913) 263-64.

⁴ *Hist.* 1.55.4, and cf. R. Syme, *Sallust* (University of California Press 1964) 185-86, 198-99.

Zama, Cynoscephalae and Magnesia.⁵ c) there is no evidence whatsoever of Sura's coming into contact with eastern theories around 190 B.C., or at any other time, as Swain and others suggest.⁶ As I will show later, Sura's order of empires is typical of imperial Roman historiography, and reflects a topos commonplace from the end of the first century B.C. onwards.

Swain brings a passage from Varro in which Ennius says that Rome was founded "about seven hundred years before his own time" (*Ann.* 468–69, ed. E. H. Warmington). Swain concludes that Ennius had the year 880 B.C. in mind, "the year ordinarily given at that time for the fall of the Assyrian empire." He then argues that Ennius connected the fall of Assyria to the foundation of Rome, and adds that "it implied a theory of the succession of empires similar to that given by Sura."⁷ Even if this "chronological device was used by writers dealing with four empires" in later times,⁸ it is clearly impossible to accept Swain's conclusions, particularly when the date of Sura's passage is also

⁵ As perhaps Aemilius Lepidus did when referring to *libertas*, or Florus, who in fact looks upon Zama as the decisive battle for the conquest of Carthage. The third Punic war is in his view but "a throwing of the Roman yoke" (1.30.14–15). Also Dion. of Hal. may have reckoned Rome's *κοινῆς ἡγεμονίας* from Cynoscephalae and Magnesia (1.3.5–6, and note in the Loeb ed. vol. 1, 12–13). In contradistinction, Lycophron cannot be dated after 146 B.C., if only because he says that Rome has the "*γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης σκῆπτρα καὶ μοναρχίαν*" (*Alexandra* 1229, and cf. A. Momigliano, "Terra Marrique," *JRS* 32 [1942] 279–307). Sura's supposed dependence upon Ctesias and Eratosthenes for his date of the foundation of the Assyrian empire (Swain, art. cit. 2), should be re-examined in light of modern research (cf. R. Drews, "Assyria in Classical Universal Histories," *Historia* 14 [1965] 129–42).

⁶ Art. cit. 2–12; Eddy, op. cit. 16–36.

⁷ Art. cit. 3.

⁸ Art. cit. 3 and 14. Cf. on the chronographers, already C. Trierer, "Die Idee der vier Weltreiche," *Hermes* 27 (1892) 321–44. Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* 18.2, 22, 27), I believe, cannot be brought as evidence for the presumed early 2nd century B.C. connection of the fall of Assyria and foundation of Rome to the four empires theory. Even if Varro was Augustine's source in this matter, there is no proof that either Augustine or Varro connected the fall of Assyria and foundation of Rome "in order to connect the first and last empires in the series" (as suggested by Swain, art. cit. 14). Also Orosius (ca. 418 A.D.) is difficult to accept as evidence: he could have learned of the sequence of empires from many predecessors (even Trogus will bring us back only to the Augustan era). That Assyria was a true predecessor of Rome (7.2.5) he could learn from his "beatissime pater," Augustine.

in question: first, even Varro, who quotes Ennius, is not content with this date (*R.R.* 3.1.2: "In hoc nunc denique est ut dici possit, non cum Ennius scripsit." "With regard to this matter, only now could it be said, and not when Ennius wrote, that . . ."). Second, if Ennius' lines reflect a speech of Camillus which would bring Rome's foundation down to about 1100 B.C.,⁹ then Swain's argument becomes even less valid.

A passage attributed to Polybius by Büttner-Wobst (from Appian, *Pun.* 132: Scipio and Polybius standing before Carthage in flames), should also be questioned. First, Astin and Walbank have, for reasons other than the one referred to in this paper, convincingly argued that Büttner-Wobst's attribution of *Pun.* 132 to Polybius was erroneous.¹⁰ I should like to emphasize here that Diod. Sicul. (*Biblio.* 32.24) who drew directly on Polybius for the episode of the fall of Carthage (146 B.C.), does not mention the five empires topos, although he was acquainted with the theory of the rise and fall of empires through the 'Persica' of Ctesias of Cnidus,¹¹ and probably also through Polybius himself. Second, Polybius knew of the theory of the rise and fall of empires, but in the various instances where he uses it (all written after 168 B.C.), he shows clearly that he was not familiar with the well-defined "four plus one" topos with its typical order of Assyria, Media, Persia, Macedonia and Rome, commonly found in later periods. In passages where one would expect him to use the topos—assuming it was already known—he does not.¹² Third, Scipio and Polybius, standing before Carthage in flames, may genuinely have thought of Rome's similar fate in the future, but we cannot expect them to use a topos which Rome's enemies used against imperial Rome about 100–150 years later.¹³ Hence, it may be assumed that Appian, who knew the topos of "four plus one" (*Praef.* 6–11) interpolated it into the Polybian (or

⁹ O. Skutsch, *Studia Enniana* (London 1968) 11–13.

¹⁰ E. Schwartz, "Diodorus," *RE* 5 (1903) 689; A. E. Astin, *Scipio Aemilianus* (Oxford 1967) 282–83; F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* 3 (Oxford 1979) 722–25.

¹¹ Diod. Sicul. 2.1–34; cf. F. Jacoby, "Ktesias," *RE* 11 (1922) 2032–73.

¹² Polybius 1.2; 29.21 (from the parallel in Livy 45.9.2, we can also understand that the topos of "four plus one" was not used by Polybius); and 38.2–3 where Polybius is more close to the theory of the *τετρακταίος* (cf. note 15).

¹³ Cf. in the fourth Sibyl, below.

intermediary) story, thus inadvertently turning a sad thought of Scipio's into a concept commonplace among the later enemies of the Roman empire.¹⁴

If then the gloss in Velleius, the vague sentence of Ennius, and the conjectured interpolation in Polybius are put aside, we get the following picture: there are scattered references to the theory of the rise and fall of empires in Greek literature from Herodotus and Ctesias onwards. The empires are Greek and foreign, sometimes only Greek.¹⁵ The theory, however, had not yet crystallized into a well-defined, I should say, propagandistic topos of "four plus one." From the end of the first century B.C., such a topos (which in some cases does not recognize the Greek powers as empires), becomes so commonplace in Greek and Roman literature¹⁶ that Aelius Aristides in the second century A.D., can only say "Again, history records five empires, and may their number not increase. In the time of the oldest of these, the Assyrian, occurred the first deeds of the city's history, and the anecdotes about the gods fall in this period. In the time of the second occurred the rise of the city. The third she completely defeated. In the fourth, she alone held out and came off best of all. In the time of the empire now established, which is in all respects the best and greatest, she holds the place of honor in the whole Hellenic world, and has so fared that one could not wish for her the old circumstances instead of the present." (*Panath.* 234).

It should be emphasized that against the background of examples from early Hellenistic eastern literature, it becomes even more obvious that the theory as well as topos of the rise and fall of eastern empires in Greek and Roman literature derived from Ctesias and his followers rather than directly from eastern

¹⁴ Cf. below.

¹⁵ Herod. 1.95–130 (also Egypt); Ctesias, epitomized in Diod. Sic. 2.1–34; Demetrius of Phalerum (in Polybius 29.21); the *τρεῖς ἀρχαί* (only Greek powers) attributed to Theopompus by Anaximenes, Pausanias, 6.18.5; and Polybius 1.2; 38.2–3; Justin 30.4, 4.

¹⁶ If M. Varro (*De gente populi Romani*) knew the topos (perhaps alluded to in Augustine, *De Civ. Dei* 18.2, 21, 26) then, as far as I know, he is the first to use it. Dion. of Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.2–3; Trogus, in Iustinus 1.3.6; (Velleius Paterculus 1.6.1–2); Tacitus, *Hist.* 5.8–9; Appian, *Praef.* 6–11; *Pun.* 132; Aelius Aristides, *Panath.* 234, and see also *Rom. Orat.* 91 (with J. H. Oliver, "The Ruling Power," *TAPhA* N. S. 43, 4 [1953] and 58, 1 [1968] ad loc). For the later references, Swain, art. cit. 13–21. See also G. Kaibel, "Dionysios von Halikarnass und die Sophistik," *Hermes* 20 (1885) 497–513.

sources. In the latter we find a variety of concepts concerning the rise and fall of kings, dynasties and empires. Whereas the order of empires in our eastern examples differs from source to source, the one of Greek and Roman literature follows the same pattern. The examples found in eastern sources are problematic and require a special study: suffice it to mention Daniel. 2; 7; 8,¹⁷ the Babylonian 'Dynastic prophecy',¹⁸ the third Sibylline oracle,¹⁹ and perhaps also Tobit 14²⁰ and the Testament of Naphtali.²¹

¹⁷ The date of these chapters will, of course, not be discussed here (cf. in general, O. Eissfeld, *The Old Testament* [Oxford 1965] 512–29). It is still not certain whether the four kingdoms of Dan. chaps. 2 and 7, unlike chap. 8, refer to empires. They may have alluded to periods of rule of kings, dynasties, or the kingdoms of the Diadochi. The latter finds support, for instance, in 7.2 where the four winds come from four different directions and 7.12, where three kingdoms are contemporaneous (the fourth has ten horns denoting ten Seleucid kings: vv. 7–8, 11, 20–25). Periods of rule of kings or dynasties may have been alluded to in chap. 7 (cf. v. 17), but esp. in chap. 2 (there is, however, no necessity to see in it a later revision changing kings into empires as suggested by E. Bickerman, *Four Strange Books of the Bible* [N. Y. 1967] 62–71). If that is the case, then a connection to the Persian 'Vahman Yasht' (if it at all reflects early Hellenistic ideas: M. Boyce, "Middle Persian literature," *Handbuch der Orientalistik* 4, 2, 1 [1968] 29–66), postulated already by E. Meyer, becomes more plausible (*Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums* 2 [Stuttgart and Berlin 1921] 189–91; Eddy, op. cit. 16–36; Flusser, art. cit. 165–74). The metals there (similar to Dan. 2) represent periods of rule of certain kings (some replaced by other kings in the later redaction). Cf. for the text of 'Vahman Yasht,' E. W. West, *Sacred Books of the East* 5, 1 (Oxford 1901) 192–201. Cf. also n. 24 below.

¹⁸ A. K. Grayson, *Babylonian Historical-Literary Texts* (Toronto and Buffalo 1975) 13–37. And cf. Tadmor's addendum.

¹⁹ In the third oracle, we find an "eastern" order from an Egyptian point of view (vv. 157–61): Egypt, Persia, Media, Aethiopia, Assyria and Babylonia, Macedonia, Egypt and Rome. The date of the oracle is much debated. On the problem see V. Nikiprowetzky, *La troisième sibylle*, École pratique des hautes études, Études juives 9 (1970) 195–225; J. J. Collins, *Studies in the Sibylline oracles of Egyptian Judaism*, SBL Diss. Series 13 (1974), and cf. Flusser, art. cit. 160 n. 49.

²⁰ Tobit 14.4–7 has been mentioned within this context (J. Lebram, "Die Weltreiche in der jüdischen Apokalyptik," *ZAW* 76 [1964] 328–31; Flusser, art. cit. 154). But, neither the date of composition nor the exact mention of a sequence of empires (differing from version to version) is certain. Cf. in general on the problems in Tobit: F. Zimmermann, *The Book of Tobit*, in *Jewish Apocryphal literature* (New York 1958) 1–42, 127–60; A. Wikgren, "Tobit, book of," *The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible* 658–62; and on the different versions: D. C. Simpson, in R. H. Charles, *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament* 1 (Oxford 1913) 202–41.

²¹ As to the Greek *Testament of Naphtali* 5.8, two crucial problems are still open: first, the exact list of the empires mentioned (for the Greek versions, cf. M.

However, one reference to the topos of "four plus one" which may have come from the east and was claimed to be early Hellenistic,²² is relevant to our discussion: the fourth Sibylline oracle.

The fourth oracle includes the commonplace "four plus one" topos found in Greek and Roman literature from Dion. Hal. onwards, namely, Assyria, Media, Persia, Macedonia, and Rome, which is cleverly used against Rome (e.g. Rome will be destroyed as the former eastern empires were). Whereas the ten generation scheme of the oracle may have been of early Hellenistic origin,²³ there is no reason to follow D. Flusser in viewing the "four plus one" topos as "pre-Roman and early Hellenistic" in a composition of circa A.D. 80.²⁴ It is more natural to argue that a popular topos of the first century A.D. was inserted into the

De Jonge, *The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, A Critical Edition of the Greek Text* [Leiden 1978] 119). Second, its date: E. Bickerman ("The date of the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs," *JBL* 69 [1950] 254–55) claims the verse is a later addition from between 170–140 B.C., whereas M. De Jonge argues for an independent source "clumsily attached" to a second or third century A.D. composition: *The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, A Study in their Text, Composition and Origin*² (Assen 1975) 55, 121–28.

²² Flusser, art. cit. 150–53 and passim; and J. J. Collins, "The Place of the Fourth Sibyl in the development of the Jewish Sibyllina," *Journal of Jewish Studies* 25 (1974) 370–71.

²³ Flusser, *ibid.* 162–63, 171 and passim.

²⁴ The date of the fourth oracle is a communis opinio: cf., for instance, J. Geffcken, *Oracula Sibyllina* (Leipzig 1902) 18–21; H. C. O. Lanchester "The Sibylline books," in R. H. Charles, op. cit. 2, 372–73. The connection Flusser finds between Dan. 2 and the fourth oracle concerning the topos of "four plus one," may be questioned. First, the kingdoms of Dan. 2 (LXX: βασιλείαι) may have referred to periods of rule of certain kings or dynasties rather than to empires (cf. n. 17 above). Second, even if the reference in Dan. 2 (and 7) is to empires (as the redactor of Dan. as well as Rabbinic and related literature interpreted), the first empire in the line must be Babylonia (H. H. Rowley, *Darius the Mede and the Four World Empires in the Book of Daniel* [Cardiff 1935] 67–182). There is also the possibility that the four kingdoms of the Diadochi are mentioned. Hence, if the Jewish author of the fourth Sibyl drew on Dan. in this matter, why should the Sibyl nevertheless have the topos common in Greek and Roman literature of the 1st century A.D. where Assyria is always the first eastern empire. When dealing with a topos this difference is of significance. Third, the identification of kings or empires with metals in Dan. 2 is absent from the fourth oracle. This fact is decisive since early Greek and Roman literature, as far as I know, mentions the concept of the connection between metals and ages independently of the theory of rise and fall of empires (cf. for instance, Hesiod, *Erga* 106–201; Plato, *Polit.* 547 A–B and passim. Aratus, *Phaenomena* 96–136; Ovid, *Metam.* 1.89–150.)

presumably earlier ten generation scheme of the fourth oracle.²⁵ This may have caused the awkward alteration of ten generations into eleven at the beginning of the oracle (v. 20), and the strange division where Macedonia and Rome are in fact compressed into one generation, the tenth.

To conclude, the topos of four eastern empires and Rome the fifth emerges in the last half of the first century B.C. in Greek and Roman literature, and from then on is commonly used in this and similar forms by Rome's flatterers and enemies, in different interpretations, all over the empire.²⁶ I should like to suggest that the stimulus to turn the theory into a propagandistic topos could have arisen when Rome started to interfere intensively in the regions which belonged to the first three empires of the topos, namely in the first century B.C.²⁷

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²⁵ I doubt whether Servius' Sibyl can serve as evidence for Flusser's case. Servius' Sibyl only divides the ten generations by metals (*Servii Grammatici qui feruntur in Vergilii Bucolica et Georgica Commentarii* [Lipsiae 1887] 44–45). There is no reference to four periods or four empires, or a connection between them (as suggested by Flusser, art. cit. 163–65). The division into ten cannot in itself serve as proof (cf. Flusser, *ibid.*) for an early Hellenistic date for Servius' Sibyl. Also a direct derivation of the fourth Sibyl from the Cumean one (Cf. Collins, art. cit. 371) seems difficult, as besides the division into ten, the two sources have nothing in common.

²⁶ As Swain shows, art. cit. 13–21. Cf. also *Mechilta d'Rabbi Ismael*, ed. H. S. Horowitz and I. A. Rabin (Jerusalem 1960) 87; *Mechilta d'Rabbi Shimon bar Jochai*, ed. J. N. Epstein and E. Z. Melamed (Jerusalem 1955) 50.

²⁷ On propaganda against Rome from the east, cf. H. Fuchs, *Der geistige Widerstand gegen Rom in der Antiken Welt* (Berlin 1938); A. Peretti, *La Sibilla babilonese nella propaganda Ellenistica* (Firenze 1943).

ADDENDUM

The succession of empires, in the sense that it appears in Ctesias, *Persica* and in the later Greek and Roman writings, is so far unattested in the chronographic, the historical and the 'prophetic' literature of Assyria and Babylonia. The concept there is that of a dynasty or of a single reign of a king, both rendered by the term *palû* (originally BALA in Sumerian, meaning 'turn of office,' 'turnus,' cf. Tadmor, *Journal of Cuneiform Studies* 12 [1958] 26 ff.). Though the Babylonian chronographers of the 1st millennium B.C. must have been fully aware of the periodic succession of kingdoms in Mesopotamia—each in its time, dominating Babylonia and occasionally claiming dominion of the "four quarters of the world"—they could express that only by the traditional formula of successive *palû*'s (e.g. the *palû* of Shulgi [= the IIIrd dynasty of Ur], the *palû*'s of the Amorites, of the Kassites, of the city of Isin, of the 'Sea-Land,' of the land of Bazi, of Elam, of the city of Shapiya, of the city of Ashur etc. and see E. Weidner, in *Mitteilungen der Vorder asiatisch—Aegyptischen Gesellschaft* 21 [1921] No. 2, p. 40; J. A. Brinkman, *A Political History of post-Kassite Babylonia* [Roma 1968] 37–38; 168).

Therefore, a late-Babylonian text published recently by A. K. Grayson is of interest to the present topic, especially as it was taken to be the earliest precursor to the Hellenistic and Roman concepts of the "Four Empires" (A. K. Grayson, *Babylonian Historical-Literary Texts* [Toronto 1975] 24–37). Named by its editor "The Dynastic Prophecy"—the text is fragmentary: only parts of four columns have survived. These contain prophecies referring to (a) the destruction of Assyria by Nabopalassar (end of Col. I), (b) the reign of [Neriglissar], (c)–(d) the reigns of Nabonidus and of Cyrus designated, respectively, as the dynasties (*palû*'s) of Harran and of Elam (end of Col. II), (e)–(f) the reigns of Arses and Darius III and (g) the rise of Macedonia (end of Col. III).


Col. IV contains only end-bits of two lines referring to two or three unidentified reigns and a colophon. However, it is very probable that the original tablet was of six columns (see also now W. G. Lambert, *The Babylonian Background of Jewish Apoca-*

lyptic [The University of London 1978] 12–13). It would appear then, that the tablet, when complete, included prophecies referring to the rest of the Chaldaean and Achaemenid kings who exercised dominion in Babylon, and not only to those in prophecies (a)–(f), two of them the founders of the Chaldaean and the Persian Empires. Yet, unrelated to the concept of the “Four Empires,” this and similar Babylonian compositions, all *vaticinia ex eventu*, can rightly be considered as the precursors of Dan. Ch. 11, a point first observed by A. K. Grayson and W. G. Lambert (*Journal of Cuneiform Studies* 18 [1964] 10; cf. W. W. Hallo, *Israel Exploration Journal* 16 [1966] 241) and stated very convincingly by W. G. Lambert in the aforementioned study on the Babylonian antecedents of Daniel’s visions.

On the other hand, Daniel Ch. 2, or the original core of it, should not be interpreted as referring to the ‘Four Empires,’ but rather to four single reigns of four dynasties, at most. The Aramaic term *malku*, *malkūta*, lit. ‘reign,’ ‘kingship,’ would be then semantically equivalent to the Akkadian *palū*, as it is found in the Assyro-Babylonian ‘prophetic’ genre. (For the notion that the original prophecy on Dan. Ch. 2 speaks of individual reigns, not of empires, see the observations of E. J. Bickerman, *Four Strange Books of the Bible* [New York 1967] 61 ff.).

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ON JUDICIAL APPEALS IN ROMAN EGYPT

In Memoriam
James H. Oliver

Epigraphy and papyrology have complemented each other for the past hundred years, ever since the latter discipline came into being. Linguistic and institutional bridges connecting those two branches of classical studies have repeatedly been demonstrated and utilized, notably in the writings of J. H. Oliver, and most recently in his paper published in *AJP* 100 (1979) 543–58. There he draws upon three inscriptions and one papyrus to illustrate procedures by which, under the Empire, Greek litigants might carry their disputes to Roman courts. The papyrus is *P. Yale* inv. no. 1606, soon to be republished as *P. Yale* II 162.¹ Of the inscriptions, two deal *expressis verbis* with appeals to the emperor, the third has generally been interpreted as doing so, and to these Oliver adds the evidence of the papyrus. In the *ed. pr.* I had simply assumed from the context that the appeal in the papyrus was to the prefect of Egypt. As Oliver's challenge to that view is based upon a parallel he professes to find in contemporary inscriptions, the logical next step, surely, is to ask whether collateral papyri shed any light on the problem.

The Yale papyrus contains the remains of an edict issued by Marcus Petronius Mamertinus, who was prefect of Egypt in A.D. 133–137. The text presents a list of crimes that come under the personal jurisdiction of the prefect,² after which comes the following: οἱ λοιποὶ οὐκ ἄλλως / ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἀκουσθήσονται / εἰ μὴ ἐπικαλεσάμενοι / καὶ παραβόλιον θέντες / τὸ τέ[ταρτον?] μέρος ἐκ τιμῆ / μα[τος περὶ] οὗ ἐδικάσθη (lines 27–32).

Translations:

Ed. pr. (from the French): Other (complainants) will not be heard by me unless they are appellants and they deposit as

¹ *Ed. pr.* in *RHD* 1972, 5–12 and 1973, 5–7. See also *Le monde grec: Hommages à Claire Préaux*, 760–65.

² Oliver thinks (550) that the list is quoted from “a special order of Hadrian.” That is possible, but as the reference to the source, if there was one, is lost at the bottom of Col. i, any such ascription remains hypothetical.

security a fourth(?) of the value attributed to the matter over which judgement was rendered.

Oliver: The other (litigants) will be heard by me in the same way unless they appealed (to the emperor) and deposited a pledge equal to the quarter of a valuation over which the case arose.

Both versions accept that *ἐμοῦ* refers to the prefect.³ Verbal variations aside, then, *Oliver* departs from the interpretation of the *ed. pr.* on two points: (1) He takes *οὐκ ἄλλως* as a rhetorical turn of phrase equivalent to *ὁμοίως*. (2) He insists that the appeal mentioned was to the emperor.

As to (1): There is obviously no *grammatical* obstacle to translating *οὐκ ἄλλως* as "in the same way." But what about the context? In the same way as what? There has been nothing in what precedes, nothing about court procedures or anything else, to which, strictly speaking, "in the same way" could refer. We could, perhaps, dismiss the inconcinnity as merely a matter of loose wording, but before we resort to such a desperate remedy let us consider the linguistic parallel found in *P. Hamb.* 29 = *Jur. Pap.* 85. In that document, an extract from the minutes of a hearing held before the prefect Marcus Mettius Rufus on 3 August A.D. 89, an attorney asks for a postponement without prejudice to his clients' case because [*ἄ*]λλως οὐ δύνανται λέγειν τὴν δίκην εἰ μὴ λάβοιεν τὰ βιβλία παρὰ τῶ[ν] ἐπιτρόπων (lines 13–15). There can be no doubt about what this means: the clients, in the translation of P. M. Meyer, "könnten nicht in die Verhandlung eintreten, bevor sie nicht die Akten (*βιβλία*) von den Vormündern . . . erhalten hätten."⁴ Here the expression "not otherwise . . . unless" clearly posits a *sine qua non*, a delimiting condition in the absence of which the subject of the main verb cannot act. The parallel with the language of *P. Yale* 162, 27–29, is too striking to be ignored.

As to (2): The first point to be noted here is that there is no mention of an emperor anywhere in the preserved text of *P. Yale* 162. The question, then, is whether there are grounds in the text for inferring that the appeal mentioned was intended for him. It is true that *Oliver*'s first inscription, the relatively new "letter" of Marcus Aurelius from the Athenian agora, contains a reference

³ Cf. *Oliver*, 550 n. 14

⁴ *Jur. Pap.* 85, introd. (p. 292), repeating almost verbatim *P. Hamb.* 29, introd. (p. 124).

by the emperor to "securities on appeals in the cases pleaded in my court."⁵ But such posting of bonds is not by itself presumptive evidence of an appeal to the emperor. On the contrary, most extant instances of such posting of bonds, both in inscriptions and in papyri, clearly relate to intra-provincial appeals. A good example is the last inscription in Oliver's group, the well known letter of Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo, proconsul of Asia under Claudius, to the city of Cos.⁶ In it the governor reminds the Coans of the established procedure: appeals to the emperor are submitted to the governor of the province, who then decides if they deserve to be forwarded; in appeals to the governor the appellant must post a bond of 2,500 denarii.⁷ Among the papyri attention is claimed particularly now by *P. Strasb.* 709, a second-century document that was published after Oliver's article. In form that document is a petition to the *iuridicus* of Egypt, relating to a dispute over an inheritance. Some of the parties have Roman names.⁸ In line 13 we read *καταδ[ικ]ασθεῖσα ὑπὸ Κλαυδίου Ἀπολιναρίου*, who may be a strategos known to have been in office in A.D. 164, and in the next line, *παραβόλιον θείας πρὸς Κλαυδίου*[, which looks very much like a reference to the same judge. Whether it is the same man both times or not, the entire legal procedure, including the posting of bond, clearly takes place within the judicial apparatus of the province. Pertinent here, too, is *P. Oxy.* XLVI 3296, the incompletely preserved record of a hearing before the prefect of Egypt, Titius Honoratus, held on 10 June A.D. 291. The hearing is on appeal (lines 11–12) from the court of a strategos or epistrategos (line 14), and an appeals bond of 4,625 drachmas is posted (line 15, *τοῦ τῆς ἐκκλητίου προστίμ[ο]υ*), where the last word obviously has the sense of "fee," not "penalty": cf. *WB* and *LSJ*, s.v. 2).

To sum up: The procedure enunciated in *P. Yale* 162, 27–32, fits most naturally within the framework of the administration of justice within Roman Egypt. Specifically, the text fits the lan-

⁵ Oliver, 544. For essential bibliography on the inscription see 543.

⁶ *AE* 1974 no. 629, an improved text of *IGR* IV 1044 = Abbott-Johnson no. 119.

⁷ The new reading is *ἀππα[βών]ας*, which confirms an earlier conjecture and dismisses Mommsen's restoration of *ἀρχοντ[ας]*.

⁸ On the possibility that Mamertinus' edict in *P. Yale* 162 affected only Roman citizens, see *RHD* 1972, 11–12.

guage and procedure of an appeal to the prefect of Egypt. A commentator seeking to wrest the text from that milieu must accept the burden of proof, and the proofs will need to be more compelling than any yet adduced.

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REVIEWS

JAMES J. O'DONNELL. Cassiodorus. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, University of California Press, 1979. Pp. xvi + 303. \$17.50.

Few figures appear as emblematic of the great transition from Antiquity to the Middle Ages as Cassiodorus Senator. After a distinguished career in the bureaucracy of Ostrogothic Italy and a stay in Justinian's Constantinople, he closed his long life in the learned tranquillity of his monastic library at Vivarium, bequeathing to the Middle Ages a splendid example of that kind of coenobitic scholarship to which we owe so much of what has come down to us from Latin antiquity. His works include a lost *Gothic History*, known to us through Jordanes' *Getica*, a consular chronicle, an exceedingly important collection of administrative correspondence, several treatises on theological and grammatical subjects, as well as the *Institutiones*, one of the fundamental links between ancient and medieval literary culture. The editing of these works has attracted Latinists as eminent as Mommsen, Ludwig Traube and R. A. B. Mynors, not to mention the most recent publications in the *Corpus christianorum*. Few of Cassiodorus' contemporaries have enjoyed so much detailed attention, as Å. J. Fridh's select bibliography of 281 titles shows (*Corpus christianorum, series latina* 96.1 [Turnhout 1973] p. xvii - xxxii). We can only agree with J. J. O'D.'s statement (p. ix) that the time seems to have come "to take a fresh look at the primary sources, review the accumulated scholarship, and attempt a new survey."

Cassiodorus offers itself as this survey. In two opening sections, the a. reviews Cassiodorus' dates and historical context. Each of the next chapters proceeds in rough chronological order and discusses one or more of his works, concluding with Cassiodorus' old age and literary "afterlives." The book includes four appendices, the first of which reprints, in a somewhat confused manner, the *Ordo generis Cassiodororum* (259-66). Here the a. professes to accept into the text "only the unanimously accepted corrections (260)," yet he corrects (260.2) the reported reading of Karlsruhe, Badische Landesbibliothek, Cod. Aug. CVI: *et cons(ule)* to *ex cons(ule)*, despite Fridh's refusal to admit this emendation of Usener; his apparatus reproduces the banal abbreviated form of *aequiparet* (*eq. perar&*) as though it possessed some special significance; he does not seem to have collated the extant MSS. The second appendix presents largely derivative material on Cassiodorus' name (p. 267, read *Κασσιόδωρος* of course), the third, a genealogy of the Amals and the fourth, a critique of a hypothesis of A. Momigliano on Cassiodorus' revision of the *Gothic History*. The whole concludes with a bibliography and index.

The a. has courageously attempted an ambitious project. Yet few knowledgeable readers will consider his work a substantial success. Cer-

tainly, great difficulties are inherent in the comprehensive study of an *oeuvre* as vast and varied as that of Cassiodorus. But the unavoidable difficulty of the subject matter is compounded, in this case, by many avoidable shortcomings.

The book displays severe problems of organization and documentation. At one point, for instance, the a. discusses the evidence for dating the *Gothic History* and concludes that it should be placed in 519 (45–47). Several pages later, at the end of an almost unrelated footnote on the “flowers from a meadow” topos, he suddenly rejects his earlier conclusions and modifies his dating to “uncertain: before 526” (52–53, n. 28). Elsewhere, the connection between a section of the text and its substantiation is not always clear (e.g., p. 61, with n. 7; cf. his documentation for a discussion of the syntax of the *Variae*, p. 95, n. 46: “Skahill, op. cit., can be squeezed to produce this paragraph,” or p. 99, where the assertion “*praesumptio* is often tied to *cupiditas* as effect in action of a cause in spirit,” is documented by n. 54: “This is explicitly the case at *Var.* 7.9.3, often implicitly elsewhere”).

The work is not without interesting points, like the observation of patterns of arrangement of letters within the *Variae* (77sq.) or the discussion of the *De orthographia* (229sq.). Even the casual reader, however, will be disturbed by many of the a.’s offhanded remarks (“Byzantine theological tendencies were generally Monophysite. . .,” p. 2; state dignities like “patrician” were but “honorific name-tags,” p. 134; the undocumented remark that Theoderic “was still a hated Arian to . . . the so-called Anonymus Valesianus chronicler,” p. 107, which overlooks, of course, the complexity of the *Excerpta Valesiana*’s origins and the contradictory appreciations of Theoderic contained therein). The reasoning is sometimes less than clear. Thus, the study of some of the sources of the *Expositio Psalmorum* gives “us clues to the circumstances of composition” (137). To this end, J. J. O’D. begins by observing the use of three authors “whose works would not have been widely disseminated in the west at this time, even in translation: Athanasius, Cyril of Alexandria and John Chrysostom,” (142). Unfortunately, the a. would have had a hard time finding three Greek patristic authors more widely translated into Latin in late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages (for indications on the early Latin *versiones*, see on Athanasius, M. Geerard, *Clavis patrum graecorum*, 2 [Turnhout 1974], nos. 2093, 2095, 2098, 2109, 2111–12, etc.; on Chrysostom, *ibid.*, nos. 4305, 4308–9, 4330, 4333, etc.; on Cyril, *ibid.* 3 [Turnhout 1979], nos. 5209, 5221–23, 5225, 5229–30, etc.). He continues by admitting anyway that some of the citations are drawn from known translations (142) and concludes that “two things need to be said about this evidence. First, it proves nothing [because of the availability of translations]. . . . Second . . . the use of these Greek authors gives a hint of the atmosphere in which the work was composed,” i.e., perhaps in Constantinople.

Aside from such minor flaws, the book contains quite a number of evaluations of source material which combine a careless reading with untested assumptions to arrive at conclusions which are more arresting

than correct. Two examples will suffice to show the caution which must be exercised in consulting this work.

In his treatment of the propaganda themes in the *Variae*, the a. rightly calls attention to the prince's *humanitas*, contending that, in Theoderic's correspondence, *humanitas* is just as important a slogan as the prince's *civilitas* (98–100). After admitting the first slogan's Ciceronian origin, J. J. O'D. asserts—but does not substantiate—that the idea of a prince's *humanitas* “never really caught on in Latin” and that Cassiodorus' use of it was intended to give “a folksy touch to a lofty monarch” (98). Aside from the dubious “folksiness” of the ideal of *humanitas*, the a. seems quite unaware that at least one emperor (Probus) introduced the slogan on his coinage (P. H. Webb, *The Roman Imperial Coinage*, 5.2 [London 1933] 7), that the term is quite at home in the Latin panegyrics, and that the prince's *humanitas* is very much in evidence in imperial legislation. In fact, Cassiodorus' contemporary on the throne of New Rome could be presented as asserting that “. . . nihil aliud tam peculiare est imperiali maiestati quam humanitas” (*Cod. Just.* 5.16.27; A.D. 530). Far from adding a “folksy touch” to his audience's image of Theoderic, Cassiodorus was clearly applying to his barbarian prince an ideological slogan of the *imperator augustus* (cf. in general the material collected in *T.L.L.* 6.3 [1936–1942] 3081.35–71).

The second example concerns J. J. O'D.'s evaluation of Virgilian citations in the *Variae*. After pointing out (91) that explicit quotations are few in number, he notes that they “are not quite verbatim, thus probably from memory,” an assertion which is substantiated by n. 39: “See Vergil slightly misquoted from memory in *Var.* 5.21.3 and 5.42.11, for example.” At 5.42.11, the ‘misquotation from memory’ is taken from the first-person speech of the Cumaean Sibyl (*Aen.* 6.625–27). Cassiodorus' mistake consists of turning the second clause of the Sibyl's statement into a rhetorical question, introduced by *quis*. At the same time, he recasts the citation in the third person: “*quis* scelorum comprehendere formas, *quis* omnia poenarum percurrere nomina possit?” (ed. Fridh, 219.68–69). It is not obvious to me that this adaptation of a classical tag to a foreign textual context derives from Cassiodorus' faulty memory. If anything, the other instance is even clearer. Here Cassiodorus adapts *Aen.* 1.294–96 to the judicious talent of his addressee Capuanus, *vir spectabilis*, by replacing *belli* with *litis*, by suppressing an unneeded clause (lines 295–96: “*saeua sedens super arma et centum uinctus aenis post tergum nodis*”) and by replacing the future tense with the present. J. J. O'D. has apparently failed to notice that Cassiodorus admits his adaptation with the very phrase that introduces the tag: “. . . de quo *uerius diceret* uates Mantuanus ‘*clauduntur*’ *litis* ‘*portae furor impius intus*’ *inclusus* ‘*fremit horridus ore cruento*’” (ed. Fridh, 200.27–29).

MICHAEL MCCORMICK

DUMBARTON OAKS AND
THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

J. T. HOOKER. *Linear B: An Introduction*. Bristol, Bristol Classical Press, 1980. Pp. xii + 204. Hardback & Paperback editions; no price stated.

There has long been a crying need for a comprehensive introduction to the Linear B script used in Mycenaean Greece and to the clay tablets on which it was written. These contain much that is essential for any student of Classical and especially Archaic Greece, particularly those interested in Homer and Hesiod, yet until now even specialists often found Linear B a strange collection of incomprehensible syllables sounding more like the incantations of the Sorcerer's Apprentice than anything resembling what a reasonable human being could be expected to recognize as Greek. When I taught Mycenaean Greek in Fall 1980, existing works proved inadequate for my students. John Chadwick's *Decipherment of Linear B* (Cambridge 1959, 1967) is for interested lay people, not for the Classicist who already knows Greek and wants to read Linear B texts. The second edition of Ventris' and Chadwick's *Documents in Mycenaean Greek* (Cambridge 1973), while as close to a definitive survey of the Mycenaean archives as we possess, is organized in an intricate way, while L. R. Palmer's *Interpretation of Mycenaean Greek Texts* (Oxford 1963), despite its many valuable insights, is more a personal tour de force than a comprehensive treatment.

Three weeks after my last seminar, I found what I had wanted: a usable introduction to the Linear B script and tablets and to the Mycenaean Greek language they contain. In his *Linear B: An Introduction*, J. T. Hooker has filled the need so keenly felt by Hellenists for so long.

Hooker's book is divided into three parts. The first begins with a short discussion of the Aegean Bronze Age and its writing systems (1-18) then passes to a consideration of first Alice Kober's, then Michael Ventris' step-by-step progress towards decipherment of linear B (19-34). This section is in several respects more illuminating than the lengthier treatment in Chadwick's *Decipherment*; for example H., in reproducing the successive stages of Ventris' syllabic grid, lists the tentative values given the consonantal and vocalic elements of the syllabograms, values which remind one that the decipherer believed until the final breakthrough that he was dealing with a language closely akin to Etruscan. Following this, H. discusses the inscriptions themselves (script, types and classification of tablets) (35-47) and the language (49-79) in a thorough and balanced way that will be useful and understandable to any student of Mycenaean.

Part Two is devoted to the tablets themselves, with an attractive reproduction of the original syllabic signs on each plus a transliteration, followed by a learned but readable commentary after each tablet or group of tablets. The inscriptions are classified according to subject and place: thus we have the Knossos sword tablets (81-84), the sheep and wool tablets from Pylos and Knossos (85-93), working women from Pylos (101-5) and so forth. Each section of Parts I and II is accompanied by a copious bibliography to facilitate further research.

Part Three consists of indexes of (1) Linear B words, (2) Classical Greek words, and (3) Linear B inscriptions discussed in the text. At the end of the book there are four pages of reproductions of Linear B inscriptions on clay and pottery.

No review of this book would be complete without an expression of surprise as to its source. This is not to impugn H.'s ability as a scholar, but rather to wonder at the change in his opinions. For H. has ranked among the heretics of Mycenaecology, and this for two reasons. First, he has long refused to accept the language of Linear B as Greek, regarding it rather as a "jargon" or mixed language" composed of Greek and Minoan (or other Aegean) elements.¹ Second, he has supported John Chadwick in the latter's recent assertions that the Dorians were the peasants of Mycenaean Greece, not immigrants who arrived at the close of the Bronze Age, thus implying agreement with C.'s efforts to find Doric elements on the tablets.² Here, however, H. presents Mycenaean as a Greek dialect, exhibiting many curious features, it is true, but Greek nonetheless. Moreover, words such as *di-do-si* / *didonsi* / 'they give' instead of **di-do-ti* show the dialect of Linear B to be East Greek, while medio-passive endings in *-toi*, *-ntoi* vs. *-tai*, *-ntai* indicate a special kinship with Arcado-Cyprian. On p. 33, we find only an echo of H.'s former beliefs: "Many items of vocabulary . . . cannot be reconciled with any words known in later Greek. The explanation may be that such words are, indeed, Greek but that they went out of use before the historical period or that the Linear B texts contain elements of a language, or languages, other than Greek." Elsewhere he ascribes peculiar forms to scribal error or archaism, ascriptions which he was quick to criticize in the past.³

¹ See his *The Origin of the Linear B Script* (Salamanca 1979), especially pp. 53–73 (the quote is from p. 67), and his *Mycenaean Greece, States and Cities of Ancient Greece*, (London, Henley and Boston 1976).

² *Mycenaean Greece*, Chapter 7 (140–82) and Appendix I (213–22).

³ Take for example his treatment of the enclitic *-qe* (Classical *-te*, Latin *-que*), which in Mycenaean Greek can function not only to bind members of a series together (*a-ja-me-no . . . a-to-ro-qo i-qo-qe po-ru-po-de-qe po-ni-ke-qe* = decorated [vel sim.] with a man and a horse and a palm tree and an octopus), but also after a verb on the land tenure tablets in a way that remains mysterious to us. In *Origin*, Hooker concludes (66): "The *-qe* found in the E tablets cannot be attributed to a scribal peculiarity, and it is not a Greek suffix. We have to reckon, on the contrary, with the presence of a non-Greek syntactical feature which alters the meaning and the structure of sentences in ways incomprehensible to us at present." In *Introduction*, he says the following about the *-qe* of the E series: "In the E tablets from Pylos, *-qe* is attached to *e-ke* (*ἐκεῖ*) and to *e-ko-si* (*ἐχοῦσι*) in circumstances which make its interpretation as a copula impossible. Furthermore, the presence of *-qe* in these texts disturbs the word-order without bringing about any perceptible change of meaning. These facts suggest that in the E series *-qe* represents a particle different from *-te* as it is used in later times."

Mr. Hooker has certainly produced an excellent handbook that will, one hopes, introduce a new generation of graduate students—and others—to Linear B and Mycenaean Greek. Dare we hope that it will help stimulate Mycenaean studies on this side of the Atlantic, where until now they have been neglected?

JON-CHRISTIAN BILLIGMEIER

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

MARIE-THÉRÈSE LINGER. *Corpus des Ordonnances des Ptolémées* (C. Ord. Ptol.). Réimpression de l'édition princeps (1964) corrigée et mise à jour. Brussels, Académie Royale de Belgique, 1980. Pp. xxiv + 418. BF 700 (*Mémoires de la Classe des Lettres, Collection in-8°, 2^e série*, t. 64, fasc. 2).

Linger's book became a standard work upon its appearance in 1964; it has been out-of-print for some years and its reprinting is most welcome. That the Belgian Academy has produced it at an exceptionally reasonable price is also gratifying.

The Corpus is one of the few typological collections of papyri produced so far. The constant stream of newly-published papyrus documents tends to make most such volumes obsolete quickly, and most papyrologists have preferred editing new texts to re-editing known ones. In the case of papyri containing Ptolemaic royal legislation, however, the coherence of the material, its interest to jurists and historians, and the relatively small flow of new Greek papyri from the Ptolemaic period justified the enterprise. The gains of the volume were (1) the up-to-date texts of some much-corrected papyri, (2) the extensive bibliography (although there have been justified complaints about the lack of internal organization in the lemmas to texts), (3) the improvement of our understanding of Ptolemaic legislation from the confrontation of these papyri with one another, and (4) the full indices. Although the commentaries are brief, the translations were welcome, rendering many previously untranslated items accessible to the Greekless.

The Supplement to the reprint edition has very modest goals: to correct actual errors and supplement the bibliography. Most of the material for the latter appeared in the *Festschriften* for Georges Daux and Claire Préaux, but its collection here is useful. There are, however, no new texts and not much comment. Still, under the limitations imposed upon Linger by the nature of this reprint, the new material is convenient to have in this form.

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ILIAD 13.202-5: ΑΙΑΣ ΣΦΑΙΡΙΣΤΗΣ

H. A. Harris, in the course of his excellent discussion of ancient ball games, remarks that the famous seashore scene in *Odyssey* 6 includes the first appearance of ball-play in Western literature¹ and, on the strength of the wording of lines 115ff., conjectures that the specific game is very like one still commonly played by modern schoolchildren and known in England as "Kingy": "the fundamental aim of the game is to throw the ball at another player and hit him."² In the *Odyssey* 6. passage,

the language is strangely vigorous. . . . Homer does not use the simple dative, "to the girl," but a preposition (*μετά*) which has the fundamental force of "in pursuit of." The girl did not miss the ball; the ball missed her. It did not simply fall into the pool; the picture of Nausicaa throwing it is repeated. All this would be explained if we could believe that Homer had at some time seen girls playing Kingy—or as it would be in this case, Queenie.³

Harris then notes that "the only other ball-play in Homer" occurs during the exhibition of Phaiakian dancing in *Odyssey* 8.370ff.

But we can find evidence of ball-play, indeed of Kingy itself, in *Iliad* 13.202-5, a description of the mutilation of the corpse of Imbrios on the battlefield by Aias, son of Oïleus:

κεφαλὴν δ' ἀπαλῆς ἀπὸ δειρῆς
κόψεν Ὀϊλιάδης κεχλωμένος Ἀμφιμάχοιο,

¹ *Sport in Greece and Rome* (Ithaca 1972) 81.

² *Ibid.*, 77. In America, the same game is, I believe, sometimes called "Dodge-Ball" or "Battle-Ball."

³ *Ibid.* 82.

ἦκε δέ μιν σφαιρηδὸν ἐλιζάμενος δι' ὀμίλου·
 Ἔκτορι δὲ προπάροιθε ποδῶν πέσεν ἐν κονίῃσι.

Aias hurls the head *like a ball* (σφαιρηδὸν) *through the crowd* (δι' ὀμίλου), which presumably parts to avoid the grisly missile, just as players would move to avoid a ball thrown at them in a game of Kingy. Homer thus heightens our sense of the exceptional ferocity of Aias' action⁴ by likening it to a child's game. One thinks of the grim witticism of Patroklos at the expense of the dead "acrobat" (κυβιστητήρ) Kebriones in *Iliad* 16.745–50. In both places, the juxtaposition of an innocent leisure pastime and the bloody and feral pursuits of warriors is arrestingly macabre.

JAMES P. HOLOKA

EASTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY

⁴ Decapitation is among the *δεικέα ἔργα* that Gilbert Murray argued had been almost entirely expurgated from Homeric epic—see *The Rise of the Greek Epic*, 4th ed. (Oxford 1934) 128–29. M. M. Willcock, in his recent *Companion to the Iliad* (Chicago 1976), ad loc., maintains that the barbarity is appropriate to the lesser Aias, who "is a mean and brutal man. The greater Telamonian Aias would not treat a dead enemy in this way." So too, Charles Segal finds "a special degree of violence and emotionality" about the scene, *The Theme of the Mutilation of the Corpse in the Iliad*, *Mnem. Suppl.* 17 (Leiden 1971) 23, n. 1.

THE SACRIFICE OF AGAMEMNON'S DAUGHTER IN HESIOD'S' *EHOEAE*

In the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* the sacrifice of Iphigeneia seems to be unknown. In *Iliad* 2.299–332 the time spent in Aulis is associated with an omen and a prophecy of Calchas which do not concern Agamemnon's own life or any member of his family; and when in Book 9 the embassy to Achilles is empowered to offer him one of Agamemnon's three daughters for marriage it stands to reason that Chrysothemis, Laodice and Iphianassa (v. 145; cf. v. 287) are all of them alive. The wrath of Artemis and preparations for appeasing it by the sacrifice are reported for the *Cypria* but the account in Proclus continues: "Ἄρτεμις δὲ αὐτὴν ἐξαρπάσασα εἰς Ταύρους μετακομίζει καὶ ἀθάνατον ποιεῖ, while a hind is taking her place on the altar.¹ Was there then in the early Greek epic no version in which the horrible deed so familiar to us from Aeschylus' brutally powerful description actually took place, or if this is too hard to believe must we acquiesce in assuming that the episode was probably described somewhere but that no trace or evidence of it has reached us?²

Such resignation is not necessary. A longish passage of Hesiod's' *Ehoeae* which has been restored in recent publications includes the sacrifice of Iphimede (as she is here called). This at least seems to have been the original text, although in the passage as we read it Artemis again saves her for an illustrious destiny which is not the same as in the *Cypria*. As I must give my readers the opportunity to form their judgment about the original and the expanded text, fourteen lines of the passage

¹ Procli, *Chrest.* 104.15–20 Allen. It is possible that in the *Cypria* Agamemnon was given four daughters, Iphigeneia being distinguished from Iphianassa. (*schol.* S., *Ele.* 157). See for good comments on this and other relevant questions concerning the *Cypria* George Huxley, *Greek Epic Poetry from Eumelos to Panyassis* (London 1969) 136.

² Cf. Carl Robert, *Die griechische Heldensage* 2 (Berlin 1923) 2.1095ff. Eduard Fraenkel, *Aeschylus Agamemnon* 2.97ff. (ad vv. 158ff.) takes no source other than the *Cypria* into consideration. If this were correct Aeschylus would have omitted not only the motive of Artemis' wrath (which is the item that monopolizes Fraenkel's attention) but also the rescue by Artemis.

(23.13–26 M–W)³ must here be quoted. In the genealogical account preceding them we have been introduced to Leda and her sisters and then moved on to the three daughters whom Leda bore to Tyndareus. One of them is Klytemnestra.

- γῆμ[ε δ' ἐὼν διὰ κάλλος ἀναξ ἀνδρ]ῶν Ἀγαμέμνων
 κού[ρην Τυνδαρέοιο Κλυταιμῆσ]τριν κυανῶπ[ιν·
 15 ἢ τ[έκεν Ἴφιμέδην καλλίσφυ]ρον ἐν μεγάρ[οισιν
 Ἠλέκτρην θ' ἢ εἶδος ἐρήριστ' ἀ[θανά]τησιν.
 Ἴφιμέδην μὲν σφάξαν ἐυκνή[μ]ιδες Ἀχαιοὶ
 βωμῶ[ι ἐπ' Ἀρτέμιδος χρυσηλακ]άτ[ου] κελαδεινῆς,
 ἥματ[ι τῷ ὅτε νηυσὶν ἀνέπλ]εον Ἰλιον εἴ[σω
 20 ποινῇ[ν τεισόμενοι καλλισ]φύρου Ἀργειῶ[ν]ης,
 εἶδω[λον· αὐτὴν δ' ἐλαφιβό]λος ἰοχέαιρα
 ῥεῖα μάλ' ἐξεσά[ωσε, καὶ ἀμβροσ]ίην [ἐρ]ατ[ε]ινὴν
 στάξε κατὰ κρῆ[θεν, ἵνα οἱ χ]ρῶς [ἔ]μπε[δ]ο[ς] εἴ[η].
 θῆκεν δ' ἀθάνατο[ν καὶ ἀγήρ]αον ἥμα[τα πάντα.
 25 τὴν δὴ νῦν καλέο[υσιν ἐπὶ χ]θονὶ φῶλ' ἀγ[θρώπων
 Ἄρτεμιν εἰνοδί]ην, πρόπολον κλυ[τοῦ] ἱ[ο]χ[ε]αίρ[ης].

It is hardly rash to suggest that anyone reading in vv. 17–20 that the Greeks σφάξαν Iphimede and that this happened on the day when they sailed to Ilion in order to exact a penalty for Helen will have no doubt about the reality of the act denoted by σφάξαν; in fact at v. 20 we have moved beyond the act itself and have received information not only about the day when it took place but about the purpose—the purpose, to be precise, not of the sacrifice but of the expedition to Troy.⁴ The word εἶδωλον which lacks an organic syntactical connection with the preceding lines is a clumsy way of introducing a correction of the original story. Nothing that we have read so far could arouse a suspicion

³ That Iphigeneia did not die but was changed by Artemis into Hecate is attested for the *Catalogue* (= *Ehoiae*) by Paus. 1.43.1. See frg. 100 Rzach (*Hesiodi Carmina*, Leipzig 1902) or 23b M(erkelbach)-W(est), *Fragmenta Hesiodica* (Oxford 1967).

⁴ The brilliant reconstruction of the text in M–W, which goes considerably beyond the original publication by Lobel in *POx* 2481 (vol. 28, 1962, pp. 8f.) involves some uncertainties but I do not see how they could affect our problem. The key words are not in doubt; σφάξαν (v. 17) is in the papyrus edited by Lobel. βωμῶ[ι] was discovered by the recent editors on a Michigan papyrus (*PMich* 6234 frg. 2) which they recognized as a part of the same text. So was εἶδω[λον] and the continuation αὐτὴν is confirmed by the Homeric parallel presently to be discussed.

that it was not Iphimede *αὐτή* whom the Achaeans slaughtered in Aulis.⁵ The rhapsode who added vv. 21–26 knew a version in which Artemis saved her; therefore he gave the account which he found a turn in this direction.

Before we proceed to further conclusions regarding this text we do well to broaden the basis of our discussion by recalling a passage of the *Odyssey* which seems comparable to the lines under scrutiny. In the Nekyia Odysseus' meeting with Heracles begins as follows:

τὸν δὲ μέτ' εἰσενόησα βίην Ἡρακλεΐην,
εἶδωλον· αὐτὸς δὲ μετ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι
τέρπεται ἐν θαλίῃς καὶ ἔχει καλλίσφυρον Ἥβην
(vv. 601–3)

Here the qualification *εἶδωλον· αὐτὸς δὲ* . . is less awkward than in the passage of the *Ehoeae* because no word separates it from the proper name to which it belongs, and yet there are very good reasons for denying that vv. 602f. were a part of the original composition.⁶ The fact that Heracles' appearance and conduct are far too vigorous for an *εἶδωλον* is by no means the only argument against the 'genuineness' of these lines. Even in these days while unitarianism is widely favored some sections of the Nekyia ask for and often receive a special diagnosis. It is reassuring to see that as confirmed a unitarian as W. B. Stanford declares vv. 602–4 to be an 'interpolation'.⁷

Corrections introduced into the original poetic text have also been discovered in two passages of the "Catalogue of Ships." For in the tenth year of the war neither Protesilaos nor Philoctetes are any longer leaders of their contingents and without commit-

⁵ Lobel, op. cit. quite correctly commented on *σφάζαν* v. 11 (now 17): "This must mean that she was actually killed. 1. 17 (now 23) implies the same." *εἶδωλον* had however not yet been restored at that time.

⁶ For the views of ancient critics as reported in scholia ad loc. see the apparatus in the editions of T. W. Allen or von der Mühl, although the latter singles out Onomacritus as charged with the interpolation of the two lines. This was not the opinion of all who athetized them. V. 604 (= Hes., *Theog.* 952) was also condemned.—Once people knew of Heracles' admission to Olympus, they would not tolerate his presence in the underworld. Vv. 602–4 represent a compromise between these conflicting ideas.

⁷ *The Odyssey of Homer*, vol. 1 (London 1954) ad vv. 11.602–4. He even seems inclined to regarding the lines as an "interpolation within an interpolation" (vv. 565 or 568–627 condemned by Aristarchus).

ting ourselves to a specific theory about the original context of the 'catalogue'—i.e. the assembly in Aulis⁸ or whatever else has been thought of—we must admit that *Il.* 2.695–710 and 716–28 provide weighty support for such opinions. There would be no justification for quoting or discussing the entire sections in this paper. Suffice it to observe that in one of these examples where after listing the groups of men the text continues *τῶν αὖ Πρωτεσίλαος ἀρήιος ἡγεμόνευε/ζῶδς ἐών· τότε δ' ἤδη ἔχεν κατά γαῖα μέλαινα* the correction does not lack a certain elegance, whereas in the case of Philoctetes we have to wait longer to learn that although said to *ἡγεῖσθαι*, he is not actually leading his men any longer (see vv. 718, 721, 726). In both instances the same line: *οὐδὲ μὲν οὐδ' οἱ ἀναρχοὶ ἔσαν, πόθεόν γε μὲν ἀρχόν* (vv. 703, 726) is used to introduce us to the new leader.

In these last instances we may speak of adjustment to a new purpose, while for the lines removing Heracles to the immortal gods 'interpolation' seemed to be the appropriate word. For the six lines in frg. 23 M–W, with which we are concerned we would also use this term if we were dealing with a passage of Greek tragedy or indeed of an epic like the Homeric and most others. In the *Ehoëae* it makes little sense to speak of interpolations. For it is characteristic of this work that it continued to grow from a small nucleus (which some scholars would even consider produced by Hesiod himself) to ever larger dimensions through additions that rhapsodes saw fit to include.⁹ With the nature and the sources of these additions (which were by no means always genealogical in content) we need not here deal but there are good reasons for thinking that, except perhaps for the basic nucleus there was considerable variety between the text of one rhapsode

⁸ See Lesky, *RE Suppl.* 11.787 s.v. 'Homeros,' where he takes this view and gives a useful survey of scholarly opinions. For more recent comments see e.g. James Hogan, *A Guide to the Iliad* (Garden City, N.Y., 1979) 101.

⁹ See e.g. Hermann Fränkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums*, Philolog. Monographs 13, (New York 1951) 152; B. A. van Groningen, *La composition littéraire archaïque grecque* (*Verhandl. g. Nederland Akad.* n.r. 25.2) 84f., 121 ff.; also Wilamowitz repeatedly, e.g. *Hermes* 40 (1905) 123; Rzach, *R.E.* s.v. 'Hesiod' 1205, 1212; Casanova (see n. 10). Dissenting from the majority, Merkelbach, *Chronique d'Égypte* 43 (1968) 133ff. believes in a design which controlled the organization of the entire work. Even on this view an expansion of the kind here suggested would be perfectly possible but could indeed be called an 'interpolation.'

or group of rhapsodes and that of others. Regional differences are likely to have played their part—would the *Ehoeae* relating to the origin of Cyrene be of equal interest in all parts of Greece? And as it is hard to imagine how from divergent texts a uniform standard version should have emerged in the sixth century or even in the fifth or fourth, the *Ehoeae* were probably in a somewhat chaotic condition when Alexandrian scholars began to 'edit' them.¹⁰

Following up this line of thought we may wonder whether in the fifth century B.C. there may not have been texts which included and others which lacked the six verses in which Iphimede 'herself' is rescued and raised to divine status. If this is admitted (as it probably should be), would it mean that the great tragedians finding both versions in the *Ehoeae* could avail themselves of whichever suited their purpose? Matters cannot have been quite so simple; for unlike some other poets of that century, most notably Pindar, the poets of Attic tragedy do not appear to have drawn their subjects from the *Ehoeae*.¹¹ We must therefore move cautiously. What our analysis of frg. 23 shows is that the death of Agamemnon's daughter by the hands of the Achaeans, not only her rescue by Artemis, was known to epic poets and treated in the medium of epic poetry. That the brutal version which Aeschylus used was the original one is intrinsically probable. Euripides evidently knew and used both versions. Did Aeschylus too know both? Almost certainly, I should say; for if he had not found the gentler version in the *Ehoeae*, he found it in the *Cypria*, in *Stesichorus* (PMG 215 Page) or in some other epic source (in fact Stesichorus described Iphigeneia's transformation into Hecate in his *Oresteia*, the work from from which Aeschylus is said to have borrowed the recognition by way of the lock; see PMG 217). The sequel to the rescue varied, though some kind of

¹⁰ On the conditions of the pre-Alexandrian text of the *Ehoeae* I fully agree with A. Casanova, *Prometheus* 5 (1979) 237f., a paper whose knowledge I owe to Agosto Guida.

¹¹ Cf. the conclusions reached by J. Schwartz, *Pseudo-Hesiodica* (Leiden 1960) 577ff.

¹² The presence of the *εἰδωλον* motif in our fragment as well as in the Heracles episode of the *Nekyia* may strengthen our confidence in the testimony listed among the *dubia* both by Rzach (frg. 266) and in M-W (358) where Hesiod is cited as the first to have the story of Helen's *εἰδωλον* which we associate with Stesichorus and Euripides. In the very full account of Helen's suitors of which a

HERODOTUS 1.56: A TRIO OF TEXTUAL NOTES

There are two difficult sentences in 1.56: *Ταῦτα γὰρ ἦν τὰ προκεκριμένα, ἔόντα τὸ ἀρχαῖον τὸ μὲν Πελασγικόν, τὸ δὲ Ἑλληνικὸν ἔθνος. καὶ τὸ μὲν οὐδαμῇ κω ἐξεχώρησε, τὸ δὲ πολυπλάνητον κάρτα*. I give the text as it appears in the standard editions of Hude (1927) and Legrand (1932).

Three distinct problems bedevil the reader of these two sentences. What is the reference of *Ταῦτα* and of the repeated *τὸ μὲν*? Is the participle *ἔόντα* sound? And is the punctuation of the first sentence, specifically the comma following *προκεκριμένα*, correct? The first and third of these problems go back to Herodotus himself; the second is the result of a scribal error in the transmission of the text.

Herodotus has just said that Croesus, inquiring who were the most powerful Greeks, found that the Spartans and the Athenians were the leaders, the former of the Dorian *genos*, the latter of the Ionian. Were these *genea προκεκριμένα*? Or were the Spartans and Athenians, each the leaders of their respective *genos*, *προκεκριμένα*? Herodotus simply does not make a clear distinction between the whole (the *genos*) and the part (the Spartans and the Athenians). Since he confounds this point, *Ταῦτα* is vague. The correct reference hinges upon the context. Herodotus insists upon establishing an antithesis between the Athenians and the Spartans. The former were Ionian, Pelasgian, and stationary; the latter, Dorian, Hellenic, and migratory. This antithesis is faulty for a number of reasons, but Herodotus wants it nonetheless. Hence, in writing *Ταῦτα*, he is thinking more specifically of the part than of the whole.

The problem of *τὸ μὲν* stems from the same failure to distinguish the whole from a part. The first *τὸ μὲν* refers of course to the Athenians. The second *τὸ μὲν* must refer to the Pelasgi; *τὸ δέ*, to the Hellenes. But Herodotus is not thinking of the Pelasgi in general, who were notorious wanderers, but of those among them who settled in Attica and never left. Some Pelasgians became Athenians and never migrated again. The second *τὸ μὲν*, therefore, also refers to the Athenians, who were known to be autochthonous. The same confusion between the part and the whole applies to *Ἑλληνικόν* and *τὸ δέ*. The Spartans themselves

were not migratory. But the Ἑλληνικὸν ἔθνος as a whole, later to be called Dorian, often changed its place of habitation.

The second major problem can easily be solved by recourse to a long-forgotten emendation of Porson's. He simply substituted ἔθνεα for ἑόντα (Th. Kidd, *Tracts and Miscellaneous Criticisms of the Late Richard Porson* [London 1815] 260), thus eliminating the dubious juxtaposition of the two participles and resolving the ambiguity of Ταῦτα. The passage then reads: "For these [the Athenians and the Spartans] were the preeminent nations. . . ." Porson's change is sound but never appears in any edition or commentary.

This emendation comes to us second-hand, because Kidd cites Peter Paul Dobree as the source for Porson's idea. Looking into Dunbar's edition of Herodotus (Edinburgh 1806), Book I of which is supposed to have been edited in some way by Porson, we note that there no emendation appears. The text is printed just as it appears in the Florentine family of mss., A and B (the Roman mss., DRS and V, omit this part of the text), and in every edition from 1502 (the Aldine editio princeps) until Bekker's first edition of 1833: Ταῦτα γὰρ ἦν τὰ προκεκριμένα ἑόντα τὸ ἀρχαῖον· τὸ μὲν, πελασγικόν, τὸ δέ, Ἑλληνικὸν ἔθνος.

Ἑόντα is an easy scribal mistake for ἔθνεα. But the punctuation is correct (that is, it represents Herodotus' own version) and ought to stand. It was Dobree who changed it. In making his own variation on the Porsonian theme (James Scholefield, ed., *P. P. Dobree's Adversaria* [Cambridge 1831-1833] I), he shifted the stop for the good reason that τὰ προκεκριμένα ἑόντα is not Greek: τὰ προκεκριμένα <ἔθνεα>, ἑόντα τὸ ἀρχαῖον τὸ μὲν.

. . . Bekker (1833) then compounded the problem by dropping the suggested emendation but *keeping* the revised punctuation. All texts since Bekker's have been punctuated with a comma after προκεκριμένα.

Herodotus himself is responsible for this problem. Presumably he left behind him an unpunctuated text in scriptio continua. Subsequent readers had to decide what τὸ ἀρχαῖον modifies: either προκεκριμένα or πελασγικόν-Ἑλληνικόν. The sentence means either "the A. and the Sp. were of old the preeminent nations" or "the A. and the Sp. were the preeminent nations, the one of old Pelasgian, the other of old Hellenic."

I am inclined to think (following Jungermann, Wesseling, Rawlinson, and others) that Herodotus himself meant the

former, *not* the latter. Having just said that the Spartans and Athenians were, in Croesus' time (the present participle, *προέχοντα*), the leaders of their respective tribes, he does not need to say—again—that these peoples were preeminent. The sentence beginning *Ταῦτα γάρ* does not therefore refer to Croesus' time. The Spartans' and the Athenians' present preeminence lay in their past roles in history. The phrase *ἦν προκεκριμένα* is past, vis-à-vis Croesus' time, and emphasizes an abiding condition, or the continuance of a state. Croesus himself had no interest in the past history of these two nations. But Herodotus is interested, so much so that he proceeds to a long excursus on both the Athenians and the Spartans. He insists on telling how these two peoples grew powerful in the time before Croesus made his inquiry. This double excursus seems intended to support Herodotus' argument that the two peoples had in fact become the leaders of their respective genea when Croesus made his inquiry.

The first sentence of the passage should then be edited thus:
Ταῦτα γὰρ ἦν τὰ προκεκριμένα ἔθνεα τὸ ἀρχαῖον, τὸ μὲν Πελασγικόν, τὸ δὲ Ἑλληνικὸν ἔθνος.

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THE PATTERN OF THE EURIPIDES *ELECTRA*

Much type has been set on the subject of the first stasimon of Euripides's *Electra* (432–86). To some critics it appears attractively remote from the action of the play, 'a separate decoration,'¹ a variant of the escape ode.² S. A. Barlow singles it out as the 'classic case of pictorial irrelevance,'³ while J. Jones refers to its 'faraway sweetness . . . scarcely engaging with the business-like action of revenge,'⁴ Others find in it something quite different. G. B. Walsh, for example, while fully acknowledging that the Ode 'is imbued with the splendour of light and gold,'⁵ nevertheless observes 'the horrors that are concealed beneath the charm of [its] narrative.'⁶ And J. Ferguson, following in the footsteps of S. M. Adams⁷ and M. J. O'Brien,⁸ affirms that the horrors are not hidden but palpably present, writing of the Ode's 'ugliness,' its 'deliberate brutalizing of beauty.'⁹

For my part I do not see how an honest reading of this Ode can fail to confirm the analysis of Ferguson and his eloquent predecessors; but, in view of the continuing lack of unanimity among critics, the case seems to call for a new presentation. In addition, there is more to be said about what strikes me as the Ode's most remarkable feature, the way in which it ends as something altogether different from what was suggested at its outset. Let us accordingly examine anew the nature of this change.

¹ H. D. F. Kitto, *Greek Tragedy* (Methuen, 3rd edition, 1961) 341. Cf. Jan Kott, *The Eating of the Gods* (Methuen 1974) 251: the Chorus's songs, 'like Brecht's, are on another level, outside the action.'

² E.g., to R. Lattimore, *The Poetry of Greek Tragedy* (Oxford 1958) 119; 'We escape from *Electra* to a vision of dolphins in the spray at the ship's prow and the water full of Nereids.'

³ S. A. Barlow, *The Imagery of Euripides* (Methuen 1971) 20.

⁴ J. Jones, *On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy* (Chatto and Windus 1962) 246.

⁵ G. B. Walsh in *Yale Classical Studies*, Vol. 25 (Cambridge 1977) 280.

⁶ G. B. Walsh, *op. cit.*, p. 288.

⁷ S. M. Adams, *CR* 49 (1935) 121. 'The poet weaves reminiscences of legendary horrors into the web of legendary glory: glamour (Achilles) is confounded with monstrosities (Gorgon, Sphinx, Chimaera); the monstrous wins out . . .'

⁸ M. J. O'Brien, *AJP* 75 (1964). O'Brien offers a sensitive and cogent analysis of the Ode (13–39).

⁹ J. Ferguson, *A Companion to Greek Tragedy* (Texas 1972) 387 and 390.

The first strophe tells of the famous ships that took light-leaping Achilles to Troy. Their journey is an idyllic one as they escort the choruses (*χορούς*, 434) of Nereids, and the dolphin, responding to the music of the flute, leaps and spins around the coloured prows while innumerable oars cut the sea. Then the happy rusticity of the antistrophe transfers this mood of unclouded joy from sea to land. Here the Nereids, carrying to Achilles his golden armour, seek him on Pelion and Ossa where the Nymphs keep their watch and where the centaur Chiron has raised him to be a light for Greece. In the word 'light' (*φῶς*, 449), the brightness implicit in the land- and sea-scapes of the two stanzas at last finds expression. A delightful dream of heroic mythology¹⁰ has been conjured up in these twenty lines.

But then, abruptly, the dream is juxtaposed with the actuality of an eye-witness account of warfare, for the Chorus explain, now with conversational directness (452-57), that they have heard a description of Achilles's armour from a man who has (presumably) arrived at Nauplia from Troy. With one word flung into striking relief by rhyme (*σήματα, δέσματα*, 456), a new element breaks forcibly into the Ode and shatters the idyll: the blazons *terrify*. The heroic vision of ll. 432-51 gives way to a horrific evocation of the brutality of the Trojan War.

The armour is, of course, a work of art (443-44, *τετόχθαι*, 457). Hephaestus's craftsmanship has given order and beauty to what it portrays, and for the time being the horror is held in an equipoise with the glamour of the artefacts which dazzle both literally and figuratively. For example, the picture on the shield's base or rim, of Perseus flying over the sea with the pastoral Hermes, undoubtedly has its beauty; yet it is a beauty grimly counterbalanced by the presentation of Perseus as a throat-cutter holding the severed head of the Gorgon. In much the same way, the *αἰθέριοι χοροί* (467) of the stars on the middle of the shield renew the attraction of the choruses of Nereids of 434, but their brightness more obviously evokes the fearful glitter of Achilles's armour that makes the shivers take hold of Hector in the *Iliad* (*δμμασι τροπαῖοι*, 469: cf. *Il.*, xxii, 131-37).¹¹

¹⁰ G. B. Walsh has noted how 'the ode is given an appropriately strong Homeric flavor by epic-Ionic diction and dialectal features' (op. cit., p. 279).

¹¹ Ferguson discusses the ambivalence of the theme of light in this play (op. cit., pp. 387-88).

By the end of the second antistrophe, the horror of what is portrayed on the armour has largely eclipsed any thought of the artist's ordering skill. On the gold-wrought helmet, the music the dolphin loved is perverted into the song of the Sphinxes who hold the victims of their music in their talons. And the picture on the cuirass, of the Chimaera running from Pegasus, singularly fails to exploit the possibilities for optimism inherent in this fable. The ghastly fire-breathing monster is portrayed with a vivid immediacy¹² while its destruction by Bellerophon is merely hinted at.

In the epode, the armour is no longer viewed as a work of art. It is in operation on the battlefield and the hilt does not gleam. By now it is a bloodstained weapon (*φονίω*, 476),¹³ the chasing upon it a nasty vignette of warfare. If its four horses recall the winged mares of the glittering sun (464–66) and the motion of the dolphin (with which they share the verb *πάλλω*, 435),¹⁴ they do so only to sully them with blood and a cloud of black dust. The exquisite opening, like Hephaestus's wondrous decoration, has been defiled by the terror of the war which, through Achilles, Agamemnon has won.¹⁵ The final horror of the first stasimon, Clytemnestra with her throat slit, may at present be a vision but will before long become a visible reality when she lies on the stage with a gaping wound in her neck (1223, 1228). With grim inescapability, her bloodstained corpse will prove a retrospective commentary on this stasimon. What underlies the dream of heroic warfare? What is the truth beneath the shaping virtuosity of the artist? Nothing, the Ode answers, but grisly and ignoble death.

The movement of the first stasimon—from untarnished joy, evoked by appropriately appealing images, to horror and blood—recurs, as Ferguson has seen,¹⁶ in the second (699–746).

¹² The dative *χαλαῖς* captures with visual expressiveness the flash of the Chimaera's hooves. I find no reason to alter the accepted text here. But see B. H. Polack, *CQ* 26 (1976) 3.

¹³ See Denniston's note ad loc. in Euripides, *Electra*, ed. by J. D. Denniston (Oxford 1939). If not the hilt but the spear is referred to, it makes no odds with regard to my argument.

¹⁴ O'Brien, op. cit., p. 17.

¹⁵ 'Taken as a whole, the Armor of Achilles is a symbolic expression of conflict and dread.'—O'Brien, op. cit., p. 22.

¹⁶ Ferguson, op. cit., pp. 389–90.

Here the Chorus narrate the old tale (*ἐν πολιαῖσι φήμαις*, 700–1) of how Pan endorsed Atreus's kingship of Mycenae by giving him a golden lamb. The lamb was then stolen by his brother Thyestes who exploited for this purpose his clandestine affair with Atreus's wife—in reaction to which Zeus changed the course of the sun. The images of the first twenty lines are, with their idyllic evocation of happiness, familiar from the previous Ode: pastoral joy, music and dance, colour and glitter. The rustic Pan makes sweet music on his pipes; the delighted community celebrates the golden lamb with its beautiful fleece in dancing (*χοροί*, 711); golden censers and altars blaze throughout the city; and the lovely sound of the flute and songs is suggested with sensuous allure (716–18). Upon this there bursts, with grating suddenness, the treachery of Thyestes with its double violation of the bonds of brotherhood and the cosmic recoil of his crime whereby the paths of the stars and sun are changed.¹⁷ This wrenching of the climate from its previous balance and order (726–36) as the result of human sin is a powerful symbol of the kind of dislocation which we now recognize as the pattern of this Ode as well as of the first. Here the dream of rustic joy, of the happy community and of kingship endorsed by the gods, is shattered by the evil realities of human behaviour. The gleam of the golden lamb and the flash of fire give way to the unadorned horror of Clytemnestra's murder of her husband (*πόσιν κτείνεις*, 745–46). And we should not forget, of course, that the slaughter of Aegisthus, the son of Thyestes and quite possibly the killer of Atreus, is taking place at this very moment.

One interesting aspect of the second stasimon is the marked scepticism of the Chorus (in 737–46) who find it hard to believe that the sun changed course for the sake of justice among men (*θνατᾶς ἔνεκεν δίκας*, 742), that human sin can have repercussions in nature. Stories that make such claims they cynically consider advantageous in that they make men serve the gods, and Clytemnestra certainly did not bear them in mind when she murdered her husband; but to the causality that relates man's

¹⁷ '... as in the previous song the blessing of light turns to a curse, and the sun and the stars are fearful and punitive.'—Ferguson, *op. cit.*, p. 389. Is it significant that the dehydrating effects of this change are given so much more emphasis than their opposite? Perhaps so, in a play where water appears to suggest ideas of freshness and sanctity.

crimes to punishment from Zeus the Chorus give scant credence. Now mythology offers a means of ordering and defining experience and suggests a world which has a logic that may correspond with justice. If the Chorus deny to the terrible destiny of the House of Atreus the structure of myth, all they leave us is the horror of a saga emptied of the divine element. Just as the subjects portrayed on the armour of Achilles had refused to be contained in a work of art and developed a brutal suggestive force of their own, so in the second Ode the Chorus strip the distasteful tale of Atreus and Thyestes of any colouring of a superior power that endorses good and punishes evil.¹⁸

Thus the inability of art and myth to encapsulate or adequately to reflect the true nature of what they seek to convey is suggested in the progress of both these Choruses, from a pellucid ideal vision to evil, horror and death. We can appreciate the implications of this pattern for the play as a whole in such passages as the exultant response of the Chorus and Electra to the speech of the messenger describing the killing of Aegisthus. Here they make use of images of joy with which we are already familiar: the dance (*χορόν*, 859—and not only in the words: they perform too); the light leap of the fawn (860–61; cf. Achilles, 439) with its evocation of rustic exhilaration; song (864–65); light and the sun (866); the colour and dazzle of bright things (861, 871, 873); the flute (879); even a glint of water (863).¹⁹ The terms in which these jubilant lines are couched can surely lead the responsive auditor to forecast a swerving aside into horror.²⁰ The dawn that has lifted its white eye (102) is a false one, for, like the cheek of Iphigeneia (1023), its whiteness will be blotched with blood.

This movement from the sweet to the bitter is a recurrent one. When she reappears for her poignant lament (112–66), Electra is carrying pure spring water in a pitcher on her head (108). This

¹⁸ Cf. J. T. Sheppard, *CR* 32 (1918) 140, and D. J. Conacher, *Euripidean Drama* (Oxford 1967) 212.

¹⁹ In one of the many athletic images of the play. For this important line of imagery, see O'Brien, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

²⁰ 'Throughout this part of the play [859–1176] . . . the chorus is swept away into a rapture which bodes ill for the sequel.'—Sheppard, *op. cit.*, p. 140. The parallel passage of exhilaration after the recognition scene (585–95) may appear equally ominous.

becomes part of the Ode's verbal imagery with the pathos of the swan's grieving for its ensnared father by the streams of a river (*ποταμίους παρὰ χεύμασιν*, 152) and then it is gruesomely transmuted into the water in which Agamemnon bathed for the last time (157). Later, we find that the grisly murder of Aegisthus is prefaced not only by his attractive hospitality—which looks straight back to that of the Autourgos, the play's touchstone of excellence (cf. 789 and 361)—²¹ but also by the evocation of a delicious landscape against which he invites his assassins to join him in his sacrifice to the Nymphs of the Rocks (805; cf. the Nymphs on Mount Ossa of the first stasimon (445–48)):

*κυρεῖ δὲ κήποις ἐν καταρρύτοις βεβώς,
δρέπων τερείνης μυρσίνης κάρα πλόκου.*

777–78

The water imagery contributes to the attractive freshness of this picture. Yet, amid these lush meadows, a murder involving an appalling violation of hospitality will soon take place and the genial host will make his sole appearance on the stage as a mangled corpse.

Inaugurating another repetition of this movement, Electra bitterly describes the brightness and gleam of Clytemnestra:

*μήτηρ δ' ἐμὴ Φρυγίοισιν ἐν σκυλεύμασιν
θρόνῳ κάθηται, πρὸς δ' ἔδραισιν Ἀσίδες
δμῳαὶ στατίζουσ', ὥς ἔπερσ' ἐμὸς πατήρ,
Ἰδαῖα φάρη χρυσέαις ἐξευγμέναι
πόρπαισιν.*

314–18

This brightness is brought onto the stage when Clytemnestra appears later. Seeing her at a distance, Electra comments on the shine of her chariot and her dress (966) and when she arrives she makes a dazzling entry, riding on with her train of glittering Trojan slave-girls. Against the painstakingly established rusticity of the background, she comes in like sunlight.²² And the choral lyrics that greet her (988–97) contribute music and, through their celebration of Castor and Pollux, references to stars and water

²¹ O'Brien, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

²² O'Brien notes the contrast between 'the elegantly arranged golden locks (1071) and the cropped head' (*op. cit.*, p. 35).

(991–92).²³ At the end of the episode, Electra warns her mother, with shocking irony, to be careful in case the smoky house may soil her clothes (1139–40). Something far more dire than any smoke or soot is, of course, about to besmirch her, and, when the ekkyklema brings her out,²⁴ we see a bloody corpse (1178–79) with gaping wounds (1228). The brightness of Clytemnestra has been eclipsed in blood, and the pattern of the play's imagery again receives visual confirmation.

The recurrence of this pattern from allure to destruction is in keeping with the remarkably questioning mode of the play. How, Euripides seems ever to be asking, do you diagnose what is good or bad, since the initial impression of things is unlikely to survive further probing (50–53, 367–90) and certainly beauty is no guide to real worth (1062–64)? Furthermore, his assault on the idealistic beauty of the heroic age²⁵ is entirely in keeping with the satire on the Aeschylean symbols of recognition (518–44). I can see no compelling reason to doubt the authenticity of this passage.²⁶

But the pattern I have discussed has other implications. The play opens with a suggestion of natural freshness as the Autochthon addresses the streams of Inachos.²⁷ There is a river source nearby from which Electra can fetch the water. Black though the night may be, it is the nurse of golden stars (54), and in this countryside with its kindly inhabitants there is a pleasing sense of

²³ Sheppard refers to 991 and remarks on the stars in this play and their relevance to the Dioscuri (op. cit., p. 141). There is much water in this landlocked tragedy, which lends an added aptness to the choice as *dei ex machina* of gods who save at sea.

²⁴ N. C. Hourmouziades, *Production and Imagination in Euripides* (Athens 1965) 107.

²⁵ S. M. Adams (op. cit., p. 121) sees in the play 'a deliberate assault on legend. . . Euripides has stripped the old bloody deed of the heroic glamour that surrounded it.'—G. Murray, *Euripides and His Age* (Oxford, 2nd edition, 1946) 78. G. M. A. Grube writes of 'the horror of this tragedy which gives the reverse side of the heroic legend . . .' (*The Drama of Euripides* [Methuen 1941] 304–5).

²⁶ As David Bain has recently done with modestly tenuous assertion (*BICS* 24 [1977] 104–16): 'I am painfully aware throughout that much of what I shall say is of a highly speculative nature . . .' (p. 105). This episode strikes me as altogether characteristic of the play.

²⁷ If *ἀρδύος* (and not *ἄρρυος*) is the correct reading of the fourth word in the play, the opening line becomes still more watery. (M. W. Haslam, *CQ* 26 [1976] 1–2)

community. The Chorus invite Electra to a festival of Hera and offer her appropriate clothes and ornaments (167–93), the Old Man effortfully enters with a generous gift of meat, cheese and wine as well as garlands to wear while consuming them (494–97), and the Autourgos himself embodies simple virtue to the highest degree.²⁸ Against this unglamorous yet not unbeguiling setting, moral demands seem uncomplicated and easy; it is, of course, Orestes who imports the disquieting note of uncertainty. Even if Electra lives far from pleasures and palaces, she is surrounded by generosity and good nature. Yet, with the play's repeated shift from the positive to the negative, we may feel an artistic rightness, as well as a thorough disgust, when the countryside of Argos proves the scene of polluting murder, when the fresh water is replaced by blood.

Of course, there is another side to this particular coin. With our Aristotelian expectation of a reversal,²⁹ we may anticipate that what is grim and degraded in the opening of the tragedy will give way to triumph, and that the self-conscious squalor, especially in the presentation of Electra, will prove the prelude to joyous restoration. 'Rags again!' exclaims Denniston (n. on 501), and we could surely be forgiven for expecting the motif 'from rags to riches.' Of that, however, we are to be disappointed. Whatever spasms of hope may revive optimism along the route,³⁰ the ultimate movement the tragedy insists on is obstinately a downward one and when the winds of the House of Atreus eventually veer round (1147–48) they are heavy with pollution and doom.

²⁸ Grube writes sensitively about this impressive characterization (op. cit., pp. 298 and 9). It may be, however, that the concentration of some critics on (admittedly rewarding) discussion of the characters has deflected them from other important aspects of the play. An admirable commentary on the Autourgos which does justice to his dramatic significance is provided by Sheppard (op. cit., pp. 137–38): noble and pious, he 'stands for the simple humanity which Euripides preaches, and which, if we once understand it, makes romantic talk about the degradation of poor clothes, menial labour, and a cottage instead of a palace, dwindle into insignificance.'

²⁹ *Poetics*, 1451a 11–15: '... it is the fact of change which Aristotle finds essentially tragic, not the direction of change.'—Jones, op. cit., p. 16.

³⁰ For a good discussion of the singularly unromantic recognition scene, see Sheppard, op. cit., pp. 138–39. See also D. A. Raeburn's analysis, summarized by P. Vellacott in his translation of the *Electra* (Penguin 1963) 12–13.

The god Apollo has given Orestes instructions to take his vengeance for his father's murder and in 399–400 Orestes's belief in the oracle is sure:

Λοξίου γὰρ ἔμπεδοι
χρησμοί, βροτῶν δὲ μαντικὴν χαίρειν ἔῶ.

The oracle would appear to hold out the promise of a happy ending for the play, as, surely, does the powerful invocatory ritual of 671–85.³¹ Yet, in their coda, which ties up everything and solves nothing, the Dioscori state that Apollo was wrong (1246) and add, in a chilling revelation, that Zeus caused the Trojan War to be fought over a phantom Helen:

Ζεὺς δ', ὥς ἔρις γένοιτο καὶ φόνος βροτῶν,
εἶδωλον Ἑλένης ἐξέπεμψ' ἐς Ἴλιον.

1282–83

The gods who had been trusted earlier in the play to validate Justice in the world are shown as the coldly irresponsible patrons of a slaughter that defiles beauty just as the white cheek of Iphigeneia is stained with murder, just as Electra and Orestes, who had hoped to cut the Gordian knot of their House's doom, stagger out from killing their mother badged with her blood (1172–73). Beauty, art, myth, religion, Euripides seems to say—all are mere figments. In the irrecoverably dark world of his *Electra*, blood, death and defilement are the deepest truths, the ultimate realities.

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³¹ Michael Cacoyannis's film of *Electra* (1961) first impressed upon me the considerable force of this passage.

THE IDEOLOGY OF ARISTOPHANES' *WEALTH*

We understand then what we must seek in texts: not signs of their cohesion and of their autonomy but the material contradictions which produce them and which are reproduced there in the form of conflicts. If literature is an objective reflection of reality, it is because literature is determined by the antagonisms which constitute it not as a totality, but as a historical and social material reality. Literature expresses these conflicts and adds to them an imaginary resolution; but these solutions, these compromises which are finally the texts, continue to bear the mark of the divisions which give them a real base, a reality, and also an interest. To explicate texts is first of all to recognize in them the terms of these contradictions, and to make evident not their continuity but the relationship of exclusion which alone makes them interdependent.

Pierre Macherey, "The Problem of Reflection"
trans. S. S. Lanser, *SUB-STANCE* 15 (1976) 18-19

Aristophanes' *Plutus*, or "Wealth," puts into play a complex of themes relating to poverty and plenty. Among these themes there are inconsistencies and even contradictions, which reveal themselves upon analysis. It is not our intention, however, to draw up an accusation; on the contrary, we locate the specifically literary operation of the work precisely in its tensions, those seams in its surface whereby contradictions immanent in ideology and social reality are overcome, albeit factitiously, in the production of the unified text. We experience the *Plutus* as a single work; but we know it as an active intervention in the ideological instabilities of the Athenian city-state. The work does not simply reflect, it creates.

On the level of action, the *Plutus* is not rich in conflict. From the beginning, it is clear that the good citizen Chremylus will gain the god of wealth as his ally, and such obstacles as he encounters in Wealth's own cowardice or the opposition of ill-wishers, including the goddess Poverty, are easily disposed of. The narrative line of Chremylus' progress, and that of his

demesmen, is direct: he restores sight to the blind Plutos, holds a greedy sycophant at bay, dispenses good fortune liberally and with a benign wink at petty squabbling, and finally establishes the god in the city treasury—the temple of Athena on the acropolis—for the benefit of all Athens. This straightforward motion conceals, however, a fundamental thematic tension between two quite different conceptions of the nature of want and sufficiency that are phased in and out throughout the argument. The first, in the order of narrative presentation in the text, represents wealth and poverty as a function of unequal social distribution. The rich achieve their wealth at the expense of the honest poor, who are poor because they remain honest. The second conception is predicated on a notion of universal scarcity, as a result of which all alike are more or less indigent. The solutions to these two ways of representing poverty are correspondingly different: the first, or social, conception invites a program of redistribution; the second demands a general improvement in resources, whether through technological progress or a lucky increase in fertility, the extreme imaginative version of which is a return of the spontaneous bounty of the golden age.

In the first part of this paper, we shall exhibit the presence of these two conceptions in the text, and show further how one of them—that of unequal distribution—is itself compounded of two distinct views. After that, we shall show how these several versions are integrated into a single story, and draw some conclusions about the meaning of that operation in the context of the ideological and social history of Athens.

The opening words of the play announce the role of money in establishing the class or social order of masters and slaves: the slave may know better than his master, laments Chremylus' man Carion, but must share the consequences of his master's ill judgment; "for the *daimon* does not permit the rightful owner (*kyrios*) of his body to control it, but the one who has purchased it" (3–7; the quotation proper, 6–7).¹ It is not unreasonable to identify the *daimon* here as Plutos himself.² Carion's lament

¹ The point is echoed and brought home at 147f.: "For a small bit of silver I was made a slave, because I wasn't so rich." All translations are our own; text is F. W. Hall & W. M. Geldart, *Aristophanis Comoediae* vol. 2 (Oxford 1907²).

² That Plutus is a *daimon* is evident from line 123.

concerns his master's attachment to an enigmatic blind man, having been advised by Apollo to bring home with him the first person he should encounter upon leaving the oracle. Chremylus explains his motive for consulting the oracle: although he is pious and just, he has fared badly and remained poor; those who get rich are the public speakers, informers, and trouble-makers in general. Accordingly, since his own life is shot, he was inquiring whether his only son would be better off changing his habits, and becoming utterly unscrupulous and immoral (28–37). Carion, in turn, ventures to interpret the sign: Chremylus' son must assume the local character, he explains, because even a blind man can easily see that sick conduct is most advantageous at the present time (45–50). Chremylus rejects this inference, but the point, by now, is clear: corruption is abroad in the land, and the wicked prosper while the just go empty. After Plutus identifies himself, the topic is simply embellished. First, the aetiology of his blindness: he had boasted as a youth that he would visit only the just and the wise and decent, and Zeus, spiteful toward such worthy folk, had deprived him of his ability to discriminate (87–92).³ Plutus retains his desire to attend the just, though for a long time he hasn't seen any; "Nor have I," replies Chremylus, "and I can see" (99). But Plutus is still suspicious of Chremylus: everybody pretends to virtue until they get rich (107–9). "Not everybody is bad," says Chremylus; "Absolutely everybody, by Zeus!" replies Wealth (110–11).⁴ With this, Chremylus proposes his plan to restore the sight of Plutus.

At the risk of belaboring the matter, we shall restate the import of this passage: wealth begets corruption, and corruption

³ The hostility between Zeus and Plutus finds its place in the Hesiodic tradition, according to which Zeus is responsible for concealing the earth's bounty from mortals. For a recent interpretation of this theme see J. P. Vernant, "À la table des hommes," esp. pp. 68–69, in Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, eds. *La Cuisine du sacrifice en pays grec* (Paris 1979). Hans-Joachim Newiger, *Metapher und Allegorie*, *Zetemata* 16 (1957) 168, 176f., points out some specific connections between Plutus and Prometheus. See further below, p. 383.

⁴ The logical inference from this section, if we accept the inverse relation of justice and wealth, is that nearly all men are rich, at the expense of one or two honest folk like Chremylus. The emphasis, however, falls on the moral theme of unequal distribution and not on the relative numbers; presently we shall find a conception of general scarcity under which the populace is basically poor but honest, while it is exploited by a rather small class of social parasites; see below, p. 375.

wealth. Society is divided into rich and poor, honest and evil. The fault lies not with a failure of natural abundance, but the character of the times, in which ill conduct is rewarded, virtue despised. The solution is to reverse the situation: augment the fortunes of the good citizens, few as they may be, at the expense of the prosperous thieves. And indeed, when Plutus regains his vision, this is precisely the effect.⁵ The relevant scene is the arrival of the sycophant or informer (850–958). He comes on complaining bitterly of his misfortune, since on account of Wealth he has lost all his possessions (856–58). A just citizen, who had entered shortly before to honor the god for the reversal of his fortunes, deduces at once that the newcomer is a bad type. The sycophant then puts the issue pointedly: “Where is the fellow who said he would make us all rich at once, if he could see again? Because it’s really the case that he has destroyed some of us utterly” (864–67). He is accused of immorality, but turns the charge back upon Carion and the rest: “There’s no good in any of you, and no way but what you have my money” (870–71). The gain of Chremylus and his friends is achieved at the sycophant’s expense; in his view, they have acted criminally (*pepanourgēkas*, 876), done violence against a fellow citizen (*hybris*, 886; cf. 899), been up to no good (“not yours, at any rate,” replies the just citizen, 889), and feasted off his property (890).

All this, what is more, to the harm of a worthy and patriotic citizen (*chrēstos kai philopolis*, 900)—and with this claim, the argument takes a new turn, or rather, develops a topic that was only implicit in the preceding dialogue. “Are you a farmer?” asks the just citizen; “Do you think I’m that crazy?” the sycophant replies. “A trader, then? Or do you practice some craft?” (903–5, abridged). And finally: “How then do you make a living, since you do nothing?” (906). The sycophant’s defense is that he aids the laws, that is, the administration of justice, in the city, bringing charges against those who violate them [a responsibility which, in the absence of a system of public prosecution, did in fact fall to private citizens, though these were normally ones with a personal stake in a given case]. Sycophants were popularly regarded more or less as informers, officious meddlers who stirred up trouble for its own sake and thrived on others’ losses;

⁵ But not, we may add, the only effect. For the interpretation of the later scenes, where it appears that *all* men have become rich, see below, pp. 380.

we have already cited a passage in which they are lumped with orators—that is, demagogues in the assembly, or, less disparagingly, politicians—and with good-for-nothings in general (30–31).⁶ The contrast with farmers, merchants, and artisans in the present passage is the nub of the argument: on the one side are those engaged in useful or productive labor, on the other, those who exploit the apparatus of the state for their own gain, making a profession of political activity—in the popular phrase, being a busybody (*polypragmonein*, 913)—without performing any particular service for society.⁷ Ideologically, there is a shift in emphasis here: what had previously been represented as a widespread corruption, a general rapacity and decline in morals such that Plutus could affirm that absolutely everyone was evil (111), is here redefined as an opposition, not between good men and bad per se, but between two sorts of occupation, the one honest and useful, the other mischievous and unproductive. The economic problem remains one of unfair distribution, but it is cast this time not simply in ethical but in social terms. Reform, correspondingly, is not much so a matter of a broad improvement in morals as an attack on a specific class of parasites. Get rid of them, and there will be wealth enough to meet the needs of those who created it.

Both of the views we have identified were commonplace in Athens, and the transition from one to the other is easily effected by the equation of sycophants and their like with the depraved portion of the citizen body. The audience has long since been prepared for the move because the chorus, which Chremylus summons early in the play to share equally in the new Wealth (223–26), consists like himself of hardworking farmers (*talai-poroumenous*, 224; cf. 33), fellow-demesmen (322) all of whom (286) will enjoy the bounty of the god. Aristophanes, however, mediates the shift quite explicitly in a scene between Chremylus and his friend, Blepsidemus, who enters to check out the barber shop rumors of Chremylus' sudden prosperity. Blepsidemus cannot imagine that honest work can have been the source of it (340–41). Chremylus' rather cryptic remarks concerning the

⁶See J. O. Lofberg, "The Sycophant-Parasite," *CP* 15 (1920) 61–72.

⁷On *polypragmosyne*, see Victor Ehrenberg, "Polypragmosyne: A Study in Greek Politics," *JHS* 67 (1947) 46–67; William Arrowsmith, "Aristophanes' Birds: The Fantasy Politics of Eros," *Arion* N.S. 1.1 (Spring 1973) 126–30.

risks of his plan (to restore the sight of Plutus, of course, although Blepsidemus is still in the dark about it, 350–51) seem to confirm the drift of Blepsidemus' suspicions, and he proceeds to caution preachily against theft and the temptations of greed (352–63). We need not pursue the dramatic elaboration of the contretemps, except to observe, on the one side, that Blepsidemus laments the lapse from his friend's former standard of conduct (365), and, on the other, that Chremylus repeatedly indicates his intention to share his good fortune with Blepsidemus (345) and everyone else who is good and righteous and well-behaved (386–88). The misunderstanding is at last resolved when Chremylus explains that he has Plutus with him. Blepsidemus, reassured that the wealth was not dishonestly acquired, immediately demands a portion of it (398–400). Thematically, then, the scene undoes Blepsidemus' automatic association of wealth with theft. It is not true that riches are necessarily a sign of corruption, and with this anxiety assuaged, the audience, like Blepsidemus, can forget that pervasive moral squeamishness about sudden gains, and the connection of avarice with ethical decline. The common characters in the play are good and will be rewarded. The real problem, as Chremylus goes on to say, is giving Plutus his sight. One may comfortably infer, at this point, that only the traditional types of malefactor, sycophants and their sort, will have cause to regret the god's vision.

The evil characters, then, have been identified and the sycophant stands for them all, a sort of scapegoat for the moral themes of the play. But the sycophant himself was an ideologically complex figure, and the debate between him and the just citizen takes, at one point, a surprising turn. "Wouldn't you like this" asks the just man, "to have some peace and quiet and live at leisure?" (921–22). The sycophant replies that a life without occupation is that of sheep, and that not for Plutus himself and all the tea in China (or, as the Greek expression has it, all the silphium of Cyrene) would he change. To understand the train of thought here, one must recall that one of the traits of the sycophant was a kind of inner restlessness, an urge to excessive activity (the etymological sense of *polypragmosunē*) that drove him to take on, in addition to his own, the affairs of others (cf. *t'allotria Prattōn*, 931). This idea of meddlesomeness presupposes as the norm a notion of minding one's own business which was well-suited to the Athenian regard for the independ-

ence and self-sufficiency of the individual household estate. Nor is it a wonder that such autonomy was a matter of pride, for it could be difficult to maintain, and the farmer's life—that of the chorus in our play—was commonly represented, like here, as one of toil.⁸ An image of better times would naturally include an essential component of leisure. But the sycophant, who has, it would seem, some freedom from his own responsibilities, invests his time compulsively in the affairs of others. He is thus unfit by disposition to profit from the bounty of a golden age; were he rich as Midas, he would still labor at what he thinks of as public business. This is all, as we have said, conventional in the presentation of the sycophant, but it is incongruous in the present context because the issue that has been emphasized so far is that of dishonesty and greed, not activity for its own sake. A sycophant who is prepared to renounce Wealth itself in order to maintain his profession is no very satisfactory emblem of the unjust division between rich and poor which was the original

⁸ The theme of autarky, together with the dangers to independence represented by poverty and the necessity for cooperation, are brought together in a complex way in Menander's *Dyscolus*. For *autarkeia*, see the commentaries of Handley and Gomme-Sandbach ad. v. 714. It is worth noting a distinct change in the valuation of autarky over the history—as we have it—of Athenian comic drama. In the *Acharnians*, Aristophanes' earliest surviving play, Dicaeopolis in effect secedes from Athens, establishing his private peace with Sparta, and by himself keeps at bay, subdues or wins over his fellow citizens (so too in the *Peace*). In the *Ecclesiazusae* among Aristophanes' late plays, the tension is between the *oikos* system and its antithesis, a communal ideal represented by the abolition of private property and the abrogation of the marriage rules of the society (this spirit reigns also in the *Plutus*). The *Lysistrata* occupies a middle position, in which the household is simultaneously preserved and transcended as the unit of social organization. On the one hand, the sexual strike is conceived of as an action by each woman against her husband, that is, according to the family unit. On the other hand, the retreat to the acropolis, which is in part inconsistent with the former plan, represents a potential communality which will find its complete expression in the *Ecclesiazusae* but shares with that play the view of women as bearers of the anti-structural values of Greek society. Finally, in the *Dyscolus* or in the Greek original of the *Aulularia*, the secessionist is humbled and obliged to recognize the necessity of community—albeit community as a relationship among independent households, rather than the utopian vision of Aristophanes' comedies. The reversal in the treatment of the separatist from the *Acharnians* to the *Dyscolus*—the shift from Dicaeopolis as comic hero to Knemon as comic victim, within a narrative framework that is in many ways similar for the two plays—encapsulates the ideological differences that inspired the genres of Old and New Comedy.

motive for Chremylus' appeal to Apollo.⁹ But rather than mere inconsistency, what we perceive here is a juncture between the two major motifs in the play: parasitical rapacity and the unfair division of wealth on the one hand, general poverty in this age of iron on the other. If the seams are visible under analysis, this is not necessarily a fault in the artistry of Aristophanes, much less an illusion to be interpreted away as irony or deliberate paradox; it is rather a sign of the essential work of the text, the very thing that makes it a living and creative activity rather than a passive reflection of inert ideas.¹⁰

⁹ Douglas MacDowell, *The Law in Classical Athens* (Ithaca, N.Y. 1978) p. 63, writes: "By the time of his last surviving play, *Wealth*, Aristophanes' view of sycophants seems to have mellowed a little, since he allows a sycophant to defend his activities in the following dialogue" (verses 898–919 are quoted here). But this is perhaps less a case of mellowing than it is a function of the dramatic intention of the play. The sycophant had been presented a moment before as an unjust figure, who deservedly lost his possessions when Plutus regained his sight. But he is also, as we have seen, hostile to the entire order of Plutus in which wealth creates the possibility of leisure and contentment. He is thus in opposition to Plutus in two respects: he is unjust, and by nature unsuited to the god's new golden age.

¹⁰ An "ironic" interpretation of the *Plutus* has been developed by a number of German scholars, who attempt to find in the inconsistencies of the plot a "geheimer Hintersinn" that runs contrary to the apparent resolution of the finale. This theory was first advanced by Wilhelm Süss, "Scheinbare and wirkliche Inkongruenzen in den Dramen des Aristophanes," *Rheinisches Museum* 97 (1954) pp. 289 ff., although he claims that a truly coherent analysis is impossible: "... hier im Plutos ist es ein missliches Geschäft, die zahlreichen Unklarheiten, die der Konzeption anhängen, aufzuspüren, und man bedauert es, durch die chronologische Folge genötigt zu sein, gerade mit diesem Exempel schliessen zu müssen" (313). H. J. Newiger, op. cit. (note 3) pp. 173–76, states the case for irony more strongly, and his view has been adapted by Thomas Gelzer, *Der epirrhematische Agon bei Aristophanes*, *Zetemata* 23 (1960) 36, 54, 267 f., and by Helmut Flashar, "Zur Eigenart des aristophanischen Spätwerks," *Poetica* 1 (1967) 154–75, who develops the thesis in great detail. Finally, Gerhard Hertel, *Die Allegorie von Reichtum und Armut*, *Erlanger Beiträge* 33 (1969) 13 f., 27 f., adopts the interpretation wholesale from his predecessors.

In each case the argument proceeds from the assumption that Penia is correct when she claims that poverty is a beneficial influence on men, and that wealth can only corrupt (vv. 507–609 passim). Since Chremylus does not defeat Penia's logic, but must resort to force to be rid of her, it follows that his pretensions to goodness cannot be taken literally and that he himself has been corrupted by the prospect of riches; his claim that wealth will make men pious and good (if this is the correct meaning of the difficult lines 497 f.) is belied later in the exemplification scenes, where the opposite appears to be the case (the young gigolo is

The complexity of the *Plutus*, as we have said, does not lie in its structure. Restoration of the god's vision is quickly established as the pivotal act (vv. 115f.). The following scenes clear the way for the execution of the plan. Chremylus first overcomes the opposition of Plutus himself by arguing that he, as god of Wealth, is mightier even than Zeus. Next Chremylus enlists the support of the chorus and his friend Blepsidemus, whose suspicions of dishonesty must also be put to rest. At the center of the play is the dialogue (actually, an abbreviated agon)¹¹ with Penia, "Poverty," who represents the most serious threat to the scheme, and must be driven off by force. A choral interlude marks the passage of night, then Carion reports in a long messenger-type

rewarded, while religious duties are ignored). The *Plutus* then, like the *Ecclesiazusae*, is a satire on utopian ideals. Hertel (p. 27) conveniently sums up the conclusion: "Der allegorische Charakter des Stückes ist letztlich aber darin begründet, dass das Ergebnis der Ueberlegungen fast das Gegenteil des Ergebnisses der Handlung ist, anders ausgedrückt: der Hintergrund ist 'ein anderer,' als die dargestellte Handlung die Zuschauer glauben machen möchte, nämlich: nicht ein Wechsel der Verhältnisse . . . ist es, der die Situation der Menschen verbessert, sondern der Dichter will dem Zuschauer deutlich machen, dass es allein die Armut ist, die dem Menschen zuträglich ist. . . ."

Now this ironic interpretation seems both drastic and foreign to the Aristophanic spirit. Flashar himself (173f.) argues that such unresolved irony (which places a great burden on the audience) is found in antiquity only in Aristophanes' last two plays. It also robs us of sympathy with Chremylus, who is certainly a decent fellow, as even Süß admitted (304; cf. 313 and contrast Flashar, 159f., "Chremylus . . . der Geldgierige, der nur den einen Wunsch kennt, reich zu werden . . ."). The real problem, however, is the insistence that Penia is wholly correct, that poverty really is better for us than wealth. Of course Aristophanes exploits this theme for rhetorical purposes, and Penia does score debating points, some of which deserve serious consideration. But why should her view be accepted as gospel over Chremylus', who earlier (160ff.) had used, all scholars point out, very similar arguments to prove the exact opposite (see further below, p. 386)? Men work, that is, to gain riches, not to avoid poverty. Plutus holds the carrot, Penia the stick. The true comic hero, who embodies the positive values of fertility, abundance and physical gratification, leaps for the carrot every time. It is hard to believe that Aristophanes felt it would be a *bad* thing if Carion's speech (802ff.) actually came true. The logical difficulties involved fade next to comedy's instinctual attraction to a golden age (for other examples, see H. C. Baldry, "The Idler's Paradise in Attic Comedy," *Greece and Rome* 22 [1953] 49-60). It adds greatly to Chremylus' modest credentials as a comic hero that his reply to Penia's sophistically superior arguments is: "Drop dead! Shut up! You won't persuade me, not even if you do!" (598f.).

¹¹ On the form, cf. Gelzer, *op. cit.* (note 10) pp. 35f., 53f., 97ff.

speech how Plutus was healed in the temple of Asclepius. The nature of the new regime is revealed in the familiar series of "exemplificatory" scenes, beginning with the epiphany of the god at the head of a procession. Roughly, the scenes come in pairs, each involving two new characters: the just citizen and the sycophant; an old woman and her young lover; and, finally, Hermes and a priest of Zeus—politics, sex and religion, which is to say, the essentials. This straightforward movement of the plot, however, is offset by a thematic crosscurrent which appears intermittently throughout the play, and becomes increasingly significant once Plutus' vision is restored.

The approach of the newly healed god is heralded with great excitement. Carion describes how he is attended by vast crowds, for those who had previously been just greeted him with joy; those, on the other hand, who had acquired their wealth unjustly frowned and were sullen (750–56). Stations have been altered, there is restitution and retribution, but the emphasis of the passage is on the liberal bounty of the god, and Carion concludes his speech with a word to everyone to dance and skip together (760–63), for no one shall do without. Plutus himself appears with a prayer in the high style, repenting of his former errors, when he consorted with miscreants and avoided those worthy of his company (774–77). Now, however, he will not even accept the traditional offering of nuts and figs (*katachysmata*, 789) which Chremylus' wife has brought out to greet him with; upon his first visit to the house, now that he can see, he feels it proper to take nothing out, only in (791–93).¹² Even the customary offerings he will receive inside.

The speech of Carion, who reports what has been happening in the house since Plutus entered, paints a picture of burgeoning splendor, a fertile profusion of grain and wine, silver and gold, oil and incense and fruits, that conjures up the spontaneous abundance of the golden age. To be sure, there remains a reference to moral probity, for Carion is careful to note that "a pile of goods has burst into the house upon us, though we have not done anything wrong" (804–5). But the point is not so much that just behavior is rewarded as that wealth sprouts now so freely that injustice has nothing to do with obtaining it. Under the new

¹² This reflects the traditional ancient view of economy, which is evoked again by Carion at 803. See M. I. Finley, *The Ancient Economy*, (Berkeley 1974) 109f.

dispensation, wealth does not accrue to one at the expense of another. The conventional association of wealth with crime or fraud is no longer pertinent, for there is now enough and more than enough for everybody. The superfluity of wealth has changed the rules of the game: no longer is it a matter of just distribution, for the prosperity of Chremylus and the rest has nothing to do with the fortunes of others. The limitless largesse of the god sets aside any question of social inequity. To be sure, we shall shortly be reminded that the sycophant, as a representative of the worse sort, has lost his stores. But this has nothing to do with compensating his former victims; it is simply a matter of just deserts. And in the last analysis, as we have seen, it is not a matter of his losses or gains, but of his personal preference for his profession, without regard to the possibility of idle riches. The sycophant's problem is not that he will fare worse under the golden age, but that he is by nature unfit to enjoy it.

For the Athenians, the idea of wealth was always bound up with that of autarky; the receipt of wages, for example, was considered tantamount to slavery, for it meant dependency on the will of another.¹³ The scene of the old lady and her young lover, or rather, former lover—for now that he has resources of his own, thanks to Plutus, he need no longer sell his favors to the crone—would seem to be celebrating economic autonomy, at least so far as its import for the themes we have been investigating is concerned. From another point of view, the grotesque and bawdy humor is simply a manifestation of that early exuberance that is natural to festive comedy. What Mikhail Bakhtin identified as the essential features of Rabelaisian humor¹⁴—the holiday inversion of social hierarchy; the valorization of the body and its nether functions; the abandonment of the classical moment, the poised perfection of youth, for processes of birth

¹³ There is a large literature on this subject. We cite a recent contribution by Claude Mossé, "Les salariés à Athènes du IV^{ème} siècle," *Dialogues d'histoire ancienne* 21 (1976) 97–101; cf. especially pp. 99–100: "Ce qu'ils vendent contre un salaire, ce n'est pas leur travail, concept abstrait qui ne peut être valorisé que dans un système dominé par la marchandise, mais leur corps, ou plutôt la force physique que ce corps représente. Autrement dit, hommes libres, ils vendent une partie d'eux-mêmes, se plaçant de ce fait dans cette position que crée, nous l'avons vu, la relation de service."

¹⁴ *Rabelais and his World*, (translated by Helene Iswolsky) (Cambridge, Mass., 1968).

and decay; fecundity amplified to the absurd degree of pregnant old hags, closing the circle of death and procreation—these features are the heart and soul of Aristophanic laughter. The old woman's complaint against the god is that a golden age is a golden age, and everybody's wants should be satisfied. The mood of the scene is hilarious, not critical. In passing, we may observe that the comparable antics at the end of the *Ecclesiazousae*, where the two ugliest old ladies in Athens fight for the services of a handsome young man under the new law of sexual equality, may also be best enjoyed not as a critique of the women's communist experiment but as its most glorious expression, the randy, boisterous, grotesque triumph of comic energy.

In the final scenes of the *Plutus*, the new dispensation is ratified by the submission of the Olympian deities to the god of wealth. Hermes enters violently with the message that Zeus is planning to blast them all to hell (1107–9). The reason is that from the time Plutus began to see, no one has been sacrificing the least thing to the gods. "Nor will anyone, by Zeus," replies Carion; "for you took pretty poor care of us back then" (1116–17). We shall return to a discussion of why the restoration of Plutus' vision, precisely, should have the effect which Hermes describes (below, p. 391). Suffice it here to observe that, apart from the association of the god's vision with the reward of virtue, his healing at the hands of Asclepius has also a more general significance as the symbol of his new power in the world, before which that of the Olympians has receded. There follows some characteristic comic banter about food, after which Hermes requests that they accept him as a fellow citizen (1147). The opportunism of this switch in sides is duly noted, and then Carion wonders what use Hermes might now be to them. This leads to an elegant bit of play on Hermes' various attributes and cultic titles: as Hermes *strophaios*, i.e. guardian of the doorposts, he can keep watch, but Carion reminds him that they have no need of such devices (*strophōn*, 1154, i.e. tricks, from the root meaning "to turn"; the pun, with its allusion to Hermes the trickster, is untranslatable).¹⁵ "Of the marketplace, then," suggests Hermes, but Carion reminds him that they are all rich, and

¹⁵ Cf. Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society*, trans. Janet Lloyd (Sussex, Eng., 1978) 41–42 for the significance of this cult title and its connection with wiliness and theft.

do not have to support a god of retailers. Hermes offers his role as trickster, but Carion replies that this they need least of all. "The guide, perhaps"; "But the god can see now," answers Carion. "Of the games, then. What do you say? It will be particularly useful to Plutus to set up contests in athletics and the arts." This, at last, serves, and earns from Carion a wry comment on how fine a thing it is to have many epithets (1164). The point of all this is clear: Hermes' skills and duplicity were appropriate in the reign of scarcity; now, in the kingdom of plenty, there is employment only for his marginal, festive aspect.

The last character to turn up is the priest of Zeus, who complains that he too is dying of starvation. The motif is broadly reminiscent of the plot of the *Birds*, but the reasons for withholding sacrifices here are that "everybody is rich" (1178). With this "everybody," the theme of injustice and the unfair distribution of wealth evanesces utterly. Aristophanes hasn't a thought to spare here for the evildoers who at the beginning of the play included everyone, according to Plutus (111), or not quite everyone, according to Chremylus (110)—evildoers who, by the logic of the distribution theme, should now be the legions of the poor. Under the sign of Wealth, everything is right. The priest himself prepares to abandon Zeus and remain with Chremylus (1186–87), whose house now has something of the status of a city. But in fact, there is nothing to worry about, since Zeus too is on board, having come voluntarily.¹⁶ All that is left is to establish Plutus once again as the guardian of the treasury in the temple of Athena on the acropolis (1191–93), where he may extend his beneficence to the entire community. And even the old lady, it is hinted, will have her lad this evening (1201).

The idea at work throughout this section, that the reign of Zeus is one of hardship and poverty for mankind, in contrast to some Eden either lost or still to come of goodness and fertile bounty, was part of Greek popular theology. The best known versions involve the role of Prometheus, who in various, sometimes mysterious ways is implicated in Zeus' hostility toward the human race.¹⁷ One or another tradition of this hostility is alluded

¹⁶ Most scholars (e.g. Flashar, loc. cit., p. 167) have interpreted 1189f. as if Chremylus now identified Plutus with Zeus, but there seems no reason whatsoever for this view.

¹⁷ Cf. note 3 and Patricia Johnston, *Vergil and the Golden Age: A Study of The Georgics* (Köln, 1980) *Mnemos.* Suppl. 60.

to in Plutus' account of the cause of his blindness early in the play, where he explains that Zeus deprived him of sight because of his ill-will toward man (87–92). The notion that the recovery of Plutus' sight is the emblem of a contest for power between Zeus and Plutus is elaborated in the dialogue in which Plutus is persuaded to risk Zeus' displeasure and abolish his tyranny (124). Plutus is unaware of his real strength. Once he realizes it, the epoch of Zeus will be at an end. The will to regain his vision, to see again as he did in the past (95) is simply a matter of courage (118, 122, 203). As Chremylus declares his intention to demonstrate that Plutus is far more powerful than Zeus, he swears by Heaven (*nē ton Ouranon*; not personified in OCT, 129), exceptionally for this play (also at 403)—oaths are most often by Zeus; it seems likely that there is a deliberate evocation of the dynastic succession of deities, which began with Ouranos and will now reach a new stage with Plutus.

There was, of course, an answer to this denigration of Zeus. Toil and want might also be regarded as the right environment for a hardy breed of men, the strong, self-disciplined, honest, active race that had created civilized life, held enemies at bay, brought art and morality to their zenith.¹⁸ This sentiment inspires Odysseus' praise of Ithaca as a rugged land, good for raising men and horses; or Hesiod's grudging respect for the farmer's life, tough but righteous. The doctrine that Zeus' harsh reign was instituted for the moral and intellectual benefit of mankind was articulated most fully in Hellenistic and Roman times, notably in Vergil's *Georgics*, but there are intimations of this theodicy much earlier, e.g. in the *Prometheus Bound*, and it is likely that it was developed as a topos by the sophists.¹⁹ In our play, Poverty develops in her own defense the idea that all good things derive from her, for surfeit is the death of effort. Some of Penia's reasoning is mere sophistry, such as the argument that if everyone were wealthy, no one would work—not even slave-dealers, for theirs is a risky trade, and thus there would be no slaves. As a result, everyone would be obliged to labor for him-

¹⁸ This type recurs in other plays of Aristophanes (notably *Ach.*, *Vesp.*, *Lys.*) as representative of the stuff that made Greece and especially Athens great (hence in the earlier plays such men are associated with Marathon).

¹⁹ For bibliography on this possibility (Prodicus has even been suggested as Aristophanes' model), see Hertel, *op. cit.*, pp. 19f.

self, and life would be worse than it is now (510–34). The crux of this paradox is the equation of wealth with money or gold (528: *chrysiou ontos*); with money alone and not the things it can buy, what is it to be rich, Penia asks (531). In essence, this is but a rhetorical version of the tale of Midas' touch. But the idea that modest means—not raw indigence or beggary, but modest means, *paupertas* not *egestas*, the *penēs* not the *ptōchos*—that modest means prompt men to labor passes over into the familiar diatribe on the virtues of the rigorous life, which produces men who are sere and wiry and bitter to their enemies (561), as well as well-mannered (564) and concerned for the public welfare (567–68); the hard way is the just way (578). Penia's dialectic is much too sharp for Chremylus, who, when he does not apply threats and invective, resorts to repeating the proposition that much is better than little; "you won't persuade me, not even if you do" (600), is the flourish with which he caps his case. Chremylus' problem, however, is that he has lost sight of his own position. He had not argued for paradisaical opulence; he had proposed only that the just thing was for good men to fare well, and for bad men the reverse (490–91); at present, the very opposite obtains (500–4). Penia does not respond to this charge at all, but shifts the grounds of the debate. The nature of this move is clear from what has been said so far, for in a way it recapitulates the movement of the play as a whole. Chremylus poses the question of fairness in the social distribution of wealth; Penia responds with a sermon on the advantages of the spare life which assumes a more or less universal scarcity, in which specific inequalities are mere perturbations in the system, and may be overlooked for the sake of the argument. To be sure, Penia endorses a world that is at the opposite pole from that inaugurated by Plutus in the finale of the play. Plutus restores the original prosperity of an age preceding Zeus, while Penia, insisting that Zeus too goes poor, dismisses the picture of Olympian splendor drawn by Chremylus and Blepsidemus as a Cronus-like dimness (*Kronikais lēmais*, 581), playing on the common idea of Cronus as an old man, but alluding also, no doubt, to their purblind faith in the golden age over which that god was believed to have presided. Precisely as opposites, however, Penia and Plutus present two sides on the same issue: that of the relative benefits of generalized want or plenty—a different concern from that originally articulated by Chremylus. That his characters might not seem wholly to speak

past each other, Aristophanes here and there masks the distance between them with an ambiguous or inconsistent phrase. Thus Chremylus asks what harm it will do to Penia if he provides some good to all men (450–62); the “all” is quite inconsistent with the thrust of his primary complaint. More subtle is the way Penia formulates her hypothetical premise: “If Plutus should see once more and distribute himself equally . . .” (*diâneimeien i'ison hauton*, 510). As we have seen, Chremylus was not in the first instance concerned with equality, despite the reference to “all men” which we just cited. What is more, Penia’s own position is not incompatible with an equal apportionment of wealth. Perhaps the word *ison* here can be construed vaguely as “fair,” but Penia does not want to insist that the kind of poverty that nourishes virtue is necessarily the unfair penury of the just members of the population. Rather, the expression is simply a bridge, which resonates with Chremylus’ arguments about justice without being so specific as to jar noticeably with Penia’s main thought. If poverty is abroad, something must be unfair, and the audience will have a sense of continuity in the argument without paying much heed to the details of the logic.²⁰

There is an argument employed by Chremylus and Carion in their effort to assure Plutus of his supreme power that has a certain resemblance to some of the things Penia says. Penia asserts that without poverty there would be no skills, no striving, no work (cf. esp. 527–34); Chremylus claims that all crafts and skills were discovered on account of Plutus (160–61; the idea is developed in the verses following). Chremylus means that people exert themselves only for the sake of profit. His view thus seems

²⁰ Another “bridge” can be seen at 494–97. Chremylus seems to imply (the meaning of 497 is disputed) that Plutus, by avoiding the bad men and rewarding the good, would make *all* men just, since they would change their ways to acquire wealth. Thus would all men eventually become rich. But this idea is never developed, and its usefulness in “unifying” the themes of the play has been much exaggerated (see note 10).

A propos of the agon, it is interesting that Aristophanes avoids the obvious direct opposition of Penia and Plutus. The ironists (esp. Newiger, 173f.) assert that Aristophanes undercuts the validity of the opposing arguments by putting them in Chremylus’ mouth instead, but this is unwarranted. The roles are in keeping with the characterization both of Plutus (who remains aloof and diffident until his transformation) and Chremylus (the god’s enthusiastic supporter). It also keeps Penia on a level distinctly below that of the divine Plutus.

correlative with that of Penia: she contends that men work because they have little, he because they want more. The context, however, reveals that the points of view are entirely disparate. Apart from some sophisticated banter which we have already noted, Penia's case rests on a moral vision of the simple, rugged life and its creative energy, a life in implicit contrast to the softness and decadence of a rich, safe society. The worship of luxury to which Plutus testifies is a sign of that very decadence. It points, not to the way people should be, but the way they are. Plutus is already in power. Everyone is motivated by the desire for money, and those who appear not to be are merely sugar-coating their baser purposes (158-59). What is more, money is the one thing of which there is never enough (187-97). Aristophanes' folk wisdom here anticipates an insight of Aristotle, who observes in the *Politics* that of all goods there is a natural limit, save of money, which is pure quantity.²¹ Plutus thus presides over a world in which money has dissolved the relations of barter based on the production and exchange of use-values, in Marx's phrase, and the reigning passion, accordingly, is greed. Kings, councils, armies and whores: all arise through the power of Wealth (170-79; cf. 149-57). Clearly, such a world bears little resemblance to that over which Plutus sheds his bounty at the end of the play, for it is based on a relative scarcity of riches and universal competition. Nor is there occasion for surprise that Plutus as he is depicted here is unlike his later self. At this stage of the action, the prevailing conception of wealth is still what we have called social rather than natural. Boundless greed is the moral condition for the differentiation into rich and poor, in which wealth falls typically to scoundrels, while the decent sort do without. In their panegyric to Wealth, Chremylus and Carion do not yet look to transforming this condition; they merely wish their piece of the action. Some of the language in this passage points up the ambiguous ethical status of Chremylus, who wants, after all, to exchange places with the rich. He reassures the still hesitating Plutus of his plan by promising that they will have plenty of allies, "all those who, because they are just, haven't a groat." Plutus is not convinced: "Aiii! Those are wretched allies you've mentioned," to which Chremylus replies "Not if they should grow rich again" (219-21). The term for wretched here—

²¹ Aristotle, *Politics* 1256a-1258a.

ponērous—is loaded. It can have the morally neutral significance of “unfortunate” or “in distress,” reflecting its derivation from *ponos*, but throughout this play it is used in the pejorative sense of “bad” or “villainous” (e.g. 31, 96, 352, 491, 496, 502, etc.; and cf. the related use of the vocative as a mild term of abuse at 265, 442, although the former is perhaps a dubious case). Chremylus understands Plutus to mean only that his friends are poor, but there seems to be a connotation also of knavishness. Whether or not it is the case here, however, there is no mistaking it in Chremylus’ invitation to Plutus to enter his home: “This is the house which you must make full of money today, whether justly or unjustly” (231–33). Chremylus wants what others have, and is happy to have it at their expense. There is nothing here of that spirit of community represented both by Penia, in her praise of poverty, and by Plutus in the final scenes, albeit in such different ways. The dominant ideas in the present passage are those of greed and inequality, or, in a word, of distribution.

We hope to have demonstrated in this detailed review of the themes in the *Plutus* that the complex and shifting conceptions of wealth and poverty that are at play throughout the text may be analytically resolved into two primary conceptions or topics—unequal distribution, and scarcity versus plenty, together with certain variations in each of these. We shall now examine how the movement from one conception to the other is accomplished so smoothly that the work retains its apparent unity. In one way, the solution to this problem—Aristophanes’ solution to the problem of creating his text—lies with the representation of Plutus himself, who has two distinct symbolic aspects in the play. In the first place, and most obviously, there is the feature of his sight or blindness, which is the characteristic immediately relevant to the theme of equitable distribution: when Plutus does not see, he rewards the vicious as well as—or rather, instead of—the virtuous; when he does see, he visits the just rather than the wicked. In the second place, and this is less apparent, there is simply the presence or absence of Plutus, and this is related essentially to the theme of scarcity and plenty: when Plutus is at hand, he brings prosperity, when he is away, there is want. These two properties—vision and presence, with their negations—are so neatly intertwined that it takes a moment’s reflection to realize that they operate in quite distinct

ways and contexts. The story begins simply with the appearance of Plutus, whom Chremylus is following at the instruction of Apollo's oracle. Logically, this should suffice for Chremylus, since all he has to do now is bring the god into his home, and wealth will be his. Or, if loyalty demands that he share with his friends, he can take Plutus round to the homes of his fellow demesmen, those of them who are poor and honest. We are not suggesting that Aristophanes' fantasy need be constrained by the rules of logic; we are merely exposing the places where it takes flight. For within a hundred lines of the beginning of the play, and less than 20 lines from the moment when he discovers the identity of the god, Chremylus begins to conceive the plan which goes beyond anything Apollo had intimated, that is, to restore Plutus' sight. Chremylus' statement at 212-14 that Apollo is aware of what is happening cannot mean that he told it directly to Chremylus (the phrase *ex hōn* in 212 suggests an inference), for otherwise Chremylus would not have been ignorant at first of who Plutus was. This is not to say that there is some implied contrast between Chremylus' initiative and the message of the oracle, for Chremylus' words, as we have just seen, deny precisely that. Our point is simply that the whole issue of Plutus' blindness enters into the action independently of his first appearance on stage. There is a reason for this: Aristophanes wants the god on the scene, but he does not want the fact of his presence to resolve at once the problem of injustice which drove Chremylus to consult the oracle to begin with. This will rather be accomplished by enabling him to see again, so that he can visit good men and avoid bad. Thus, the god's arrival is engineered in a more or less mysterious way; the moment he is identified, attention is drawn to his blindness, and the idea of healing it is broached. But this does not mean that the matter of the god's presence is no longer of relevance to our play. On the contrary, it can now be reserved for quite another function, which will be exploited in the latter half of the comedy, when Plutus has his real epiphany—then his presence will signal a new age of prosperity for all.

Having once been explicitly articulated, the association of Plutus' vision with justice remains thematic, and is now and again reaffirmed throughout the play, as when Chremylus reveals to Blepsidemus (and, for the first time, to the audience)

his intention of bringing Plutus to the precinct of Asclepius (400–12), or, much more emphatically, in the agon with Penia (494–97, 502–6; cf. Plutus' prayer of thanksgiving at 774–81, or the sycophant's complaint at 864–67). And yet, over and above this association, the restoration of Plutus' vision takes on another meaning in the context of Zeus' opposition. Plutus is, as we have seen, in terror of Zeus, and must be made to realize his power. But asserting his power is one and the same thing as daring to see again. After Chremylus and Carion have given witness to the fact that all things turn on Wealth, Plutus reveals that he still has only one anxiety: "This power that you say I have," he asks; "how can I become master of it?" Chremylus remarks that Plutus is truly the greatest of cowards, as people say, and then reassures him that if Plutus throws himself into the business, then he, Chremylus, will have him seeing better than Lynceus (199–203, 208–10). The word for power here, *dynamis* (200), is pivotal: it looks back to the signs of Plutus' potency in the world, the fact that he alone is responsible, as Chremylus says, for all things good and bad; to which Plutus responds, "Am I, one person, capable (*dynatos*) of doing all this?" (186). Looking forward, however, *dynamis* must refer to the power of sight; the way that Plutus will become master of his own potency is to regain his vision. His sight, then, is his power. To put it another way, Plutus' blindness is an emblem of his powerlessness, and his healing is synonymous with the realization of his puissance in the world. From this point of view, the story of Plutus' recovery of vision is in the tradition of tales about the healing of magical or symbolic wounds, by which a fallen god or hero is restored to excellence or authority. Euripides' tragedy on the story of Telephus, which Aristophanes never tired of ridiculing, had something of this character, and we may detect analogues also in the *Philoctetes* and *Oedipus at Colonus* of Sophocles; but the type is widespread in folktale and mythology. The labors of Heracles, the disguises of Odysseus, Demeter's search for Persephone in the form of an old woman, are all versions of the type.²²

²² Compare in general stories of resurrection, such as that of Lucius the Ass in Apuleius, in which the recovery of a blessed age is symbolized in the shedding of a debased form and the epiphany of the god or hero in his true aspect. It is

The healing of the god, then, serves a double function in our play: on the one hand, it is emblematic of fairness in the distribution of wealth; on the other hand, it is a token of the god's return to power, a theme that is fully realized in the final scenes. This double function has a palpable effect upon the plot. At the end of the episode in which Chremylus and Carion persuade Plutus to undertake the cure, Chremylus invites the god, as we have seen, into his house, and, after assurances that Chremylus is neither a miser nor a spendthrift, but a man of the middle sort (*metriou*, 245), the god consents (251). From this point forward, Chremylus is rich, and Blepsidemus hastens to his house because rumors of his good fortune are already abroad (335–39). Chremylus explains this sudden prosperity by revealing that he has (*echo*, 392) the god; he is inside, “with me”; “With you?” “Absolutely.” “Damn! Plutus with you?” “I swear it” (393–94). The presence of the god confers the blessing of wealth. Blepsidemus naturally enough asks whether Chremylus won't send him now to his friends (398), to which Chremylus replies, rather inconsequentially, that this is not the problem: it is necessary to make him see (399–401). Blepsidemus falls in at once with the plan, so that the audience has no time to wonder why it is so important; Blepsidemus' own suggestion, after all, would appear as good. The action is now interrupted by the arrival of Penia, which is followed by the long dialogue between Carion and Chremylus' wife, in which the slave reports, with comic embroidery, the healing of the god in the temple of Asclepius (641–770). When at last we see Plutus again, he is escorted by a great procession, and he proclaims his new dispensation to the world (procession: 750–59; dispensation: 774–81, esp. 779 *panta palin anastrepsas*). After this, Carion reemerges from the house with the jubilant description of the blossoming of wealth within (802–22). This arrangement of the action conveys the inescapable impression that the luxury within the house is the consequence of Plutus' *vision*, although we already know that it came about simply as the result of his *presence* inside. Plutus' own words help to con-

possible that some of the tales concerning heroes look back to an Indo-European archetype of the sins of the hero, as Georges Dumézil argues in *The Destiny of the Warrior*, trans. Alf Hiltebeitel (Chicago 1970); cf. esp. pp. 74–76, and the treatment of Heracles, 96–104. But Plautus would, in Dumézil's scheme, belong to the third function, and one would want to locate his story elsewhere.

firm the impression, when he says that it is inappropriate for him to take anything out, rather must he bring things into Chremylus' house—*now that he can see* (792–93). The point is surely not that he is now for the first time aware that Chremylus is really a just man; rather, the fact of his sight is here clearly a token of the unstinting liberality of his new regime. This same suggestion hangs about the remark of Hermes, to which we have already called attention (above, p. 391: "From the time when Plutus began to see again, no one sacrifices any longer to us gods, no incense, no laurel, no barley cake, no animal, no nothing" (1113–16). There is no particular connection between Plutus' sight and fairness here; everybody is rich, and the return of the god's vision is the sign of his supremacy over the Olympian pantheon (cf. also lines 1173–74, with 1178, where again Plutus' vision is the condition for universal prosperity).

The odd but deliberate confusion over whether it is the god's presence or the god's vision that is the cause of Chremylus' prosperity—a confusion generated by the postponement of Carion's description until after the healing of Plutus—is abetted in two earlier passages. In Chremylus' exchange with Blepsidemus, his friend inquires whether he is really rich, as people say. Chremylus replies: "I shall be right away, if the god pleases" (347). He adds that there is a certain danger in the matter. From what follows (350–51, and esp. 399–402 where *ta pragmat(a)* in 399 echoes *tōi pragmati* in 348), it is clear that Chremylus must be referring to the problem of curing the god, and that his own financial success depends on it. Since, however, the actual proposal to restore the god's vision is not mentioned for some fifty verses, it is natural to think that Chremylus' reservations about his wealth point vaguely to some delay in the god's efficacy. The second passage is Carion's announcement that the god has been healed, uttered to the chorus and following immediately upon the scene with Penia. Carion exclaims: "My master has been most fortunate, or rather, Plutus himself has been; for instead of being blind he has his sight altogether back and his pupils are shining for he found Asclepius the healer well-disposed" (633–36). Quite plainly, Chremylus' fortunes here are equated with Plutus' own. For the one, it resides in wealth, for the other, in vision. The god's vision is the condition for his efficacy.

The double function of Plutus' sight is the means of converting the plot of the play from the issue of distribution to that of the

golden age. The device of the procession celebrating the healing of Plutus' eyes permits Aristophanes to fuse the themes of vision and epiphany, and thus to move from the idea of the cure, and its associations (above all with the distribution theme), to the idea of Plutus' presence and power in the world. We may observe the transition. Carion concludes his account of the healing work of Asclepius with a peroration that incorporates symbols of regeneration into the account of the process: "Even before you could guzzle ten cups of wine, my mistress, Plutus stood up and saw" (737-38). Carion awoke his master, as he tells it, and all those in the temple spent the whole night rejoicing in the god until the day shone; Carion himself praised Asclepius for making Plutus see, and Neocleides blind (Neocleides was a well-known speaker at this time, ridiculed for his poor vision also in *Eccl.* 254, 398). Chremylus' wife adds her word of admiration for Asclepius, and then inquires: "But tell me, where is Plutus?" (749), to which Carion replies, "He's coming." Later, Carion notes that the procession is getting close (767). The arrival and installation of the god in the house of Chremylus (actually a second installation) coincide with the restoration of his vision.

The association and, to a degree, confusion of several distinct versions of the problem of wealth and poverty are not unfamiliar. It is not difficult to discover in popular literature today such a welter of opinions existing side by side concerning the causes of economic distress: the corruption of a few parasites—a general decline in social morality—the scarcity of natural resources. By the fanciful device of introducing Wealth personified into his cast of characters, playing off the double function of Wealth's blindness as a source of error and a sign of weakness, mixing up the meaning of Wealth's presence with that of his restored vision, Aristophanes has held the several views together in a single tableau while at the same time effecting a broad transition from a social conception, in which poverty is a consequence of injustice, to a natural conception, in which wealth is a function of scarcity to be remedied by a general and spontaneous bounty. This deflection in the play's themes serves to dissolve the issue of exploitation and inequality into a vague nostalgia for a golden age, a nostalgia which is catered to with comic exuberance in the utopian finale of the play.²³ Essentially, Aristot-

²³ On the comic utopia in Aristophanes, see Jean Claude Carrière, *Le Carnaval et la politique: une introduction à la comédie grecque* (Paris 1979), the chapter

phanes' strategy is conservative. He masks the real antagonisms generated by the *oikos* or household system of the classical city-state in a vision of communal solidarity and well-being. As a solution to problems of the growing inequality between the wealthy and the poor, the development of class divisions, the increasing significance of a state apparatus represented by the informal institutions of the sycophant and the orator or demagogue, Aristophanes offers the ancient dream of limitless bounty, which is the answer to a different question. The historical Athens with its living social contradictions departs the stage, or rather is subsumed under an ideal community of smallholders who share alike the burden of eking their livelihood from a stingy land, and are granted the collective wish of universal prosperity. To be satisfying, such a transformation must be subtle, witty, and natural; we hope in this paper to have revealed the art by which Aristophanes accomplished it.

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entitled "L'Utopie comique," esp. pp. 87-91. Carrière cites the *Ploutoi* of Cratinos, various treatments of *Plutus*, the *Race of Gold* by Eupolis, and the *Cronus* of Phrynichus, as examples of the theme in Old Comedy (p. 88).

REPUBLIC 530C–531C:
ANOTHER LOOK AT PLATO
AND THE PYTHAGOREANS

Perhaps more than any other work by Plato, the *Republic* has attracted the attention of scholars and commentators. And of the many aspects of philosophical interest contained therein, Plato's educational plan, as set forth in the seventh book of the *Republic*, has proved to be one of the most enticing. Across the millennia, scholarly controversies have swelled and dissipated regarding the meaning of certain parts of Plato's propaedeutic to dialectic. One controversy that lingers on concerns Plato's positioning of mathematics on the spectrum from sensible objects to ideas or forms (εἶδη). The role that mathematics is to play in the propaedeutic is introduced as Socrates and Glaucon set about to list the sciences to be studied by the Republic's guardians, 522E ff. The problem comes to a head not in the discussion of arithmetic and geometry per se, but rather when Socrates and Glaucon take up the physical sciences of astronomy and harmonics. For by astronomy and harmonics is meant the mathematical sciences customarily attributed to the Pythagoreans, and it is at this point (529C) that Socrates introduces the matter of just how mathematical these sciences should be. In another light, one might view the problem as one of rationalism versus empiricism.

James Adam, in his edition of the *Republic*, argued the case for rationalism. "Plato's Astronomy is in fact a kind of idealised kinematics, with occasional illustrations from the visible movements of the heavenly bodies."¹ This notion is extended by Plato to include harmonics, "which Plato treats as a branch of pure mathematics, condemning both a purely empirical approach and such empirically based musical theory as the Pythagorean."² Against Adam's position, John Burnet argued that Plato's intention was not to postulate an ideal heaven with ideal motion of ideal planets, but rather to distinguish between apparent and real motion.³ Subsequently, Cornford, Frank, and Guthrie seem to

¹ Plato, *The Republic of Plato*, ed. and annot. James Adam, 1902; 2nd ed., with an introduction by D. A. Rees, 2 vols. (Cambridge 1963) 530B.12.

² D. A. Rees, in his introduction to Adam's edition, *ibid.*, xlv.

³ John Burnet, *Greek Philosophy. Thales to Plato* (London 1914) 226–27.

have sided with Adam, recognizing what might be called mathematical intermediaries between sensible objects and forms or ideas.⁴ Paul Shorey, agreeing more or less with Adam *et al.*, observes that the extension of the notion of ideal astronomy to harmonics "is perhaps one of Plato's rare errors. For though there may be in some sense a Kantian *a priori* mechanics of astronomy, there can hardly be a purely *a priori* mathematics of acoustics. What numbers are consonantly harmonious must always remain a fact of direct experience."⁵ I do not intend to take up here the problem as it has just been presented; the position of mathematics in the propaedeutic and its relation to sensible objects and to forms. The interpretation of Adam views Plato as at least a gadfly and perhaps even an opponent of the physical sciences. In later writings, however, Plato seems to modify his position somewhat.⁶ Rather than this philosophical issue, I should like to discuss a historical one: the role of Pythagoreanism and the Pythagoreans in Plato's educational plan as set forth here.

It is remarkable in and of itself that Plato mentions the Pythagoreans by name in this passage (530D.25), for it is the only time that Plato does so. And although there exist many aspects of Plato's philosophy that now seem to be Pythagorean, we are left largely in the dark regarding the direction of influence between Plato and the Pythagoreans owing to our dearth of knowledge about Pythagorean philosophy before and around the turn of the fourth century B.C. Compounding the problem, later Pythagorean, or more properly Neopythagorean writers go out of their way to incorporate Platonic philosophy with Pythagorean. Ferreting out the Platonism from the writings of Nico-

⁴ Erich Frank, *Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer* (1923; reprint ed., Tübingen 1962), and especially "The Fundamental Opposition of Plato and Aristotle," *AJP* 61 (1940) 48-50. W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. 4, *Plato. The Man and His Dialogues: Earlier Period* (Cambridge 1975) 523. Plato, *The Republic of Plato*, trans. and annot. Francis MacDonald Cornford (Oxford 1941) 241-45. As Rees notes, most scholars of the twentieth century have accepted Adam's interpretation of this passage, *Republic*, ed. Adam, xlv.

⁵ Plato, *The Republic*, trans. and annot. Paul Shorey, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1930) 2:193, n. g.

⁶ "It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that what is said about the sciences in the *Republic* represents the mature thought of Plato on the subject." Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, 223.

machus, Iamblichus, and other Neopythagoreans is indeed no easy task.

I reopen the issue of Plato's relationship to the Pythagoreans because I believe that some of the conclusions drawn over the past two centuries regarding this relationship are too simple. By comparing what we know about Pythagorean musical theory, both early and late, with a careful reading of this portion of the *Republic*, I purport to show the shaky foundations upon which rest the conclusions of Adam *et al.* To do this we must first take a close look at the platonic passage in question.

* * *

This passage of the *Republic* contains a pair of demonstrative pronouns, *ἐκεῖνοι* (530E.27 and 531B.13), the denotation for which is not entirely clear. Socrates and Glaucon take note at the beginning of this passage that the sciences of astronomy and harmonics are sisters, *ἀλλήλων ἀδελφαί*, "as the Pythagoreans believe and so do we."⁷ Socrates then remarks that the task at hand—the study of motion in its audible species (*εἶδη*)—is difficult and that the advice of *them* should be sought. *They*, like astronomers, waste their time and effort measuring intervals against one another. At this point Glaucon ridicules a group of musicians that he believes to be the object of Socrates' scorn, but Socrates corrects Glaucon, saying that he does not mean *these people* (*τοῦτοι*), but rather *those* (*ἐκεῖνοι*).

Throughout the history of Platonic scholarship, editors, translators, and commentators have submitted various groups as references of Socrates' demonstrative pronouns and Glaucon's

⁷ 530D.25. "ὥς οἱ τε Πυθαγόρειοί φασι καὶ ἡμεῖς." Archytas is more generous in ascribing filial relations, for he notes that all four of the *μαθήματα* appear to be sisters, Hermann Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 6th ed., rev. Walther Kranz (Berlin 1952) 47 B 1.7–8. "ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ μαθήματα δοκοῦντι ἡμεν ἀδελφεά." Nicomachus, too, cites Archytas' treatise on harmonics as source for the concept of sister sciences, *Arithmetica* i.3.4., *Introductionis arithmeticae libri II*, ed. Richard Hoche (Leipzig 1886) 6.16–17. The most elaborate version, however, occurs in Ptolemy's *Harmonica*, *Die Harmonielehre des Klaudios Ptolemaios*, ed. Ingemar Düring (Göteborg 1930) iii.3.94.18–20, where not only are arithmetic and geometry sisters, but also they nourish (*τρέφω*) respectively harmonics and astronomy as if the latter two were the former's own, i.e., as if harmonics and astronomy were the foster-children of arithmetic and geometry.



misunderstanding. During the nineteenth century a tradition developed that identified the Pythagoreans as those who waste their time measuring audible intervals. To my knowledge, Stallbaum and Schneider, in their respective editions of the *Republic*, were among the first to cite the Pythagoreans as the *them*.⁸ Both Jowett and Cornford, in their respective translations of the *Republic* into English, followed the direction of Schneider and Stallbaum to the point of substituting the name of the Pythagoreans for the second *ἐκείνοι*, that of 531B.13.⁹ Thus the tradition of reading the Pythagoreans as the *ἐκείνοι* continues in this century, with the vast majority of editors, translators, and commentators accepting this interpretation.¹⁰ Not all students of Plato,

⁸ Adam gives credit to Schneider for pointing out that Socrates (Plato) is ridiculing the Pythagoreans here, *The Republic of Plato*, 531C.15. Schneider, remarking that Ficino interpreted this passage incorrectly, gives the following Latin translation of it: "non hos, quos tu memoras, sed illos, quos modo de harmonia interrogandos dixeramus, in mente habebam, quum inanem a quibusdam in hac disciplina item ut in astronomia laborem consumi et nobis a tali eius tractatione cavendum esse demonstrabam." Schneider then adds: "sequitur, ut Pythagoreos eosdem, quos antea reliquis praetulerat, nunc ab eo reprehendi et quamvis empiricis non comparandos, tamen verae rationis ne ipsos quidem omnino compes dici statuamus." Plato, *Platonis opera graece*, ed. and annot. Carl Ernst Christoph Schneider, 3 vols. (Leipzig 1830–33) vol. 2 (1831) 312, n. Stallbaum comes to the same conclusion in his edition of Plato's works, *Opera omnia*, 8 vols. (Gothae 1828–40) vol. 3 (1829–30).

Many editions and translations prior to those of Stallbaum and Schneider left the pronouns *ἐκείνοι* without further reference. See: Plato, *Platonis philosophi*, ed. Heinrich Stephani, trans. Marsilio Ficino, 11 vols. (Biponti 1781–87) vol. 7; Plato, *Opera*, ed. Friderich Ast, 11 vols. (Leipzig 1819–32) vol. 5 (1822); Plato, *Platonis dialogi*, ed. Immanuel Becker, 8 vols. (Berlin 1816–18) vol. 2 (1817).

⁹ Plato, *The Dialogues of Plato*, trans. Benjamin Jowett, 4 vols. (Oxford 1871) 2:359. Plato, *The Republic of Plato*, trans. and annot. Cornford, 244.

¹⁰ Besides Adam, Cornford, Jowett, Schneider, and Stallbaum, the long list of commentators includes: Walter Burkert, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism*, trans. Edwin L. Minar, Jr. (Cambridge, Mass., 1972) 85 and 328; Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, 228; Frank, *Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer*, 155ff.; Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. 1, *The Earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans* (1962) 214 and 220; vol. 4, *Plato. The Man and His Dialogues: Earlier Period* (1975) 524; Thomas L. Heath, *History of Greek Mathematics*, 2 vols. (Oxford 1921) 1.286; Richard Lewis Nettleship, *Lectures on the Republic of Plato* (1918; reprint ed., London 1964) 274–75; Lukas Richter, *Zur Wissenschaft von der Musik bei Platon und Aristoteles* (Berlin 1961) 67ff.; L. M. de Rijk, "Ἐγκόκλιος παιδεία. A study of its original meaning," *Vivarium* 3 (1965) 69; B. L. van der Waerden, "Platon et les sciences exactes des Pythagoriciens," *Bulletin de la Société Mathématique de Belgique* 21 (1969) 120–22.

however, have assumed that the Pythagoreans are the *ἐκεῖνοι* of 531B.13,¹¹ and even those who see the Pythagoreans as the object of Socratic disdain do not agree in their interpretations of the meaning of this passage. My intention here is to pursue further, in light of writings both contemporary with and subsequent to the composition of the *Republic*, what are the consequences of assuming the Pythagoreans to be *them*.

Before doing so, however, let me clear up a couple of lesser matters. First, I believe that the *ἐκεῖνοι* of 530E.27 and 531B.13 refer to the same group. In the former instance, Socrates has noted the difficulty of the task at hand and has suggested that an outside opinion be sought of *them*, although *they*, like astronomers, waste their time and effort studying the mathematics of empirical data. Glaucon confuses this *them* with another group, and at 531B.13 Socrates corrects Glaucon, saying that he does not mean Glaucon's group but rather those whom they were to question about harmony, i.e., the *ἐκεῖνοι* 530E.27.

Second, there can be no doubt that the group satirized by Glaucon is the Harmonists. Adam presumes that Glaucon is making fun of a group of musicians, *μουσικοί*, later to be led by Aristoxenus. Adam notes further that the "bitter epigram"—"preferring their ears to their minds" (531A.8)—applied later to Aristoxenus by Adrastus is particularly apt.¹² Rather than leading this group, however, Aristoxenus was its chief opponent. Burnet claims that Aristoxenus "represents" those who attempt to determine harmonic intervals by ear, whereas Archytas represents the Pythagoreans.¹³ In a sense, this is the case, although Burnet is clearly making the same mistake as did Adam. Burkert is perhaps the closest to the truth when he observes that the theorists satirized by Socrates and Glaucon conceive the pitch spectrum spatially like a line; thus the spectrum, like magnitude, is infinitely divisible. Aristoxenus is the successor to this group.¹⁴

On several occasions in his *Harmonica*, Aristoxenus ridicules the Harmonists (*ἁρμονικοί*) for their endeavor to create systems

¹¹ Plato, *The Republic*, trans. and annot. Shorey, 2:190–93; Franz Susemihl, *Die genetische Entwicklung der platonischen Philosophie*, 2 vols. (Leipzig 1855–57) 2:210–11.

¹² *The Republic of Plato*, ed. Adam, 2:135, n. 8.

¹³ Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, 228, n. 1.

¹⁴ Burkert, *Lore and Science*, 372.

or scales of closely packed small intervals, *καταπύκνωσις* to be exact.¹⁵ He notes further that the Harmonists have erred seriously by assuming sensory perception to be the primary faculty of harmonics. Equal to hearing in the study of harmonics is reason, which determines the functions of notes and tetrachords and the differences between genera and between simple and composite intervals (*Harmonica* ii.40). Glaucon's criticism was of those who compete to hear the smallest musical interval (*πυκνόν*), and Socrates plays along for a bit, adding a macabre metaphor of his own. Clearly the group satirized by Glaucon is the Harmonists, a group that received far more ridicule from Aristoxenus than from Plato.¹⁶

Returning to the main problem at hand, one recalls warnings in elementary school about the sloppy use of pronouns. Who might be the denotation of Plato's *ἐκεῖνοι*? From this portion alone of the *Republic* it appears that, in fact, the Pythagoreans may be *them*. Socrates just cited *them*, the Pythagoreans, as those who relate astronomy and harmonics as sisters, and then remarks that of *them* inquiry will be made regarding harmonics, and further that *they* transfer their useless labor over astronomy to harmonics. This doubtless was the reasoning of Stallbaum, Schneider, *et al.* Furthermore, Aristotle's discussions of the Pythagoreans seem to confirm this assumption.

The essence of Plato's criticism of *them* (the Pythagoreans?) is that they confine their exploration of number to sensory data. Aristotle observes that the Pythagoreans "believe that things themselves are numbers,"¹⁷ whereas Plato posits mathematical intermediaries between sensible objects and forms or ideas (*Metaphysica* 987a.30ff.). Aristotle also notes that the Pythagoreans recognize numbers of one kind only, and these not separate from sensible objects (1080b.16–18). This is all quite unacceptable to

¹⁵ Aristoxenus, *Aristoxeni elementa harmonica*, ed. and trans. Rosetta da Rios (Rome 1954) i.7, and 28, ii.38 and 53.

¹⁶ Andrew Barker, "ΟΙ ΚΑΛΟΥΜΕΝΟΙ ἈΡΜΟΝΙΚΟΙ: The Predecessors of Aristoxenus," *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 204 (new ser. 24) (1978) 1–21, argues that *ἀρμονικοί* denotes a wide spectrum of musical theorists and not simply the extreme empiricists against whom Aristoxenus rails. Regardless of the term employed—*ἀρμονικοί* does not appear in this passage of the *Republic*—it is clear that Glaucon is ridiculing the extreme empiricists. See Barker, *ibid.*, 8.

¹⁷ *Metaphysica* 987b.27–28. "οἱ δ' ἀριθμὸς εἶναι φασιν αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα."

Aristotle because sensible objects have magnitude, and in turn magnitudes are infinitely divisible. Numbers, on the other hand, consist of units, and the unit by definition is indivisible (1083b.8–19).

Thus Aristotle's *Metaphysica* as well as his *Physica* (203a.6ff.) and *De Caelo* (290b.12ff.) serve as corroborating evidence for the identification of the Pythagoreans as the object of Plato's scorn in this part of the *Republic*. The case for this identification is a good one, and by no means do I claim that the remainder of this article will destroy the argument already put forth. I do claim, however, that the case is not airtight, and I shall discuss some of the problems that result from assuming the Pythagoreans to be *them*.

First of all one must consider the context in which the ridicule takes place. Plato devotes the seventh book of the *Republic*, in large part, to the education of the Republic's guardians, i.e., to the propaedeutic to dialectic. And what constitutes this preliminary study?

(1) the study of number, ἀριθμητική, in and of itself (525B–E). Plato even warns against the study of λογιστική, at least here in the *Republic*, if it does not lead to pure numerical speculation (525D). Plato also refers here to the experts, οἱ δεινοί, in the study of numbers (525D.27).

(2) geometry (526C–527A). Plato refers in this passage to the practitioners, οἱ μεταχειριζόμενοι, of geometry (527A.4).

(3) solid geometry or stereometry (528B). Plato does not use the word στερεομετρία here, but Theon of Smyrna does in his *Expositio rerum mathematicorum ad legendum Platonem utilium*,¹⁸ and Plato's meaning is clear. Furthermore, the author of the *Epinomis* uses the word, 990D.32.

(4) astronomy (528Eff.).

(5) harmonics (530B–531C).

Thus, with Plato's notable addition of stereometry, the propaedeutic to dialectic consists of the four mathematical sciences of the Pythagoreans.

By and large, Pythagorean discussions of the four mathematical sciences are really Neopythagorean discussions, dating from well after Plato's time. Nicomachus (second century A.D.) pre-

¹⁸ Theon of Smyrna, *Expositio rerum mathematicorum ad legendum Platonem utilium*, ed. Eduardus Hiller (Leipzig 1878) 1.17 and 17.17–18.

sents in elegant fashion the fourfold division of mathematical science. Things are divided into those continuous and thus having magnitude, and those discontinuous and thus having multitude (*Arithmetica* i.2.4–5). Multitude is capable of infinite extension and magnitude admits infinitely many divisions, and therefore both multitude and magnitude are unknowable in a sense. However, quantity, i.e., limited or finite multitude, and size, i.e., limited or finite magnitude, are knowable by the sciences of arithmetic and geometry respectively. Thus “it is clear then that two scientific methods will lay hold of and arrange in order the entire subject of quantity: arithmetic, quantity in and of itself, and music, relative quantity.”¹⁹ In turn, “limited multitude is number.”²⁰ Therefore, music is the science that deals with relative number. Similarly, *σφαιρικά* is the science that treats relative size.²¹

After Nicomachus’ presentation of the mathematical sciences, it still remained for Iamblichus to sanctify this organization of science by quoting Pythagoras: “And indeed there are four steps in set order to ascend to wisdom: (1) arithmetic, (2) music, (3) geometry, (4) spherics.”²² After sanctification there remained only the christening. This was performed by Boethius in his *De arithmetica* where he calls these four sciences the *quadrivium*.²³

In addition to the Neopythagorean discussions of the fourfold division of mathematical science there is that of Archytas of Tarentum. Archytas, a Pythagorean who lived around the turn of the fourth century B.C. in southern Italy, was a politician, an inventor, a mathematician, and a friend of Plato. Apparently

¹⁹ Nicomachus, *Arithmetica* i.3.1 (H.5.18–6.3). “δὴλον ὅτι ἄρα δύο μέθοδοι ἐπιλήψονται ἐπιστημονικαὶ καὶ διευκρινήσουσι πᾶν τὸ περὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ σκέμμα, ἀριθμητικὴ μὲν τὸ περὶ τοῦ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ, μουσικὴ δὲ τὸ περὶ τοῦ πρὸς ἄλλο.” Cf. Boethius, *De institutione arithmetica*, ed. Godofred Friedlein (Leipzig 1867) i.1 (F.9.1–3).

²⁰ Ibid., i.7.1 (H.13.7). “Ἀριθμὸς ἐστὶ πλῆθος ὠρισμένον.” Cf. Boethius, *De arithmetica*, i.3 (F.13.10–14).

²¹ *Spherics* rather than *astronomy* appears to be the term used by the Neopythagoreans. Cf. Iamblichus, *Theologoumena arithmeticae*, ed. Victorius de Falco (Leipzig 1922) 21.8–10.

²² Ibid. “τέτταρες μὲν καὶ ταὶ σοφίας ἐπιβάθραι, ἀριθμητικὰ μωσικὰ γεωμετρία σφαιρικά, ἃ β’ γ’ δ’ τεταγμένα.”

²³ Boethius, *De arithmetica* i.1 (F.7.25). The grouping of four mathematical sciences is undoubtedly connected to the Pythagorean notion of the *τετρακτὺς*. See Armand Delatte, *Etudes sur la littérature pythagoricienne* (1915; reprint ed., Geneva 1974), especially pp. 253–55 where Delatte makes important distinctions

Archytas' accomplishments were many—his solution to the Delian problem is dazzling—and of particular concern here is his statement concerning the four mathematical sciences. He notes that mathematicians have provided us with “a clear judgment concerning geometry and numbers [arithmetic] and spherics and not the least concerning music.”²⁴ Furthermore, these four sciences are sisters (see above, note 7). Thus Archytas' remarks in conjunction with the statements by the Neopythagoreans establish as Pythagorean the fourfold classification of mathematical science, at least from about 400 B.C., i.e., prior to the composition of the *Republic*.

The connection of what was to be known during the Middle Ages as the *quadrivium* with the Pythagoreans does not eliminate them from consideration as reference for the *ἐκείνοι* of 530E and 531B. Such a connection, however, sheds a different light on this passage. After all, Plato is here just finishing the outline of his educational plan, and this plan he has modelled on the Pythagorean classification of science. As he completes the outline, Socrates (Plato) criticizes *them* (the Pythagoreans?) for wasting their time and effort on sensible objects. Perhaps all this goes to show Plato as a free thinker. But there is more.

Assuming the Pythagoreans to be *them*, Socrates states: “for they seek the numbers in these audible consonances.”²⁵ The most natural interpretation of this sentence is that the Pythagoreans derive from the consonances before them the numbers, which numbers in turn they venerate as well as identifying the numbers with the consonances themselves. Such a position is contradicted by two later treatises on harmonics, *Sectio canonis* and Ptolemy's *Harmonica*. Certainly there is the danger of inverting the cart and horse when one relies on writings from as late as the second century A.D. to describe the state of affairs in Plato's Athens. This is especially true of Pythagorean writings, as Burkert has admirably demonstrated, where the later authors have a ten-

between the tetractys and the tetrad. Also see Paul Kucharski, *Étude sur la doctrine pythagoricienne de la tétrade* (Paris 1952). I discuss a musical connection with the tetractys in my “Arithmetic and Geometric Divisions of the Tetrachord,” *Journal of Music Theory* 21 (1977) 294–95.

²⁴ Diels, *Vorsokratiker*: 47, B 1.5ff. “... σαφῆ διάγνωσιν καὶ περὶ γεμετρίας καὶ ἀριθμῶν καὶ σφαιρικᾶς καὶ οὐκ ἤκιστα περὶ μουσικᾶς.”

²⁵ 531C.15–16. “τοὺς γὰρ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς συμφωνίαις ταῖς ἀκουόμεναις ἀριθμοὺς ζητοῦσιν.”

dency to modify Pythagorean theory so as to make it consonant with Platonic doctrine. Such is not the case, however, with *Sectio canonis* and Ptolemy's *Harmonica*. The former is quite clearly a Pythagorean treatise, Euclidean in style, and dates, perhaps, from as early as 300 B.C. It does not, however, transmit any of Plato's theories. Ptolemy certainly exhibits Pythagorean influence in his *Harmonica*, but at the same time he is critical of certain aspects of Pythagorean musical theory. Furthermore, Ptolemy's *Harmonica*, like *Sectio canonis*, is more or less free from Platonic doctrine.

A considerable amount of uncertainty attends the composition and transmission of *Sectio canonis*, uncertainty that need not detain us here. The treatise was well known in late antiquity, and is quoted in part by Porphyry and Boethius.²⁶ Of particular concern here is the introduction to the treatise, for there we find the fundamental principles of Pythagorean musical theory set forth.²⁷ "Therefore one must say that from parts notes are composed, since by addition and subtraction they arrive at the proper point. For as all things composed from parts are related to one another in numerical ratio, so also is it necessary that notes be related to one another in numerical ratio. For indeed as of numbers some are related by a multiple ratio, others by a superparticular, and others by a superpartient, so also is it necessary that notes be related to one another by these ratios. And of

²⁶ Porphyry, *Porphyrios Kommentar zur Harmonielehre des Ptolemaios*, ed. Ingemar Düring (Göteborg 1932) 99–103, and Boethius, *De institutione musica*, ed. Godofred Friedlein (Leipzig 1867) iv.1–2 (F.301.7–308.15)

²⁷ Karl von Jan, *Musici scriptores graeci* (1895; reprint ed., Hildesheim 1962) 149.6–24. "διόπερ ἐκ μορίων τοὺς φθόγγους συγκεῖσθαι φατέον, ἐπεὶ δὴ προσθήσει καὶ ἀφαιρέσει τυγχάνουσι τοῦ δέοντος. πάντα δὲ τὰ ἐκ μορίων συγκείμενα ἀριθμοῦ λόγῳ λέγεται πρὸς ἀλλήλα, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς φθόγγους ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ἀριθμοῦ λόγῳ λέγεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους· τῶν δὲ ἀριθμῶν οἱ μὲν ἐν πολλαπλασίῳ λόγῳ λέγονται, οἱ δὲ ἐν ἐπιμορίῳ, οἱ δὲ ἐν ἐπιμερεῖ, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς φθόγγους ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις λόγοις λέγεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους. τούτων δὲ οἱ μὲν πολλαπλασίοι καὶ ἐπιμόριοι ἐνὶ ὀνόματι λέγονται πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

"Γινώσκουμεν δὲ καὶ τῶν φθόγγων τοὺς μὲν συμφώνους ὄντας, τοὺς δὲ διαφώνους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν συμφώνους μίαν κρᾶσιν τὴν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ποιοῦντας, τοὺς δὲ διαφώνους οὐ. τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων εἰκὸς τοὺς συμφώνους φθόγγους, ἐπεὶ δὴ μίαν τὴν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ποιοῦνται κρᾶσιν τῆς φωνῆς, εἶναι τῶν ἐν ἐνὶ ὀνόματι πρὸς ἀλλήλους λεγομένων ἀριθμῶν, ἥτοι πολλαπλασίους ὄντας ἢ ἐπιμορίους."

these the multiple and superparticular are related to one another by a single name.²⁸

"And we know regarding notes that some are consonant and some are dissonant, and that [two] consonant [notes] produce a single blend from the two, and dissonant [notes] do not. And so this being the case, it is reasonable that consonant notes, since both produce a single blend of sound, when related numerically to one another by a single name, are either multiple or superparticular."

By itself, the introduction to *Sectio canonis* does not discredit the identification of the Pythagoreans as the object of scorn in the *Republic*. At no point in the musical treatise, however, can one infer that the Pythagoreans induced general laws of numerical consonance from audible sounds. *Sectio canonis* claims that all things are composed of parts and that things composed of parts are related by numerical ratios. Which came first, the number or the note, cannot be decided on the basis of *Sectio canonis* alone. In conjunction with Ptolemy's *Harmonica*, however, the Euclidean treatise casts a new light upon the portion of the *Republic* under consideration.

As mentioned previously, Ptolemy is partly indebted to the musical theory of the Pythagoreans for his own *Harmonica*. He exhibits some independence from them, however, when he criticizes certain aspects of their theory for being either irrational or empirically unfounded. The latter criticism is relevant here, especially when Ptolemy chastizes the Pythagoreans for not recognizing the interval of a diapason plus a diatessaron (an eleventh) as a consonance (*Harmonica* i.6.13–16). According to Ptolemy, the eleventh is consonant because it comprises a homophonic (*ὁμόφωνον*) interval and a symphonic (*σύμφωνον*) interval, i.e., a diapason plus a diatessaron. He claims that two notes sounding a diapason are, in a sense, subsumed into one another. When an interval is extended by a diapason or added to a diapason, the new interval sounds like the original one less the diapason. In other words, the addition of the diapason to an interval preserves the original sound of the interval. Therefore, the diatessaron,

²⁸ For an explanation of "a single name" or "term"—*ἐνὶ ὀνόματι*—see Thomas J. Mathiesen's translation of *Sectio canonis*, "An Annotated Translation of Euclid's Division of a Monochord," *Journal of Music Theory* 19 (1975) n. 12.

which is symphonic or consonant to begin with, is preserved in the eleventh. The eleventh, in turn, must also be consonant. The Pythagoreans, however, refuse to recognize as consonant the eleventh because it is characterized by the ratio 8:3, a multiple superpartient. Multiple superpartients are the ratios furthest removed from equality and, in a sense, they are the least beautiful.²⁹ Furthermore, as Ptolemy informs us, the Pythagoreans recognize as consonant only those intervals that are characterized by multiple or superparticular ratios (*Harmonica* i.6.13). This is precisely what the author of *Sectio canonis* had to say about consonance. Joining the two treatises, we obtain the following picture of Pythagorean musical theory.

Although the diapason plus the diatessaron sounds the same to the ears as the diatessaron alone, the Pythagoreans reject this bit of empirical datum because it fails to correspond with their theoretical, mathematical science. Thus, judging from Ptolemy and *Sectio canonis*, the Pythagoreans are guilty of applying an a priori theory of harmonics to sound. But according to Plato, the Pythagoreans are guilty of just the opposite of this; they seek numbers in audible sounds, but never get beyond empirical data in order to determine which numbers are consonant a priori.

²⁹ Nicomachus, in his *Arithmetica* i.17–23 and ii.21–28 (H.44.8–72 and 119.19–144.19), defines ratio and proportion, and discusses their composition as they depart from unity, 1:1. Unity, then, generates ratios in the following order. (1) The multiple (*πολλαπλασίσιος*) ratio is of the form $nx:x$, and its opposite, the submultiple, is of the form $x:nx$ where $n > 1$.

(2) The superparticular (*ἐπιμόριος*) ratio is such that the greater term contains the whole of the lesser plus some one part of the lesser. The subsuperparticular is the obvious inversion of the superparticular. It is worth noting that although all superparticular ratios when reduced to their lowest terms are of the form $(x+1):x$, not all ratios of that form are superparticular. Specifically, 2:1, which clearly is a multiple ratio of the form $nx:x$, is also of the form $(x+1):x$. However, 2:1 is not a superparticular ratio because the greater term contains all of the lesser term twice, not once plus some *one part* of the lesser. Theon of Smyrna, too, carefully defines superparticular ratio so as to exclude 2:1, *Expositio*, H.76.21 ff. Thus, superparticular ratios, when reduced to their lowest terms, take the form $(x+1):x$ where $x > 1$.

(3) The superpartient (*ἐπιμερής*) ratio is such that the greater term contains the lesser plus more than one part of the lesser. The subsuperpartient is the inverse of the superpartient. Now the intent of this definition is to exclude, say, 6:4 from the class of superpartient ratios, but not 10:6. Thus a superpartient ratio, when reduced to its lowest terms, is of the form $(x+m):x$ where $x > m > 1$. Nicomachus orders superpartients in curious fashion (*Arithmetica* i.21.1). Where

Clearly the position of the *Republic* is incompatible with that of *Sectio canonis* and Ptolemy's *Harmonica*.

Ptolemy's remarks, along with those in the introduction of *Sectio canonis*, could be reconciled with the position assumed in the *Republic* if either the Pythagoreans did not accept the eleventh as consonant on an auditory basis or Ptolemy's remarks referred to a group of Pythagoreans other than those discussed in the *Republic*. Although both of these conditions are possible, neither is likely. We have no statements from early Pythagorean authors regarding the auditory perception of the eleventh. Neopythagorean writers of the first few centuries A.D. either refrain entirely from discussing this interval or they include it among the consonances.³⁰ Boethius, who may be following Nicomachus here, informs us that the Pythagoreans reject the eleventh as consonant, but the reasons given are the mathematical ones already set forth (*De musica* ii.27). We must conclude, therefore,

$x/2 = k + 3/2$ and $y = k + 2$, the k th superpartient is $x_k : y_k$. Thus, in the order, infinitely many superpartient ratios occur before 8:5, which clearly is a superpartient too.

(4) The multiple superparticular ratio when reduced to its lowest terms is of the form $(nx + 1):x$, where $x > 1$ and $n > 1$. The submultiple superparticular ratio is of the form $x:(nx + 1)$, $x > 1$, $n > 1$.

(5) The multiple superpartient ratio is such that, when reduced to its lowest terms, it is of the form $(nx + m):x$, where $x > m > 1$ and $n > 1$. The submultiple superpartient is the inverse.

³⁰ Plutarch explicitly rejects the eleventh, although he neither cites the Pythagoreans nor specifies the mathematical principles that underlie his rejection. He does note, however, that the eleventh, introduced by the harmonists, is beyond measure (*ἔξω μέτρον*), *De E apud Delphos* 10, *Plutarchi Moralia*, v. 3, ed. W. R. Paton, M. Pohlenz, and W. Sieveking (Leipzig 1929) 389D–E.

Among the various authors who classify the eleventh as consonant, Gaudentius—third or fourth century A.D.—is most notable, for in his *Harmonica* he expands the musical tetractys 12:9::8:6 so that it becomes 24:18::16:12. He then conjoins this with the old tetractys, producing 24:9 as a characterization of the consonant eleventh, Jan, *Musici scriptores graeci*, 339.21–340.3. Theon of Smyrna also classifies the eleventh as consonant in his *Expositio*, H.56.12–14, as do several Latin writers including: Chalcidius, in *Platonis Timaeum*, ed. Ioh. Wrobel (Leipzig 1876) 112; Martianus Capella, *De Nuptiis Mercurii et Philologiae*, ed. Adolf Dick (1925; reprint ed., Stuttgart 1969) 950; and Cassiodorus, *Institutiones*, ed. R. A. B. Mynors (Oxford 1937) 144.21 ff. and especially 145.14–15, where he presents the eleventh as 24:8. Cassiodorus is probably relying on Gaudentius' *Harmonica*, because he mentions that his friend Mutianus had translated the Greek work into Latin. By representing the eleventh as 24:8, however, Cassiodorus has made the eleventh *too* consonant—a multiple ratio!

that the Pythagoreans did not reject the eleventh as a consonance solely on auditory grounds. As for the veracity and applicability of Ptolemy's remarks, we have the *Harmonica* itself, or at least the first two books, which presents an intelligent and, apparently, empirical theory of harmonics. Furthermore, along with his criticism of Pythagorean theory in the first book, Ptolemy presents the tetrachord divisions of Archytas (*Harmonica* i.13.30–31). Ptolemy criticizes these divisions as well as those of other theorists. Therefore, the Pythagoreans to whom Ptolemy refers reach back at least as far as Archytas, i.e., to the time of the *Republic*, and Ptolemy leaves no doubt that he considered Archytas to be a Pythagorean when it comes to harmonics (*Harmonica* i.13.30.9–10).³¹

Let us return now to a phrase in the passage of the *Republic* under consideration, 531C.15–16. “τοὺς γὰρ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς συμφωνίαις ταῖς ἀκονομέναις ἀριθμοὺς ζητοῦσιν.”

We have thus far assumed the Pythagoreans to be the subject of this sentence. We have further assumed that the meaning is as follows: they seek numbers in these audible consonances. And as we have seen, these two assumptions seem to be incompatible with remarks in *Sectio canonis* and Ptolemy's *Harmonica*. For the moment, at least, let us continue to identify the Pythagoreans as *them*, but let us try out the following interpretation of the phrase above: they seek numbers [that they know already to be consonant] in these audible consonances. If this reading were correct, then we would have Plato criticizing the Pythagoreans for seeking empirical corroboration of numerical truth. Furthermore, this reading would be compatible with the passages from *Sectio canonis* and Ptolemy's *Harmonica*. Under these circumstances the eleventh would not so much be rejected by the Pythagoreans as it would be ignored because the ratio 8:3 would not be something worth seeking in the sensible world. Perhaps this is why no early Pythagoreans, and few late ones—actually, only Boethius—explicitly take up the issue of the eleventh.

³¹ Ptolemy also criticizes the Pythagoreans for not being consistent in their rationalism. He notes that they do not accept 5:4 and 5:1 as consonant intervals although the former is a superparticular ratio and the later is a multiple ratio (*Harmonica* i.6.13). A Pythagorean response to this criticism would certainly rely on the notions of tetractys and tetrad, thus excluding from musical consideration the 5 in these ratios.

Although this latter interpretation solves one problem it creates another. If the Pythagoreans are the rationalists that this interpretation makes them out to be—and certainly the late writings of Nicomachus, especially his *Arithmetica*, would support this rationalism³²—then the following two-step procedure would be required. First, they determine which ratios are consonant and which not solely on numerical grounds. This is done by establishing some relations superior to others, e.g., superparticular superior to superpartient, and similarly some sets superior to others, e.g., sets containing four members superior to sets containing five. Second—perhaps optional but far too attractive to forgo—they seek instances in the real world for these incorporeal relationships and categories. So far so good; but what about the rest of the phrase under consideration: “ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἰς προβλήματα ἀνίστασιν, ἐπισκοπεῖν τίνες ξύμφωνοι ἀριθμοὶ καὶ τίνες οὐ, καὶ διὰ τί ἑκάτεροι” (531C.16–18). Here we have Socrates criticizing *them* for not taking into consideration the problems of which numbers are or are not consonant a priori and why.

If we accept this latter reading, then we have found (perhaps produced) a mistake in Plato’s argument, for we have him criticizing the Pythagoreans for not doing exactly what Socrates says they do. Of course, all this presumes the Pythagoreans to be *them*. If we were to assume that the *ἐκεῖνοι* of 530E.27 and 531B.13 referred to some group other than the Pythagoreans, then all the problems set forth here would not exist, and a new one would take their place: to whom do the *ἐκεῖνοι* refer?

We may never know the answer to this question. Shorey thought *them* to be the experts, *οἱ δεονοί*, and this may be the case.³³ Socrates frequently recommends that specialists be consulted as he develops the propaedeutic (see above, page 401). If this is the case, then the expert referred to here might be Damon, as Shorey points out.³⁴ But Damon was a fifth-century Pythagorean, and so we are back whence we started. Or are we?

³² Over the space of several chapters, *Arithmetica* i.2–7, Nicomachus develops a definition of music as the pure science of relative number. See above, pages 401–2 and my “Interpreting an Arithmetical Error in Boethius’s *De Institutione Musica* (iii. 14–16),” *Archives Internationales d’Histoire des Sciences* 31, No. 106 (1981) 40–41.

³³ Plato, *Republic*, ed. Shorey, 2:190, n. a.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 1:252, n. b. (400B), and 1:332, n. e. (424C).

By assuming the Pythagoreans to be *them*, the passage in the *Republic*, isolated from all other considerations, seems to make sense. Furthermore, Aristotle's remarks concerning the Pythagoreans are compatible with this interpretation. But surely we cannot ignore the evidence that seems to contradict this assumption. First, this part of the *Republic* seems to be modelled on the Pythagorean division and classification of mathematical science. That this classification is Pythagorean and not Platonic is borne out by the fragments of Archytas. Therefore, to attack the Pythagoreans at this point might diminish the force of Socrates' argument in behalf of his educational plan. Second, the fundamental principles of Pythagorean harmonics are set forth in the introduction to *Sectio canonis* and developed in the remainder of the treatise; these principles intimate an a priori science of relative number, one that is displayed materially in sound. Subsequently Nicomachus defines music to be precisely this science of relative number. Third, Ptolemy confirms the intimation of *Sectio canonis* in his *Harmonica*, especially in his discussion of the interval of an eleventh. Boethius, in his *De musica*, corroborates the testimony of Ptolemy. If we accept this evidence, then we are left in the dark regarding who *they* are. Furthermore, the interpretation of Schneider, Stallbaum, *et al.* must be reconsidered, and the interpolation of *Pythagoreans* for *ἐκείνοι* by Jowett and Cornford must be rejected.

We have seen that there exists a way to assume the Pythagoreans to be *them* and at the same time to take cognizance of the testimony just cited. To do this we must accept the unusual interpretation of 531C.15–16: they seek numbers that they already know to be consonant in these audible consonances. But this reading requires us to charge Plato with a logical error in this passage of the *Republic*.

None of the interpretations presented above is entirely satisfactory, and indeed an interpretation that reconciles all of these arguments may not be forthcoming. A careful reading of the relevant sources appears to have cast shadows where there once was light. Thus we must set aside the "solution" of Schneider and Stallbaum and ask anew: who are *them*?

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APOLLO'S RETORT TO ENVY'S CRITICISM

(TWO QUESTIONS OF RELEVANCE
IN CALLIMACHUS, HYMN 2, 105 FF.)

The dramatic final scene of Callimachus' hymn to Apollo (vv. 105ff.), which comes as a surprise to the reader, has been and still is the subject of much controversy among scholars)¹:

"Envy secretly whispered into Apollo's ear: 'I do not admire the (this) singer, who does not at all sing as much as the sea.'—Apollo kicked Envy and said: 'The Assyrian river is vast, but it carries with it plenty of mud and much waste on its water. To Demeter, however, bees do not bring of every water,² but the finest flower of the few droplets that pour forth pure and immaculate from a holy fountain.'³—Farewell and be gracious, Lord! And Blame may go where Envy has gone."⁴

E. L. Bundy, adducing an impressive array of illuminating parallels, came near to proving that this short dialogue between Phthonos ('Envy') and Apollo is "a dramatization of the epilogic break-off pattern," especially familiar from Pindar but also found in Callimachus himself (hy. 1.92f.).⁵ He weakened his argument, however, firstly by assuming that Phthonos in the finale of hy. 2 not only referred to people envious of Callima-

¹ For a critical assessment of more recent contributions see e.g. H. Herter, 'Kallimachos,' RE Suppl. XIII, (1973), 233–36; cp. F. Williams, *Callimachus, Hymn to Apollo. A Commentary*, (1978), 86ff.

² See R. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship I* (1968), Excursus p. 284 on hy. 2.110ff.

³ For the syntax cp. J. Vahlen, *Über einige Anspielungen in den Hymnen des Callimachus*, SBAkBerlin 1896, 826=Ges. Philol. Schr. II (1923), 462 with note 15.

⁴ Hy. 2.105–113: ὁ Φθόνος Ἀπόλλωνος ἐπ' οὐατα λάθριος εἶπεν· | 'οὐκ ἄγαμαι τὸν δαιδὸν δς οὐδ' ὅσα πόντος αἰεῖδει.' | τὸν Φθόνον ὠπόλλων ποδί τ' ἤλασεν ὡδὲ τ' εἶπεν· | 'Ἀσσυρίου ποταμοῖο μέγας ῥόος, ἀλλὰ τὰ πολλὰ | λύματα γῆς καὶ πολλὰν ἔφ' ὕδατι συρφετὸν ἔλκει. | Διοῖ δ' οὐκ ἀπὸ παντὸς ὕδωρ φορέουσι μέλισσαι, | ἀλλ' ἥ τις καθαρὴ τε καὶ ἀχράντος ἀνέρπει | πίδακος ἐξ ἱερῆς ὀλίγη λιβάς ἀκρον ἄωτον.' | —χαῖρε, ἄναξ, ὁ δὲ Μῶμος, τὴν ὁ Φθόνος, ἐνθα νέοιτο; cp. below note 31.

⁵ E. L. Bundy, The 'Quarrel Between Kallimachos and Apollonios,' Part I (the only one published): *The Epilogue of Kallimachos' Hymn to Apollo*, CalStud-ClassAnt 5 (1972) 39–94, esp. 87ff.

chus' achievements but also to the "ill will of the god" himself,⁶ and secondly by not sufficiently distinguishing between 'Phthonos' (vv. 105 and 107) and 'Momos' ('Blame', v. 112).⁷ This is, presumably, why Bundy's observations have not received the attention they deserve. Thus F. Williams in his recent commentary on the hymn, while, like Bundy, rightly discarding the time-honoured "quarrel between Callimachus and Apollonius Rhodius,"⁸ does not seriously consider his arguments for regarding the famous dialogue as an elaborate 'break-off formula,' and C. Meillier in the latest contribution to the hymn and its finale does not even mention Bundy's paper.⁹ The purpose of this article will be to reconsider Callimachus' line of thought in hy. 2. 105ff., especially in the light of Bundy's and Williams' comments, and to answer two questions: (I) What is the significance of the final scene *within the framework of the hymn*, and (II) why has Callimachus chosen to distinguish between Phthonos and Momos but, actually, only given Phthonos a role to play?

(I) What the criticism of 'Envy' is, in fact, aimed at still seems to be a matter of dissent. Thus (to take only the interpretations

⁶ Bundy 92, cp. 57: This is hardly compatible with line 113 (dismissal of Momos corresponding to that of Phthonos); cp. also Williams, *Comm.* 89f. on line 105. It seems that Bundy himself had some difficulties with his theory: see next note.

⁷ Bundy 92: "the wish (sc. v. 113) that Momos may join Phthonos is the wish that neither Apollo nor the audience of worshippers will critically censure the hymn, seeing that *their* *φθόνος* has been appeased" (my italics). This would mean that Phthonos and Momos differ only as to the persons they refer to (Apollo on the one hand, the 'critical audience' on the other, cp. p. 88), but Bundy does not stick to this distinction (cp. "their *φθόνος*" above); he also says that Call. by means of the dialogue between Phthonos and Apollo wanted to "apologize to the god's assembled worshippers for curtailing his praise of so august a personage" (92; in this case Phthonos, like Momos, would refer to the audience as well); see below.

⁸ Williams (above note 1) 2 and 97. The explanation of the hymn's finale by reference to 'the quarrel between Call. and Apollonius,' once advocated by U. v. Wilamowitz (*Hellenistische Dichtung* [1924] II 86f.) and until recently accepted by many, is still defended by Herter (above note 1) 234f. Against already J. Vahlen (above note 3) 429–63 (still well worth reading; cp. esp. 461–63); cp. H. Erbse, *Zum Apollonhymnos des Kallimachos*, *Hermes* 83 (1955) 411–28 = *Kallimachos*, ed. by A. D. Skiadas, *Wege der Forschung* 296 (1975) 276–300, esp. 294ff.; W. Wimmel, *Kallimachos in Rom*, *Hermes Einzelschriften* 16 (1960) 59–70, esp. 63f. Cp. now M. Lefkowitz, *ZPE* 40 (1980) 1–19.

⁹ C. Meillier, *Callimaque et son temps*, Publications de l'université de Lille 3, (1979) 91ff.; cp. now also Lefkowitz 5f.

already mentioned), whereas Bundy thought that 'Envy' complains about Callimachus' failure to exhaust the dimensions of his theme¹⁰ (lines 105–12 being "an objective representation of an internal dialogue" between Apollo and his own ill will: see above), Meillier believes that Phthonos is the champion of unity as much as of scale (the epilogue being about the «*unité organique*» of «*une oeuvre de grandes dimensions*» advocated by Phthonos, versus that of «*une oeuvre réduite*», favoured by 'Apollo').¹¹ He even thinks that the dialogue between Phthonos and Apollo is not only concerned with the question which form of art to follow in general, but also with the particular one of knowing «*quelle forme d'art convenait le mieux à la célébration des Carnéïa*» in Cyrene.¹² But what indication is there to limit the impact of 'Envy's' complaint and Apollo's answer (or, for that matter, of the hymn as a whole)¹³ to a specific place or occasion? And, are we really justified to find in 'Envy's' criticism concern for quality as well as for quantity? Is the image of the sea as applied by 'Envy', like that of the fountain later on (vv. 109 ff.), already intended to convey not only the idea of size but also of purity and artistic unity?¹⁴ Finally, Williams, while conceding that "the dispute here (as in the Aetia prologue) is . . . in part between long poems and short poems,"¹⁵ nevertheless also maintains that the criticism of 'Envy' is not only concerned with

¹⁰ Bundy (above note 5) 49: ". . . line 106 suggests the dimensions of Kallimachos's theme and criticizes his omissions."

¹¹ Meillier 92f.

¹² Meillier 93.

¹³ For Meillier, p. 89 (and *passim*), «l'oeuvre se comprend mieux, si on la considère comme une paraphrase du chant rituel récité à l'occasion des Carnéïa». Like others before him Meillier concentrates on the Cyrenean legend in the centre of the hymn (vv. 65–96) and plays down the elements concerned with other places (esp. vv. 55–64 Delos; 97–104 Delphi) or else having a more general significance (vv. 1–46 and 105–13). Above all we should be aware of the fact that there are no indications as to the identity of the chorus and worshippers, and the whereabouts of Apollo's temple and precinct in the opening scene (vv. 1 ff.) or of his encounter with Phthonos in the finale (cp. e.g. Williams, *Comm.* 19 on the 'Delian palm-tree' line 4, or 48f. on line 47 *κικλήσκομεν*). This vagueness is probably intentional. The hymn is a piece of literature (full of subtle allusions to earlier literature, like all of Call.'s hymns); it is hardly designed to reproduce a local cult song; cp. Williams, *Comm. Introd.* 2–5.

¹⁴ Meillier 92f.

¹⁵ Williams, *Comm.* 86.

quantity but also with quality ("the poet is attacked for not equalling the sea *even* in quantitative terms"¹⁶ "οὐδ' ὅσα implies an unspoken οἶα."¹⁷ This in turn leads him to believe that πόντος (v. 105) means 'Homer'.¹⁸ His interpretation, however (like that of Meillier), can for a number of reasons hardly be correct: (1) Apollo's answer (vv. 108ff.) presupposes that Phthonos had based his criticism solely on size: otherwise the god could not have replaced πόντος by Ἀσσυρίου ποταμοῖο μέγας ῥόος.¹⁹ Those who credit Phthonos with a respect for quality disregard the progression of thought and neglect the dramatic form of the encounter.²⁰ Phthonos' argument is partial and unfair exactly because he is 'Envy', 'grudging' the singer of this hymn the approval that is his due.²¹ But as the situation of the hymn is a dramatic one, Phthonos (unlike his counterparts in the Aitia-prologue: see (2) below) makes his appearance in person and

¹⁶ *Comm.* 90 on line 106.

¹⁷ *Comm.* 87. Cp. e.g. H. Erbse (above note 8) 295: "der Phthonos verzichtet bewusst (darauf), die Reinheit des Meeres hervorzuheben. Er setzt sie offensichtlich als selbstverständlich . . . voraus"; E. Eichgrün, *Kallimachos und Apollonios Rhodios*, (Diss. Berlin 1961) 169f.: "Phthonos . . . wird doch dabei nicht nur an die Quantität gedacht haben, sondern auch an die Qualität; denn dass Phthonos den Anspruch auf Qualität von vornherein aufgegeben habe, ist doch wohl sehr unwahrscheinlich." But Phthonos is a character invented by Call. for his own ends; he has no separate existence outside the hymn, and we have no means of discovering his 'thoughts.'

¹⁸ Williams, *Comm.* 88f.; 90 on line 106 *δειδει*.

¹⁹ Cp. A. Kambylis, *Die Dichterweihe und ihre Symbolik*, (1965) 78 with note 33: "Kallimachos lässt den Phthonos . . . im Meer nur das Moment der Grösse erblicken . . . Indem er . . . das Symbol des Pontos durch das des grossen Flusses ersetzt, zeigt er ihnen" (sc. his opponents), "dass die von ihnen gepriesene Dichtung . . . zugleich viel 'Unreines' in sich trägt . . .".

²⁰ Herter's statement (see above note 1) 235: "Entscheidend ist, dass *der Sprecher* das Meer alsbald durch den grossen, aber schmutzigen Fluss ersetzt . . ." (my italics), is misleading, as it does not take account of the distribution of speakers in the dramatic situation: Whereas 'Apollo' could not have used the image of the sea (see H. Erbse, above note 8, 294f.), that of the 'large Assyrian river' would have been inappropriate if spoken by 'Phthonos'. Thus the substitution of the river for the sea is necessitated by the dramatic form of the final scene.

²¹ Cp. e.g. Pind. *Parth.* 1.8f. *παντὶ δ' ἐπὶ φθόνοσ ἀνδρὶ κεῖται ἀρετᾶς*; Hdt. 8.124f. (*φθόνοσ* of the Greeks against their best man, Themistocles) or 7.237.2 (grudge of a citizen against his more successful fellow-citizen); cp. Aristotle's definition of *φθόνοσ*, *Rhet.* 2.10.1387 b 21ff., cp. 2.11.1388 a 33-36; E. Milobenski, *Der Neid in der griechischen Philosophie*, *Klass. Philol. Stud.* 29 (1964) 61-74; cp. 10f. (on the Anonymos Iamblich).

states his case in direct speech; therefore, to make his statement look respectable, the image of largeness by which he illustrates his point of view is phrased in positive terms; he is made to use the most common image of awe-inspiring vastness. Apollo, however, immediately counters with a similar but less reputable image designed to discredit vastness. What Apollo means, in plain prose is: 'You tell me a poem ought to be as vast and everflowing as the sea, but you do not seem to realize that (if size is the only criterion) you could as well exchange the sea for the Euphrates, which is vast, too, but carries a lot of dirt with it . . .'. Apollo's answer would be meaningless if Phthonos had already paid attention to quality;

(2) Callimachus has exactly the same antithesis of mere size on the one hand and quality on the other in the famous prologue of his 'Aitia', which has often been compared with our passage, Aet. I Fr. 1, 1-32 (cp. esp. vv. 17f., where he tells his critics, there referred to as *βασκανίης ὀλοὸν γένος*: 'judge my poetry by the standards of art, not by the Persian measuring line,' i.e. in terms of mere length)²²;

(3) There is nothing in the context of the hymn to support Williams' identification of *πόντος* with Homer.²³ On the contrary, the fact that there is a whole chain of metaphors taken from water (v. 106 *πόντος*; 108 *Ἀσσυρίου ποταμοῖο μέγας ῥόος*; 109 *ἐφ' ὕδατι*; 110 *ὑδωρ*; 112 *πῖδαξ* 112 *ὀλίγη λιβάς*) is decisively against it.²⁴ We are hardly justified to isolate the first element in this series of consistent images and identify it with Homer;

(4) Williams' argument rests on his assumption that v. 106 *οὐδ' ὅσα (ὅς οὐδὲ (τοσαῦτα) ὅσα πόντος αἰδεῖται)*, which he translates

²² Aet. I Fr. 1, 17f.: ἔλλετε *βασκανίης ὀλοὸν γένος*· ἀθι δὲ τέχνη| κρίνετε, μὴ *σχοίνῳ Περσίδι τὴν σοφίην* (cp. Schol. Flor. 10 ad Fr. I Pf.).

²³ There is scarcely more justification for identifying *πόντος* with Homer here than e.g. in line 18 (*εὐφημεῖ καὶ πόντος*). The examples listed in Williams' appendix 'Homer as Oceanus,' *Comm.* 98f., are all explicit comparisons or similes: they do not show that mere *πόντος* without any clarification in the context can indicate Homer.

²⁴ Williams seems to be aware of this objection, as he tries to read references to Homer and epic into the imagery of the Assyrian river and the pure fountain as well: "... this presumably represents the imitation of traditional epic . . .," and "To write such poetry . . ., Apollo asserts, is to emulate and recreate Homer in a more meaningful and original way . . ." (*Comm.* 89). But all this is simply not in the text.

'not even as great as the sea,' is by implication a qualitative as well as a quantitative comparison ("οὐδ' ὅσα implies an unspoken οἷα").²⁵ But the implication assumed, besides being contradicted by Apollo's answer (see (1) above), is unlikely in itself (Williams does not give parallels for mere unaided οὐδ' ὅσα implying something like μή ὅτι οἷα).²⁶ The particle οὐδέ (unless it is 'connective') gives emphasis to what follows (it is often a negative equivalent to the emphatic καί).²⁷ Thus, if we follow Williams in translating οὐδέ by 'not even,' the sense would rather be 'even less' ('who does not sing even as much as the sea' = 'who does sing even less than the sea').²⁸ This would be a grotesque statement to make, which could only be defended on the assumption that Callimachus wanted to ridicule Phthonos by stressing beyond all limits the absurdity of his demand (the unattainable vastness of the sea would itself appear only as less than the minimum of what a singer is to go for).

In the context of the hymn, however, the statement of Phthonos probably has a more specific and more obviously relevant meaning: 'I cannot admire *this* singer (i.e. the singer of this hymn)²⁹ who (= because he) does *not at all* sing as much as the sea'.³⁰ In this version the force of the emphatic or, rather, indig-

²⁵ Williams, *Comm.* 87.

²⁶ The examples listed in J. D. Denniston, *Greek Particles*² (1954) 196 (s.v. οὐδέ II 2 'not even') are quite different.

²⁷ See Denniston 197f. ("οὐδέ as an emphatic negative, 'not at all'"), cp. 196 ("with sense of climax, 'not even'"); cp. e.g. K. J. Dover, *Aristophanes Clouds* (1968) 155 on Nu. 425: "οὐδέ . . . γε is simply the negative of καί . . . γε."

²⁸ Cp. A. R. 3.932f.: 'ἀκλειῆς ὅδε μάντις, ὃς οὐδ' ὅσα παῖδες ἴσασιν | οἶδε νόφ φράσασθαι . . .': 'not even as much as children' = 'even less than children.' It is out of the question here that "οὐδ' ὅσα implies an unspoken οἷα"; cp. e.g. Call. hy. 5.18 (cp. 7) οὐδ' ὅκα 'not even at the time when,' implying some other *time*, but not a place (i.e. a relative of a different order).

²⁹ Cp. Williams, *Comm.* 90 on line 106: "τόν: the article is demonstrative—this particular poet"; Williams refers to v. 16 τοὺς παῖδας (cp. his comments on v. 7); cp. also vv. 28 and 30 ὁ χορός 'this chorus here.'

³⁰ Cp. e.g. Men. *Dysc.* 962 ἐάν σε παρακινουῖντά τι λάβωμεν αὐτίς, οὐδὲ μετρίως, ἴσθ' ὅτι, χρησόμεθά σοι . . . and 314 τετράραγμ' . . . οὐδὲ μετρίως ('not at all gently' and 'to no small degree': E. W. Handley, *The Dyskolos of Menander* (1965) 188 on line 313f.); Hdt. 7.16 β 2 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ταῦτα . . . θεῖα ('by no means,' cp. Denniston 197); expressing indignation or impatience: Ar. *Eq.* 1302 οὐδὲ πυνθάνεσθε ταῦτα(α) . . . τάν τῇ πόλει; ('do you not at all hear of these goings-on . . .?'); Ar. *Nub.* 8 ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ χρηστός οὐτοσί νεανίας ἐγείρεται τῆς νυκτός (cp. Dover ad locum); Men. *Asp.* 415 οὐδὲ παύσεται; ('will he by no means stop': 'won't he ever

nant *οὐδέ* is immediately evident: it reflects the 'shocking' fact that the incriminated singer is unwilling to comply with the absurd rule laid down by Phthonos. He does not even *try* to live up to the ideal of vastness.

The significance of this version will become even more apparent if one asks why Callimachus has introduced 'Envy'. Critics, with the exception of Bundy, seem to take for granted that the target of his criticism is Callimachus' poetry in general. But for what reason does Phthonos turn up at all, and why does he state his case at this very moment when the hymn is drawing to its close and the poet is about to take his leave from the god (cp. v. 113 *χαῖρε, ἄναξ*), who is imagined to be present?³¹ Should we not rather expect Phthonos' criticism to be provoked by the hymn itself? What is it that makes his encounter with Apollo a fitting epilogue to this particular hymn?

After what has been said there is only one answer: in the eyes of Phthonos (as he appears on Callimachus' stage) the hymn is too short.³² That is why Callimachus makes him present his opinion in purely and one-sidedly quantitative terms. What his words suggest is this: 'What, already finished? I cannot admire this singer who does not even try to exhaust the sea. Actually, a hymn in your honour, Apollo, should never stop.' The Callimachean Apollo, however, takes sides with his singer, first negatively, pointing out the flaw in 'Envy's' exclusively quantitative argument (a large river, like the Euphrates, tends to be dirty), then positively, recommending extreme excellence in a small compass (the choicest flower of a pure fountain), i.e. 'Apollo' much prefers the small but accomplished poem of Callimachus to the immense song envisaged by Phthonos.

stop?'). Call. by making Phthonos speak in tones of feigned indignation has added to the liveliness of the scene (*οὐδέ* in this sense is in line with Apollo 'kicking' Phthonos).

³¹ For the meaning of *χαῖρε* (v. 113) see esp. P. Friedländer, *Das Proömium von Hesiods Theogonie*, Hermes 49 (1914) 277 ff. = Hesiod, ed. by E. Heitsch, *Wege der Forschung* 44 (1966) 277–315, esp. 279 f.; cp. Bundy (above note 5) 49 ff. for the conventions involved. For the presence of the god see Erbse (above note 8) 293.

³² Bundy (above note 5) 92 from a different angle (the study of hymnal conventions) arrived at a similar conclusion: "Phthonos . . . suggests to Apollo that the brevity of Kallimachos' hymn is grounds for critical disapproval of it *as a hymn*" (Bundy's italics). Contrast the Homeric hymn to Apollo which is nearly five times the length of the Callimachean hymn (546 as against 113 lines).

Thus, by means of the encounter between 'Envy' and 'Apollo' Callimachus has managed to anticipate and dramatize the probable reaction to and his own justification for the limited scale of his hymn, which at first looked as if it would go on for a long time.³³ By visualizing Apollo's rejection of Phthonos as a dramatic experience³⁴ he has also provided his hymn with a lively and wholly unexpected finale³⁵ highlighting Apollo in his most important capacity as patron-god of poetry.³⁶

(II) There is however one more line to come. Having got rid of Phthonos, Callimachus, after a farewell address to Apollo, completes his hymn by wishing Momos to keep Phthonos company (v. 113). What is the significance of this line? Wilamowitz was certainly right to reject J. Vahlen's idea that 'Envy' and 'Blame' could be simply identical,³⁷ but his own explanation ('just another critic, less dangerous than the first'),³⁸ although it has

³³ Cp. lines 12 ff.: *μήτε σιωπηλήν κίθαριν . . . τοῦ Φοῖβου τοὺς παῖδας ἔχειν ἐπιδημήσαντος*; 30 f. *οὐδ' ὁ χορὸς τὸν Φοῖβον ἐφ' ἔν μόνον ἡμᾶρ δέσειε*, | *ἔστι γὰρ εὖνομος*: τίς ἂν οὐ βέα Φοῖβον δέδοι; cp. Bundy 92.

³⁴ This accounts for the aorist tense, lines 105 *εἶπε*; 107 *ἤλασεν* and *εἶπεν*, forms which correspond to similar ones in the opening scene of the hymn (lines 1 *ἔσειε*; 4 *ἐπένευσεν*, and 16 *ἡγασάμην*). As these alternate with present tenses (lines 3 *ἀράσσει*; 4 *ἀράς*; 5 *αἰδεῖ*) they seem to indicate not so much the time (Williams, *Comm.* 90 on line 105 "the very recent past"; cp. Erbse, above note 8, 293) as the nature of the dramatic action. There is no doubt, however, that the final encounter is part of the epiphany-situation visualized at the beginning (Erbse 291 ff.).

³⁵ Cp. hy. 1.92 f. (compared by Bundy, 85), where Call. elegantly avoids the traditional praise of the god's deeds by means of a rhetorical question: 'your deeds, who could sing of your deeds? There never has been and never will be. Who will be as bold as to sing of your deeds?', thereby closing his hymn on a note of surprise comparable to that in hy. 2.

³⁶ Cp. hy. 1.78 (*Φοῖβου δὲ λύρης εὖ εἰδότας οἶμους*); hy. 4, 5 (*Φοῖβον δαιδάων μεδέοντα*); in hy. 2.43 f. Apollo's patronage of the arts is emphasized along with that of bowmanship, *οἰστευτής ἀνὴρ (τόξον)* preceding *δαιδός (δαιδή)*, i.e. the order is the same as in the closing part of the hymn, where Apollo's fight against the serpent at Delphi (*τόξον*: vv. 97–104) is followed by his encounter with Phthonos (*δαιδή*: vv. 105–13); cp. Wimmel (above note 8) 65.

³⁷ Vahlen (above note 3) 461–63 (his defence of the reading *ὁ Φθόρος* as against *ὁ φθόρος* in line 113 is, however, unconvincing: cp. most recently Williams, *Comm.* 96 f.).

³⁸ Wilamowitz (above note 8) 86: "... unvermeidlich, dass dem Phthonos ein zweiter Kritiker folgen muss. Das ist der Momos . . . ein Nörgler, der immer etwas auszusetzen hat . . . Der Phthonos aber will schaden, denn er hat den bösen Blick . . . Der Momos ist viel ungefährlicher, aber Kallimachos verbittet

been widely accepted (most recently by Williams),³⁹ will hardly do. It is linked with his ill-founded assumption of an allusion to two specific contemporary critics (one of them Apollonius Rhodius), and stripped of this assumption looks rather pointless. Moreover, there is nothing in the text that points to a distinction in terms of dangerousness. Therefore, although we cannot accept Vahlen's solution, we are still up to his problem: Where are we to find a clear functional distinction between Phthonos and Momos?⁴⁰

Any answer to this question has to take into account three facts offered by the text: (1) the position of Phthonos is made explicit, while that of Momos is not; (2) the criticism of Phthonos is dealt with within the compass of the hymn, whereas that of Momos is still to come; (3) Phthonos approaches Apollo 'secretly' (v. 105 *λάθριος*). We have to bear in mind these facts when looking for parallels.

Both, Phthonos and Momos, are fairly well attested, and sometimes overlapping concepts, since Hesiod (Momos: *Th.* 224, among the children of Night), and Pindar (Phthonos: see below). What we are looking for, however, are passages where they both occur (as in Callimachus) thus allowing us to distinguish between them.

Callimachus when composing the mythical centre-piece of his hymn was certainly influenced by Pindar,⁴¹ in whose poetry especially *φθόνος* plays an important part. Therefore Bundy was justified to look to Pindar for illumination of the hymn's finale.

sich auch seine Kritik". Wilamowitz did not bother to support his suggestion by parallels; cp. below note 48.

³⁹ *Comm.* 97: "... Wilamowitz' distinction is basically sound."

⁴⁰ Vahlen (above note 3) 463 note 13: "Es gelingt mir nicht, den Zusammenhang des Gedankens festzuhalten und mir verständlich zu machen, wenn nicht *Μῶμος* (113) mit *Φθόνος* (105.107) nur im Ausdruck variiert, in der Sache identisch ist"; cp. e.g. Kämbylis (above note 19) 77 (identifies Phthonos and Momos), and the significant slip in F. Quadlbauer, *Properz* 3, 1, *Philologus* 112 (1968) 86 (on hy. 2.108f.): "Apollo weist Momos (!) ... scharf zurecht. ..." *φθόνος* is not found elsewhere in our text of Call., but cp. *Βασκανίη* Epigr. 21, 4 Pf.; Aet. I Fr. 1, 17 Pf., whereas *Μῶμος* does also occur Fr. 393, 1.

⁴¹ Esp. by Pind., *Pyth.* 4, *Pyth.* 5, and *Pyth.* 9 for his lines about Cyrene, hy. 2.65-96: see e.g. Williams, *Comm.* Intr. 4 (cp. his index p. 109 s.v. 'Pindar'); Meillier (above note 9) 86ff.; cp. Herter's statement (above note 1) 236: "Für die Sagen Geschichte hat er auch schriftliche Quellen benutzt, zweifellos Pindar und nicht zuletzt Herodot. ..."

The scope of his paper, however, is limited to break-off devices. He did not include passages where *φθόνος* and *μῶμος* have a wider significance (as the enemies of success and praise),⁴² although some of these may help us to draw a more convincing distinction between Phthonos and Momos. Pindar says, *Ol.* 6.74—76: 'Criticism (*μῶμος*) from envious rivals (*φθονεόντων*) (always) threatens those who have been victorious in the chariot races',⁴³ i.e. criticism ('blame') is the consequence of envy: those who are envious of more successful competitors find fault with their accomplishment. Similarly, Bacchylides, ep. 13, 199–203: 'He, whom 'Envy' (*Φθόνος*) bold of speech does not bias, may praise the dexterous man (a trainer) with justice. Men's blame (*μῶμος*), however, is on all achievements',⁴⁴ i.e. 'Envy', the evil spirit that makes men envious, tries to dissuade them from due praise. As a result, there are always people who find fault with noble deeds.⁴⁵

It is clear from these two passages that 'envy' and 'blame' are intimately connected, 'blame' being caused by 'envy'. Accordingly, if *φθόνος* and *μῶμος* are replaced by their respective divine agents, their logical relationship (cause and effect) will become a temporal succession: Phthonos is followed by Momos, as in Callimachus (cp. Bacchylides above). Further, it is evident that *μῶμος* is 'open criticism' (cp. the passages quoted above),⁴⁶ while *φθόνος* is not normally exposed to the eyes of the public (cp. Pindar, *Ol.* 1.47, where we are told about 'envious' people, *φθονεροί*, who try to slander those they envy 'secretly,' *κρυφῶ*).⁴⁷

⁴² Cp. my *Funktion des Mythos bei Pindar*, (1971) 210f. and 222f.

⁴³ *μῶμος ἐξ ἄλλων κρέματα φθονεόντων τοῖς, οἷς ποτε πρώτοις περὶ δωδέκατον δρόμον | ἐλαυνόντεσσιν αἰδοία ποτιστάξῃ Χάρις εὐκλέα μορφάν.*

⁴⁴ *εἰ μὴ τινα θερσιεπὴς Φθόνος βιάται, | ἀνείτω σοφὸν ἄνδρα | σὺν δίκῃ βροτῶν δὲ μῶμος | πάντεσσι μὲν ἔστιν ἐπ' ἔργοις:* The fact that *φθόνος* is called *θερσιεπής* 'bold of speech' shows that it is a personification and should be written with a capital Φ. *βροτῶν* is perhaps better taken with *πάντεσσιν* . . . *ἐπ' ἔργοις* (in spite of the word-order, for which cp. ep. 14, 16f.): 'on all works of mortals,' *βροτῶν ἔργα* being a much more plausible combination than *βροτῶν μῶμος*. In that case, Momos, too, may be a personification.

⁴⁵ Cp. also Pind. *Pyth.* 11.28f.

⁴⁶ Williams, *Comm.* 96 on line 113, observes in passing "*μῶμος* is criticism of published work," without following up this idea or commenting upon *Φθόνος* . . . *λάθριος* (v. 105).

just as, in Callimachus, Phthonos approaches Apollo 'secretly,' *λάθριος*). The difference between personified Phthonos and Momos in Callimachus, therefore, seems to be that between secret inspirer and open proclaimer of criticism. What Phthonos is secretly complaining about to Apollo now, Momos is likely to advance publicly against the hymn later on. Momos in Callimachus does not need specification: he does not differ from Phthonos in substance, for 'criticism is a manifest sign of envy' (*βασκανίης μνημείον ἀριφραδέες ἐστιν ὁ μῶμος*).⁴⁸ This is why Callimachus has laid all emphasis on 'Envy'. The message he wants to put across is: 'What Momos will say against my hymn is caused by Phthonos and has already been dealt with adequately by Apollo. He may therefore go and keep Phthonos company.'

Structurally, the Phthonos-Momos-finale in Callimachus, hy. 2, is indeed a 'break-off formula,' as Bundy has seen, but it is at the same time a peculiar inversion of the conventional motif. Whereas in Pindar and Bacchylides *φθόνος* or *μῶμος*, when occurring in break-off passages, are brought in to explain why the poet is forced to cut a long story short (if he did not, he would risk ennui, ill feeling and criticism from his audience: see e.g. Pindar, *Pyth.* 1.81 ff. and other examples collected by Bundy),⁴⁹ in Callimachus it is the other way round: Phthonos would have liked the poem to go on for much longer, and he is rejected because the poet (represented by 'Apollo') prefers his poem to be short. Thus the traditional motif has been elegantly

⁴⁷ Pind. *Ol.* 1.47 (Pelops having disappeared from his father's house) *ἔννεπε κρυφᾷ τις αὐτίκα φθονερῶν γειτόνων, . . . ὅτι τε . . . μαχαίρα τάμον κατὰ μέλη . . .* For *λάθριος* and *κρυφᾷ* cp. Call. hy. 4.241 (Hera about Zeus' mistresses) *καὶ γαμέοισθε | λάθρια καὶ τίκτοιτε κεκρυμμένα*.

⁴⁸ Unknown poet (*τις τῶν σοφῶν*) quoted, along with Call. hy. 2.113, in Schol. Greg. Naz. c. 1 2, 34, 72 (= PG 37,950): see Pfeiffer's (= Williams') apparatus on hy. 2.113 (not taken into account by Williams in his notes on the Phthonos-Momos-relationship, *Comm.* 96f.). Cp. e.g. Philipp. Thess. 60 G.-P. (= AP 11,321), 1 ff.: *γραμματικοί, Μώμου Στυγίου τέκνα, . . . τελχίνες βιβλίων, . . . Καλλιμάχου στρατιῶται . . .* (Callimachean concepts turned against Call. himself: cp. Aet. 1 Fr. 1, 17 Pf., where Call. calls his envious rivals, the *Τελχίνες* of v. 1, *Βασκανίης* (~*Φθόνου*) *ὄλοδον γένος*). Philip did evidently not distinguish in substance between the 'children of Momos' and those of Phthonos (*τελχίνες βιβλίων*): cp. Gow-Page, *Garland of Philip*, II 362 on Phil. 60, 2).

⁴⁹ Bundy (above note 5) 87ff.; cp. R. Stoneman, *CQ* 26 (1976) 193.

APOLLONIUS OF TYANA AND APOLLONIDES OF CAESAREA MARITIMA

A recently published inscription of the third or fourth century from the Adana Museum honors Apollonius of Tyana as *Ἀπόλλωνος ἐπώνυμος* (line 1).¹ The Apolline allusion appears to be continued in line 2, where Apollonius is said to extinguish men's faults through his radiance (*λάμψας*), and perhaps in line 4, where there is a reference to his driving out of men's pains (*θνητῶν ἐξελάσσει πόνοους*).² The new inscription, with its explicit play on the names Apollonius and Apollo, prompts me to return to a passage in one of the letters ascribed to Apollonius of Tyana.

The eleventh letter is addressed to the *probouloi* of Caesarea Maritima. Apollonius is thanking the Caesareans for some honor bestowed upon him, perhaps a grant of citizenship. He heaps praise upon the city and promises to pray for its future well-being. The letter ends with a reference to a young citizen of Caesarea who apparently is a disciple of Apollonius: *Ἀπολλωνίδην δὲ τὸν Ἀφροδισίου νεανίαν ἐρρωμενεστάτης φύσεως ἀξίας τε τοῦ ὑμετέρου ὀνόματος, πειράσσομαι χρήσιμον ὑμῖν παρασκευάζειν εἰς ἕκαστα μετὰ καὶ τύχης τινὸς ἀγαθῆς*. In his Loeb edition of the letters, F. C. Conybeare understood *ἀξίας . . . ὀνόματος* to mean "worthy to bear your name," i.e., the name "Caesarean." Another possible translation, the one I adopted in my own edition of the letters, is "worthy of your renown" (cf. *LSJ* s.v. *ὄνομα* II).³ My main concern here, however, is with *ὑμετέρου* rather than with *ὀνόματος*. In his *editio maior* of the letters,⁴ C. L. Kayser reported that one manuscript, Parisinus Gr. 3047 (my Pr), has the reading *ἡμετέρου* instead of *ὑμετέρου*. My own collations revealed that *ἡμετέρου* is also the reading of Pr's close

¹ G. Dagron and J. Marcillet-Jaubert, *Türk Tarih Kurumu Belleten* 42 (1978) 402-5; E. L. Bowie, *ANRW* II 16.2 (1978) 1687-88; and esp. C. P. Jones, *JHS* 100 (1980) 190-94.

² Cf. Dagron and Marcillet-Jaubert 403 and esp. Jones 191, 193.

³ Conybeare, *Philostratus, The Life of Apollonius of Tyana, the Epistles of Apollonius and the Treatise of Eusebius* II (1912, rev. 1950); Penella, *The Letters of Apollonius of Tyana: A Critical Text with Prolegomena, Translation and Commentary*, Mnemosyne Suppl. 56 (1979).

⁴ *Flavii Philostrati quae supersunt* (1853).

relative X and of the four mutually related manuscripts HOCQ. PrX and HOCQ are among what I labeled the Group II manuscripts of the letters, HOCQ belonging to a larger subgroup of Group II that also includes VRJPaPW.⁵

The variant *ἡμετέρου* was not noted in my edition, not in the critical apparatus nor in the preliminary discussions of PrX and HOCQ, for two reasons. First, I judged *ἡμετέρου* to be an impossible reading, an obvious corruption of *ὕμετέρου*. Secondly, since the confusion of eta and upsilon is so easy and common,⁶ I regarded the corruption *ἡμετέρου* as stemmatically uninteresting; there were far more distinctive conjunctive errors to cite for PrX and HOCQ. But I was wrong in judging *ἡμετέρου* an impossible reading. The new inscription shows how it may be construed. If *ἡμετέρου* is adopted, Apollonius is saying that Apollonides is worthy to share the divine name Apollo with him. The name Apollonides gives the young disciple (or ward?) of Apollonius a far more appropriate divine model than does the name of his father Aphrodisius. Those familiar with the letters of Apollonius will not be discomforted by the self-important tone that the reading *ἡμετέρου* creates (cf. Ap. Ty., *Epp.* 44.1, 47, 48.2–3, 69).

To demonstrate that a variant may be read and even has some attractiveness is not, of course, to assert that it should be read. The Group II witnesses are split between *ὕμετέρου* and *ἡμετέρου*. The Group I witnesses are of no help, since none of them includes *Epp.* 11. What is certain, though, is that the variant *ἡμετέρου* in *Epp.* 11 should appear at least in the critical apparatus, perhaps even as a “fortasse legendum,” and with a reference to line 1 of the new inscription.

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⁵See my edition, 9ff.

⁶I recorded in my edition of the letters of Apollonius three instances of the corruption of *ὕμεις* to *ἡμεις* (pp. 12, 41 in app. crit.), three instances of the corruption of *ἡμεις* to *ὕμεις* (pp. 12, 56 in app. crit., 62 in app. crit.) and an instance of the corruption of *ἡμετέραν*, already corrupted from *ἡμέραν*, to *ὕμετέραν* (p. 75 in app. crit.) For a corruption of *ἡμῖν* to *ὕμῖν* in an excerpt of Ap. Ty., *Epp.* 55 found in Leidensis B. P. G. 73D, see *HSCP* 79 (1975) 307.

PLUTARCH AND THE NAMING OF GREEK WOMEN

Recently David Schaps¹ has devoted an interesting discussion to the fact that the Greek orators studiously avoided mentioning the names of women. The only exception they made was for "women of shady reputation, women connected with the speaker's opponent and dead women."² The avoidance was part of the general "muting" of women in Athenian society, as John Gould³ has now demonstrated in a seminal article on the position of Athenian women, and this reluctance to mention the name of any living respectable woman continued to exist at least until 260 B.C., as can be shown from Xenophon, Plato and comedy.⁴

Even though, then, it was permitted to mention the names of dead women, we may well wonder whether this in practice would have happened very often. If women's names were not mentioned when they were alive—who would remember them when they were dead? The avoidance of the names must have often amounted to a *damnatio memoriae*, as can be well illustrated by some passages in Plutarch's *Lives*. Concerning Solon's mother Plutarch⁵ knows only that according to Heraclides Ponticus (F 147 Wehrli²) she was a cousin of the mother of Pisistratus. In the case of Demosthenes, Plutarch (*Dem.* 4.2) wonders whether his maternal grandmother was a barbarian, as Aeschines (3.171) asserted, but he is unable to adduce any evidence to solve the problem, even though she may well have been Athenian.⁶ In fact, in his biography of Alcibiades (*Alc.* 1.2) he notes with apparent exasperation that whereas even the name of Alcibiades' nurse is

¹ D. Schaps, *The Woman Least Mentioned: Etiquette and Women's Names*, *CQ* 27 (1977) 323–30.

² Schaps, 328.

³ J. Gould, *Law, Custom and Myth: Aspects of the Social Position of Women in Classical Athens*, *JHS* 100 (1980), 38–59, 45.

⁴ A. H. Sommerstein, *The Naming of Women in Greek and Roman Comedy*, *Quaderni di Storia* 11 (1980) 393–409.

⁵ Plut. *Sol.* 1.3, cf. M. Manfredini/L. Piccirilli, *Plutarco: La Vita di Solon* (Milano 1977) 112.

⁶ Cf. J. K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families* (Oxford 1971) 121f.

known, he cannot name the mothers of Demosthenes,⁷ Nicias, Lamachus, Phormio, Thrasybulus and Theramenes.

The great, if not quite successful, length to which Plutarch went to recover the names is demonstrated by the case of a woman whose name Xenophon did not mention. As an illustration of Agesilaus' modest way of life, Xenophon (*Ages* 8.7) tells us that the king's daughter did not go to Amyclae for the Hyacinthia festival in an elaborately adorned *kannathron*—a carriage in the shape of griffins or stag-goats—but in a (presumably simple) public vehicle. The passage attracted much attention in antiquity because of the fantastic character of the carriage and Polemon devoted a whole treatise to it.⁸ Plutarch (*Ages* 19.6, tr. B. Perrin, Loeb) *expressis verbis* notes that Xenophon neglected to record the name of the girl and continues: "and Dicaearchus (F 65 Wehrli²) expressed great indignation that neither her name nor that of the mother of Epaminondas was known to us; but we have found in the Lacedaemonian records that the wife of Agesilaus was named Cleora, and his daughters Eupolia and Proauga."⁹

Although Plutarch was successful in the case of Agesilaus' wife and daughters, his failure to recover the names of the other women clearly demonstrates that the Athenian custom of avoiding naming living respectable women had rendered even the names of the mothers of their most important statesmen into oblivion.

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⁷ Her name was Cleobule: [Plut.] *Mor.* 844A.

⁸ Cf. Ath. 4.138E = Polemon fr. 86 Preller; *EM* 489. 5ff.; Schol. II.XXIV.190; Eust. II. 1344.44.

⁹ For Plutarch's research in Sparta, cf. L. Piccirilli, in *Φιλίας Χάριν. Miscellanea di studi classici in onore di Eugenio Manni V* (Rome 1980) 1762f.

WAR AND THE SHEPHERD: THE TOMB OF BIANOR IN VERGIL'S NINTH ECLOGUE

In the Ninth Eclogue of Vergil, which echoes the First, we find again the pessimistic theme of shepherds, or more precisely, goatherds, being driven from their land by the *barbarus miles*. The Ninth, which is even more hostile than the First, sums up its position in a simile reminiscent of the *Iliad*:

sed carmina tantum
nostra ualent, Lycida, tela inter Martia, quantum
Chaonias dicunt aquila ueniente columbas.

(11-13)

After the half-hearted attempt by Moeris to sing his old songs about Galatea and indifference toward the invitation to sing the praises of Daphnis and the *Caesaris astrum*, he exclaims that sorrow has rendered his voice mute: *Omnia fert aetas, animum quoque; saepe ego longos / cantando puerum memini me condere soles*. (51-52) At this climax of the emotional tone of the poem they approach the tomb of Bianor:

L. Causando nostros in longum ducis amores,
et nunc omne tibi stratum silet aequor, et omnes
aspice, uentosi ceciderunt murmuris aurae.
hinc adeo media est nobis uia: namque sepulchrum
incipit apparere Bianoris; hic ubi densas
agricolae stringunt frondes, hic, Moeri, canamus;

(56-61) ¹

There can be no doubt that the name Bianor should be appropriate for the mood at this time, and help to enhance the effect of melancholy and sorrow. Yet the name has left scholars mystified. In his recent commentary on the *Eclogues*, Robert Coleman—after rejecting or finding inadequate the tried solutions, admits his inadequacy to solve the problem.² The reference is apparently modeled on the appearance of the tomb of Brasilas in Theokritos, *Idyll* 7.10-11, but why Bianor? Coleman rejects Servius' identification of Bianor with Ocnus, the son of the Etruscan river god Tiberis and the prophetess Manto, the

¹ R. Coleman, *Vergil. Eclogues* (Cambridge 1977) 270-71.

² OCT text of R. A. B. Mynors, *P. Vergili Maronis Opera* (Oxford 1969).

legendary founder of Mantua (*Aeneid* 10.198–200) since the name is patently Greek. Reference to a Bithynian epigrammatist who was still alive at the time is out of the question. The only likely reference is to a Bianor lamented by his mother in Dio-timos (*A.P.* 7.261).

The appearance of a simile modeled on the Iliadic type, earlier in the poem suggests that the *Iliad* might be a good place to look for Bianor. The slaughter of a Bianor or Bienor does in fact appear in the Eleventh Book, lines 91–100. It is quite possible that the pastoral touches introduced before and after the death of Bianor, who is himself described as shepherd of the people (*ποιμένα λαῶν*), struck Vergil's attention and partly influenced his choice of the name.

Bianor is a Trojan who is killed in an Achaian counterattack led by Agamemnon. It is midday, itself a very pastoral hour, when the attack begins—at the hour “when a woodman who has been felling trees in the glades of a forest is overcome by the desire for sweet food and rest.” Agamemnon now rushes forward and slays Bianor:

ἐν δ' Ἀγαμέμνων
πρῶτος ὄρουσ', ἔλε δ' ἄνδρα Βιάνορα ποιμένα λαῶν
αὐτόν, ἔπειτα δ' ἑταῖρον Ὀϊλῆα πλήξιππον.
(91–93)

92 βιάνορα Ar. S A: ita L¹⁹ V¹⁶: -ήνορα cet.³

Bianor's death is followed by the more graphic description of the slaughter of Oileus, the charioteer. Agamemnon then rushes on to kill Isos and Antiphos, two sons of Priam, who while pasturing their sheep on the spurs of Mount Ida had been captured by Achilles and set free for a ransom:

ὦ ποτ' Ἀχιλλεὺς
Τῆς ἐν κνημοῖσι δίδη μόσχοισι λύγοισι,
ποιμαίνοντ' ἐπ' ὅεσσι λαβών, καὶ ἔλυσεν ἀποιόνων.
(104–6)

Agamemnon's violence and cruelty at this point is emphasized by a very bloody and graphic simile of the lion falling upon the lair of a hind and devouring the young.

³ OCT text of T. W. Allen, *Homeri Ilias* II (Oxford 1931).

The emotional tone of the slaughter of Bianor, Isos, and Antiphos by Agamemnon, the essence of ruthless military power, hardly escaped either the Homeric audience or Vergil. As Oliver Taplin puts it, commenting on the killing of Isos and Antiphos: "The pathos of the ruthless warrior cutting down the innocent pastoral world is quintessentially Homeric, and is wonderfully conveyed here by the two herdsmen. One moment they are going along with the flock and "playing happily on pipes and they took no thought of treachery" (526), the next they lie killed."⁴

Vergil's allusions and imagery here are neither exclusively Homeric nor exclusively Hellenistic. The name itself, Bianor, reflects this synthesis. It was common for heroes from the Trojan War to have tombs or cults in Greece.² The imaginary landscape of the Ninth Eclogue embraces Sicily through Moeris singing the song of the Cyclops to Galatea, and the suggestion of the sea's proximity (*et nunc omne tibi stratum silet aequor, et omnes / aspice, uentosi ceciderunt murmuris aurae*. 57–58). References to Mantua and Cremona evoke Gallia Cisalpina and the Bella Civilia, but the presence of Arcadia is implied by the appearance of Menalcas here and in the Arcadian Tenth Eclogue (*tristis et ille "tamen cantabitis, Arcades," inquit*, 31).

A further hint that Vergil borrowed the name from the *Iliad* is in the metrical similarity. In each case the word falls before the bucolic diaeresis in a line containing enjambment:

πρῶτος ὄρουσ', ἔλε δ' ἄνδρα Βιάνορα ποιμένα λαῶν (92)
 incipit apparere Bianoris; hic ubi densas (60)

Though the bucolic diaeresis is a characteristic of pastoral poetry, it is in this case equally Homeric.

Vergil's intention seems to have been not only the evocation of youthful death such as we find it in the lament for Bianor in the anthology, but also the sober recollection that shepherds too are affected by war. The name Bianor leads one to Isos and Antiphos, shepherds drawn into war and trapped by the terrible realities of battle and death, and to the depiction of the conflict between the pastoral and military worlds in the Homeric *Iliad*. The name itself, Bianor or Bienor, suggests both force (*βίη*) and life (*βίος*), either of which lends a melancholic note to the dead

⁴O. Taplin, "The Shield of Achilles within the *Iliad*," *Greece and Rome* 27 (1980) 1–21, here 7.

CROSS-REFERENCES IN ROMAN PROSE

Both ancient and modern authors use cross-references, short phrases like *ut supra dixi*. Modern authors employ a restricted group of phrases that range from the general (e.g. "See below") to the specific ("See above p. 3"). Their readers flip to the passages easily. But ancient works reached the public as scrolls, which might contain only part of a long work and which were awkward to manipulate. A reader could not be expected to follow up many cross-references, since he might well need to locate a different scroll and unroll it. Finding a specific passage in a prose work would be challenging, since the differing size of scrolls, columns, and copyists' handwriting prevented both standard pagination and precise cross-references.¹ In this paper I shall discuss the vocabulary, specificity, and uses of cross-references in Roman prose from the mid-first century B.C. to the early second century A.D.²

Although a large variety of words occurs once or twice, most Roman cross-references employ a limited vocabulary shared by most authors. Simple phrases like *ut supra diximus* or *ut dicemus* predominate. Various forms and compounds of *dico* are overwhelmingly popular; few other words appear with any regu-

¹ E. Turner, *Greek Papyri* (Princeton 1968) 8, comments that the papyrus roll "did not encourage careful scholarship" and draws attention to "an ancient writer's reluctance to check his references or his tendency to take his metrical and grammatical examples out of an author's opening verses." Cf. T. Birt, *Das Antike Buchwesen* (Berlin 1882) 159ff. and K. Dziatzko, *RE* 3.960 (1899) s.v. "Buch." J. Van Sickle, "The Book-roll and Some Conventions of the Poetic Book," *Arethusa* 13 (1980) 5-42, writes suggestively about how the scroll form might have influenced the way poetry was written and read.

² Little modern study has been devoted to cross-references except when they illuminate another topic. This paper is based primarily on Caesar, *B.C.*; Cic., *De Am.*, *De off.*, *De sen.*; Sall., *B.C.*, *B.J.*; Livy 1-5; Pliny, *N.H.* 8-11; Sen., *De ira*; Tac., *Hist.*, *Ann.* 1-6; and Suet., *De vita Caesarum*. Chronology suggests that all these works were first published in scroll form (see C. H. Roberts, "The Codex," *Proc. of the Brit. Acad.* 60 [1954] 184 and T. Kleberg, *Buchhandel und Verlagswesen in der Antike*, trans. E. Zunker [Darmstadt 1967] 83 note 46). The list of works provides variety within certain continuity: historical monographs, annalistic histories, essays, biography, plus one technical work. Orations are excluded from this study because the question of oral delivery and written presentation provokes many problems best temporarily avoided.

larity (e.g. *rettuli, docuimus*). Most of the verbs are ordinary and colorless: they convey information without attracting attention. When an author or period shows a marked preference for other verbs, an explanation should be sought. In the *B.C.*, for example, Caesar eschews *dico* for *demonstro*, especially in the passive, which creates an impression of formality and distance.³ Tacitus betrays Sallust's influence in employing the unusual *memoravi*.⁴ Pliny, Seneca, Tacitus, and Suetonius use *refero* forms, which are avoided by Golden Age authors.

Helping words or phrases (e.g. *supra*) occur frequently in cross-references. Again, although many appear occasionally, very few do so regularly. *Supra* is by far the most common, followed at a considerable distance by *ante* and *paulo ante*. Phrases like *in prioribus libris* or *suo loco* are not strikingly unusual, but neither are they commonplace. The helping words, like the verbs, are ordinary words.⁵

Cross-references inform the reader only that the subject has been or will be treated. The tense of the verb indicates whether to look back or ahead, but nothing clearly indicates how far. The helping words do not provide clear, reliable, or consistent information. In the *Bellum Catilinae*, for instance, *supra* refers back three Teubner lines in one case (57.2 to 57.1), 13 in another (5.7

³ E.g. 1.81.2; 2.28.1. Although the *B.Afr.* has three *dico* cross-references (32.1; 51.6; 69.4), the Pseudocaesarian monographs generally follow Caesar's practice.

⁴ As noted by H. Heubner in Tac., *Die Historien*, vol. I (Heidelberg 1963) on 1.64.2. See Sall., *B.C.* 5.7; 20.1; 26.3; 57.1; *B.J.* 12.1; 25.4; 28.4; Tac., e.g. *Ann.* 3.18.1; 3.48.2; 4.1.1; 6.36.2; *Hist.* 1.64.2; 4.46.2; 5.19.3. *Memoravi* does not occur in any of the other works mentioned in note 2 above, although *commemoravit* appears in Cic., *De am.* 4.15 and *commemoravi* in Cic., *De sen.* 14.50. A comparison of Tacitus' *Hist.* and *Ann.* does not reveal any change in the historian's practice from one work to the other.

⁵ Their only interesting feature is that *ante* can bear a spatial or temporal meaning, referring to an earlier point on the scroll or to an earlier point in time as one reads a text. The adverb *supra* in this context, however, I would suggest, is more nearly purely spatial, referring to an earlier point in the column or the scroll. Lewis and Short, s.v. *supra* I.B.1, contend that *supra* can mean, "Of time, before, formerly, previously (esp. of any thing said or written)." Their examples are almost all cross-references, where a spatial sense is possible. Two examples seem particularly forceful: *quae supra scripsi* at Cic., *Ad fam.* 6.10.2 refers to an earlier point in the same letter, as does *ut supra scripsi* at Pliny, *Ep.* 6.27.5. Not all the examples, however, can be interpreted in a literal, spatial sense (e.g. Sall., *B.C.* 5.9, *supra repetere*; one might add Tac., *Hist.* 1.36.1; 3.68.1).

to 5.2), and about 20 in a third (57.1 to 55.6).⁶ *Paulo ante*, which one might expect to refer back a short distance because *paulo* is specified, moves over about 40 lines in both cases (20.1 to 17.3–6; 26.3 to 23), the longest distance covered by any of the work's cross-references.⁷ Cicero's *De off.*, *De am.*, and *De sen.* reveal the same vagueness. In *De off.*, for example, *dixi* alone refers to the same section four times (1.40.142; 1.43.153; 2.3.9; 2.6.19) and to the previous section twice (1.21.70; 2.3.12). *Ante dixi* refers to the same section twice (1.17.58; 2.10.36) and to the previous section three times (1.39.141; 2.9.32; 2.14.50). *Paulo ante dixi* refers to the previous section twice (3.10.44; 3.15.63), two sections back twice (1.12.38; 2.14.49), and three back once (1.33.121). *Supra dixi* tends to refer farther back, but its antecedent ranges from two sections away (1.33.119) to nine sections (1.45.161).

Pliny, *N.H.* 8–11,⁸ appears at first to be a special case. Pliny sometimes refers by subject matter to a specific passage that conceivably could be located through Book 1's Table of Contents, a cumbersome but not utterly impossible process. When discussing human teeth, for instance, he says, "reliqua de iis [dentibus] in generatione hominum dicta sunt" (11.170 to 7.68ff.). Such references, however, occur only six times in the four books. In any case, one would not read the *N.H.* in the same way one would an essay or a history. As Pliny himself suggests (*Praef.* 33), his reader would study particular subjects, not read through the entire work.

Specificity of reference, however, is not always a necessity. Many modern cross-references, especially outside of scholarly writing, share their Roman counterparts' vagueness. "As I have said" is both a translation of *ut dixi* and a common modern expression. Two points suggest that the Romans were aware of their references' imprecision and worked around it.

First, many references go back a very short distance, thereby making precision unnecessary. None of Sallust's cross-references

⁶ Cf. *B.J.*, where *supra* ranges in reference from about ten lines (e.g. 75.6 to 75.2; 37.3 to 36.4) to over 200 lines (25.4 to 15.4; 40.4 to 30.2).

⁷ The one time *paulo ante* appears in the *B.J.*, it goes back only about ten lines, the same distance covered by some of the *supra* references (see above note 6).

⁸ I selected these books as a sample of the whole *N.H.*. They concern life in its various forms—aquatic and terrestrial animals, birds, and insects—a fairly unified topic. Citations are by short sections.

in the *B.C.* traverses more than about 40 lines.⁹ Of the six references in Livy's first pentad, three refer to the same chapter (1.37.4; 4.37.3; 5.18.6), one to the previous chapter (4.19.7), and one to a passage four chapters earlier (1.46.5).¹⁰ In Pliny, *N.H.* 8–11, however, almost one-half of the 61 cross-references pass over one or more book boundaries, while only 13 allude to material less than 10 sections away. This author, however, was faced with prodigious problems of organizing his material, so his atypical practice need not surprise.

Second, many cross-references contain a brief summary of the earlier material for the reader's convenience. Even if his memory fails him, he need not consult the other passage. For example, Pomponius Labeo appears only twice in the extant books of Tacitus' *Ann.* (4.47; 6.29.1–2). In the second passage the historian says, "Pomponius Labeo, quem praefuisse Moesiae rettuli, per abruptas venas sanguinem effudit" (cf. *Ann.* 2.68.1 to 2.58; 3.48.2 to 3.22; Tac., *Hist.* 5.21.1 to 4.70.2; Livy 5.2.14 to 4.48.6). In the *B.C.* Caesar usually refers back to factual matters of people or places and frequently includes a brief summary (e.g. 3.66.2; 3.79.6). Sometimes, however, he alludes to discussions of motives or reasons without providing a summary. This can make an uncommonly large demand on the reader, especially if the antecedent lies many chapters away and is difficult to locate (e.g. 3.100.1 to 3.23). If the reader does not remember the earlier passage, he must either laboriously search it out or ignore the cross-reference and forge on. I suspect the latter was the more common practice.¹¹

But even imprecise cross-references can be valuable. An obvious but important function is simply jogging the reader's memory. A reminder of a previous passage would probably call it to mind, especially if it was nearby or a summary was given.

⁹ See above pages 432–33. In the *B.J.* some references go back farther than 40 lines (e.g. 25.4 to 15.4; 52.5 to 49.1), but about half of the 15 cases refer back less than 20 lines.

¹⁰ The cross-references in Sen., *De ira* are also usually to nearby material. The ten cross-references in Suet., *De vita Caesarum* all have their antecedents in their respective *Lives*, although they refer back various distances from one chapter (*Calig.* 8.2) to 60 chapters (*Aug.* 90 to 29.3). More than one-half of the cross references in Cicero's *De am.* and *De sen.* refer back two sections or less.

¹¹ Cf. Pliny, *N.H.* 11.172 (to 9.28): "de purpurarum lingua diximus." If the reader were not passionately interested, he would probably just keep on reading.

For instance, on the second appearance of a soldier named Crastinus, Caesar identifies him as, "Crastinus, cuius mentionem supra fecimus" (*B.C.* 3.99.2 to 3.91). Tacitus' practice is similar: "Latiaris, ut rettuli, praecipuus olim circumveniendi Titii Sabini et tunc luendae poenae primus fuit" (*Ann.* 6.4.1 to 4.68–70; cf. 3.7.2 to 2.74.2; 4.21.1 to 2.34). The summary is brief but sufficient.

In essays cross-references help organize and advance arguments by providing transitions and summaries. In the *De off.* Cicero lists three aspects of *gloria* and then opens the discussion with the words: "ac primum de illis tribus, quae ante dixi, benevolentiae praecepta videamus" (2.9.31–32; cf. Cic., *De sen.* 14.53). He also uses cross-references to restate one point in preparation for another (*De off.* 1.24.82; 1.33.119.; 3.12.50; *De sen.* 14.48) and to let the reader know that a topic will be treated later (*De off.* 2.6.19; 2.6.22). In *De ira* Seneca uses them to recall or restate earlier material so he can take his argument a step further. When discussing whether anger can be controlled, for example, he cites several examples of men who performed difficult feats, like tight-rope walking, through persistence. After stating the general point the examples teach, he says, "Istis quos paulo ante rettuli aut nulla tam pertinacis studii aut non digna merces fuit" (2.12.5). He then proceeds to the next step in his argument: if these men performed such feats without significant reward, one should conquer anger, a feat offering great rewards.

In historical narrative cross-references serve a similar purpose: they keep details straight. They help keep the reader abreast of the large number of people, places, and actions in Caesar's *B.C.*, for example, and help coordinate parallel accounts. The two Allobroges who deserted Caesar appear several times, reintroduced by cross-references that help identify them (e.g. 3.84.5; cf. Tac., *Hist.* 5.21.1). Cross-references come to Tacitus' aid in the *Ann.* when the narrative of events occurring over a span of years becomes disjointed by the demands of annalistic structure; e.g. "Eodem anno Tacfarinas, quem priore aestate pulsum a Camillo memoravi, bellum in Africa renovat" (3.20.1 to 2.52; cf. 2.68.1 to 2.58.2; 3.7.2 to 2.74.2). Annalistic structure is observed, and the ongoing narrative remains clear.¹²

¹² Tacitus, acutely sensitive to the annalistic bounds, also uses cross-references to foreshadow material that must be presented later (*Ann.* 1.58.6; 2.4.3; 6.22;

Cross-references commonly provide a way to resume an earlier account after a digression or the intervention of other material. Livy records consular elections (4.37.1), turns briefly to *peregrina res*, and then says, "consules ii, quos diximus, idibus Decembribus magistratum occepere" (4.37.3).¹³ In the *B.C.* Sallust lists Catiline's supporters (17.3-6), digresses on the so-called First Conspiracy (18-19), and then resumes the narrative with these words: "Catilina ubi eos, quos paulo ante memoravi, convenisse videt" (20.1; cf. 55.1 to 53.1; 16.1 to 14.5-6).¹⁴ In the *Hist.* (5.11.1 to 5.1.2) Tacitus uses a cross-reference to return from the digression on the Jews to Titus' campaign against Jerusalem.¹⁵

Cross-references help Pliny organize his mass of facts without endless repetition. He writes, e.g., "Piscium species LXXIII praeter crustis intacta, quae sunt XXX. de singulis alias dicemus; nunc enim naturae tractantur insignium" (*N.H.* 9.43; cf. 8.228). Since even a single topic may involve various subtopics, the reader can be referred to different parts of a discussion (e.g. 8.32 to 8.26, another passage in the treatment of elephants).

Style as well as content benefits from cross-references. Cicero uses them to avoid repeating lists of names (*De off.* 1.17.58; 2.14.50; 3.23.92; *De am.* 5.19; *De sen.* 14.50; 23.85). *Supra memoravi* saves Sallust the trouble and stylistic infelicity of reiterating a list of names twice with a Teubner page (*B.C.* 57.1), while in the next section (*B.C.* 57.2) *supra diximus* makes it

Hist. 4.67.2). Cross-references help Suetonius work within his topical scheme of organization. When the same item appears under different topical headings, as it were, within a *Life*, he sometimes refers back to its earlier occurrence (e.g. *Nero* 22.3 to 19.1).

¹³ Cf. 4.19.7 (to 4.18.4), with the story of Cossus intervening; R. M. Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy Books 1-5* (Oxford 1965; corr. rpt. 1970), on 4.19.7, suggests that Livy wants to present the Cossus story as a unity and so does not keep up to the moment in the other action. Cf. also 1.46.5 (to 1.42.1).

¹⁴ The famous portrait of Catiline (5.1-5) is followed by a narrative of his desire for *regnum* (5.6). A cross-reference then integrates the portrait and the narrative: "agitabatur magis magisque in dies animus ferox inopia rei familiaris et conscientia scelerum, quae utraque iis artibus auxerat, quas supra memoravi" (5.7). Cf. Sall., *B.J.* 96.1 to 95.1 (on Sulla).

¹⁵ Tacitus makes this resumptive function explicit at *Hist.* 2.27.2: "neque enim rerum a Caecina gestarum ordinem interrumpi oportuerat." Using a cross-reference, he then summarizes earlier material before carrying on with the new account.

unnecessary for him to repeat the same material twice within four lines when the narrative's focus has changed.

Finally, cross-references assert the author's presence in his work and his control over his material. This function by itself explains very few passages, but it may underlie other more obvious purposes. Although conclusive examples are rare, Cicero, not unexpectedly, provides one clear case of a cross-reference motivated by ego. He mentions in the *De off.* that Panaetius omits a certain point (1.43.152), discusses it himself, and then says, "hic locus a Panaetio, ut supra dixi, praetermissus" (1.45.161). Cicero wants the reader to suffer no illusions about his diligence. Some of Tacitus' cross-references in the *Ann.* may arise in part from his desire to show the reader that he is aware of the limitations of annalistic structure.¹⁶ Pliny's stated concern for his reader (*Praef.* 33) indicates his own fascination with organization and may also hint that some of his cross-references, useful and practical though they may be, are also a way for him to draw attention to his own organizational labors.

In summary: cross-references in Roman prose use a limited vocabulary shared by most authors. The scroll form made exact references impossible in prose works. Writers realized this and countered the lack of precision by usually referring to nearby material and by frequently providing brief summaries for the reader's convenience.¹⁷

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¹⁶ See above page 435.

¹⁷ I would like to thank Professor Mary R. Lefkowitz of Wellesley College and the editor and anonymous referee of *AJP* for their helpful suggestions and comments, and Wellesley College for a grant in aid of my research.

THE POSITION OF THE VOCATIVE IN THE LATIN CASE SYSTEM

Latin grammars traditionally mention two characteristic features of the vocative: first, that it is the case of address or appeal; and second, that a noun in the vocative is somehow outside and independent of the rest of the sentence.¹ In a paper published in 1972 in the *American Journal of Philology*,² Robert O. Fink pursued the matter, asking whether the vocative was a case at all (62). Fink's conclusion is that the vocative should be "recognized as a construction in which the dominant element is not case but person": "it can best be described as a second-person form which is indeclinable for case" (65). In Fink's approach, the vocative is distinguished by the following features: a noun in the vocative has a second-person value, whereas nouns in the other cases have a first- or third- person value; since the vocative is "indeclinable for case," a noun in the vocative is "an all-purpose form" which can be "paired without distinction" with words in any of the other cases and can thus perform any of the functions expressed by these cases, including that of subject (64–66). The latter point appears clearly in the paradigm on page 68, where the vocative form *amice* is given as being nominative, dative, accusative, ablative and—with a question mark—genitive.

Fink is undoubtedly right in regarding the vocative as a second-person form; this character had already been noted by Greek and Latin grammarians.³ In two respects, however, his interpretation seems less than satisfactory. First, it is possible to

¹ For bibliographic references see Robert O. Fink's article (cited in the following note) 62–63.

² Robert O. Fink, "Person in Nouns: Is the Vocative a Case?" *AJP* 93 (1972) 61–68. All page references in parentheses refer to this article.

³ In Latin, see Priscian, in Heinrich Keil, *Grammatici Latini* (Leipzig: Teubner 1887; rpt. Hildesheim: Georg Olms 1961) III, 150.5–6: [*vocativus*] *transfert positionem a tertia persona ad secundam*; 204.9–10: *vocando eundem intellectu ipso vocandi facio secundam personam*. In Greek, a scholiast notes that "concerning the case order, some grammarians were of opinion that the vocative must come first, since it is in the second person, the other cases in the third person, and what is second precedes what is third." Enlightening information about classical grammarians' interpretations of the vocative is given in Gualtiero Calboli, *La linguistica moderna e il latino: I casi* (Bologna: Pàtron 1975) 95 and 102–5.

more accurately define the contrast between the vocative and the other cases if we connect it to a more general and fundamental opposition concerning not only cases but various elements in language. Second, it is difficult to subscribe to Fink's opinion that the vocative, as an all-purpose form, can combine with any of the other cases and perform the same syntactic functions. As we shall see, this view seems to result from a confusion of two radically different notions; it is therefore unacceptable.

But let us begin by considering what is implied in the statement that the vocative is a second-person form.

I

It is a well-known fact⁴ that every language utterance results from an act of speech which occurs in a certain spatio-temporal situation. This act of speech involves two participants: the speaker, who produces the utterance, and the hearer, to whom the utterance is addressed.

Among the linguistic elements used in utterances there are some whose meaning is relative to the situation of utterance and the act of speech. Some Latin examples are the adverbial of time *nunc* 'at the time of speaking,' the adverbial of place *hic* 'in the place of speaking,' and the demonstrative pronouns *hic, iste* 'proximity to the speaker, the hearer.' But the most important are the person-indicators, personal pronouns (*ego, tu*) and inflectional endings of the verb (*-o/m, -s, -t*). Although the category of person is a complex one requiring further discussion, for our present purpose it will suffice to say that both personal pronouns and inflectional endings indicate whether the referent—i.e., the person or object referred to in the utterance—is a participant in the act of speech (first and second person) or not (third person) and, if he is, whether he assumes the role of speaker (first person) or of hearer (second person). On the other hand, there are linguistic elements whose meaning concerns only the utterance with no reference to the act of speech which produces it or the situation in which it is produced. To this class belong, in Latin as well as in other languages, the elements by which syntactic relations

⁴ John Lyons, *Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics* (Cambridge, London: Cambridge University Press 1968) 275–79.

are expressed: case-inflections (*dominus, dominum*, etc.) and prepositions (*apud dominum*).

The difference between the vocative and the other cases can be considered as a particular aspect of the more general distinction between act of speech and utterances. From this point of view, it can be defined as follows: The function of the vocative relates to the act of speech which produces the utterance where the noun in the vocative occurs. In *Domine, quid est?*, for example, the vocative denotes that the referent of the noun *domine* assumes the role of hearer in the situation of utterance. The functions of the other cases, on the contrary, relate exclusively to utterances. What is denoted by the cases in *Dominus advenit, Dominum conveni, Argentum domino dedi*, is the syntactic relationship of the noun in the nominative, accusative, dative, to another constituent of the sentence. With the exception of the vocative, cases are among the means by which the structural organization of a sentence is made visible on the surface level in Latin.⁵

On the basis of the distinction between act of speech and utterances, we can identify two features in which the vocative stands apart from the other cases: 1) the vocative deals with the referent of the noun, i.e., a particular person who is real or supposedly real, whereas the other cases deal with nouns as linguistic items, with no regard to their referents; 2) the vocative marks a participant-role in the act of speech, whereas the other cases mark syntactic relationships between constituents of sentences. These distinguishing characteristics proceed from the fact that an act of speech is a concrete event: it occurs in a certain place, at a certain time, and involves the participation of specific persons. Utterances, on the contrary, are linguistic entities: they can be roughly defined as stretches of language separated by pauses, provided with a certain meaning, and made up of words in a certain relationship to one another.⁶

Having clarified the nature of the opposition between the vocative and the other cases, we are now on firmer ground to confront the question of whether the vocative itself is a case.

⁵ Two other means are the prepositions and the inflectional verb endings. On the latter point, see below, p. 443.

⁶ Lyons, *Theoretical Linguistics*, 171-72.

II

The answer to this question will obviously depend on what is meant by the word 'case.' There are at least two ways of defining this term.

From the morphological point of view, we may choose to call 'cases' the various possible forms, singular and plural, in which a noun necessarily occurs when used in utterances: for *dominus*, in the singular, *dominus*, *dominum*, etc.; in the plural, *domini*, *dominos*, etc. This set of forms, which constitutes the declension, characterizes the noun as opposed both to the verb (*dominor*, *dominarius*, etc.) and to the invariable words (*acriter*, *semel*, *cum*). In this morphological sense, it seems beyond doubt that the vocative is a case. As a matter of fact, there is no reason to separate the form *domine*, with the inflectional ending *-e*,⁷ from *dominus*, with the inflectional ending *-us*, or *dominum*, with the inflectional ending *-um*. As for *pater*, which is indistinctly a vocative or a nominative form, it does not differ in this respect from *patres*, indistinctly a nominative, vocative or accusative form, or *patribus*, indistinctly a dative or ablative form: there is identically in all three forms a morphological neutralization.

From the syntactic point of view, on the other hand, we may call 'cases' the inflectional forms in their role as indicators of the function fulfilled by the noun in the sentence, i.e., the position it occupies in the syntactic structure and its relationship to the other constituents.⁸ If the word 'case' is used in this sense, the vocative is not a case. Consider the following instances, from Plautus: *Estne hoc ut dico, Libane?* (*Asin.* 54); *Omnes parentes*,

⁷ Considered diachronically, *domine* is a zero-ending form, in contrast with *dominu-s*, *dominu-m*, etc.: stem **domine/o-* + endings **-s* (nominative), **-Ø* (vocative), **-m* (accusative), etc. But synchronically, *domine* was certainly understood by the Latin speakers in the same way as *domin-us*, *domin-um*, *domin-i*, *domin-o*, i.e., as a form with an inflectional ending *-e*; the synchronic analysis was: stem *domin-* + endings *-us*, *-e*, *-um*, *-i*, *-o*. See Manu Leumann, *Lateinische Laut- und Formenlehre* (Munich: Beck 1977) 423.

⁸ A sentence is a hierarchy of units which are in syntactic relation to one another on different levels. The sentence itself is the highest unit in the hierarchy: it includes and dominates all lower-rank constituents. For further details see Lyons, *Theoretical Linguistics*, 210–25, and Roger Fowler, *Understanding Language: An Introduction to Linguistics* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1974) 98–103.

Libane, liberis suis, / Qui mihi auscultabunt, facient obsequentiam (Asin. 64–65); *Cererin, Strobile, has sunt facturi nuptias?* (Au. 354); *Adulescens, quid est?* (Mi. 1297). In all such instances it is clear that the noun in the vocative cannot be syntactically connected to any other word. It is impossible to assign it a place in the hierarchical organization that underlies the linear sequence of words and determines its meaning. We are thus led to concur with traditional grammarians' opinion that a noun in the vocative remains outside the sentence. We might say more precisely that a noun in the vocative remains outside the syntactic structure of the sentence: it is no constituent of it. As I have already noted, however, Fink's opinion on this point is somewhat different. I will now examine more closely and discuss his interpretation.

When defining the vocative as "indeclinable for case," Fink recognizes that this form by itself gives no indication of syntactic function. But, according to him, this very characteristic enables nouns in the vocative to be linked with words in any of the other cases and thus, to fulfill the functions denoted by these cases. Thence the definition of the vocative form *amice* as: 1) "nominative, second person," versus *amicus* "nominative, first and third person"; 2) "dative, second person," versus *amico* "dative, first and third person," etc. (68). Concerning the function of subject, Fink states explicitly that in certain instances "it seems simplest and most natural to regard the vocative as the subject of the verb" (66).

At first sight, Fink's interpretation does not seem untenable: it is, *a priori*, possible to consider the vocative as an unmarked term in the case system and to assume that it is capable, as such, of a wider range of uses than any of the marked terms. On closer examination, however, there seems to be two errors in his analyses.

In his comments on examples such as Cic. *Cat. 1, 2 Ad mortem te, Catilina, duci . . . oportebat* (64–65), Fink fails to make a clear distinction between, on the one hand, the fact that two linguistic units are in syntactic relationship to each other and, on the other hand, the fact that they are co-referential, i.e., that they refer to the same person or the same object. Syntactic relationship and co-referentiality are radically different in nature and independent of each other: in *Catilinae impudentia*, the words *Catilinae* and *impudentia* are syntactically linked

(*Catilinae* determining *impudentia*), but they are not co-referential; in *cum Cicero Catilinam accusavisset, is respondit*. . . ., the words *Catilinam* and *is* are co-referential, but they are not syntactically linked. In the examples cited by Fink, the noun in the vocative is co-referential with a personal pronoun which is used in another case as required by its function in the sentence: *Catilina* and *te*, for instance. But it must not be inferred from this co-referentiality that the noun in the vocative performs the same syntactic function as the pronoun: in Cic. *Cat.* 1, 2, *Catilina* is in no syntactic relationship with the accusative *te*; unlike *te*, it remains outside the syntactic structure of the sentence.⁹

In examples such as Cic. *Cat.* 1, 1 *Quo usque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra?* (66), on the other hand, Fink fails to recognize the syntactic function of the inflectional verb endings in Latin. Consider the sentence: *Quo usque tandem abutere patientia nostra?* It is possible to introduce an adjective in the nominative, for instance: *Quo usque tandem impudicus abutere patientia nostra?* The adjective *impudicus* necessarily derives its case and number from some 'nominal'¹⁰ element which it modifies and with which it agrees. Its presence therefore proves that the sentence contains such a 'nominal' element. This element is not realized morphologically as a second-person pronoun: its surface-realization is the verbal ending *-re*. It is included in any sentence containing *-re* and functions as subject. Consequently, in Cic. *Cat.* 1, 1, the subject of the verb is not the vocative *Catilina*; it is rather the 'nominal' element realized in the verbal ending *-re*, just as in the above sentences without *Catilina*. The vocative form *Catilina* denotes that the person named Catiline assumes the participant-role of hearer in the act of speech, that he is the one to whom the speaker's *Quo usque tandem*. . . . is addressed. But it does not fulfill the function of subject, or any other syntactic function, in the sentence. It is co-referential only with the 'nominal' element realized by the verbal ending *-re*.¹¹

⁹ Fink's terms (the vocative "is linked with," "paired with," "combines with") lack precision; they give no hint of the difference between syntactic relationship and co-referentiality.

¹⁰ By 'nominal element,' I mean an abstract element characterized by certain syntactic properties common to the noun and the pronoun, as opposed to the adjective. See my article: "Le problème de la 'personne' (particulièrement en latin)," *L'Information Grammaticale* 2 (1979) 39-46.

¹¹ A further objection to Fink's interpretation is that it fails to take into account the melodic factors in speech. See below, p. 445f.

III

To conclude the above discussions, I would replace Fink's definition of the vocative as "a second-person form which is indeclinable for case" by the following one: the vocative is an inflectional form of the noun—i.e., a case, in the morphological sense of the term—whose value is relative not to the utterance itself, but to the act of speech that produces the utterance; it denotes the *role assumed by the referent of the noun as a participant in the act of speech*, whereas the other cases mark the *syntactic function of the noun as a constituent of the sentence*.

This definition clarifies the characteristic features of the vocative as well as of the other cases. That the vocative concerns exclusively the act of speech accounts both for the second-person value of the noun in the vocative and for its lack of syntactic function. As for the other cases, the fact that they concern not the act of speech, but the utterance, accounts for the two features by which they contrast with the vocative: a noun in any other case fulfills some syntactic function in the sentence; it bears no indication regarding the role of the referent in the act of speech: it is undetermined with respect to person.¹²

There is an additional advantage in our definition of the vocative: it enables us to state precisely what a vocative noun such as *domine* and the second-person pronoun *tu, te, tibi* have in common, and in what ways they differ. Both *domine* and *tu, te, tibi* are second-person forms: they denote that their referent assumes the role of hearer in the act of speech. But this indication is given by the case, the inflectional form of the noun, in *domine*, whereas it is conveyed by the stem of the pronoun in *tu, te, tibi* (*tu*, as opposed to *ego, ille*, etc.). Moreover, in both the vocative noun and the pronoun, the second-person meaning is paired with another indication: in *domine*, the indication, conveyed by the lexeme *domin-* and constituting its 'sense,' that the referent is the 'master of the house'; in *tu, te, tibi*, the indication, conveyed by the inflectional form, of the syntactic function fulfilled by the pronoun in the sentence. It appears therefore that

¹² I do not agree with Fink's opinion that *amicus, amicun*, etc., are in the first and third person. I think, on the contrary, that the noun fundamentally lacks the category of person. This problem is discussed in my article: "La personne du nom: 3e personne et absence de personne." *BSLP* 75 (1980) 1, 267–83.

the pronoun *tu, te, tibi* concerns both the act of speech (role of hearer) and the utterance (syntactic function), whereas the vocative *domine* concerns only the act of speech; the indication 'master of the house' regards neither the act of speech nor the utterance, as it is attached to the noun independently of its use in any utterance.

The explanations so far given seem to have established beyond question that the vocative is fundamentally different from all other cases. Nevertheless, there is one case with which the vocative appears to be in close relationship: the nominative. We must examine this further problem and investigate the nature of the vocative-nominative relationship in Latin.

IV

It has often been pointed out that the morphological distinction between the vocative and the nominative is largely neutralized in Latin. As a matter of fact, the two cases are distinct only in the singular of the so-called 'second declension' and, even in this area, only for nouns such as *domine : dominus, amice : amicus*, etc. The fact that the form of the vocative is identical with that of the nominative is partly the result of phonetic changes which have obliterated the original differences between the forms of the two cases; for instance, **patēr : patēr > patēr : patēr* (gr. *πατήρ : πάτερ*), **pueros : puere > puer : puer*. But more often it results from the nominative form being used as a vocative, causing the vocative form to fall out of use and eventually disappear; for instance, *homō* instead of **homōn* (gr. *δαίμων : δαῖμον*), *civis* instead of **civi* (gr. *πόλις : πόλι*). Even with nouns that retain in Latin a vocative morphologically distinct from the nominative, the nominative form can be used as a vocative: *Da, meus ocellus, mea rosa, mi anime* . . . (Plt. *Asin.* 664).¹³

It may be assumed that the vocative-nominative morphological distinction was virtually eliminated in Latin because it was redundant and therefore unnecessary. Consider the following instance: *Domine, quid est?* The noun *domine* was characterized as a vocative by the inflectional ending *-e*; but, judging from what can be observed in modern languages, it must have been

¹³ J. B. Hofmann and Anton Szantyr, *Lateinische Syntax und Stilistik* (Munich: Beck 1965) 24-25.

characterized by some melodic features as well: a special intonation and a pause setting it apart from the rest of the utterance. Even when the noun used as a vocative had no specific form, it presented these melodic features and was thus adequately characterized: *Adulescens / quid est?* (Plt. *Mi.* 1297); *Ad mortem te / Catilina / duci . . . oportebat* (Cic. *Cat.* 1, 2). These melodic features are not directly perceptible to us, as Latin is a dead language known only through the medium of written documents, but modern languages show that melodic factors in general play an important part in syntax.¹⁴ We might therefore reasonably admit that in Latin, the melodic features were considered by the speakers to be the real marks of the vocative since they characterized every noun used in the vocative, whether or not its form was distinct from that of the nominative. Thus, in *Domine, quid est?*, the inflectional ending *-e* must have seemed redundant and useless by comparison with *Pater, quid est?*, *Adulescens, quid est?* Since a noun in the vocative was always melodically marked, an inflectional mark was superfluous and could easily disappear.¹⁵

Concerning the vocative-nominative relationship in Latin, a last question might be raised: why was the form of the nominative, rather than that of any other case, used as a vocative? An obvious answer is that the phonetic changes mentioned above caused the vocative to become morphologically identical with the nominative rather than with another case. But a more important factor may have been the value of the nominative case itself. There is no space to enter into detailed explanations here. Let us state briefly that the nominative can be regarded as the case of the subject, i.e., a sentence-constituent which is *syntactically linked to* another, the predicate, but *does not depend on* it, is not

¹⁴ See, for instance, M. A. K. Halliday, *Intonation and Grammar in British English* (The Hague: Mouton 1967) 31–48, and, concerning French, Mario Rossi, "L'intonation et la troisième articulation," *BSLP* 72 (1977) 1, 55–68.

¹⁵ It is significant that the melodic marks of the vocative agree to a certain extent with the value assigned to the case. The difference between *Pater advenit* 'My father has arrived,' without any pause, and *Pater / advenit* 'Father, he/she has arrived,' with a pause (and a specific intonation for the word *pater*), shows the contrast between *pater* in the nominative, which is syntactically a constituent of the sentence, and *pater* in the vocative, which is syntactically outside the sentence.

subordinate to it.¹⁶ Constituents in all other cases, on the contrary, are not only linked to another constituent of the sentence, but depend on it; for example: *amo* ← *patrem*, *domus* ← *patris*, *do* ← *patri*, *doctior* ← *patre* (the arrow-heads indicate the dependence of a lower-rank constituent on a higher-rank one). It is the character of syntactic non-dependence attached to the nominative case which must have qualified the nominative form, more than any other inflectional form in Latin, to carry the melodic marks of the vocative and to function in complete syntactic independence.

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¹⁶ The nature of the relationship between subject and predicate is one of the most difficult problems in linguistics. The bibliography is considerable. Among recent publications on the subject, see Jacques Veyrenc, "Le schéma grammatical de la proposition," *BSLP* 74 (1979) 1, 25–42. In Latin, there is reason to suspect that the predicate may be subordinate to the subject. But this question cannot be examined here.

REVIEWS

A.W. GOMME, A. ANDREWES and K. J. DOVER. A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, Vol. V: Book VIII. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981. Pp. 520. \$74.00.

In November of 1944, when Hitler's forces had just been driven out of Greece and the Balkans, Arnold Wycombe Gomme composed the preface to the first volume of his projected *Historical Commentary on Thucydides*. There he announced that the work would appear in three volumes—the first entailing the Introduction and commentary on Book I, a second on the Archidamian War, and a third on the remainder of the text. Volumes II and III did not appear until 1956, the delay evidently being due to the appalling theft of Gomme's notes, and when they did appear they met with even more critical acclaim than had Vol. I (Victor Ehrenberg taking the occasion to observe somewhat unnecessarily that Gomme's *Thucydides* and also Walbank's *Polybius* were "models of methods of scholarship typical for the country of their origin. Nowhere else but in Britain," Ehrenberg wrote, do "we still find such detailed, scrupulous and necessarily shapeless works of analysis" [*Historia*, 7 (1958) 251]). In the preface to Volumes II and III, Gomme explained that the length of the commentary had made it imperative for him to devote not one but two volumes to the Archidamian War, and hence the whole project would take *four* volumes instead of three. He also expressed his regret at the twelve-year gap which separated the appearance of the first volume from that of the second and third and recorded his hope that the fourth and last volume would be finished within a much shorter time. N. G. L. Hammond, writing two years later in the *Classical Review*, took the occasion to "wish [Gomme] well on the final stage of this great work of twentieth century scholarship" (*CR* 8 [1958] 33). But Gomme died shortly after these words were printed, and in 1970, when Vol. IV appeared, the dust jacket proclaimed that actually a *fifth* volume yet remained. . . . We begin to suspect that we are in a Monty Python film on Zeno's paradox; but now in 1981 the truly final volume has appeared—largely the work of Andrewes and Dover, though Gomme left a few manuscript notes which are cited where appropriate—and the commentary is complete.

Scholars hoping to find in this tome a worthy successor to earlier volumes in the series will not be disappointed. The work of Andrewes and Dover in completing Vol. IV had already made clear (if there was ever the slightest doubt) their eminent suitability to the monumental task which they had assumed. (Whether their formidable skills derived from having been educated in Britain or from some other source we shall, of course, never know.) The present volume includes commentary on the entirety of Book VIII, entailing one short excursus (27–32) on the ships involved in the Aegean war and a long and invaluable one (184–256) on sources for the revolution of the Four Hundred; the latter

includes full commentary on *Ath. Pol.* 29–33 (the text of which might better have been included for easy reference, though this has not been the custom in the series). There are also two appendices. The first, by Andrewes, on “Indications of Incompleteness” is concerned with what unrevised portions of Thucydides’ *History* may have to tell us about his methods of work; the second, by Dover, on “Strata of Composition” is much longer: it surveys and analyzes the arguments which can be advanced to distinguish earlier and later strata in the *History*. A chronological table for the years 421–411 is also included, picking up from the table which Gomme himself had provided in Vol. III, pp. 716–21. The list of *addenda* in the back of the book covers not only this volume but also the account of the topography and battle of Mantinea which had appeared in Vol. IV, pp. 94–102, since the authors wished to modify this account in the light of W. Kendrick Pritchett’s *Studies in Ancient Topography* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1969); and there are three indices (a general one, a Greek one and an *index locorum*) which blessedly cover all five volumes in the series.

Book VIII has always occupied a special place in Thucydidean scholarship. Already in antiquity Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Marcellinus had observed that the eighth book differed in several respects from the other seven, and most nineteenth- and twentieth-century critics (with the notable exception of Eduard Meyer) have tended to view the book as insufficiently well organized, written earlier than the other books and never properly revised. Andrewes and Dover manage to address this problem at junctures where it is appropriate without allowing their concern over questions of composition and completeness to take on the character of an obsession, and they have held back too from the impulse (so often discernible in Steup) to emend the text to say what they would prefer Thucydides to have written. They provide a number of long notes—on the shadowy Five Thousand, for example, on the date of the ostracism of Hyperbolus, and on the words *ζυνομοσία* and *ἐταιρεία*—and have strewn their commentary generously with pertinent references to both primary sources and secondary literature. They have also assembled important prosopographical data on several puzzling figures—Peisander and Phrynichus, for instance, about whom we know too little, and Antiphon, about whom we know both too little and too much. An additional citation or two might be proposed: the discussion of Hyperbolus on pp. 257–64 makes no reference to the article of Charles Fuqua, “Possible Implications of the Ostracism of Hyperbolus,” *TAPA* 96 (1965) 165–79 or to the several articles of Camon, and the references to Mogens Herman Hansen’s work in the *addenda* do not entirely make good the failure to refer to his monographs on *ἐισαγγελία* and the *γραφὴ παρανόμων* in the appropriate places (esp. pp. 168, 216).

Gomme stressed in the preface of 1944 that the *HCT* was to be a commentary on Thucydides and “not a history of Greece.” Happily, as the work progressed this distinction was increasingly blurred, and Andrewes and Dover have performed a magnificent service in carrying this closet history of Greece down to the end of Thucydides’ narrative.

2. The book is divided into six chapters, each chapter being divided into several sections. Practically all problems connected with the person of the author, his work, and his readers are discussed. The volume is completed by an appendix (155–62, *Dramatis Personae* and “List of Places”), a “Selected Bibliography” (173–81, but on p. 175 the title “Translations” ought to read “English Translations”) and an Analytical Index (182–87). All this seems very useful to the “general reader,” for whom the book is intended (10) and for whose benefit all Greek terms have been transliterated; but the book will be no less useful to the specialist (although he might appreciate a list of all the passages in which the two protagonists appear, even though they are many).

3. Some parts of the book, in my opinion, deserve special attention. Chapter 2, “Analysis of the Ephesian Novel of Habrocomes and Anthia”, summarizes the plot of the novel and its organization, but the summary is enriched by a long series of observations which are always plausible, often ingenious. Let me quote a few: p. 40 “The pattern of alternating instead of complementing/adding/filling-in/contrasting/comparing obtains throughout the novel”; p. 51 on Anthia and Habrocomes “wherever she was last, he is now; when she leaves a place, he arrives”; p. 54 “there are no internal standards that the characters apply, nor are there any externally applied values”; p. 73 “it is a kind of poetic justice that the passive, and sometimes uninterested, Habrocomes should be the last to discover that his months of travel and searching are almost at an end.” Once in a while, S. resorts to irony: p. 64 “the governor is very busy (as are all governors)”; p. 68 “the net result in all three plots (sc. of Habrocomes, Anthia and Aigialeus) is that all must make sea voyages.” If there is anything that puzzles this reviewer it is the statement (66) that “heroes (sc. in Greek novels) do not normally kill people—and heroines even much less.” I can think of Heliodorus’ Charicleia who shoots arrows against her enemies with careless cruelty (Heliodorus 5.32.3 ἡ δὲ . . . ἀπὸ τῆς νεῶς ἐτόξευεν εὔσκοπα; 5.32.4 καὶ ἐβαλλεν οὐ καθ’ ἐν τῆς μάχης μέρος, ἀλλ’ ὅντινα πρῶτον ἴδοι τοῦτον ἀνῆλίσκεν).

4. Chapter 3, “The Structure and Nature of Xenophon’s Writing”, is equally interesting. The author shows how well organized the novel is (p. 84 “The structure is both sound and reasonable”), even though the episodes are given more play than the overall plot (p. 82 “the episodes in the plot fill out the plot without meaning anything”), and the novelist is more concerned with adventures than with psychology (p. 86 “the novel is crude because the leading characters are weak”; p. 83 “the structure develops but the characters do not”; cf. also p. 102). Among the characters Hippothous stands out, because of his whimsical, believable personality, so different from the predictable passiveness of all the others. The rhythm of the narrative is based on “alternation” (distant symmetrical effects with ‘telescopic’ correspondences; cf. G. Genette, *Figure III. Discorso del racconto*, Italian transl., Turin, 1976, p. 122); the author tends to believe, not quite correctly, in my opinion, that this is more of a syntactic or expressive phenomenon rather than one relating to content and narrative (93). This rhythm frequently (93 ff.) uses “recapitulations”

(the "analessi omodiegetiche" of G. Genette, op. cit., 99ff.) and (89ff.) "foreshadowings" (the "prolessi" of G. Genette, p. 115); they are less frequent in Xenophon's novel, because they are statistically less frequent in Western literature. On the other hand there are hardly any descriptive pauses (p. 95 "Xenophon describes neither people nor things").

5. There is a discussion (104-11) whether this work ought to be defined as a "novel" or a "romance." For a reader whose native tongue is not English, this may be less pertinent than the rest of the book. The author would prefer to call it a "novel," because of certain realistic implications. In Italian (and not only in Italian) the distinction between the two literary forms is of a different nature than the one which is here presented. On the other hand there are some very interesting conclusions which result from this discussion. They show, in fact, that Xenophon's novel contains a large number of testimonies about the world which the novelist knew and refers to (even unconsciously). In fact, he "serves no tribal or civic function" (112), because he "writes for a group which sees the Empire only darkly." The book, therefore (113), is "apolitical, personal and representative of alienated men in the great Empire," but it is also strongly, though in a rather confused manner (114), permeated by religious feeling. This does not mean (117) that the *Ephesiaca*, as a novel, serve as propaganda for the mystery religions, as R. Merkelbach and R. E. Witt maintained. But there is a striking mixture between eroticism and sublimation—religious sublimation; on the proximity and analogy of the two experiences, see G. Bataille, *Histoire de l'érotisme*, in *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. VII, Paris 1976, p. 88. This, too, after all, is a testimony of the *Zeitgeist*. Moreover, in my opinion, it is absolutely true that (116) opinions and prejudices expressed by characters are probably those felt by Xenophon to represent the feelings of his audience," that (117) "prejudices (sc. of Xenophon) were also the prejudices of his world," and that some characters represent (123) "a clearly defined individual, most probably drawn from life and not from tradition." Still, one must admit that the work is "escape-literature," the representation of an "ideal world" (134), that imaginary and quite turgid reality known to the author (and, thanks to him, indirectly also known to us).

6. In ch. 6, "Audience and Readers of Xenophon", S. tries to define what kind of public Xenophon of Ephesus might have had. He concludes that it must have been a "middle-class" group (133) which means, in this case, a "sentimental group," not an economic class. But also, I might add, a wide-spread group, geographically speaking, even though small in numbers—a group of people who knew Greek and spoke that language which was, even in the Eastern part of the Roman Empire, a foreign language, imported and superimposed on local dialects.

7. I hope that it has become clear from what I have said that Schmeling's book is substantial and highly informative; it is also very readable. I am thinking especially of references to the movies (45; 50; 91; 134), to television (92); Verdi (58); Glazunov (81); Wodehouse (91); Segal (138). I am also thinking of Schmeling's straightforward but rather sophisti-

cated style. He states that he does not have great respect for Xenophon of Ephesus; I wonder what kind of a book he might have written, if he admired and loved him.

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LESLIE THREATTE. *The Grammar of Attic Inscriptions*. Vol. I: Phonology. Berlin & New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1980. Pp. xxxv + 737. V. I.: \$137.50.

The preface of this very comprehensive treatment of the phonology of Attic inscriptions begins with a brief account of the grammars which preceded it—*Meisterhans, Grammatik der attischen Inschriften*, 1885, second edition 1888, third edition by E. Schwyzler 1890. Each of these marked an advance over its predecessor, both in use of new collections of inscriptions and in other respects, and yet the discovery of new inscriptions since 1900, especially in the Agora but also in other sites inside and outside Athens, has been so extensive that a new treatment of the language of the whole corpus of inscriptions was long overdue. Additional reasons include the correction of letters on some inscriptions which previously had been erroneously read and the correction of dates wrongly assigned. In a considerable number of instances Threatte has personally checked questionable readings, and (L.) (= lapis) after a citation means that he has made such a check, or usually in the case of inscriptions from Eleusis that he has had the benefit of an examination of the stone by Kevin Clinton, whose help he has acknowledged on p. x. The treatment of standard orthography and of deviations from the standard is carried out with ample discussion and abundant documentation in the form of citations from epigraphical collections, and due regard is regularly given to chronology (archaic, fifth century, fourth century, Hellenistic, Roman) and to type of inscription (decrees, inventories, dedications, sepulchral monuments, defixiones, dipinti on vases, and other types). Thr. is also much preoccupied with the problem of distinguishing those spelling aberrations which have phonological significance—that is, those which permit inferences to be drawn regarding pronunciation—from those which are simply careless errors, and, other things being equal, deviations are more likely to be placed in the latter category if they occur in texts which are marred by a rather large number of clearly identified errors. Popular etymology is not frequently called in to explain orthographical peculiarities, though we find an example on p. 167, where *Ἡφαιστιάδης* (on a text of the fourth century B.C.) for *Ἰφιστιάδης* is attributed to false association with *Ἡφαιστος*; and on p. 194 *χείρων* for original *χίρων* under the influence of *χείρ* is suggested as a possible alternative to the theory that *χίρων* represents an early instance of a change from [ē] to [ī]. Over-correction is also not frequently given as the explanation of spelling errors, and yet

the principle is implicit in certain instances; on p. 638, for example, it is suggested that such spellings as *ἐπιδέμοι τρεῖς* (early fifth century, pre-Ionic alphabet) reflect the hesitation between e.g. *τομ* and *τον* before labials; and on p. 532 late instances of incorrect *-λλ-* and *-pp-* are attributed to a simplification of genuine *-λλ-* and *-pp-* in the speech of some speakers with a consequent uncertainty about correct writing of geminate liquids. All in all we have here a work the writing of which must have involved an incredible amount of labor and patience and the usefulness of which to scholars, especially to epigraphists and students of the Greek language, could not be exaggerated; in other words, a book which a reviewer could scarcely praise too highly.

As is usual in a work of this kind, several minor matters call for brief comment. Pp. 25–26 contain discussion of *ph lh mh* ([Φρ]εαφιο[ς], Φρεαφφιος, Μηεακλες, Αηαβετος, etc.), their probable value as voiceless *p l m*, and their relation to Homeric scansion. There is no suggestion of a laryngeal explanation here, but for some *lh-* and *mh-* forms such an explanation is sometimes offered. Regarding *μεγα-* *μεγαλ-* and their responsibility for length by position in Homer see G. M. Messing, *HSCP* 56–57 (1947) 184, R. S. P. Beekes, *The Development of the Indo-European Laryngeals in Greek* (The Hague/Paris, 1969) 153–54, 161, 180.—P. 132: Thr. cites the form *ἐγγυατη*[ν]—11²2498.5 (321/0 B.C.) for *ἐγγυατη-* as “without parallel,” and on 136 *καφυνᾶθεν* on a bronze dedication by a native of Arcadia (late sixth or early fifth century) is cited as a case of *ā* where an Athenian would write *η*. This raises the question of the application of the Attic rule *ā* after *ε ι ρ, η* elsewhere, to the quality of the long final vowel if preceded by *υ*. There is some fluctuation, with a number of doublets (e.g. *ἐγγύη/ā, δόξυη/ā, δαστρυή/ā, σπύυη/ā*), and in general the attestation, in comparison with that for *-εā, -īā, -ρā*, is so poor that it is difficult to formulate a rule; cf. Schwyzler, *Gr. Gr.*, pp. 187–89, Lejeune, *Traité de phonétique grecque*, p. 139.—P. 160: Here the history of some of the front vowels is discussed in the light of their representation on Attic inscriptions, and the table from Sturtevant's *Pronunciation of Greek and Latin*, p. 39, is presented. It is generally recognized that in classical Attic the short vowel *ε* was more close, the long vowel *η* more open in quality, but eventually *η* was raised so as to become identical with *ι τ*, while *ε* became an open vowel, merging with the gradually monophthongized *αι*, phonemic distinctions of vowel quantity being meanwhile abolished as a system of stress accent replaced the old pitch accent; yet a certain problem is involved. Thr. says “. . . the two sounds *ε* and *η* probably came to be more like each other in quality in the course of these developments.” Yet they cannot have merged, or else their subsequent history would have had to be the same. Presumably their difference of quantity must have remained intact during the time that *ε* was being lowered and *η* raised, thus preventing merging.—Pp. 179–83, 185–88 contain tables for the period between the introduction of the Ionic alphabet and the middle of the third century B.C. showing the representation of original *ει* and the secondary diphthong written *ει* in standard orthography (Buck's “spuri-

ous diphthong"). So many are the possible sources of the diphthong that it is sometimes difficult at first glance to assign a form to the proper category. It does not seem justifiable, however, to separate *κλείσοφος*, *κλείδημος* (in the non-original column along with *εἶνας*, *εἶχον*, etc.) from *-κλείδης* (under inherited diphthongs); since all the forms are derivatives of the root contained in *κλέος* < **klewos*, and since all contain an *ει* without ablaut-variants *ι*, *οι* in cognate forms, all must owe their *ει* to contraction.—P. 211: The full text of the dedication in I²820 (perhaps before about 490 B.C.) is *Ἑρμῆν Εὐφρονίδεσι τόνδε καλίας ἐπέεσε*, and the meter is declared in *IG* to be glyconic from *Ἑρμῆν* through *καλι*, adoneus from *ας* to the end. I find too many syllables for a glyconic; if we set a diaeresis after *τόνδε*, we would have an almost perfect priapean verse, were it not for the final syllable of *τόνδε*, which makes the first half too long by one syllable. But Thr. may easily be right in doubting that any verse at all is intended here.—P. 243: again the question of inherited and secondary diphthongs arises, this time in connection with *τούτων*, placed in the column for inherited diphthongs. If Frisk, Chantaine and others are right in deriving the first part of *οὔτος* etc. from *ὄ*, *το-* plus a particle *υ*, we must have a case of vowel contraction, though admittedly a very early one.—P. 419: in I²834.18 *τὰ δικάϊ ὅπως* there is not an elision of *αι* but of *α* after *αι*.—P. 451: *Περρεφ[α]ττη, ἀρκεθέωρος, Ἄρκεφῶν, Εὐτύφρων* are cited beside the forms *Φερρέφαττα, ἀρχεθέωρος, Ἀρχεφῶν, Εὐθύφρων* with normal orthography. Schwyzler, *Gr. Gr.* p. 261 calls attention to the stronger tendency in epigraphical texts to show dissimilation of aspirates affecting the prior member of compounds, in contrast to literary texts which here favor etymological rather than phonetic spelling; in other words Grassmann's Law may cross a morpheme boundary, but its effect in such cases is seldom shown in literary texts. Schwyzler cites some of the same examples found in Thr., in addition to a few others, including some from dialects.

There are a one-page list of addenda, an index of Greek words, and an index of subjects. At a number of places through the text reference is made to the forthcoming *Morphology*, which will make up Vol. II. All who have had an opportunity to become familiar with the first volume are certain to await eagerly the appearance of the second.

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PAUL CARTLEDGE. *Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History 1300–362 B.C.* London, Boston, and Henley, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979. Pp. xv + 410. 19 figures. \$22.50.

In a distinct, characteristic style Paul Cartledge has given us an integrated, regional history of Sparta and Lakonia. The Lakonia of the title, like the idea of a regional history, is momentarily puzzling; and its explanation gives a sense of the work. The term Lakonia, first occurring

in late Roman or medieval times, serves conveniently *because* "it has no exact political denotation for the period chiefly under consideration in this book, c. 1300/ to 362. It should serve as a constant reminder that the size of Lakonia varied directly in proportion to the strength and inclinations of the inhabitants of its central place, which from about 1500 has been located in the vicinity of the modern Sparta" (4). Broadly speaking, Cartledge's purpose is to produce an innovative history that does expository justice to both the Spartans and the territory they unified and exploited. Internal political developments at Sparta are not his concern. He pores over the available evidence—archaeological, environmental, philological, epigraphic, and even occasionally (dare I say it?) numismatic. Readers will not always agree with the author's conclusions, especially those for the properly historical period, but to the extent that he succeeds, Cartledge's study is informative, not ordinary, and useful to keep at hand, though his treatment can be uneven.

The work is organized into four parts. Summarizing Cartledge's main points in each part as I proceed will help to convey a sense of the shape and diversity of his argument. Part I (chaps. 1–4) details the boundaries, physical setting, and climate of the region; it also surveys the stone and bronze ages to c. 1300. We learn interesting things: Sparta's climate today probably resembles closely that of the fourth century B.C. though it has not remained constant. And curious things: "present-day pattern of settlement is dictated by consideration of security rather than accessibility to natural resources, a reversal of ancient priorities" (18). For the stone and bronze ages, Cartledge adeptly spins a consecutive account without depending on the illusion of secure dates; instead, he emphasizes the relationships, interconnected or disjointed, among our different pieces of evidence. Systematic excavations have been too few, and the region between Paros and Taygetus is not so well known as Argolis or Messenia. Lakonia has not shown the two, or possibly three, characteristics of EH civilization elsewhere on the mainland. No structure indicates an individual or family group dominating a settlement; the "Mediterranean triad" (grain, wine, olives) is not attested; nor are there the controversial destructions by supposed Greek-speaking IE invaders or anyone else. Surface surveys show 30–40 EH settlements spread over all the main geological subdivisions of Lakonia. The number of settlements contracts to 20–30 sites in MH times; their pattern shifts to the "acropolis" type; and gray and yellow Minyan ware and matt-painted pottery, already familiar elsewhere on the mainland, now appear. Finally, by LH II—the fifteenth century—tholos tombs exist in three of Lakonia's six main subregions; and the most striking one at Vapheio marks a distinct change in Lakonian social, economic and political organization: hereafter the center of gravity in Lakonia lies firmly in the Spartan basin. By LH IIIB Kythera has lost its Cretan and transmarine flavor and is firmly aligned, for the time being, with the sites in mainland Lakonia.

Part II (chaps. 5–10) on pre-classical Lakonia c. 1300–500 begins with a parenthetical discussion of oral tradition as an historical source.

(Kinaithon, Tyrtaios, Alkman, and Stesichoros are placed in an intellectual background that reaches to Plato, but the Homeric poems are relegated to an appendix.) This discussion is necessary since Sparta produced no historian of its own, and since our historiographical tradition therefore depends on hearsay and the appraisal of outsiders. Then he resumes: settlement-pattern, relatively dense in the thirteenth century and concentrated in the Eurotas valley, declined between LH IIIB and LH IIIC, with nearly two-thirds fewer inhabited sites and with noticeable population increases at Amyklai and Epidauros Limeri. Mycenae effected the twelfth-century destructions, and this explains why the invaders and victims are not archaeologically distinct. Between c. 1050 and c. 950 Lakonia appears, archaeologically at least, to have been unpopulated, though indirect evidence and logic suggest a vastly reduced and sparse population of Mycenaean holdovers. The Dorians, however, *are* archaeologically attested: "Lakonian PG cannot be simply derived either from an antecedent Mycenaean style in Lakonia or from a contemporary PG style elsewhere" (87). Cultural isolation and deprivation explain the long life of Lakonian PG from c. 950–900 to c. 750. Thus Cartledge modifies but does not discard ancient tradition about historical Lakonia and Dorian Sparta. Sparta did not lead in eighth-century developments (writing, colonization, metal-working advances, the shaping of the Homeric poems). The drive for social and political unity in Lakonia and the expansion into Messenia, which made some Spartans the richest men in Greece, underlie the so-called Renaissance of c. 775–650. Taras, in fact, not authorized by the state at first, was approved only after the success of a few enterprising families. The consolidation of Lakonia c. 650–490 is marked chiefly by Cartledge's discussion of the Achaeanizing propaganda of Chilon (eponymous ephor c. 556), by his detailed analysis of the policies of Kleomenes I, and by his hesitant acceptance of the ill-attested helot revolt in Messenia in 491. The author concludes this part with an engaging and complex discussion of the status and character of the helots and perioikoi. (Modern scholars generally underestimate the helots' antipathy towards the Spartiates.) He invokes Finley's "sixth-century revolution" to explain the gradual, not sudden, decline to the "philistine Sparta" of Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle. This revolution was "a complex and gradual transformation of the Spartan social system designed to perpetuate Spartan control over the Helots and Perioikoi without abolishing the wide and growing disparities within the citizen body itself" (156).

Here the book divides into two thematic units. Taken together, Parts I and II form the more compelling unit. They depend primarily on archaeological evidence and are informed by the research and writing of the author's unpublished doctoral dissertation, *Early Sparta c. 950–650: An Archaeological and Historical Study* (Oxford 1975). In these parts the evidence best meets the author's purpose and method: "As I hope to show, it is the conditions of production, the economic basis of human society, which in the long run explain the nature and direction of social and political change" (11). Every archaeologist is, to some degree, a

materialist, and Cartledge's premise is not a bad one. He intends to avoid "categories of social analysis . . . in the form of laws from which deductions may automatically be made" (8), and he acknowledges other limitations in interpreting material data.

The predominantly literary evidence of Parts III and IV shapes the rest of the book and does not show the author at his best. "The most serious and glaring symptom of internal contradictions was the catastrophic decline in the full citizen population, that 'oliganthropia' through which, as Aristotle ('Pol.' 1270a33f.) laconically put it, 'Sparta was destroyed.' This will be the major theme throughout the rest of this book" (157). My objection is historiographical and literary, not ideological. As *oliganthrōpia* works itself out in the narrative, it looks like one of those "laws from which deductions may automatically be made." In Parts I and II Cartledge used ingenuity in resisting archaeological oversimplification and in reconstituting complex events. In Parts III and IV, however, he risks causal and thematic oversimplification.

To return to our summary of the book, classical Lakonia c. 500–362 is treated in Part III (chaps. 11–13). The onset of *oliganthrōpia* came in the decade between Marathon and Thermopylae. Its indications can be elusive. For example, Herodotus forgot the 900 or 1,000 perioikoi at Thermopylae who are the first perioikoi known to have campaigned with the Spartiates. (Perioikoi and Spartiates were not yet brigaded together as they were in Mantinea in 418, and possibly as early as 425 at Sphakteria when the shift from an "obal" to a "moral" army seems already to have been effected.) Military reforms reflect *oliganthrōpia*, and Cartledge's litany of evidence for the demographic decline is familiar: Spartiate numbers present or available at Mantinea in 418, at Nemea River in 394, at Leuktra in 371—all measured against the 8,000 available in 480. Cartledge also duly notes that after 1,200 Lakedaimonians were lost at Olynthus in 381, Sparta significantly relied on its only recorded Lakedaimonian force of volunteers drawn from Spartiates of inferior status and from the better perioikoi. As *oliganthrōpia* worsens, the danger of helot revolts increase. Plato knew of a revolt in 491, and Cartledge thinks "that the 'secretiveness' of the Spartans (Thuc. 5.68.2) may have concealed from Thucydides or his source an abortive Helot uprising, in which Pausanias was somehow implicated" (214). The earthquake of c. 464 killed numerous Spartiates (though not as many as others have thought), initiated the Third Messenian War, and did *not* spur the known army reforms between 479 and 418. (The perioikoi were restless too. The Argive tablet honoring the prexenos Gnosstas appealed to perioikic sympathies in northern Lakonia.) After the earthquake, Tolmides urged *epiteichismos* as a strategy for the Athenians to exploit the antagonism between Spartiates and helots, a lesson passed on to Demosthenes, Nicias, and Konon. Significantly, Naupaktos Messenians fought on the Athenian side at Mothone in 431 and their presence at Pylos after 425 was meant to rouse their oppressed fellow nationals. (Later Messenian exiles perhaps advised Konon to ravage Lakonia from Melos in 393). In any case, the 700 Brasideioi and the 2,000 murdered

helot dissidents show Sparta's exceptional need in 424 to reduce its helot population. The surviving Brasideioi, once freed on completion of service, did not receive land grants in Triphylia nor did they become Neodamodeis, i.e. new citizens, a status attested only between 421 and 370–369. (Neodamodeis, however, were a partial remedy for *oliganthrōpia*, as is shown by their dramatic increase between 413 when 600 select helots and Neodamodeis were assigned to Sicily and 396 when 2,000 Neodamodeis formed Agesilaus' main Spartan corps in Asia.) The missing ingredient in Cartledge's formula, *stasis*, appeared in summer of 421 when the returned POWs taken at Sphakteria were temporarily deprived of full citizen rights, but only after 404–403 did it become problematic. The machinations of Lysander and Pausanias in 403 and afterwards unsettled the land, but Kinadon in c. 399, like the Theban ambassadors to Athens in 395, hoped to rouse equally well-armed subjects against their Spartiate rulers. In 393 and 392 the "union of Argos and Corinth" combined with Pharnabazus and Konon's *epiteichismos* at Kythera to prompt the initiatives of Antalkidas. When the King's Peace came, it reflected the "lakonizing" of the Great King, as Agesilaos knew, and underlined both Sparta's self-interest and its weakness. By 382 the Peloponnesian League was war-weary, as the hiring of mercenaries shows; and in 382–381 only forcibly winning over and silencing the opposition at Sparta averted *stasis*. Sparta's luck ran out with Agesilaos' in 378, Kleombrotos' in 376, and the navy's also in 376. After Leuktra dissatisfaction with Spartan rule brought Epameinondas and the inevitable. The revolt of the Messenian helots, their liberation, and the (re)founding of Messene deprived Sparta of what had been for three centuries the economic basis of its might (*quod erat demonstrandum*). After 366 Sparta was isolated diplomatically, and its refusal to swear the Common Peace on the battlefield at Mantinea in 362 was merely pathetic.

Part IV (chaps. 14–15) serves as a brief epilogue giving the author's results and prospects. One chapter summarizes the theme of demographic decline and includes a detailed social analysis of Kinadon's conspiracy; the other sketches in five pages the shrinking of Lakonia and the rustication of Sparta from 362 B.C. to A.D. 78.

There are five appendices: (a) Gazetteer of Sites in Lakonia and Messenia, (b) The Homeric Poems as History, (c) The Spartan King-Lists, (d) The Helots: Some Ancient Sources in Translation, and (e) The Sanctuary of (Artemis) Orthia. Eighteen of the nineteen drawings map topography and geography, mostly of Sparta and Lakonia (including Messenia), though the colonization of Taras in Italy c. 706 is also illustrated. The one exception is a drawing that shows the shapes and designs of Lakonian protogeometric and geometric pottery. (Photographs of artefacts might have sustained the argument when it was heavily archaeological; and I was helped by an occasional look at L. F. Fitzhardinge's convenient new book, *The Spartans* [London 1980], even though nearly a third of his 150 illustrations are drawings, not photographs, of actual objects.)

granted, therefore, to Syme's pupils who accept a welcome invitation to review his *Roman Papers*, even though they know that they cannot provide a dispassionate assessment.

Glen Bowersock, in the *New York Review of Books* for 6 March 1980, and Fergus Millar, in the *Journal of Roman Studies* 71 (1981) in press, have already said (and said better) most of what I could say in general terms about Syme as a historian and as a teacher, and I shall try to avoid mere repetition. But I should like to preface my discussion of the two volumes of the *Roman Papers* with a paragraph of personal reminiscence which (I hope) will help to set the fifty-nine articles, lectures and reviews reprinted here in the context of Syme's work as a whole.

When I became Syme's pupil, in October 1964, he had long believed that the early centuries of Christianity required careful investigation by Roman historians, but he had only recently acquired an intense interest in the *Historia Augusta*, and it was in October 1964 that he first, at least in Oxford, offered a seminar in Roman history for graduate students. It was an excitement and a revelation to discover how open, how generous with the treasures of his mind was the Camden Professor whom so many had described to me as aloof, formal and unfriendly. Supervision usually took the form of a walk after lunch round Christ Church meadow and the Botanical Gardens or to the University Parks or in college gardens (in Trinity Syme would pass the porter guarding the college gate with the characteristically modest password "Old member": he was in fact an honorary fellow). The subject of my research was agreed from the start. Syme felt strongly that someone should write a book on Tertullian—a book, for articles and thesis were to be mere stages on the road toward an edifice to be constructed with deliberate artistry. Syme exemplified and inculcated a set of values, but he never imposed his own views: he merely indicated his opinion and left the pupil to make up his own mind. I still remember the trepidation with which I broached a topic on which I felt compelled to dissent: Syme listened patiently to the diffident exposition, reviewed the relevant considerations on either side succinctly—and with a magic "perhaps" concluded that the pupil might be correct. Syme treated his pupils as intellectual equals, as companions in the search for historical truth. But the truth, when apprehended, was to be expounded rather than merely presented. A man of astonishingly wide intellectual horizons, Syme would often illustrate a point from the history or literature of modern France or Germany, Italy or Spain. That was not a display of idle erudition: Syme has always thought of history (and has encouraged others to think of history) as an art as well as a science, as a form of literature as well as an academic pursuit. Hence the ending to *Ammianus and the Historia Augusta*, which compares the *Historia Augusta* to the "Serbonian bog" of Milton's *Paradise Lost*. Anyone who has conversed with Syme swiftly discovers how much wider are his knowledge and his interests than the areas about which he has usually chosen to write.

The *Roman Papers* are not a complete collection of Syme's *Scripta Minora*. Three separate forms of limitation have operated to define the

contents. First, ten articles were collected in *Ten Studies in Tacitus* (Oxford 1970), and seventeen articles and reviews were reprinted with substantial addenda in *Danubian Papers* (Bucarest 1971), while four long articles on the *Historia Augusta* comprise the first four chapters of *Emperors and Biography* (Oxford 1971). Naturally, the *Roman Papers* contain none of these. Second, the *Roman Papers* exclude anything published after 1970—since when Syme has published three books and enough articles to fill a third volume. Third, a deliberate selection has been made by the editor in consultation with Syme himself.

There is some mystery over the delay in publication until 1979 of a collection originally intended for publication in 1973. (Syme's own revisions of his review of Degraffi's *Fasti consolari* [255–59] were clearly written before 1974 and not revised subsequently.) The preface states that most of the delay has been due to the project of an index of persons, embracing both this collection and *Ten Studies in Tacitus* and *Danubian Papers*: this proved extremely "difficult and time-consuming" and the editor "could do such work only intermittently," so that Oxford University Press eventually decided to print the *Roman Papers* without the index, which would have been ready by January 1979. From the preface to *Some Arval Brethren* (Oxford 1980), it emerges that in the spring of 1977 Syme believed the index to be already in proof.

The previous republication of articles in *Ten Studies in Tacitus* and *Danubian Papers*, combined with a deliberate restriction here to articles, lectures and reviews on Roman history, mean that the *Roman Papers* give a misleading impression of the overall balance and focus of Syme's work. Technical prosopographical studies predominate. Many of them are classics in that genre: for example, "Caesar, the Senate, and Italy" (88–119), the reviews of Broughton's *Magistrates of the Roman Republic* (271–91), of Degraffi's *Fasti consolari* (231–59: the only paper here which Syme himself revised for republication), and of Taylor's *Voting Districts of the Roman Republic* (582–604), the series "Missing Persons" (316–24, 455–60, 530–40), "People in Pliny" (694–723), and several studies of individual careers and families (e.g., Vedius Pollio (518–29), the Ummidii (659–93) and Domitius Corbulo (805–24). But Syme began as a military historian, and the real centre of gravity in his scholarly writing has always been his interest in literature, especially the Latin literature of the Augustan age and Roman historians. That is evident from the fact that the majority of his books have titles which name Latin writers.

It was inevitable, and perhaps desirable, that the chapters which Syme wrote on the northern frontiers from Augustus to Domitian for volumes 10 and 11 of the *Cambridge Ancient History* (published in 1934 and 1936) are omitted, and it is true that the *Roman Papers* contain lengthy studies of Livy (400–54) and the Augustan conquest of north-western Spain (825–54). But Syme's paper "Three English historians: Gibbon, Macaulay, Toynbee," *Emory University Quarterly* 18 (1962) 129–40, most certainly ought to have been included, even if that would have necessitated changing the title of the collection. Gibbon has influ-

enced Syme more than an other writer, except perhaps Tacitus, and one of the characteristics which distinguishes Syme from most recent historians of ancient Rome is the breadth of his interests: he has, for example, lectured learnedly in French to an academic audience on Marcel Proust, and conducted a detailed questioning of a candidate for an Oxford fellowship on the contents of the novels of Arthur Schnitzler. In the *Roman Papers*, only the brief "Roman Historians and Renaissance Politics" (470–76) more than hints at Syme's passionate interest in modern European history and modern European literatures. Moreover, his remarks on Gibbon, Macaulay and Toynbee reveal a great deal about his own attitude toward the writing of history.

For similar reasons, it is unfortunate that Syme's British Academy lecture on Thucydides (*Proceedings of the British Academy* 48 [1962] 39–56) has been omitted. It is Syme's only published piece on Greek history, and thus of unusual interest, whatever professional Greek historians may think of it. Syme had been a pupil of Marcus Tod (who exerted a formative influence on his attitude to the scholarly aspects of history), he taught Greek history while he was a fellow and Greats tutor at Trinity between 1929 and 1949, and he has always retained a lively, if detached, interest in the subject.

The *Roman Papers* do not reproduce Syme's published lectures, articles and reviews on Roman history without alteration. Besides selection and arrangement in chronological order, the editor has standardised references, made some minor corrections silently (e.g., "mercenaries" for "agricultural labourers" on p. 100), and added a certain amount of annotation. He properly and clearly marks additions as such with square brackets. Nevertheless, many of these additions are unnecessary, even irritating, especially those which introduce adventitious polemic against writers subsequent to Syme (e.g., 289 n. 1, 294 n. 3, 329 n. 6, 364 n. 6, 368 n. 3, 709 n. 1), and those whose sole purpose appears to be to contradict Syme (e.g., 109 n. 6, 111 n. 3, 125 n. 1, 303 n. 9, 307 n. 2, 313 n. 7, 356 n. 4, 360 n. 1, 671 n. 2). The strangest addition of all is where the editor reports Leschi's reading of an inscription quoted and discussed by Syme with the observation "That ought to be checked" (545 n. 7, on *AE* 1946.113): true enough; but by whom?

The choice of what subsequent work to note was of course difficult, and the editor shows himself generally judicious and usually unobtrusive in his selection. Nevertheless, some choices seem open to criticism on the grounds that only one of two equally relevant articles has been noted. Why, in annotating "Pollio, Saloniinus and Salonaē" (18–30), adduce G. W. Bowersock, *HSCP* 75 (1971) 73ff., on the date of Virgil's Eighth Eclogue, but not the discussion by A. B. Bosworth, *Historia* 21 (1972) 463ff., of whether Pollio was proconsul of Macedonia or Illyricum? (On Eclogue 8.6–8, see now R. J. Tarrant and G. W. Bowersock, *HSCP* 82 [1978] 197ff.) Similarly, it is odd to cite only S. Jameson, *Historia* 18 (1969) 204ff., for recent bibliography on Varro Murena (424 n. 9), when Jameson herself nowhere refers to P. M. Swan's important (indeed, in my view, decisive) study of the Capitoline fasti (*HSCP* 71

[1966] 235 ff.). (On the identity of the Varro Murena who was elected consul for 23 B.C., but probably died before assuming office, see now G. V. Sumner, *HSCP* 82 [1978] 187 ff.) Again, why adduce G. W. Bowersock, *ZPE* 5 (1970) 42, on Claudius Severus as ὑπατικός (385 n. 3), but not E. M. Smallwood, *JRS* 52 (1962) 131 ff., on Atticus, the ὑπατικός of Judaea (relevant to 383 n. 7)?

The editor cites both articles which corroborate and articles which reject Syme's views: for example, he twice cites P. A. Brunt, *JRS* 51 (1961) 71 ff., to contradict Syme's contention that the adoption of Tiberius in A.D. 4 had an observable effect on the consular elections (75 n. 3, 94 n. 4). But he has not always chosen his ground perfectly. The addition which contradicts Syme's date of 92 B.C. for Sulla's governorship of Cilicia and asserts firmly that "the date should be 96/5 B.C." (120 n. 3) reads oddly for anyone who has been convinced by A. N. Sherwin-White, *CQ* 27 (1977) 173 ff., and G. V. Sumner, *Athenaeum* 56 (1978) 195 f., that the correct date is in fact 94. On the other hand, some important issues receive no comment at all. The most conspicuous case concerns the discussion of the dates of Livy's birth and death. Syme's conclusions (414 f.) have been widely accepted (e.g., by R. M. Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy, Books 1-5* [Oxford 1965] 1). But the only evidence for the precise dates is Jerome's *Chronicle*, which Syme treats in an arbitrary fashion, disregarding most of what is known about Jerome's sources and method of working—a lapse which seems to me virtually unparalleled in the whole of Syme's vast scholarly output.

The *Roman Papers* will be treasured by Roman historians, and should be read and reread. For the articles are a continual source of both instruction and delectation for young and old alike. Those who do not know Syme's work well may be advised to begin with the contrasting reviews of Wilhelm Weber's *Rom: Herrschertum und Reich im zweiten Jahrhundert* (the original version of *Cambridge Ancient History* 11 [1936] 294-392) and of Matthias Gelzer's *Caesar der Politiker und Staatsmann*³ (55-61, 149-71). (Unfortunately, the withering review of W. Schur, *Das Zeitalter des Marius und Sulla* [Leipzig 1942] in *JRS* 34 [1944] 103-9, is omitted.) Syme regarded Weber's "bombast and mysticism" as dangerous (the final footnote in *Roman Revolution* [Oxford 1939] 524 n. 1, is to be read in conjunction with Syme's protest against panegyric of autocrats in the preface [viii]), and he had attempted to dissuade the editors of *CAH* 11 from commissioning Weber to write important chapters on the Antonine emperors. As a reviewer for *Historische Zeitschrift*, he demolishes with gentle scepticism: "That looks impressive, and is vividly written. Is it convincing?" Syme has always cut through cant with the same despatch. The treatment of Gelzer, whom Syme admired as a man and as a scholar, is totally different, and Syme explained his partial disagreement with Gelzer's interpretation of Caesar by composing what remains, after nearly forty years, the best brief introduction to the political history of the last decades of the Roman Republic. With these two reviews as an introduction to the quality of Syme's mind, one can read the two

volumes consecutively: since the articles are reprinted in chronological order, they illustrate how Syme's interests in Roman history developed, broadened and deepened, while at the same time giving the reader an education in historical method.

There is much in the *Roman Papers* to excite and delight even the most jaded palates. The historian who has struggled for years to wield intractable material into readable history will never cease to marvel at the alchemy which enables Syme to transmute the dulllest information into living, vivid history. "Imperator Caesar: A Study in Nomenclature" (361-77) uses the dry evidence of the changing names and titles of Caesar's heir to analyse his rise to supreme power and the nature of his authority. Similarly, "Pliny's less successful Friends" (477-96) uses the cursus inscriptions and career patterns familiar from numerous dull prosopographical studies to reconstruct the social circle of the younger Pliny. From the very discrete evidence which he uses, Syme derives a conclusion which illuminates a literary classic. Despite the impression deliberately fostered by his collected *Letters*, Pliny's friends enjoyed real prominence only after his premature decease. It is an important characteristic of Syme's work that his detailed prosopographical researches lead to a general conclusion.

This review could proceed in similar fashion for many pages, explaining why every piece in *Roman Papers* deserves to be studied closely. But enough has been said to indicate the richness of these two volumes, and the absence of an index will prove beneficial if it encourages scholars and students to read deeply in these penetrating studies.

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GRAHAM WEBSTER. *The Roman Imperial Army of the First and Second Centuries A.D.* New York, Barnes & Noble Books, 1979. 2d. ed. Pp. 334, [16] leaves of plates; ill. \$25.00.

The value of this book was generally recognised on its first appearance in 1969: "a volume of immense worth . . . unreservedly to be welcomed," "an up-to-date study on the Roman army . . . (which) will long be used as a standard text book," "an attractive and welcome introduction . . . one may hope that its use will justify a second edition." This hope has been fulfilled, and the new edition, moreover, is for the first time published in New York as well as London.

Caveat autem lector: revisions have been limited to those that could be fitted in without seriously disturbing the existing text. For this, presumably, the publishers are responsible, since the author himself in his foreword laments that "a complete rewriting of certain sections, now overdue, was not possible." The book therefore remains essentially what it always was, the best account in English of the army and frontiers in the Early Empire, but flawed in detail and based too much on Roman Britain. Parts are now also sadly outdated.

The introductory chapter, from the origins of Rome to "changes under Augustus" in 30 pages, might, as one reviewer of the first edition suggested, have been "reduced to a few Tacitean paragraphs." As it stands, it is unbalanced (6½ pages on Polybius and Scipio, less than a paragraph on Caesar), often so compressed as to be misleading, and perfunctory in its use of modern scholarship. Revision for the second edition is minimal. Walbank is still not mentioned on Polybius, nor Brunt on manpower and recruitment (cf. Webster. p. 41, "volunteers would be plentiful and compulsory powers would only be needed to fill in the gaps," with Brunt, *Italian Manpower*, chapter 22, demonstrating "the persisting and frequent necessity for conscription in the late Republic").

Chapters 2 to 4 contain the meat of the book. They are by far the longest chapters (60, 59, 55 pages respectively in the second edition), and together almost twice as long as the other three chapters combined. Chapters 2 and 4 in particular, devoted to "Frontier Systems" and to "Camps and Forts," draw heavily on the archaeological evidence. The disproportionate attention given to Britain, however, struck forcibly the non-British reviewers of the first edition, such as G. Alföldy, *Bonn. Jb.* 169 (1969) 568-69, and J. F. Gilliam, *Gnomon* 47 (1975) 310-13. It is equally striking in the revisions. The Claudian invasion of Britain happens on page 59, and from there to the end of chapter 2, not only is well over a third of the space devoted to Britain, but all the major revisions refer to Britain: p. 60, on the dispositions under Claudius; p. 74, n. 7, on the fortresses at Inchtuthil, Carlisle and Wroxeter; p. 92, n. 2, on the non-disappearance of legion XX; p. 94, n. 5, on the occupation of the Antonine Wall and Hadrian's Wall around 160; p. 105, n. 2, where a concessive clause has been added. New works, other than those on Britain, referred to in the notes comprise merely 2 *JRS* articles, together with Fink, *Roman Military Documents on Papyri*, and Birley, *Septimius Severus*. There is no reference to all the work done in Germany since 1969; nothing new on the Danube; no mention of Rossi, *Trajan's Column and the Dacian Wars* (London 1971), surely worth a note on p. 77; nothing from the East, nor from Africa.

The relative neglect of Judaea was commented on by a reviewer of the first edition. Neglect of Africa is even more flagrant. In a chapter where we hear of the fortlet at Throp and "signal- or watch-towers like Pike Hill, a stone structure 20 ft. square" (82), we might expect at least a mention of the great legionary base at Lambaesis. Yet Africa in post-Claudian times rates less than a dozen lines on the work of Colonel Baradez (64-65), plus the statement that Hadrian encouraged provincials to make an official career, especially in Africa (89-90). Baradez is said to have revealed "a frontier facing the desert," which "took the form of patrol roads, a flat-bottomed ditch (*fossatum*), blockhouses and forts, operated on a kind of home-guard basis," leaving the unwary with the impression of a continuous barrier extending along the whole desert frontier. There is no mention of Troussset's work on the *limes Tripolitanus*, although it is in the addendum to Webster's bibliography, as are

the two volumes of *Studien zu den Militärgrenzen Roms* which contain not only Baradez' own "Compléments inédits au 'Fossatum Africae,'" but also useful contributions by Ezennat and an article by Janon on Lambaesis, demolishing the theory that the African *limes* was "un dispositif tourné uniquement vers un ennemi extérieur," an interpretation which depends on the old, exploded distinction between nomads outside the frontier and sedentary farmers within.

Another surprising omission, both from Chapter 2 and from the addendum to the bibliography, is E. N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire* (Baltimore 1976). Other additions might have been fitted in easily, even within the scissors-and-paste limits imposed by the publishers. On p. 52, n. 1, it would be appropriate to refer to the discovery that Varus was also at one time Agrippa's son-in-law. On p. 53, n. 1, Dubs suggested, not that captives might have been "sold to the Chinese Emperor," but that they might have been captured by Chinese troops; in any case the theory should never have been entertained, and has now been laid to rest by Raschke, *Aufstieg und Niedergang* II.9.2, pp. 679–81 ("a bizarre flight of fancy"). On p. 73, two lines from n. 1 on the page opposite are repeated, replacing the last two lines of n. 4, which must be supplied from the first edition ("the XIII Gemina moved from Poetovio to Vindobona (Vienna) about the same period, all in Pannonia"). The maps are reprinted unchanged, but on the British maps (figs. 6–8), changes that ought to have been made are noted in the caption. The Rhine and Danube maps (figs. 3–5) lack even this amenity, and all three, like that of the Eastern frontier (fig. 9), suffer *ab origine* from a failure to indicate at which dates the various fortresses were occupied, as if all were occupied simultaneously, which they were not. A reviewer of the first edition pointed out that the map of Hadrian's Wall gives only the forts' Latin names, the text only their English names. He might have added that the Antonine Wall map has the English names, the map of British legionary fortresses only the Latin, while the Rhine and Danube maps have both, though it might have been guessed that Steklen is unlikely to be the modern name of *both* Novae and Durostorum, which are in fact both differently identified in the notes (p. 71, n. 3; p. 77, n. 5).

The later chapters betray a similar unevenness in conception and arbitrariness in revision. Chapter 3, "The Composition of the Army," is divided into three sections, on the legions, the auxilia, and the fleet, but not one on the praetorians. There are two major changes in the text of this chapter, on pp. 124–25, where part of a paragraph on legionary body armour has been rewritten, primarily to take into account the work of Russell Robinson (also cited in two new notes on p. 127, concerning helmets), and on p. 149, incorporating the new conclusions of R. W. Davies on the *cohors equitata*. There are minor additions regarding the pay of *optiones* (120) and iron working in the Weald (159), and errors have been tacitly corrected regarding the organisation of the century (120) and the centurion's helmet-crest (132), the latter accepting the criticism of Davies in his review, *JRS* 60 (1970) 226–27.

Over a dozen other references have been added, but on recruitment, for instance, in the first two paragraphs of the chapter, we miss Brunt, *Scripta Classica Israelica* 1 (1974) 90-115; Davies, *BJ* 169 (1969) 208-32; and Forni's own later thoughts on soldiers' origins in *Aufstieg und Niedergang* II.1, 339-91. Several other articles in the same volume might have been cited elsewhere, at least in the bibliographic addendum, while the reference to the one *Aufstieg* article that *is* cited, by Speidel, where the volume is given simply as II (1975), is inadequate, since vol. II of that amazing compilation has now reached II.31, and the Speidel article is in II.3. On p. 133, n. 4., the Caelius gravestone, where the first edition printed [oc]cidit, following von Petrikovits, *BJ* 151 (1951) 116-18, Webster now tacitly and rightly accepts Alföldy's vindication of the older [ce]cidit; the text should also show a gap between *ossa* and *inferre*, to be filled by [l](ibertorum), or possibly [lib](ertorum), as demonstrated by Bickel, *Rhein. Mus.* N.F. 95 (1952) 97-135, 283-86. This is less romantic than supposing that it is Caelius's own bones that are to be brought in if recovered but almost inescapable.

Chapter 4, "Camps and forts of the first and second centuries," is perhaps the one where we should expect most updating, in view of the vast amount of new excavation carried out in the 1970's. Indeed it begins well, with its first footnote completely rewritten. Then on p. 171 we note Wild's correction of *tutulus* to *tiulum*, and on p. 197 Manning's article on timber granaries. But p. 190 fails to mention that in addition to the *principia* at Inchtuthil and Chester, we now know something of the *principia* at York, where column bases were found during restoration work beneath the Minster; and on p. 202, the footnote on the amphitheatre at Chester is not updated to include the very important and significant report in *Archaeologia* 105 (1975). On p. 206, the First Cohort of Tungrians at Housesteads is now described as quingenary, thanks to yet another article by the valiant R. W. Davies, although, inconsistently, the last sentence of the page still credits Housesteads with a *cohors milliaria*. On p. 208, a new report is cited on Pen Lllystyn. Some but not all of the references to the *Roman Frontier in Wales* are changed to refer to the 2nd edition. There is new material on p. 220 relating to Vindolanda and elsewhere. But the excavations at Longthorpe are ignored, together with the question of the so-called "vexillation fortresses," while the Continent fares still worse. On p. 212, there is no reference to recent works on Valkenburg. The Rödgen granaries are ignored on p. 216. There is no discussion of work on *canabae* and civil settlements, nor of von Schnurbein's reconsideration of the evidence from Haltern, crucially important as a legionary base in transition from Caesar's *hiberna* to the later fortresses.

The last two chapters, "The Army in the Field" and "The Army in Peaceful Activities," were always much slighter, and changes and additions are proportionately fewer. They include references to Davies' valuable but not exhaustive work on the army diet (255), to which might now be added the evidence from the Vindolanda tablets; to Davies again on army medicine (250-51); to Marsden on artillery (233), and to

Gudea and Baatz on ballista remains from Rumania (235), though not to Baatz's later report to the 1976 Limes-Congress on a ballista found at Hatra (*Limes: Akten des XI. . . . Kongresses*, Budapest, 1978, 597–600). Speidel is cited on auxiliaries' pay (260), Mann on diplomas (279). But several of the topics touched upon in these chapters are more fully treated elsewhere, for instance by R. MacMullen, *Soldier and Civilian in the Later Roman Empire* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), or G. R. Watson, *The Roman Soldier* (London 1969), a work primarily concerned "not with the organization of the army . . . but with such matters as the procedure of enlistment, basic training, field service training, and conditions of service."

Finally, there is an addendum to the bibliography containing 75 items. It includes the 3 books on the Balkans which have appeared in the "Provinces of the Roman Empire" series, but not Frere's *Britannia* in the same series. For most books, the publishing house is given, but not the place of publication, whereas for the proceedings of the various Limes Congresses, including a volume whose full title is improbably given as *D'Etudes sur les Frontières Romaines* (sic), the place of publication is given, but not the publisher. The principles of German capitalisation have escaped the compiler, and an article in German "*von*" (i.e. "by") Nicolae Gudea and D. Baatz, suffices to get Gudea christened von Nicolae, both in the addendum and in a footnote. Septimius Severus is consistently spelled "Septimus."

If I had bought this volume, already possessing the first edition but expecting substantial up-dating, I should not have been pleased. It would have been better to leave the text and footnotes unchanged and add a short list of amendments and additions. More attention might also have been paid to reviewers' comments on the first edition. Readers are still directed to the reviews already cited, plus that by G. C. Boon, *Antiquaries Journal* 50 (1970) 131–33, for a list of points still largely unanswered. The illustrations and plans, however, remain generally excellent, although some, e.g. the plans of Carnuntum, Haltern and Vindonissa (figs. 36a, 37a, 37b), are now out of date, and the plan of Haltern is still upside-down.

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GREGORIO PANIAGUA (Atrium Musicae de Madrid). *Musique de la Grèce antique*. Harmonia Mundi HM 1015, 1978. 33.3 recording. Pp. 11 + 8 pl. No price stated.

This recording contains realizations of the thirty-nine musical fragments transcribed and discussed in E. Pöhlmann, *Denkmäler altgriechischer Musik* (Nürnberg 1970). Because of its completeness—it omits only the more recently discovered *POxy.* 3161–62 and *PLeid.* inv. 510—this recording easily replaces the several more selective attempts made in

previous decades, but Paniagua and his colleagues have by no means avoided the many pitfalls lurking in the recreation of ancient Greek music, namely questions of organological accompaniment, musicianship, textual editing, musical format, and the treatment of *lacunae*.

One can appreciate Paniagua's desire to cram the sounds of several dozen, reconstructed Greek instruments onto the one disc, but in many cuts this organological display destroys the vocal line along with all claims to authenticity. The *pandoura* used to accompany *PBerol.* 6780 (11.16–19) is not the ancient Greek lute but something sounding suspiciously similar to a member of the tanbur-sitar family of Indian music, the distinctive sound of which results from the use of (un-Hellenic) brass and steel strings. The salpinx blast which introduces the comic (or satyr play) fragment preserved in *PVindob.* 29825 a/b *verso*, the Wagnerian ensemble of phorminx, cithara, pandoura, barbiton, and monochordon (!) which eliminates the vocal line of Mesomedes' *Hymn to Helios*, the *ascaules* (bagpipe) which accompanies the *Hymn to Nemesis*, the yodelesque, aulotic acrobatics which accompany *PMich.* 2958, the hydraulos with its grotesque yet emphasized gurgling waters which plays the melody of *P. Cairo Zeno* 59533, and the dissonant chords of the psalterion, epigoneion, and magadis—three harps and zithers rarely used in Greek music and certainly indigenous to Eastern musics—which accompany *POsl.* 1413, are all inauthentic, unpleasant to hear, and predominant over the vocal line. Tympana and various idiophones, particularly sistra, abound. Both aesthetically and academically preferable are the simplicity of the cithara and monochord used to accompany a lovely alto soloist for Mesomedes' *Hymn to the Muse* (sic), the single lyre used to accompany the same voice for the Seikilos Inscription, and the various combinations used to play the exercises from the Anonymous Bellermand. Only in the monochord accompaniment to the aforementioned Mesomedes *Hymn*, an accompaniment which is admittedly an organological absurdity but which is nonetheless deftly and atmospherically played with repeated thirty-second notes, and in the lyre and sambyke renditions *con affetto* of the Anonymous' *ὀκτωκαίδεκάσημος* (#101) does the listener hear genuine virtuosity on an instrument. These few successes, however, are truly marvelous. Elsewhere the musicianship alternates between good and inadequate. Beatriz Amo renders the Seikilos piece and the first two *Hymns* by Mesomedes quite well, but the unstable voice straining to convey the melody of the spurious Pindaric fragment and that which has difficulty with the low tessitura of the second part of the *POsl.* 1413 sound quite amateurish.

In responding to textual considerations Paniagua might have been more successful by omitting such obvious falsifications as the Aristophanes, Terence, and Gregory of Nazianzus material. He should also have omitted fragments which are too fragmentary to be of any aural value, e.g. in the second part of *POsl.* 1413: *ρ...φ...αγγον*. In providing a musical format to many of the fragments Paniagua has had both failures and successes. The *da capo* arrangement of the *First Delphic*

Hymn is anachronistic, and he destroys the value of many fragments—*PVindob.* 29825 a/b *recto*, G 13763/1494, Mesomedes #3, 4, and 5, *PMich.* 2958, *PBerol.* 6870 (Paeon), *POxy.* 2436, *P. Cairo Zeno* 59533, and the *Second Delphic Hymn* (which should have been one of the crowning glories of the album)—by merely reciting the vocal line in a contrived, inauthentic sort of *παρακατολογία* (recitative) while the accompanying instruments carry the melody. More authentic and welcome are the occasional non-melodic, scalar introductions (*ἀνάπειραι*) to several fragments; these resemble Indian *ālāpa* in function and form, and one assumes that Greek music contained the same procedure.

In several bands Paniagua treats the *lacunae* with admirable restraint. He supplements the *lacunae* in several selections with recomposed phrases, particularly in the *Orestes* papyrus, some of which derive from J. Chailley (*La musique grecque antique* [Paris 1979] 152–53), and in the *First* and *Second Delphic Hymns*. None of these supplements can be considered to have been inspired by Orphean genius, but even where Paniagua simply repeats the last notated pitch the effect is an academically appropriate, conservative guess; at least the melody's ambience is not ruined. Elsewhere, however, he fills *lacunae* with cacophonous instrumental and human noises emitted from various unmusical areas including sistra and cithara pounding (*PVindob.* 29825 c), handclaps and bridge striking (*Hymn to Nemesis*), annoyingly persistent cymbala (*POxy.* 2436), and anachronistically dissonant chords strummed on the psalterion, magadis, or epigoneion (*POsl.* 1413). Too frequently Paniagua saw fit to include every morsel of musical fragment, so that in *PVindob.* 29825 a/b *recto* he recites not only such meager, unmusical material as Hunger's *N*] *ψα[ταῖς* but even the musicological annotation *φρυσσιτί* scribbled above line 6; one might just as well sing "*adagio poco a poco*."

Highly recommended are *PBerol.* 6870 (11.13–15, 20–22), an instrumental fragment excelling in its use of the pause which creates a catching rhythm out of mere quarter and eighth notes; Mesomedes' *Hymns* #1 and 2 with a pleasant alto voice, cithara accompaniment, and drone; the Anonymous Bellermann exercises which are superior examples of rhythmic skill in *μελοποιία*; and the Seikilos "Song." The latter's melody falls neatly into four equal cola: a statement ranging a fifth and ending at the fourth, an answer plunging gently to a surprising seventh, and two lines of variation ending with a triplet descent to the original fifth, one octave lower. It is the frequent and deliberate obscuring of such accomplished melodic form which condemns this album to the realm of curiosity.

JON SOLOMON

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DAVID W. MAC DOWALL. *The Western Coinages of Nero*. New York, The American Numismatic Society, 1979. Pp. xvii + 256. 25 plates. \$40.00 (*Numismatic Notes and Monographs*, 161)

David Mac Dowall has provided us with a thorough descriptive catalogue of the coinage produced by Nero's western mints. The variety of the coinage is great, and the author takes great care to classify and elucidate according to a sensible schema. Using die study and type analysis, M. has produced a new corpus "from coins in the principal numismatic collections." Actually the search range is far from limited and includes sale catalogues and items seen in trade.

M. begins with the chronological framework noting titulature and TRP dates and correlating them with actual issues. His emendation to TR POT VIII (5) does seem to be correct. He then proceeds with a discussion of the different mints in the west. Two tables, rather intrusively placed (10-11), represent the aurei and denarii hoard information. While M. notes that Rome was the sole mint of precious metals, this was not the case for the *aes* issues, and it is here that this work shines. The finds of sestertii, dupondii, and asses are divided into the "globe" and "non-globe" types and are then provenanced according to province. He includes an interesting discussion of the ore mines which involved the artificial alloying of orichalcum which was used for various *aes* denominations.

Chap. 4, "*Aes* without SC," is one of the most important and original in the book. He relies on the recent insight of Mattingly that the issue of Imperial coinage was not entirely controlled by the constitutional dyarchy of Senate and Emperor, and that the inclusion or absence of SC does not invariably refer to products of a Senate or Imperial mint respectively. M. finds that the problematic *aes* issues with SC are the product of the mint at Rome and fall into two chronological groups. Convincingly countering Gnecci's argument that the omission of SC was an indication of the fact that these issues were actually medallions to be distributed to the populace during *congiaria* and games, M. uses Kraft's theory that *S(enatus) C(onsulto)* does not invariably mean "struck by order of the Senate," as assumed by the "medallionists" such as Gnecci, Grant and Mattingly himself. Instead he notes that the formula was originally an honor to the Emperor rather than, strictly speaking, an authorization for coinage. Thus SC means "honour in the form of the *corona civica*, etc., bestowed on the Emperor *by decree of the Senate*." (Italics mine.) While not totally accepting Kraft's hypothesis, M. concludes, very sensibly noting the strained relationship between the Emperor and the Senate, that "Nero's *aes* without SC . . . should . . . be regarded as a deliberate and calculated attempt to abandon the complementary formula the reality of which had disappeared and the importance of which had considerably waned." (72). The reasoning is cogent, the conclusion rings sensible and true.

M. proceeds to catalogue the *Aes* issues from Rome, ingeniously updating Mattingly by noting that find distribution does not substan-

tiate his suggestion that the copper quadrantes ought to be assigned to the mint at Lugdunum on the analogy of the orichalcum issues at Rome. In chap. 6 ("Earliest Aes at Lugdunum"), M. attempts to identify the earliest *aes* issues at Lugdunum which in turn is used to identify subsequent issues. For example, the globe type of sestertius is found at Lugdunum, never Rome. M.'s clues as to mint provenance seem to me to be very probable if not totally convincing evidence. Chap. 7 continues the catalogue of later *aes* issues at Lugdunum.

M.'s text concludes with chapters on mint organization and currency reform. Beginning with the sobering observation that "If the (Roman) mint inspectors were able to distinguish easily the coins of different officinae, so too, in theory at least, should the modern numismatist." Then using type and die identifications, M. attempts to distinguish the issues of various officinae. He uses the reverse type as the significant variant and with good results. He explains the variance of obverse dies by having them consigned to a central depository after the day's work, while the reverse dies would presumably be left in the constant custody of individual minters. The suggestion is ingenious and offers a glimpse into the quotidian life of the worker. M. also makes the case that die engravers used three dimensional *images* when making their models of the emperor's head. The chapter on currency change summarizes Nero's currency reforms which were indeed considerable. The gold and silver standards were reduced by weight and debasement, an occurrence which is here attributed to the result of the Great Fire at Rome in 64 A.D., the important omission of the SC legend, the introduction of orichalcum coinage for all *aes* denominations, this last an observation for which M. is to be given credit. He easily disposes of Mommsen's theory that the reduction of the aureus weight was the result of embezzlement. He notes that the mint attempted to keep the bullion supply of aurei up after the weight reduction, since they drove the heavier issues out of normal circulation. He also supplies the interesting information that Soutzo's metrology was inaccurate, although his theory that Nero's innovative orichalcum issues were an attempt to accomodate the various *aes* systems of the Greek east is basically still upheld.

The linear catalogue is arranged according to types and varieties and establishes the substantive varieties of each issue. Since much of the material in the catalogue is based on the same material as the entries quoted by RIC, M. conveniently provides an individual listing of all the varieties in RIC (and BMC) which cannot be substantiated. Included as an appendix are analyses of some silver coins carried out by the Neutron Activation Method and the X-Ray spectrometer. Metrological tables are arranged according to mint location and denomination. The final appendix gives examples of die linkage at Rome of Sestertii. There are twenty-three plates of good quality of the coinage and two final views of a bust of Nero used in the stylistic analysis.

The book is basically for the specialist, both historical and numismatic. The methodology is rigorous and the conclusions generally correct, as far as I can tell. It makes full use of the most modern methods of

analysis, yet pays careful attention to the economic and artistic significance of the individual coin. It is worth noting, I think, that coinage provides us with the most duplicable form of ancient art, yet technology was such that perfect copies were the exception, not the rule. As Walter Benjamin states, "... the technique of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition. By making many reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence." ("The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction"). This creates a problem for the antiquarian and the classicist since when multiplication is possible through technology, the uniqueness to which we have become accustomed disappears. The tetradrachms of Syracuse signed by Cimon are traditional classical art while the mass produced asses of Nero are hardly justified on the same grounds. Most and most serious contemporary numismatists search for a kind of prosopography of objects, the actual origin and experience of the item. This method does have important historical implications and is perhaps, the last resort.

The book is well produced and was printed in Germany. There are not many misprints, although the following do appear: p. 142, *range* > *ranged*; in the catalogue, pp. 195, 196 *Secuntas* > *Securitas*; p. 226 *ae* > *are*. Also, it seems that the proper classification of copper semisses is "Issue L-IVB," not "Issue L-IVA," (108). The punctuation is careless, and the use of the semicolon is, occasionally, bizarre.

DALE SINOS

HOWARD UNIVERSITY

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